CAPERS v. LANIGAN

Filing 6

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 9/30/2015. (TH, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KEITH MICHAEL CAPERS,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 15-3279 (JBS-KMW)

v.
GARY M. LANIGAN,

OPINION
Defendant.

APPEARANCES:
Keith Michael Capers, Plaintiff Pro Se
#2409B/416728
South Woods State Prison
215 Burlington Road South
Bridgeton, NJ 08302
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Keith Michael Capers’
(“Plaintiff”), submission of a proposed amended civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket Entry 5).
Plaintiff is a convicted and sentenced state prisoner
currently confined at South Woods State Prison (“SWSP”),
Bridgeton, New Jersey. By Order dated May 27, 2015, this Court
dismissed Plaintiff’s original complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and for seeking monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). (Docket Entry 4). The Court also granted

leave to file a proposed amended complaint within 30 days.
(Docket Entry 4). Plaintiff submitted a proposed amended
complaint on June 30, 2015. (Docket Entry 5). For the reasons
set forth below, the amended complaint will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
II. BACKGROUND
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant
Lanigan and John Doe Correctional Officers deprived him of
medical and physical therapy “by knowingly and purposefully
keeping Plaintiff at the Adult Diagnostic & Treatment Center
[“ADTC”] for reasons other than treatment.” (Docket Entry 5 at
8).
According to the amended complaint, Plaintiff suffered a
stroke in 2010, resulting in injury to his arm and leg. (Docket
Entry 5 at 8). Plaintiff was instructed to use the inmate remedy
system by Michelle Ricci on March 25, 2011, presumably regarding
his placement at ADTC. (Docket Entry 5 at 8). He was
subsequently informed by Ms. Ricci that “no action was taken
because Plaintiff was transferred to South Woods State Prison.”
(Docket Entry 5 at 8). He returned to ADTC on September 21, 2011
at the direction of M. Yatauro “for reasons other than
treatment.” (Docket Entry 5 at 8). He was informed a transfer
was possible on March 9, 2013. (Docket Entry 5 at 8). At some
point, Plaintiff was transferred to SWSP. (Docket Entry 5 at 9).
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Plaintiff asks this Court to order Defendant to pay for
Plaintiff’s Botox treatment and therapy, attorneys fees and
costs, and compensatory and punitive damages. (Docket Entry 5 at
7).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996)
(“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental
employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim
with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The
PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject
to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner
proceeding in forma pauperis and is seeking relief from a
government official.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007)
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(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’”

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte
screening for failure to state a claim,1 the complaint must
allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”

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“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x
120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230,
232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1));
Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x. 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
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Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
B. Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
§ 1983. Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second,
that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person
acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir.
2011); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.
1994).
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant must be dismissed for
failure to state a claim. “Government officials may not be held
liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates
under a theory of respondeat superior [and] a plaintiff must
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plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
official's own actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). See also Bistrian v. Levi,
696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012).
The Third Circuit has identified two general ways in which
a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts
undertaken by subordinates: (1) “liability may attach if they,
with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established
and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly
caused [the] constitutional harm”; or (2) “a supervisor may be
personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in
violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate
them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and
acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct.”
Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir.
2014) (internal citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015).
Plaintiff has alleged no facts beyond his conclusory
allegations that tend to prove Defendant himself acted
unconstitutionally regarding Plaintiff’s placement in ADTC.
Furthermore, the Court notes “an inmate does not have an
inherent constitutional right to determine the place of his
confinement, nor does he have a state-created liberty interest
which allows him to be incarcerated at an institution of his
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choosing.” Spuck v. Ridge, 347 F. App'x 727, 730 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983)). Accordingly,
the Complaint must be dismissed.
Plaintiff has also failed to set forth sufficient facts to
support a denial of medical care claim against Defendant. In
order to set forth a cognizable claim for a violation of his
right to adequate medical care, an inmate must allege: (1) a
serious medical need; and (2) behavior on the part of prison
officials that constitutes deliberate indifference to that need.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Presuming for
screening purposes only that Plaintiff’s 2010 stroke left him
with serious medical needs, he does not indicate what those
needs are and how Defendant Lanigan himself was deliberately
indifferent to those needs. In order for this Court to
reasonably infer a constitutional violation took place,
Plaintiff must provide more factual detail regarding what
treatment should have been provided. “[A]n unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is not sufficient for
a complaint to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009).
Plaintiff may, however, be able to set forth facts that
would permit his claims to go forward. He shall therefore be
permitted to move for leave to amend his complaint within thirty
(30) days of the date of this Opinion and Order. Any motion for
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leave to amend must be accompanied by a proposed amended
complaint. Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint
is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Ibid. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file
an amended complaint that is complete in itself. Ibid.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the amended complaint is

dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff may file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies
within thirty (30) days from the entry of this Order. An
appropriate order follows.

September 30, 2015
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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