ESTATE OF SAMUEL JACKSON et al v. CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY et al

Filing 24

OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 5/22/2016. (dmr)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

(Doc. No. 13)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
___________________________________
:
Samuel JACKSON, Sr., as Administrator of :
Civil No. 15–5818 (RBK/AMD)
the ESTATE OF SAMUEL JACKSON, JR., :
and individual in his own right,
:
OPINION
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY, et al.,
:
:
Defendants. :
___________________________________ :
KUGLER, United States District Judge:
Samuel Jackson, Jr., tragically drowned on July 27, 2013 while swimming in the ocean
near Martin Luther King Boulevard beach in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Plaintiff Samuel
Jackson, Sr., brings claims against Defendant City of Atlantic City individually and as
administrator of his son’s estate. This action comes before the Court on Defendant City of
Atlantic City’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the
reasons expressed below, Defendant’s Motion (Doc. No. 13) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s
Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I.

STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss an action for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, “courts
accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff
may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)
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(quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). In other words, a
complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). It is not for courts to decide at this point whether the non-moving party will
succeed on the merits, but “whether they should be afforded an opportunity to offer evidence in
support of their claims.” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Prop., Inc., 311 F.3d 198, 215 (3d Cir. 2002).
In making this determination, a three-part analysis is needed. Santiago v. Warminster
Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)).
Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give
rise to an entitled for relief. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). This plausibility determination
is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A complaint cannot survive where a court can only infer
that a claim is merely possible rather than plausible. Id.
II.

BACKGROUND
On July 27, 2013, Samuel Jackson, Jr. (“Samuel Jr.”) went swimming and tragically

drowned in the ocean at or near the Martin Luther King Boulevard beach in Atlantic City, New
Jersey (“the Beach”). Compl. ¶ 12. Defendant City of Atlantic City (“the City”) owned and
controlled the Beach. Id. ¶¶ 13–14. The City made improvements to the Beach, including the

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installation of jetties, signs, and piping. Id. ¶ 17. The City further provided lifeguards on the
Beach. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff filed his Complaint before this Court on July 25, 2015, bringing suit
against the City, the State of New Jersey, and Atlantic County (Doc. No. 1). The City, the only
remaining defendant,1 moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on September 14, 2015 (Doc. No. 13).
III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings common law claims for negligence and vicarious liability, as well as

statutory claims under the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:31–1, and the New
Jersey Survival Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15–3. The City argues that that the unimproved public property
immunity doctrine bars this lawsuit against the City in its entirety. See Def.’s Mot. at 9–20. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that “the public policy of this State is that public entities
shall be liable for their negligence only as set forth in the Tort Claims Act.” Pico v. State, 116
N.J. 55, 59 (1989) (citing N.J.S.A. 59:1–2). The Tort Claims Act (“TCA”) defines “public
entity” to include municipalities such as the City. See N.J.S.A. 59:1–3. As a public entity, the
City is liable to Plaintiff only to the scope allowed by the TCA. See N.J.S.A. 59:1–3.
The TCA provides that “[n]either a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an
injury caused by a condition of any unimproved public property, including but not limited to any
natural condition of any lake, stream, bay, river, or beach.” N.J.S.A. 59:4–8. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey held in Troth v. State that “[p]ublic property is no longer ‘unimproved’ when
there has been substantial physical modification of the property from is natural state, and when

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Atlantic County moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on September 3, 2015 (Doc. No.
6), and the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal as to Atlantic County on October 14, 2015
(Doc. No. 20). The State of New Jersey moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on October 12,
2015 (Doc. No. 15). On May 10, 2016, this Court granted the State’s unopposed motion,
dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against the State as barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the
United States Constitution (Doc. No. 23).
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the physical change creates hazards that did not previously exist and that require management by
the public entity.” 117 N.J. 258, 269–70 (1989). To impose liability upon the public entity,
“there must be a causal connection between the ‘improvement’ and the alleged injury.” Id. at
270. The Court “specifically adopt[ed] the holding . . . that public property may be partly
improved and partly unimproved.” Id. at 272.
Plaintiff alleges that Samuel Jr. went swimming and drowned on public property owned
by the City. Plaintiff further alleges that the City improved that public property with jetties,
signs, and piping. But Plaintiff does not allege any facts in the Complaint to suggest that the
jetties, signs, or piping caused Samuel Jr.’s death. Plaintiff asserts that Samuel Jr. died “as a
direct and proximate result of the negligence” of the City, and that the City was negligent by,
among many other things, “[d]angerously allowing beachgoers to swim close to the jetties and in
an area where there were man-made underwater piping and/or installations that present a hazard
to unsuspecting persons like Plaintiff’s decedent[.]” See Compl. ¶ 36e. These conclusory
allegations, embedded in Count I of the Complaint, fail to plausibly allege that the jetties or the
underwater piping caused Samuel Jr.’s death. Plaintiff does not allege any facts about what
dangers the jetties or the underwater piping presented or how those dangers caused injury to
Samuel Jr. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is therefore GRANTED.
IV.

LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff requested leave to file an amended complaint if this Court granted Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss. See Pl.’s Opp’n Br. at 11. District courts should freely grant leave to amend,
“unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d
103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Whether the jetties or the underwater piping actually presented dangers
to Samuel Jr. and if and how those dangers caused him injury are questions of fact that Plaintiff

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may be able to plead with sufficient specificity. Regarding Plaintiff’s Count I (negligence claim),
Count III (New Jersey Wrong Death Act claim), and Count IV (New Jersey Survival Act claim),
the parties dispute only whether the unimproved public property immunity doctrine applies to
bar Plaintiff’s claims. These claims are therefore DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Even if Plaintiff properly pleaded that improvements to the Beach caused Samuel Jr.’s
injuries, Count II (vicarious liability claim) fails to adequately state a cause of action. The
Complaint asserts that the City is vicariously liable for the negligence of its lifeguards, but fails
to identify how the lifeguards breached their duty of care or how that breach caused injury to
Samuel Jr. See Compl. ¶¶ 39–41. The Court notes that it will be futile for Plaintiff to amend his
Complaint as to the vicarious liability claim unless he corrects these deficiencies. But because
Plaintiff may be able to plead sufficient facts to state a cause of action for vicarious liability, this
claim is also DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s

Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Dated:

05/22/2016

s/ Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge

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