ASHLEY v. METELOW et al
Filing
103
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 10/25/2019. (rtm, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
KEITH ASHLEY,
Plaintiff,
THE HONORABLE RENÉE MARIE BUMB
v.
Civ. No. 15-3153 (RMB-AMD)
DAVID METELOW, et al.,
OPINION
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Keith Ashley
575398/589308B
East Jersey State Prison
Lock Back R
Rahway, NJ 07065
Plaintiff pro se
Suzanne Marie Davies, Esq.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
25 Market Street
PO Box 112
Trenton, NJ 08625
On behalf of Defendants
BUMB, United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on cross-motions for
summary judgment filed by Defendants David Metelow, Don Siebert,
Anthony Marrocco, and Tohni Stelts (improperly pled as Tanya Stelz)
(ECF No. 91), and Plaintiff Keith Ashley (ECF No. 99). The Court
will decide the motions on the briefs, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 78.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a convicted and sentenced state prisoner in the
custody of the New Jersey Department of Corrections (“DOC”).
(Defendants’
Statement
of
Facts
(“DSOF”),
ECF
No.
91-1
¶ 1;
Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (“PSOF”) ECF No. 99-1 ¶ 2). At all
times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was incarcerated in South
Woods State Prison (“SWSP”), in Bridgeton, New Jersey. (DSOF ¶ 2;
PSOF ¶ 5). At the time relevant to the complaint, David Metelow
was the SWSP Supervisor of Education, Don Siebert was the Assistant
Superintendent of the SWSP Education Department, Anthony Marrocco
was a teacher in the Culinary Arts program, and Tohni Stelts was
a secretary in the SWSP Education Department. (DSOF ¶¶ 3-6; PSOF
¶¶ 6-9).
SWSP
including
offers
several
Building
vocational
Trades,
programs
Residential
for
Electric,
inmates,
Heating
and
Ventilation and Air Conditioning/Plumbing (HVAC), Cosmetology,
Masonry, Horticulture, Graphic Arts, and Culinary Arts. (DSOF ¶ 7;
PSOF ¶ 11). Plaintiff applied to the Culinary Arts program on
October
23,
September
2007;
22,
September
2013.
(DSOF
28,
¶¶
2009;
17-21;
December
PSOF
¶
9,
17).
2009;
Each
and
time,
Plaintiff was informed that he was ineligible for the program
because he was more than two years away from his parole eligibility
date (“PED”). (DSOF ¶¶ 17-21, 23; ECF No. 91-4 at 179). Plaintiff
has a PED of January 27, 2023. (ECF No. 91-4 at 2).
2
Plaintiff filed an Inmate Remedy Form on September 25, 2014
asking why he had been banned from Culinary Arts. (Id. at 179).
Don Siebert, the Assistant Superintendent of the SWSP Education
Department, responded that the culinary arts certification expired
after five years “[t]herefore, for both financial and pragmatic
reasons, we give preference to inmates whose PED or maximum dates
are within the next two years.” (Id.). Plaintiff appealed that
response
to
former
SWSP
Administrator
Kenneth
Nelson,
who
indicated that Plaintiff was not banned from the program and had
been “on and off the Culinary Arts Waiting List since 2007.” (Id.
at 181).
Plaintiff filed another remedy form objecting to the failure
to enroll him in Culinary Arts on November 13, 2013. (Id. at 183).
Plaintiff was informed that he was on the waiting list and “you
will
be
interviewed
when
time
eligible.”
(Id.).
Plaintiff
responded that he did not want to be on the waiting list “due to
the racial discrimination to get in the program.” (Id.). Plaintiff
is African American. (DSOF ¶ 1; PSOF ¶ 3). He asserted that
Caucasian inmates with more time on their sentences were permitted
to enroll in Culinary Arts. (ECF No. 91-4 at 183). Plaintiff
applied to Culinary Arts again on July 7, 2014 and July 11, 2014.
This time, he was rejected for not having a verified high school
diploma. (Id. at 187-88). Plaintiff was transferred to Northern
State Prison on August 7, 2014. (Id. at 14).
3
On May 5, 2015, Plaintiff filed this civil rights complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendants violated his Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection, First Amendment right to free
association, and his New Jersey Administrative Code Inmate Rights
and Responsibilities. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff amended his complaint
on
February
7,
2017.
(ECF
No.
19).
The
Honorable
Jerome
B.
Simandle, D.N.J., 1 dismissed Plaintiff’s free association and New
Jersey Administrative Code claims on September 18, 2018. (ECF No.
54). Plaintiff’s equal protection claim proceeded. (Id.).
Defendants
now
move
for
summary
judgment,
arguing
that
Plaintiff was not discriminated against on the basis of his race,
nor was he treated differently from similarly situated persons.
(ECF No. 91-2). They assert the identified Caucasian inmates were
eligible for exceptions for admission into the Culinary Arts
program whereas Plaintiff was not. Defendants further contend that
Plaintiff is barred from recovering damages under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act because he has not alleged a physical injury.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment. (ECF No. 99-1).
Plaintiff asserts Defendants permitted Caucasian inmates to enroll
in the Culinary Arts program even though their PEDs were more than
two years away. He asserts the PED was a pretextual reason. He
1
The matter was reassigned to the undersigned on August 9, 2019.
(ECF No. 86).
4
further argues that he qualified for the exceptions for admission
into the program even though his PED was more than two years away,
but only the Caucasian inmates could use the exceptions. Plaintiff
also reasserts his claims under the Free Association Clause and
the New Jersey Administrative Code.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper where the moving party “shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact,” and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); U.S. ex rel. Kosenske v. Carlisle HMA, Inc., 554
F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2009). The moving party must demonstrate there
is no genuine issue of material fact, and then the burden shifts
to the nonmoving party to present evidence to the contrary. Josey
v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 637 (3d Cir. 1993)
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
A party asserting that a fact is or is not genuinely disputed
must support the assertion by citing materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, affidavits or declarations or
other materials. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “An affidavit or
declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on
personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in
evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to
testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). “At the
5
summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’
dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (3d
Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
B.
Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Claim
Both parties move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s equal
protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court denies
both motions as there are remaining disputed issues of material
fact as to whether Plaintiff was treated differently than similarly
situated inmates.
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its
jurisdiction
the
equal
protection
of
the
laws,’
which
is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should
be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216
(1982)). “To make out a viable claim for a violation of equal
protection
rights,
a
plaintiff
must
demonstrate
purposeful
discrimination.” Bradley v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 2d 437,
445 (D.N.J. 2001), aff'd, 299 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2002). To prove
his racial discrimination claim, Plaintiff must prove that he is
a member of a protected class and that he was treated differently
from similarly situated individuals. Id. “Once a plaintiff makes
this showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a
6
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory
reason
for
the
difference
in
treatment. The plaintiff must then rebut that reason as pretextual
in order to set forth a viable equal protection claim.” Id. at
445–46 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973); Stewart v. Rutgers, 120 F.3d 426, 432 (3d Cir. 1997)
(applying McDonnell Douglas standard in equal protection cases)).
It
is
uncontested
that
Plaintiff
is
African
American.
He
is
therefore a member of a protected class.
Defendants argue Plaintiff was not denied entry into the
Culinary Arts program because of his race, but because he was more
than two years from his PED and did not have a verified high school
dipolma.
They
argue
this
policy
is
rationally
related
to
a
legitimate government interest because the culinary certificates
expire after five years and limited government resources justify
restricting which inmates may participate in the program. In
response,
Plaintiff
has
named
seven,
non-African
American
individuals who were admitted into the program despite being more
than two years from their PED: H. Quagliani, Cliff Graf, Edward
Chinchilla, David Colonpons, Christian Gougher, William Steltz,
and Calvin Sprouge.
Defendants do not dispute that inmates have been permitted to
participate in the Culinary Arts program even if they were more
than two years before their PEDs. Defendant Marrocco stated in his
Interrogatories that
7
Certain inmates may be permitted into the Culinary
Arts program that are not within two years of the
P.E.D. Those include inmates with longer sentences
that are employed in the facility’s prison, such as
but not limited to ODR workers, as well as inmates
that cook for the population, Ramadan food servers,
or teaching assistants for the Culinary Arts
Program.
(ECF No. 91-4 at 44 ¶ 4). Jecrois Jean-Baptiste, the DOC Director
of Programs & Community Services, certified that Inmates Graff and
Chinchillo were enrolled into the Culinary Arts program even though
they were more than two years from their PED because they were
Teacher’s Assistants for the program. (ECF No. 91-4 at 137 ¶ 16).
Director Jean-Baptiste certified “Inmate Graf was hired as a
Teacher’s Assistant on December 28, 2004, enrolled in the Culinary
Arts program on July 15, 2005, completed the program, and became
a Teacher’s Assistant.” (Id. at 138 ¶ 19). According to Director
Jean-Baptiste, Inmate Steltz was enrolled in Culinary Arts because
he had “a food service detail, the Culinary Arts program was
available on the facility on which he was housed, and a new class
was beginning.” (Id. ¶ 21). 2 He also certified that Inmate Gougher
was enrolled in the program but signed out after one day. (Id. ¶
14).
The Court cannot determine on the record before it that either
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Up until July
2
Inamtes Colonpons and Sprauge were never enrolled in the Culinary
Arts program. (ECF No. 91-4 at 137 ¶¶ 12-13). The DOC was unable
to locate an Inmate Quagliani. (Id. ¶ 10).
8
2014, Defendants’ stated rationale for denying Plaintiff entrance
into the Culinary Arts program was that he was more than two years
from
his
PED.
They
now
concede
that
“certain
inmates”
were
permitted to enter the program more than two years before their
PED if they had food service jobs, among other exceptions. (Id. at
23 ¶ 4). Defendants further concede that Plaintiff held food
service jobs while he was incarcerated at SWSP. (Id. ¶ 23). They
then argue that Plaintiff’s
housing movements and detail changes effected [sic] his
possible placement into the Culinary Arts program –
meaning, at times that Plaintiff held a food service
job, the Culinary Arts program was not available on the
facility he was housed on, or the Culinary Arts program
was [not] in progress at the time he was assigned food
service jobs and he would have to wait . . . for a new
class to start.
(Id.).
Plaintiff disputes this interpretation, and there is evidence
in the record to support Plaintiff’s argument. The documents
provided by Defendants indicate Plaintiff worked as a “F2-Inmate
Dine Hall F.S.” employee between September 21, 2009 and November
2, 2009. (ECF No. 91-4 at 9). Plaintiff was housed in SWSP-FAC2H4-2L-2020U from September 3, 2009 to January 5, 2010. (Id. at
13).
On September 28, 2009, Plaintiff applied for the Culinary
Arts program, listed on the application form as being available in
9
F#2 and F#3. 3 (ECF No. 99-4 at 4). The next day, he was placed on
the waiting list for the computer class and denied placement on
the Culinary Arts list because “Your PED is 2025. Mr. Marrocco
takes students within 2 yrs of their PED.” (Id.).
In contrast, Inmate Steltz was enrolled in the Culinary Arts
program from July 12, 2012 to January 2, 2013. (ECF No. 91-4 at
158). 4 He did not have a food service job until March 25, 2013.
(Id.). Therefore according to the documents provided to the Court,
Inmate Steltz was enrolled in the program before he had a food
service job, contrary to Director Jean-Baptiste’s certification.
(Id. at 138 ¶ 21).
There are other dates in the record during which Plaintiff
was working in food services and appears to have long periods of
stable housing assignments. To name just one other time, Plaintiff
was housed in SWSP-FAC3-H6-1L-1081D from September 20, 2013 to
August 7, 2014. (Id. at 14). At this time, he was employed as a
Unit Pantry Worker 6-2L and 6-1L, (id. at 9), the same assignment
Inmate Chinchillo 5 had from May 20, 2010 to April 4, 2011 prior to
3
The Academic and Vocational Programs list indicates that Culinary
Arts is only available in Facility 3, but states that “Inmates in
Facility #2 may apply to both facilities that have classes.” (ECF
No. 91-4 at 117).
4 Inmate Stelz’s PED was January 13, 2019, meaning he was six-anda-half years from his PED when he was enrolled in Culinary Arts in
2012. (ECF No. 91-4 at 158).
5 Inmate Chinchillo’s PED is February 13, 2020. (ECF No. 91-4 at
154).
10
one of his enrollments in the Culinary Arts program on April 4,
2011, (id. at 154). 6 Additionally, Inmate Gougher does not appear
to have been an ODR worker, a cook for the population, Ramadan
food server, or a teaching assistant for the Culinary Arts Program
at the time he was permitted to enroll in the program. The fact
that
he
withdrew
for
medical
reasons
after
three
days
is
irrelevant; 7 he was permitted to enroll despite being ten years
from his 2020 PED and does not appear to meet any of the other
exceptions provided to the Court.
From the available evidence, a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that Plaintiff had a stable housing assignment and a food
service position in a facility in which the Culinary Arts program
was available. There is no evidence in the record as to when the
Culinary Arts sessions began and ended, but the evidence indicates
the program lasted about four months. (ECF No. 99-5 at 35). A
reasonable factfinder could further conclude that at a time when
Plaintiff was employed in a food services position, he was rejected
6
The Court is unable to compare the other inmates’ housing
assignments with their work assignments as the information
provided to the Court on the other inmates has been heavily
redacted.
7 Director Jean-Baptiste certified that Inmate Gougher enrolled in
the program but signed out after one day. (ECF No. 91-4 at 137 ¶
14). Inmate Gougher’s progress notes report indicates the program
started on February 22, 2010 and he withdrew on February 25, 2010.
(Id. at 151).
11
from the Culinary Arts program on a pretextual reason of having a
PED of more than two years.
There is a factual dispute as to whether Defendants’ reasons
for denying Plaintiff entry into the Culinary Arts program were
pretextual. The Court denies summary judgment on this basis.
C.
Plaintiff’s Free Association and New Jersey
Administrative Code Claims
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on his First Amendment
Free Association and New Jersey Administrative Code claims. (ECF
No. 99). These claims were dismissed by Judge Simandle on September
18, 2018. (ECF No. 54). Despite Plaintiff’s multiple attempts to
amend his complaint, these claims have never been reinstated.
Summary judgment is denied.
D.
Prohibition of Damages under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act
Finally,
Defendants
argue
that
Plaintiff
cannot
recover
damages at trial because the Prison Litigation Reform Act prohibits
damages for mental or emotional distress unless there has been a
physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action
may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the
commission of a sexual act . . . .”).
Plaintiff alleges a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection. “If a plaintiff claims violations of
12
constitutional or statutory rights, [§ 1997e(e)] does not bar
claims for money damages.” Rupe v. Cate, 688 F. Supp. 2d 1035,
1044
(E.D.
Cal.
2010).
A
jury
could
award
Plaintiff
nominal
damages. 8 Summary judgment is therefore denied on this basis.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court denies both summary
judgment motions.
An appropriate Order follows.
Date:
October 25, 2019
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
8
“To be clear, nominal damages are a trivial amount of monetary
recovery that often does not exceed $1.” Webster v. Rutgers-New
Jersey Med. Sch., No. 15-08689, 2017 WL 3399997, at *9 (D.N.J.
Aug. 4, 2017). Moreover, a defendant whose conduct demonstrates a
reckless or callous indifference toward others’ rights may be
liable for punitive damages under § 1983. See Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (stating that a jury may award punitive damages
when a “defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive
or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to
the federally protected rights of others”); Savarese v. Agriss,
883 F.2d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that a defendant’s
conduct must be at minimum reckless or callous to impose punitive
damages under § 1983).
The Third Circuit “has explained that the term ‘reckless
indifference’ refers to the defendant's knowledge that he ‘may be
acting in violation of federal law.’” Whittaker v. Fayette Cty.,
65 F. App'x 387, 393 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Alexander v. Riga,
208 F.3d 419, 431 (3d Cir. 2000)). Although it seems unlikely that
Plaintiff would be entitled to punitive damages given the evidence
presented to this Court, the Court leaves this issue for another
day.
13
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