ROY v. RAMSEY MOVING SYSTEM

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 3/23/2016. (TH, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

FRANK ROY,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 15-cv-3330 (JBS/AMD)

v.
RAMSEY MOVING SYSTEM,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant.

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Frank Roy, proceeding pro se, brings this suit
against Defendant Ramsey Moving System, alleging a violation of
his civil rights, after Defendant allegedly damaged and lost
some of Plaintiff’s possessions during a move and refused to
compensate Plaintiff for the missing and damaged items. Pending
before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint [Docket Item 3], and Plaintiff’s cross-motion to enter
default [Docket Item 6]. For the reasons explained below, the
Court will grant the motion to dismiss with prejudice. The Court
will also deny Plaintiff’s cross-motion. The Court finds as
follows:
1.

According to the Complaint filed in the instant case

[Docket Item 1], Plaintiff Frank Roy initially hired Ramsey
Moving System to move several boxes containing Plaintiff’s
possessions from an unspecified location to a Marriot Residence

Inn, in or around May of 2010. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Roy then relocated
to the Econo Lodge 1 and asked for delivery to that location
instead, but the delivery was unsuccessful because the delivery
driver requested an additional redelivery charge, which Roy
refused to pay because it was inconsistent with what he had been
told over the phone. (Id. ¶ 3-4.) Ultimately, a new price was
negotiated for the delivery of Roy’s items to Homestead Village
approximately 30 days later. Roy’s chief complaint in this suit
is that Defendant damaged or lost some of his possessions in the
final delivery and has refused to compensate him for the loss.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that two boxes, including one
box containing crystal, went missing and that an “expensive
elephant,” which he received from a billionaire friend, was
cracked in the move. He alleges that the total value of the
crystal and elephant is $75,000, that Defendant has “steadfastly
refused to pay for damages,” and that Defendant falsely asserted
to Plaintiff’s previous attorney that Plaintiff had issued
Defendant a bad check. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10, 15-20.)
2.

The instant Complaint, filed on May 14, 2015, alleges

the above facts and charges Defendant only with violating the
“Civil Rights of Plaintiff in retrospect to Civil Rights.” (Id.
at 1.) Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $175,000. (Id.
at 3.) On June 12, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss
[Docket Item 3], arguing that Plaintiff has not met the amount2

in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction, that this
case is based upon a duplicative state action, and that
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. For support, Defendant attached two complaints
previously filed by Plaintiff against Defendant regarding the
same May 2010 incident. The first, reciting nearly identical
facts, appears to have been filed two years earlier in the Court
of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Pennsylvania, on July 5,
2013. (July 5, 2013 Compl., Ex. A to Mot. to Dismiss [Docket
Item 3-2].) In this complaint, Plaintiff asserted the claims of
negligence and breach of bailment, and alleged that the value of
the damaged and lost property was $39,643.50. (Id. at 2.) The
second complaint, also against Defendant Ramsey Moving Company,
was filed in this district before Judge Noel Hillman on July 8,
2014. (July 8, 2014 Compl., Ex. B to Mot. to Dismiss [Docket
Item 3-2].) Plaintiff sought to recover against Defendant under
the same set of facts as above, this time under the
Antidiscrimination Act, and asserted in this Complaint that the
value of the elephant was $35,000. (Id. ¶ 11.) Judge Hillman
dismissed the case on November 21, 2014 for failing to meet the
requirements for diversity jurisdiction, because Plaintiff
failed to plead Defendants’ citizenship and failed to allege
with the requisite factual specificity that the amount in
controversy met the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. (See
3

Hillman Opinion, Ex. C to Mot. to Dismiss [Docket Item 3-2], at
3-4.)
3.

On June 15, 2015, three days after Defendant’s motion

to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a request for default [Docket Item
4]. On June 22, 2015, Plaintiff filed an opposition [Docket Item
5] along with a cross-motion to “enter default/final judgment,”
unaccompanied by any brief [Docket Item 6]. Rather than dispute
Defendants’ claim regarding the amount-in-controversy,
Plaintiff’s opposition made only a series of rambling and wholly
unsupported statements accusing Judge Hillman and Defendant of
“fraudulent activity” and “collusion.” (See Opp’n to Mot. to
Dismiss.) Plaintiff’s cross-motion, which was filed the same day
without any legal argument, merely attached several exhibits
without explanation, including his complaint filed before the
Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, and Judge Hillman’s
opinion dismissing Plaintiff’s other complaint filed in the
District of New Jersey, both of which Defendant had already
placed before the Court. (See Exs. A & C to Cross-motion to
Enter Default.) Defendant then filed an opposition to
Plaintiff’s cross-motion [Docket Item 7].
4.

The Court begins by addressing Defendant’s motion to

dismiss. Defendant argues first that this case must be dismissed
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of diversity
jurisdiction because the damages in the case do not exceed
4

$75,000, the amount-in-controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a). After reviewing Plaintiffs’ Complaint and the
additional documents that Plaintiff subsequently included for
this Court’s consideration, the Court must agree with Defendant
that the requirements for diversity jurisdiction have not been
met.
5.

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) provides district courts with

subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions between citizens
of different states “where the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs . . .
.” Generally, a party who invokes federal court jurisdiction has
the burden of demonstrating the court’s jurisdiction. Columbia
Gas Transmission Corp. v. Tarbuck, 62, F.3d 538, 541 (3d Cir.
1995) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S.
178, 189 (1936)); Carr v. NJ Cure Ins. Co., No. 09-cv-3760, 2011
WL 380925, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2011). In diversity cases,
courts generally rely on the plaintiff’s allegations of the
amount in controversy contained in the complaint. Columbia Gas,
62 F.3d at 541; see also Suber v. Chrysler Corp., 104 F.3d 578,
583 (3d Cir. 1997). “[T]he sum claimed by the plaintiff controls
if the claim is apparently made in good faith.” Feuerstein v.
Simpson, 582 F. App’x 93, 98 (3d Cir. 2014). However, if the
defendant challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s amount
in controversy, “the plaintiff who seeks the assistance of the
5

federal courts must produce sufficient evidence to justify its
claims.” Suber, 104 F.3d at 583; see also Horn & Hardart Sys.,
LLC v. Hunter, No. 04-cv-5117, 2005 WL 1522266, at *2 (D.N.J.
June 27, 2005) (Simandle, J.). Dismissal is appropriate if the
defendant can demonstrate that the jurisdictional amount cannot
be met, or if, from the proof, it appears to a legal certainty
that the plaintiff is not entitled to that amount. Columbia Gas,
62 F.3d at 541; see also Dolin v. Asian Am. Accessories, Inc.,
449 F. App’x 216, 218 (3d Cir. 2011); 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Maia
Inv. Co., Inc., No. 14-cv-8006, 2015 WL 1802512, at *10 (D.N.J.
Apr. 17, 2015) (Simandle, J.).1
6.

Plaintiff alleges that he is a citizen of New Jersey

and that Defendant Ramsey Moving System is a Pennsylvania
company with a place of business in Media, Pennsylvania. He also
alleges that the “[e]lephant and crystal [are] valued at a total
of $75,000.” (Compl. ¶ 19.) If this was the only record before
the Court, the Court would readily conclude that Plaintiff’s
claim of the amount-in-controversy controls. Although the Court
might be skeptical of Plaintiff’s assertion that the value of
the damaged or lost property exactly equaled the statutory
threshold amount, nothing in the Complaint suggests that the

1

Plaintiff has not argued, and the Court cannot find, any other
basis for federal jurisdiction. As explained below, Plaintiff
has alleged only a violation of his “Civil Rights,” and has
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
6

claim was made in bad faith. Defendant, however, has produced
evidence which suggests that the actual amount in controversy is
far below what Plaintiff alleges. Defendant has shown that
Plaintiff filed two previous complaints against Defendant for
the same moving incident, reciting facts and allegations that
are nearly identical to the instant case, in which Plaintiff
previously alleged that the value of the damaged goods was
$39,643.50 and $35,000, respectively, and not $75,000, as he now
claims. Only after Judge Hillman dismissed Plaintiff’s case for
failing to meet the jurisdictional threshold of $75,000 did
Plaintiff file the instant Complaint, asserting that the
elephant and crystal were actually valued at $75,000. Having
reviewed and compared all three complaints, the Court finds no
additional facts in the instant Complaint that would explain why
damages for the exact same items were now approximately $35,00040,000 greater than previously estimated. Defendant’s evidence
of Plaintiffs’ own statements of the amount-in-controversy has
called into question the good-faith basis for Plaintiff’s new
claim of the amount-in-controversy, and Plaintiff must now
“produce sufficient evidence to show that the actual damages
exceeded $75,000.” Horn & Hardart Sys., LLC v. Hunter, No. 04cv-5117, 2005 WL 1522266, at *2 (D.N.J. June 27, 2005)
(Simandle, J.)

7

7.

In response, however, Plaintiff only argues, without

factual basis, that Judge Hillman was in “collusion” with
Defendant and that certain “internal documents” are “fraudulent”
and “forged.” (See Opp’n to Motion to Dismiss, at 1.) The Court
is unable to decipher Plaintiff’s allegations. For example, he
asserts,
Defendant’s attorney by way of motion entered into
evidence copies of internal documents with the intent to
set up Chief Justice for collusion accusation by
Plaintiff. These documents show proof of collusion by
Judge Noel Hillman and Ramsey Moving System.
(Id.) He also asserts,
Plaintiff wishes Chief Justice to recognize that his
numerous complaints about Justice Noel Hillman have been
confirmed with the internal documents by the Defendant’s
attorney that prove conspiracy, collusion, and violation
of Constitutional and Civil Rights.
(Id. at 2.) Plaintiff does not specify which documents he is
referring to, nor provide any evidence whatsoever to support
these allegations, and the Court cannot give credence to his
baseless accusations.
8.

Nor can the Court discern how these conspiracy and

collusion allegations against Judge Hillman and Ramsey Moving
Company disprove Defendants’ claim that the amount-incontroversy threshold has not been reached. Rather than explain
the discrepancies Defendant has identified, Plaintiff attaches
the same documents Defendant attached in its motion to dismiss.
That evidence, as noted above, only lends support to Defendant’s
8

argument. Plaintiff does not include any receipts,
certifications, or documentation of any kind to justify how he
arrived at $75,000 for the amount-in-controversy. Indeed, the
Court cannot find even a single sentence in Plaintiff’s
opposition in which Plaintiff attempts to describe how he
estimated the damages in this case.
9.

Because Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence

whatsoever, in the face of Defendant’s challenge, to support his
claim that actual damages in this case exceed $75,000,
Defendant’s motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be granted.
10.

Plaintiff’s Complaint must also be dismissed under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) may be granted only if, accepting
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a
court concludes that the plaintiff failed to set forth
sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible
on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007); Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d
Cir. 2012). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
9

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). However, legal conclusions are not entitled to the same
assumption of truth, and “[a] pleading that offers labels and
conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Id. To determine if a complaint meets
the pleading standard, the Court must strip away conclusory
statements and “look for well-pled factual allegations, assume
their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give
rise to an entitlement of relief.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d
352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because Plaintiff is a pro se plaintiff, the Court construes his
Complaint liberally. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d
Cir. 2004); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir.
2003).
11.

Plaintiff alleges only a single count of violation of

his Civil Rights “in retrospect to Civil Rights.” (Compl. at 1.)
To the extent Plaintiff seeks a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
he must demonstrate “a violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States, and must show
that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting
under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 47
(1988); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant is a government actor, or
that Defendant acted “under color of state law.” See Groman v.
10

Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638-39 (3d Cir. 1995)
(describing various approaches for detecting the presence of
action under color of state law). Nor do the facts in the
Complaint make out the deprivation of any right protected by the
Constitution. This is a dispute between private parties about
alleged damage or loss of Plaintiff’s possessions, not a
constitutional case.
12.

To the extent Plaintiff seeks a remedy under the New

Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”), Plaintiff has also failed to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The NJCRA was
modeled after 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and creates a private cause of
action for violations of civil rights secured under the New
Jersey Constitutions. This district “has repeatedly interpreted
the NJCRA analogously to § 1983,” Trafton v. City of Woodbury,
799 F. Supp. 2d 417, 443 (D.N.J. June 29, 2011), and, like §
1983, a claim under the NJCRA requires the plaintiff to show a
constitutional violation by an individual acting under “color of
law.” Because nothing in Plaintiff’s Complaint suggests that
Ramsey Moving Company was acting under color of state law during
the move when Plaintiff’s property was damaged or lost, or that
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated, Plaintiff has
not alleged facts to plausibly suggest a claim under the NJCRA.
13.

Accordingly, in addition to dismissing Plaintiff’s

Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court
11

will also dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
14.

If a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal, “a district

court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment
would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008). Here, because
Plaintiff is pro se, and because Plaintiff may be able to submit
an amended pleading that cures the deficiencies discussed
herein, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint without
prejudice.
15.

The Court turns briefly to Plaintiff’s “Cross-motion

to Enter Default/Final Judgment” [Docket Item 6], and will deny
Plaintiff’s cross-motion.2 Before entering default judgment in a

2

Because Plaintiff’s cross-motion contains no legal argument and
is unaccompanied by a separate brief or statement that no brief
is necessary, it violates Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d) and may be denied
on that basis alone. See, e.g., Developers Sur. & Indem., Co. v.
NDK Gen. Contractors, Inc., No. 06-cv-86, 2007 WL 542381, at *2
(D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2007) (“Because Plaintiff’s application does
not meet the requirements of Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1), the
Court will not hear Plaintiff’s application. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is denied.”); Mem. Op.,
at 2, Lamberty v. Rosenberg, No. 05-cv-227 (D.N.J. Mar. 31,
2008) (Simandle, J.) (“[T]he Court must deny the motion because
there is no asserted basis for it and Plaintiff has not provided
the accompanying materials required by Local Rules 7.1(d) and
7.2.”); Op. Denying Mot. for Default J. [Docket Item 8], at 2,
N.J. Bldg. & Labs. Statewide Pens. Fund v. Belmont Contracting,
No. 13-cv-507 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2013) (denying plaintiff’s motion
for default judgment because plaintiff failed to file a brief or
statement that no brief is necessary, in violation of Loc. Civ.
12

case, the court must determine that it has jurisdiction both
over the subject matter and parties, determine whether
defendants have been properly served, ascertain whether the
unchallenged facts sufficiently plead a legitimate cause of
action, and whether the circumstances otherwise render the entry
of default judgment “proper.” See Chanel, Inc. v. Matos, __
F.Supp. 2d ___, 2015 WL 4773072, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2015)
(Simandle, J.). The Court could not enter default judgment here
even if Plaintiff were to prove that Defendant intentionally
ignored its duty to respond to the Complaint, because the Court
cannot enter any judgment for Plaintiff in a case in which it
lacks jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bey v. Cherry, 2015 WL 300388, at
*2 (D.N.J. Jan. 21, 2015) (denying motion for default judgment
because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
case). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion will be denied as moot.3

R. 7.1). However, in the interests of justice and expediency,
and because Plaintiff is pro se, the Court will examine
Plaintiff’s motion and decide it on the merits. Plaintiff is
cautioned to abide by the Local Civil Rules in future filings
before this Court.
3 Nor have the other requirements for entry of default judgment
been satisfied. The unchallenged facts do not sufficiently plead
a legitimate cause of action, since, as this Court has already
explained, the Complaint does not present a plausible claim for
a civil rights violation under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the
New Jersey Civil Rights Act. Nor do the other circumstances in
this case counsel for entry of default judgment. See Emcasco
Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir. 1987)
(considering various factors, such as whether the plaintiff has
been prejudiced, whether the defendant has a meritorious
defense, and whether the defaulting defendant’s conduct is
13

16.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be granted, but

Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff may file a motion for leave to file an Amended
Complaint within thirty (30) days, accompanied by the proposed
Amended Complaint that attempts to cure the deficiencies noted
herein with clear and concise allegations of the grounds for
jurisdiction and the cause of action. If Plaintiff files a
motion to amend, it must contain the proposed Amended Complaint
as an attachment, and it must be received by the Clerk’s Office
and served on opposing counsel within thirty (30) days hereof.

March 23, 2016
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

excusable or culpable). Plaintiff served the Complaint on May
21, 2015, and Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss just one day
after the 21-day statutory deadline for filing a responsive
pleading, on June 12, 2015. There is no evidence that Plaintiff
has been unfairly prejudiced, especially since Defendant’s
motion was filed three days before Plaintiff even sought entry
of default, on June 15. Nor has Plaintiff even alleged that he
has been burdened by this one-day delay. Defendant’s motion was
filed just one day after the 21-day deadline, and Defendant has
explained that the mistake was inadvertent, a result of “the
miscalculation of the deadline for filing Defendant’s responsive
pleading.” (Scouten Cert. [Docket Item 7-1] ¶¶ 4, 7; see also
Opp’n to Mot for Default [Docket Item 7], at 2.) The Court is
satisfied that Defendant’s conduct is excusable, particularly
since Defendant had acted promptly to rectify the error. See,
e.g., Wolfsohn v. Raab, 90 F.R.D. 119, 122 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(holding that a demand for trial de novo, filed two days after
the statutory deadline, was excusable, since the delay was
negligible, the error by counsel was “minor,” and the Federal
Rules favors disposition of a case on its merits).
14