FINNEMEN v. MCCRINK et al

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, the application by Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to file the Complaint in the above-captioned action; and it is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Judge Richard F. Wells, Judge Krisden McCrink, and Mr. William Stopper are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall administratively close this case, etc. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 7/31/15. (js)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

NASIR FINNEMEN,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 15-5795 (RMB/JS)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

v.
HON. KRISDEN MCCRINK, HON.
RICHARD F. WELLS, WILLIAM
STOPPER
Defendants.

BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
On July 27, 2015, Plaintiff Nasir Finnemen (the
“Plaintiff”) initiated this civil action against Judge Krisden
McCrink of the Camden County Municipal Court, Judge Richard
Wells of the Criminal Division of the Superior Court of New
Jersey, and Public Defender William Stopper (collectively,
“Defendants”). [Dkt. Ent. 1-3 (the “Complaint”).] Plaintiff also
seeks leave to proceed without prepayment of fees and has
submitted the necessary application establishing that he lacks
the financial ability to pay the filing fee. [Dkt. Ent. 1-1.]
Based on Plaintiff’s affidavit of indigence, this Court will

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grant his application to proceed in forma pauperis.1 However, for
the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s claims against the named
Defendants shall be dismissed with prejudice.

The Complaint

will be dismissed without prejudice to allow Plaintiff to amend
the Complaint to name two officers of the Mt. Ephraim Police
Department as defendants and supplement his allegations, if he
so chooses.
I.

Background
Although his allegations are somewhat difficult to follow,

it appears as though on February 18, 2015, Plaintiff was found
guilty of an offense in the Camden County Municipal Court and
was sentenced by Judge McCrink of that court to pay a fine of
$1150, along with court fees and other assessments. (Compl. Ex.
A.) After reviewing his financial status, that court appears to
have permitted Plaintiff to make payments on the total amount of
the sentence in $50 monthly payments. (Compl. Ex. B.)
Plaintiff alleges that he then appealed this sentence to
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Criminal Division, Camden

While the record before this Court demonstrates Plaintiff’s
right to proceed in forma pauperis, this Court notes that as
part of Plaintiff’s proceedings in the Superior Court of New
Jersey he was denied indigency status. (Compl. Ex. D (“The
Court is not satisfied that Defendant has established indigency
pursuant to Rule 1:13-2 and therefore is not permitted to have
such fees waived.”).) This Court may not have before it all
information that was before the Superior Court, and as such, may
revisit the issue.
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County on March 2, 2015. (Compl. at 1.) On April 6, 2015, Judge
Wells of that court denied Plaintiff’s application for indigent
status, noting, “[t]he Court is not satisfied that [Mr.
Finnemen] has established indigency pursuant to Rule 1:13-2 and
therefore is not permitted to have such fees waived.” (Compl.
Ex. D.) Thereafter, “having failed to comply with the
requirements of Rule 3:23-2 [governing timeliness of appeals],”
Plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed with prejudice on April 6,
2015. (Compl. Ex. C.) On April 17, 2015, Plaintiff appealed this
dismissal to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court.
(Compl. Ex. I.) On July 15, 2015, during the pendency of his
appeal, Plaintiff alleges he was required to appear before Judge
McCrink and was instructed by the court to begin on August 3,
2015 making monthly payments to satisfy his February 18, 2015
sentence. (Compl. at 1-2.)
Unrelated to Plaintiff’s procedural grievances, Plaintiff
also alleges that vaguely-defined “documents” that were in the
possession of his public defender, Mr. Stopper, were not
returned to him. (Compl. at 1.) Plaintiff alleges he was told
over the phone that the documents would not be returned and that
he should refrain from calling Mr. Stopper’s office. (Id.)
Finally, although he does not name them as defendants in
this action and does not request relief, Plaintiff appears to
allege in the final sentence of the Complaint that two employees
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of the Mt. Ephraim Police Department, Sgt. Michael Beach and
Officer Michael Schaeffer, used excessive force against him in
effectuating an arrest on an unknown date. (Compl. at 3.) He
states that the officers used “excessive force and took me down
to the grown and cause a serious injury and I was already
disable when Sgt. Michael Beach, Officer Ptl Michael Schaeffer
assaulted me.” (Id.)
II.

Standard for Sua Sponte Dismissal

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must
preliminarily screen in forma pauperis filings, and must dismiss
any filing that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a
complaint contain:
(1)

[A] short and plain statement of the grounds for the
court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has
jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support;

(2)

[A] short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief; and

(3)

[A] demand for the relief sought, which may include
relief in the alternative or different types of
relief.

“[A] complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to ‘show’ such an
entitlement with its facts." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
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203, 311 (3d Cir. 2009). However, in screening a complaint to
verify whether it meets this standard, this Court is mindful of
the requirement that pro se pleadings must be construed
liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. Ed 652 (1972).
III. Analysis
After reviewing the Complaint with the requisite liberal
construction, the Court determines that it fails to state any
claim upon which relief can be granted against Judge McCrink,
Judge Wells, and Mr. Stopper. The Court additionally rules that,
although Plaintiff has failed to name them as defendants,
Plaintiff’s allegations against two Mt. Ephraim Police
Department officers are likely sufficient to survive an initial
screening. Plaintiff may amend the Complaint to name those
officers as defendants, if he desires to pursue an action
against them.
Regarding Plaintiff’s allegations against Judge McCrink and
Judge Wells, Plaintiff’s claims against both judges appear to be
based on purported errors committed by the New Jersey State
Courts during his conviction and appeals. As such, these claims
are precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, barring district
court review of final state court judgments. See Tammera v.
Grossman, No. 10-569, 2010 WL 1372406, at *4 (D.N.J. 2010); see
also Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (“[U]nder what
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has come to be known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower
federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate
jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.”). Accordingly,
these claims should be dismissed.
Moreover, regarding Plaintiff’s claim against Mr. Stopper,
Plaintiff has not provided sufficient factual allegations to
make out a valid claim. While he asserts in a single sentence
that his public defender has not returned documents to which
Plaintiff claims ownership, this Court can conceive of no claim
on those very limited facts alone that would entitle him to
jurisdiction in federal court. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Young, 388
Fed. Appx. 47, 49 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that for purposes
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability, “it is well established that a
public defender performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as
counsel to a defendant is not acting under color of state
law.”). As such, Plaintiff’s claim against the sole remaining
named defendant, Mr. Stopper, should also be dismissed.
In construing Plaintiff’s allegations liberally, however,
the Court notes that on a very deferential reading they may
implicate potential claims against Sgt. Michael Beach and
Officer Michael Schaeffer, although those officers are not named
as defendants. Plaintiff appears to assert that these two
officers used excessive force in arresting him in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although Plaintiff has provided only sparse
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facts, including no date of the actions or more detailed
circumstances of the arrest, it appears these claims may
narrowly survive an initial screening under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2), if more fully developed. (See Compl. at 3.)
In order to make out a claim pursuant to § 1983, a
plaintiff must show: (1) a violation of a right secured by the
constitution, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed
or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West
v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Assoc. of N.J. Rifle and
Pistol Clubs Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 730 F.3d 252,
261 (3d Cir. 2013).
Here, Plaintiff alleges excessive force during an arrest
when Plaintiff, who is disabled, was brought to the ground by
officers. (Compl. at 3.) These facts would satisfy the first
prong of a § 1983 claim as a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (“Where
[] the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest
or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly
characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.”). Moreover, the allegations would satisfy the second
prong as well, in that they can be construed to state that the
officers’ actions were taken pursuant to their employment as Mt.
Ephraim Police Officers and thus, under color of state law.

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This Court is hesitant to read in claims that are against
unnamed defendants. Nevertheless, because Plaintiff’s
allegations against these officers would be sufficient to
survive a screening were they named as defendants and were
relief from the injury requested, the Court will dismiss the
Complaint without prejudice to Plaintiff amending the Complaint
to more fully describe the circumstances of the arrest, name the
officers as defendants, and request appropriate relief.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY on this 31st day of July 2015,
ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the
application by Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to file the
Complaint in the above-captioned action; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Judge
Richard F. Wells, Judge Krisden McCrink, and Mr. William Stopper
are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall administratively
close this case; and it is finally
ORDERED that, within 30 days from the date this Memorandum
Opinion and Order is entered, Plaintiff may amend the Complaint.

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If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the Clerk of the Court
shall re-open the matter for this Court’s screening.

s/ Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge

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