OLEARY v. COUNTY OF SALEM et al

Filing 118

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 5/9/2018. (tf, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TIFFANY O’LEARY,
Plaintiff,

1:15-cv-03862-NLH-AMD
OPINION

v.
COUNTY OF SALEM
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND
SHERIFFS OFFICE) and ROWAN
COLLEGE AT GLOUCESTER COUNTY
GLOUCESTER COUNTY POLICE
ACADEMY,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
SARAH F. MEIL
4839 WALTON AVE.
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19143
On behalf of Plaintiff
THOMAS J. WAGNER
AMY L. WYNKOOP
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J. WAGNER
8 PENN CENTER - 6TH FLOOR
1628 JOHN F. KENNEDY BOULEVARD
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103
On behalf of Defendant County of Salem
CHRISTINE P. O'HEARN
CHRISTOPHER ALBERT REESE
BROWN & CONNERY, LLP
360 HADDON AVENUE
PO BOX 539
WESTMONT, NJ 08108
On behalf of Defendant Rowan College at Gloucester County
Gloucester County Police Academy
HILLMAN, District Judge
Presently before the Court is the motion of Defendant Rowan

College at Gloucester County Gloucester County Police Academy
(“RCGC”) pursuant to Federal Civil Procedure Rule 42(b) to sever
the trial in this case, which concerns claims by Plaintiff,
Tiffany O’Leary, against RCGC and Defendant the County of Salem
for discrimination based on sex, disability, and whistleblowing
activity.
Plaintiff worked as a corrections officer at Salem County
Correctional Facility (“SCCF”), and after several years in that
position, Plaintiff’s employment with Salem County changed from
a corrections officer to a Salem County Sheriff’s Officer
recruit.
RCGC.

She left her position at SCCF and began attending the

Plaintiff was dismissed from the police academy and

claims that RCGC violated her rights under Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. during her
time there.

Plaintiff also claims that while she was employed

by Salem County at SCCF and as a Salem County Sheriff’s Office
recruit, Salem County violated her rights under the New Jersey
Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq., and the New Jersey Contentious Employee Protection Act
(CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 et seq.
RCGC argues that Plaintiff’s sole remaining claim against
it is for disability discrimination under the ADA, which
occurred while Plaintiff was attending the police academy, and
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that claim is separate and distinct from her claims against
Salem County for sex discrimination and whistleblowing, which
occurred while she was a corrections officer at SCCF and after
she was discharged from the police academy.

RCGC argues that

trying Plaintiff’s claims against RCGC and Salem County in one
trial would prolong the trial, prejudice RCGC by requiring it to
incur substantial defense costs during long periods when the
trial focused on the claims against Salem County, and further
prejudice RCGC by a jury being swayed by spillover “guilt by
association” evidence against Salem County.
Salem County has opposed RCGC’s motion, 1 arguing that
Plaintiff’s claims overlap, separate trials would be duplicative
and a waste of judicial resources, both Salem County and RCGC
share the same economic expert, and having separate trials would
actually prejudice Salem County rather than the other way
around.
Rule 42(b) provides:
For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and
economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or
more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims,
or third-party claims. When ordering a separate trial, the
court must preserve any federal right to a jury trial.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).

The district court is given broad

1

Plaintiff filed a letter stating that she does not oppose RCGC’s
motion. (Docket No. 102.)
3

discretion in reaching its decision whether to order separate
trials.

Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 529 (3d Cir. 2008).

“The party seeking bifurcation has the burden of showing that
bifurcation is proper in light of the general principle that a
single trial tends to lessen the delay, expense and
inconvenience to all parties.”

Raritan Baykeeper, Inc. v. NL

Industries, Inc., 2014 WL 4854581, at *3 (D.N.J. 2014) (quoting
Miller v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 160 F.R.D. 37, 40
(D.N.J. 1995) (citation omitted)).
The Court agrees with Salem County, and its reasons for
opposing RCGC’s motion, that conducting separate trials would
not be convenient or expedite and economize the parties’ and
judicial resources.

Even though Plaintiff’s claims against RCGC

concern disability discrimination while she was attending the
police academy, and Plaintiff’s claims against Salem County
involve sex discrimination and whistleblowing activity while she
was a corrections officer at SCCF, the facts to support
Plaintiff’s claims are more of a cumulative series of events
rather than two distinct and unrelated periods of employment.
Plaintiff remained an employee of Salem County during her time
at the police academy, and the evidence shows that the police
academy staff communicated with Salem County staff about
Plaintiff.
The Court recognizes that some evidence relevant to
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Plaintiff’s claims against Salem County will not be relevant to
her claims against RCGC and vice-versa, but the majority of the
evidence and testimony, including a shared expert, will be
relevant to both.

Holding two separate trials in this case

would waste more resources than preserve them.
With regard to RCGC’s argument about how Plaintiff’s proofs
against Salem County may spillover and prejudice how a jury
views Plaintiff’s proofs against RCGC, the Court does not find
this concern compelling, and nothing that carefully crafted jury
interrogatories and instructions, both during and after trial,
cannot cure.

See, e.g., U.S. v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 335 (3d

Cir. 2010) (finding that “any prejudice that might have resulted
from the joint trial was easily cured by the District Court's
jury instructions”); Bavendam v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 2013 WL
5530008, at *3 (D.N.J. 2013) (denying defendant’s motion for
separate trials and rejecting defendant’s argument that a joint
trial will cause it prejudice, finding a limiting instruction
would properly cover this issue at trial).
Consequently, the Court will deny RCGC’s motion for
separate trials.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: May 9, 2018
At Camden, New Jersey

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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