CAPERS v. LANIGAN

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 5/27/2015. (TH, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KEITH MICHAEL CAPERS,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 15-3279 (JBS-KMW)

v.
GARY M. LANIGAN,

OPINION
Defendant.

APPEARANCES:
Keith Michael Capers, Plaintiff Pro Se
#2409B/416728
South Woods State Prison
215 Burlington Road South
Bridgeton, NJ 08302
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Keith Michael Capers’
(“Plaintiff”), submission of a civil rights complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is convicted and sentenced state
prisoner currently confined at South Woods State Prison
(“SWSP”), Bridgeton, New Jersey.

By Order dated May 19, 2015,

this Court granted Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma
pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and ordered the Clerk
to file the Complaint. (Docket Entry 2). At this time, the Court
must review the complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A to determine whether it should be dismissed as

frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief.

For the reasons set

forth below, the Court concludes that the complaint will be
dismissed. Plaintiff shall, however, be given leave to amend.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action against New
Jersey Department of Corrections (“DOC”) Commissioner Gary
Lanigan.

The following factual allegations are taken from the

complaint and are accepted for purposes of this screening only.
The Court has made no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiff’s
allegations.
Plaintiff states that in September 2014, corrections
officials inappropriately and unnecessarily transferred him from
the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center (“ATDC”) to SWSP.
(Docket Entry 1 at 5). He was informed that he was ineligible
for minimum custody status under DOC’s Objective Classification
System, N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:9-2.1 et seq., through which he was
assigned an “override E-1 custody status,”1 and placed in general
population. (Docket Entry 1 at 5).

1

“Code E-1: Permanent custody prohibition/bar. Medium custody
status assignment or above only due to sexual or arson offense
convictions pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:9-4.7.” N.J. ADMIN. CODE §
10A:9-2.14(a)(5) (2015). Plaintiff was convicted of multiple
counts of aggravated sexual assault, kidnapping, and related
offenses in 2000. See Capers v. Governor of New Jersey, 525 F.
2

Plaintiff further states that corrections officers
confiscated his medical braces for his leg and arm, which were
injured as the result of a stroke in 2010. (Docket Entry 1 at
5). He claims that he has been suffering from severe pain and
foot sores, and has been placed on high blood pressure
medication and vitamins as a result. (Docket Entry 1 at 5).
Plaintiff asks this Court to order his release from custody
and to compensate him for his time in custody and for medical
neglect. (Docket Entry 1 at 6).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996)
(“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental
employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim
with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The
PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

App’x 69, 71 (3d Cir. 2013). Inmates with an E-1 override code
can never obtain reduced custody status. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:92.14(d) (2015).
3

defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject
to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner
proceeding in forma pauperis and is seeking relief from a
government official.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007)
(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’”

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte
screening for failure to state a claim,2 the complaint must
allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210

2

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x
120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230,
232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1));
Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x. 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
4

(3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
B. Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
5

(1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011);
Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant is the Commissioner of the New Jersey DOC. A suit
against a public official “‘in his or her official capacity is
not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the
official's office . . . .’” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 930–31 (1997) (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). The Eleventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that, “The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State.”
Absent consent by a state, the Eleventh Amendment bars
federal court suits for money damages against state officers in
their official capacities. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
169 (1985). Section 1983 does not override a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). To the
extent Plaintiff seeks relief against Defendant in his official
capacity, the claim must be dismissed as Defendant is immune
from suit.
Likewise, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant in his
individual capacity must be dismissed for failure to state a
6

claim. “Government officials may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of
respondeat superior [and] a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official's own
actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 676 (2009). See also Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352,
366 (3d Cir. 2012).
The Third Circuit has identified two general ways in which
a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts
undertaken by subordinates: (1) “liability may attach if they,
with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established
and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly
caused [the] constitutional harm”; or (2) “a supervisor may be
personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in
violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate
them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and
acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct.”
Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir.
2014) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff has alleged no
facts that tend to prove Defendant himself acted
unconstitutionally.

Accordingly, the Complaint must be

dismissed.
In this case, however, it is possible that Plaintiff may be
able to amend his complaint to assert a basis for Defendant
7

Lanigan’s personal liability or to name non-immune defendants
with personal liability, e.g., the officers who confiscated his
medical devices. Plaintiff shall therefore be given leave to
amend his complaint. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293
F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).3
To the extent Plaintiff asks this Court to release him from
confinement, however, his sole remedy is a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus not a civil rights complaint under § 1983. Preiser
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). “Section 2254 supplies
federal jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by the inmates
challenging their state convictions or sentences, or the
execution of those state sentences, including the issues of
parole, term calculation, etc.” McKnight v. United States, 27 F.
Supp. 3d 575, 579 (D.N.J. 2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254). This
Court, however, lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s §
2254 claims absent an order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

3

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed,
the original complaint no longer performs any function in the
case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the amended
complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id.
8

Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 2244(b)(3)(A)
provides: “Before a second or successive application permitted
by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant
shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order
authorizing the district court to consider the application.”
Plaintiff has already filed two § 2254 petitions, see Capers v.
New Jersey, 2011 WL 883646 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2011) (dismissing as
second or successive petition); Capers v. Rogers, et al., 2006
2806361 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2006) (dismissal on merits), and has
already been advised of the procedural requirements of filing a
second or successive application, 2011 WL 883646 at *3. Nothing
in the complaint indicates he has sought and received permission
from the Third Circuit to file another petition under § 2254.
The Court therefore declines to separate the habeas claims into
a separate matter at this time. In the event he files an amended
complaint, Plaintiff shall not be permitted to seek habeas
relief as those claims must first be presented to the Third
Circuit.

9

III.

CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

stated

above,

Plaintiff

complaint

is

dismissed for seeking relief against an immune defendant and for
failure to state a claim. An appropriate order follows.

May 27, 2015
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

10