MAJETTE v. TURNER et al

Filing 36

OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 7/18/17. (js)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TERRENCE L. MAJETTE,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No.
15-5960 (JBS/JS)

v.
PATROLMAN TURNER, PATROLMAN
MARTINO, MAPLE SHADE POLICE
DEPARTMENT, TOWNSHIP OF MAPLE
SHADE, BURLINGTON COUNTY
DETENTION CENTER, JOHN/JANE
DOES and/or ABC COMPANIES 1-3,
jointly and severally and/or
in the alternative,

OPINION

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
Thomas J. Gosse, Esq.
126 White Horse Pike
Haddon Heights, NJ 08035
Attorney for Plaintiff
J. Brooks DiDonato, Esq.
Parker McCay
Three Greentree Centre
Route 73 & Greentree Road
Suite 401
Marlton, NJ 08053
Attorney for Defendants Turner, Martino, Maple Shade Police
Department, and Township of Maple Shade
Michelle L. Corea, Esq.
Capehart and Scatchard, P.A.
Laurel Corporate Center
8000 Midatlantic Dr.
Suite 300
Mount Laurel, NJ 08054
Attorney for Defendant Burlington County Detention Center

SIMANDLE, District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
This case arises from an incident that occurred in a
holding cell at the Burlington County Jail. Officers from the
Maple Shade Police Department transported Plaintiff Terrence L.
Majette to the county jail following his arrest in Maple Shade
Township. Plaintiff was injured after he was pushed into the
holding cell while handcuffed, where he fell backwards and
struck his chin on the cell bench. The officers contend that
they reflexively pushed Plaintiff out of the way of an automatic
moving steel door; Plaintiff contends that he was in no danger
of being crushed by the door and the officers pushed him
“purposely and maliciously.” The incident was captured on video
from two views. The principal issue is whether the video
evidence is undisputed and resolves what would otherwise be a
dispute of fact about the physical contact between the officers
and Mr. Majette.
Before this Court are two motions for summary judgment, one
filed on behalf of Burlington County [Docket Item 26] and one on
behalf of Officer Turner, Officer Martino, the Maple Shade
Police Department, and Maple Shade Township [Docket Item 27].
For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant both motions
in their entirety.

2

BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff was arrested by officers from the Maple Shade
Police Department following a domestic violence call on June 21,
2013. (Officer Turner’s Initial Uniform Supplemental
Investigation Report (“Turner Report”) at 1-2.) Plaintiff was
transported back to the Maple Shade police headquarters for
processing, where Officer Turner reported that Plaintiff was
“belligerent, defiant, and uncooperative, although [Officer
Turner] did nothing to provoke” him. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff
conceded that he was not cooperative because he was arguing with
the officers. (Deposition of Terrence Majette (“Majette Dep.”)
at 25:16-25.) After Plaintiff was unable to post bail, he was
informed that he would be lodged at the Burlington County Jail
in default of bail. (Turner Report at 3.)
Officers Turner and Martino were directed to transport
Plaintiff from the Maple Shade Police Headquarters to the
Burlington County Jail. (Id.) Officer Turner reported that
Plaintiff refused to comply with directions and made it
difficult for officers to handcuff him and escort him to the
patrol vehicle. (Id. at 4-5; see also Officer Dugan’s Initial
Uniform Supplemental Investigation Report.) During the course of

1

The Court distills this undisputed version of facts from the
parties’ statements of material facts, affidavits, and exhibits,
and recounts them in a manner most favorable to Plaintiff, as
the party opposing summary judgment.
3

the transport, Plaintiff apparently continued to refuse to
comply with officers’ directions, repeatedly banging his head
against the plastic divider separating the front seat from the
back seat, asking to “make a deal” to avoid jail time, and
calling Officer Turner “a racist.” (Officer Turner’s
Supplementary Investigation Report (“Turner Supplement”) at 1-2;
see also Officer Martino’s Uniform Supplementary Investigation
Report (“Martino Report”) at 1.)
Upon arrival at the Burlington County Jail, the officers
brought Plaintiff through the sally port to the holding area for
processing. As the surveillance video from the County Jail
shows, this entrance to the jail is separated into two rooms by
windows and a metal door; one, a waiting area in which officers
can fill out paperwork and pass the forms to the corrections
facility’s office, and the other, a holding cell with a bench
along the perimeter of the room, which Officer Turner estimated
is about 12 feet away from the door. (See Burlington County Jail
Video, Door View Video; see also Deposition of William Turner
(“Turner Dep.”) at 14:20-25, 23:5-9.)
Plaintiff stepped out of the vehicle and away from Officer
Martino. (Turner Supplement at 2.) Plaintiff stated “I know
where I’m going” and began walking in a different direction.
(Id.) Officers Turner and Martino directed Plaintiff to a
holding area and ordered him to sit down. (Id. at 2-3.)
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The door to the holding area began to close. (Id. at 3.) This
door “is a heavy steel door, mechanically operated, which slides
closed parallel to the doorframe” and is “operated by a
Corrections Officer seated in a separate room.” (Id.)
At this point, the parties’ accounts of the facts diverge.2
Officer Turner states that at this time, Plaintiff “walked back
towards officers and stood in the threshold” of the steel door
and had to be moved by “a gentle push to the chest.” (Turner
Supplement at 2.) Despite orders to sit down, Plaintiff
apparently returned to the threshold and stood in the way of the
door again, at which time both officers “pushed the accused in
the chest to clear him from the doorway” because they were “in
fear for the safety of [Plaintiff] and it was unclear if the
door would stop closing if he continued to stand in its path.”
(Id.; see also Turner Dep. at 17:2-19, 21:1-22:17.) Officer
Turner explained that he did not turn around and ask the
Corrections Officer monitoring the mechanical door to stop its
progress because in his experience “the closing of the door is
not closely monitored by Corrections Officers” and because “all

2

Defendants submitted video from three surveillance cameras at
the Burlington County Jail, covering Plaintiff’s arrival at the
jail in the Maple Shade Police Department vehicle, the events in
the holding cell, and his later return to the jail from three
different perspectives. (See Burlington County Jail Video (Cell
View, Door View, and Entering-Exiting Sallyport Video Files).)
Plaintiff does not challenge the authenticity of this video.
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this was taking place within seconds of entering the intake
facility.” (Turner Supplement at 2.) Officer Turner recounted
that as Plaintiff was pushed “and the door slammed shut,
[Plaintiff] was seen to fling himself across the room and fall
to ground,” believing that he “intentionally and dramatically
threw himself to the ground with the sole intention of causing
injury to himself in yet another attempt to avoid being
incarcerated.” (Id. at 3-4; Turner Dep. at 22:22-23:9 (“The
force . . . with which we applied to him was not consistent with
the movements that he made. . . . And he went from the door to
the other side of the room with not sufficient pressure to move
him there.”).) While waiting for nursing staff to appear,
Officer Turner recounted that Plaintiff “continued to yell at
[him], making homophobic slurs directed towards [him], and
threatening [him].” (Turner Supplement at 4.)
Officer Martino likewise reported that Plaintiff “failed to
comply with our directives and began walking toward the steel
door of the cell which had begun to close.” (Martino Report at
1.) Officer Martino stated that “Fearing that the door would
cause [Plaintiff] serious bodily harm, I pushed the accused with
my left hand finger tips in the middle of his chest at the same
time as Ptl Turner had pushed him in order to clear him out of
the doorway” two times in order to remove him from the
threshold. (Id. at 1-2; see also Deposition of Brian Martino
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(“Martino Dep.”) at 23:11-21, 26:19-29:2, 32:1-33:6.) Both
officers noted in their reports that they used only the force
necessary to clear Plaintiff from the doorway.
On the other hand, Plaintiff maintains that he approached
the door in the holding cell because Officer Turner was
provoking him, but that he never crossed the threshold and that
he “halted right there at the door to finish my conversation
with” Officer Turner. (Majette Dep. at 39:1-14, 41:16-42:9,
44:23-45:1.) Plaintiff testified that he noticed that the door
was closing and that “I was going to move my own head” out of
the way because “look[ing] at that door and you know that’s a
heavy door, you’re going to get crushed like a watermelon” and
that he knew “not to go past the threshold, period.” (Id. at
45:19-46:13.) He recalled that “the next thing I know I woke up
on the floor in my blood.” (Id. at 44:10-13.)
A few minutes later, medical personnel and Corrections
Officers arrived and administered first aid to Plaintiff.
(Turner Supplement at 4; Martino Report at 2.) Burlington County
Jail personnel refused to accept Plaintiff until he received
medical treatment and clearance for the injury to his chin.
(Id.) At the direction of Sargent Dugan of the Maple Shade
Police Department, Plaintiff was released from the holding cell,
returned to the custody of the Maple Shade Police, and
transported to an emergency room in Mount Holly. (Id.) After
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further apparent difficulty, Plaintiff received two stitches to
his chin and was discharged from the hospital. (Turner
Supplement at 5-6; Martino Report at 2-3.) Plaintiff was
transported back to the Burlington County Jail and eventually
cleared by medical personnel and lodged in the jail. (Id.)
As of the time of his deposition, Officer Turner was an
eight-year veteran of the Maple Shade Police Department and had
no other excessive force complaints filed against him. (Turner
Dep. at 7:17-19, 8:19-9:12.) He had transported prisoners to the
Burlington County Jail “dozens . . . possibl[y] hundreds” of
times before this incident. (Id. at 11:14-24.) At the time of
his deposition, Officer Martino was a four year veteran of the
Maple Shade Police Department and likewise had no prior
excessive force complaints filed against him. (Martino Dep. at
9:8-12, 11:1-12.) He had transported prisoners to the Burlington
County Jail “approximately 10 to 20 times” before this incident.
(Id. at 21:12-14.)
Both officers testified that they had been provided by the
Maple Shade Police Department with formal department policies,
rules, and regulations, and that they are also trained by
“working with other officers and going through the field
training program,” about, inter alia, transporting prisoners to
the county jail. (Turner Dep. at 9:23-11:9; Martino Dep. at
11:17-17:14.) All officers receive a written policy that must be
8

reviewed annually, and undergo use of force training and testing
twice a year. (Martino Dep. at 10:12-25, 14:7-14.) Neither
received any training or policies and procedures from the
Burlington County Jail about transporting prisoners. (Turner
Dep. at 11:25-12:10; Martino Dep. at 17:15-19:1.)
Plaintiff filed a five-count complaint against Officer
Turner, Officer Martino, the Maple Shade Police Department,
Maple Shade Township, and the Burlington County Jail,3 alleging
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights
Act of 2004, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1-2 based upon a claim of excessive
force. Discovery has closed, and now Defendants have filed
motions for summary judgment [Docket Items 26 & 27] which
Plaintiff opposes [Docket Items 31 & 32]. The Court will decide
this motion without holding oral argument pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 78.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
At summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial
burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once a properly supported

3

The real party in interest is Burlington County. The Burlington
County Jail is not a “state actor” within the meaning of § 1983.
See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 Fed. Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir.
2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992
(3d Cir. 1973)).
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motion for summary judgment is made, the burden shifts to the
non-moving party, who must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). In reviewing a motion for summary
judgment, the court is required to examine the evidence in light
most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d
Cir. 2014).
Nevertheless, where, as here, there is indisputably
authentic and complete video footage related to the claims, the
Court will not draw inferences that are “blatantly” inconsistent
with the video evidence, and the Court may rely upon that video
to reject a recollected version of disputed events. See Scott,
550 U.S. at 380–81 (“When opposing parties tell two different
stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record,
so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a
motion for summary judgment.”). In other words, the existence in
the record of a videotape capturing the events underlying a
claim presents an “added wrinkle” to the usual standard which
requires courts “to view the facts and draw reasonable
inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the party opposing
the [summary judgment] motion.’” Id. at 378 (citations omitted).

10

A factual dispute is material when it ‘‘might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law,’’ and genuine when
‘‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.’’ Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The
non-moving party ‘‘need not match, item for item, each piece of
evidence proffered by the movant,’’ but must simply present more
than a ‘‘mere scintilla’’ of evidence on which a jury could
reasonably find for the non-moving party. Boyle v. Cnty. Of
Allegheny Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir.
1998) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings claims arising out of this incident
against Officers Turner and Martino, as individuals, and against
Burlington County, Maple Shade Township, and the Maple Shade
Police Department, as municipalities, pursuant to § 1983 and the
New Jersey Civil Rights Act. Defendants seek summary judgment on
all counts. The Court will discuss each defendant in turn.
1. Burlington County
Plaintiff’s claims against Burlington County arise from the
municipality’s alleged unconstitutional policy or custom in
failing to supervise, discipline, train, or otherwise sanction
local police officers like Officers Turner and Martino.
(Complaint Count V at ¶¶ 2-6.)
It is well-established that municipal liability under §
1983 “may not be proven under the respondeat superior doctrine,
11

but must be founded upon evidence that the government unit
itself supported a violation of constitutional rights.”
Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978)). As a consequence, a municipality is liable under § 1983
only when “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. “[I]t is incumbent upon a
plaintiff to show that a policymaker is responsible either for
the policy or, through acquiescence, for the custom.” Andrews v.
City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990).
Specifically “[w]here the policy concerns a failure to
train or supervise municipal employees, liability under section
1983 requires a showing that the failure amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom those employees
will come into contact.” Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d
217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation and citation
omitted). In other words, “a municipality can only be liable
under § 1983 where the failure to train demonstrates a
‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by the municipality.” Doe v.
Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 2011). To determine
whether a municipality’s alleged failure to train gives rise to
municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that “(1) municipal
12

policymakers know that employees will confront a particular
situation; (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a
history of employees mishandling; and (3) the wrong choice by an
employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional
rights.” Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir.
1999).
Here, the record does not support Plaintiff’s claim that
the County’s alleged failure to train Maple Shade police
department officers caused his injuries. He has not adduced any
evidence of a particular or specific policy or custom on the
part of the County, identified the policymakers or
decisionmakers behind the policy, or shown a pattern of similar
constitutional violations. Indeed, it is unclear what deficient
policy Plaintiff’s failure to train claim is premised on:
whether the County should have trained local police officers on
the use of force; on how to use the automatic door; on
procedures for handling inmates in the holding cell. Moreover,
Plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence that Burlington
County had an obligation under the law to train Maple Shade
Police Department officers who were not employees of the County
or the correctional facility.
To the extent that Plaintiff’s allegations against
Burlington County are premised on the County’s failure to train
or supervise Correctional Facility employees who should have
13

intervened before the Maple Shade police officers resorted to
the use of force, Plaintiff’s claim is similarly deficient.
Again, without a developed factual record as to who the
policymakers or decisionmakers at the County were, the
“deliberate” or “conscious” choices that were made, or a past
record of a pattern of similar constitutional violations at the
County Jail’s holding cell, Plaintiff has not shown that the
municipality is liable for any constitutional violations.
Plaintiff has the burden of producing admissible evidence
supporting his Monell claim against the County and has offered
no facts regarding training, custom or policy of the County from
which a reasonable jury could find the County liable.
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment by Defendant
Burlington County will be granted.
2. Maple Shade Township and the Maple Shade Police
Department
Plaintiff’s claims against Maple Shade Township and the
Maple Shade Police Department (“the Maple Shade Municipal
Defendants”) likewise arise from the municipality’s alleged
unconstitutional policy or custom in failing to supervise,
discipline, train, or otherwise sanction its police officers.
(Complaint Count V at ¶¶ 2-6.)4

4

Count IV of the Complaint alleges that the “negligent acts” of
the Township “were the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries
and such negligence is imputed to defendants.” It is black14

As with his claims against Burlington County, Plaintiff
cannot prove that the Maple Shade Municipal Defendants are
liable under § 1983 for a failure to train their police
officers. While in this instance Plaintiff’s theory of liability
is clearer – the Maple Shade Municipal Defendants failed to
train officers “with regard to the operation of the holding cell
at the county jail” (Pl. Opp. at 12) – Plaintiff has again
failed to adduce evidence that this was a “deliberate” of
“conscious” choice on behalf of any policymakers or
decisionmakers with the municipality, or that there has been a
history of a pattern of similar constitutional violations.5
Accordingly, the Maple Shade Municipal Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment.
3. Officers Turner and Martino

letter law that a municipality cannot be liable for negligent
conduct that leads to a constitutional violation – only a
showing of deliberate indifference will do. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs
of Bryan Cnty., Okl. V. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (“A
showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not
suffice.”). Accordingly, the Maple Shade Municipal Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment on that cause of action.
5 In fact, the record in this regard suggests the opposite:
neither officer had any excessive force complaints against him
before this incident, and both reported that they had committed
other arrestees to the custody of the County Jail many times
without incident. Plaintiff has adduced no evidence to the
contrary; there is no material fact in dispute regarding the
discipline, training or fitness of these officers to apprehend
and transport individuals to the Burlington County Jail and to
safely situate them in the holding cell.
15

Finally, Plaintiff claims that Officers Turner and Martino,
as individuals, violated his state and federal constitutional
rights in pushing him into the holding cell at the Burlington
County Jail while handcuffed. (See Complaint Counts I-III.) The
officers contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on
these claims because the undisputed facts show that they used
reasonable force, or in the alternative because they are
entitled to qualified immunity.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of excessive force
by a law enforcement officer. Carswell v. Borough of Homestead,
381 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2004). Whether a given instance of
force is excessive depends on the objective reasonableness of
the force used under the circumstances. Id. The “reasonableness”
of the use of force is evaluated in light of “the severity of
the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.” Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
(1989)). The Court should not apply “the 20/20 vision of
hindsight,” but should instead consider the “perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Here, both officers testified that Plaintiff was
“belligerent, defiant, and uncooperative” at the Maple Shade
police department headquarters, during transport, and upon
16

arrival at the Burlington County Jail. Both recounted that,
despite repeated orders to sit down in the holding cell,
Plaintiff stood in the threshold of the cell door while the
steel door was sliding closed, and that they each pushed him out
of fear that the door would seriously harm Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s version of the facts differs: he testified that he
“halted right at the door” but did not, and would not have,
cross the threshold because he knew the door could hurt him and
he could face serious trouble for attempting to flee. Plaintiff
contends that the officers were provoking him and pushed him out
of “malice.”
Ordinarily, the contrasting accounts of what happened in
the parties’ reports and deposition testimony would present
factual issues as to the reasonableness and degree of the force
used, and would preclude the entry of summary judgment. But in
this case, the videotape of the events in question “quite
clearly contradicts the version of the story” told by Plaintiff.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).6 Despite Plaintiff’s

6

Scott concerned a car chase, and one of the issues before the
Court was whether there was a material factual dispute as to
whether the motorist “was driving in such a fashion as to
endanger human life.” 550 U.S. at 380. The Court of Appeals had
adopted the motorist’s, as the nonmovant on summary judgment,
version of the facts that, during the chase, “there was little,
if any, actual threat to pedestrians or other motorists, as the
roads were mostly empty and [respondent] remained in control of
his vehicle.” Id. at 378. The Supreme Court held that this was
in error, in light of the existence of a videotape that “tells
17

contention that he did not cross the threshold or get in the way
of the steel door, the video shows a substantial portion of
Plaintiff’s body crossing the threshold of the cell door twice
in quick succession. (See Cell View Video at 1:58:05 and
1:58:08; Door View Video at 1:58:05 and 1:58:08.) Rather, the
video confirms the officers’ testimony that Plaintiff stood in
the direct path of the steel door, and that they pushed him out
the door’s path in fear for his safety. That Plaintiff was
handcuffed at the time is immaterial to their belief that he
posed “an immediate threat to” his own “safety” in that split
second. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. Likewise, the video confirms
that the officers did not use excessive force to clear Plaintiff
from the door’s path. Each officer used a single, open hand to
push Plaintiff in the chest, without stepping towards Plaintiff
or winding up, in the manner that an ordinary person might push
a companion out of the path of a falling object. The video

quite a different story.” Id. at 379. The Court clarified the
standard on summary judgment where indisputably authentic video
evidence exists: “When opposing parties tell two different
stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record,
so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a
motion for summary judgment . . . [and thus, t]he Court of
Appeals should not have relied on such visible fiction; it
should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the
videotape.” Id. at 380-81. In other words, where, as here, video
evidence exists that “blatantly contradicts” one party’s story,
the parties’ dispute of fact is not “genuine” for the purposes
of summary judgment.
18

similarly contradicts Plaintiff’s position that he was knocked
unconscious by the officers, as he can be seen to move around
his cell continuously after the incident.
In sum, the indisputably authentic video shows from two
simultaneous views that Plaintiff was stepping into the path of
the heavy sliding cell door and that the police used only the
force necessary to save him from harm by pushing him back away
from the door. No reasonable jury viewing the video evidence of
the incident could find that the officers used force beyond what
was necessary to protect the Plaintiff from the closing
automatic cell door, in precisely the manner they have
described. In the absence of any genuine dispute of fact over
Plaintiff’s proximity to the heavy automatic steel door as it
was closing, the Court finds as a matter of law that the
officers committed no constitutional violations by their
conduct.7 For this reason, the Court will grant the individual
officers’ motion for summary judgment.

7

Accordingly, because the Court finds that there is no
constitutional violation, it need not address whether Officers
Turner and Martino are entitled to qualified immunity for their
actions. As a matter of qualified immunity, however, even if the
precise amount of reasonable force was debatable, the Court must
give “deference to the judgment of reasonable officers on the
scene,” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001), and the
officers would be entitled to qualified immunity in these
circumstances.
19

CONCLUSION
An accompanying Order will be entered.

July 18, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge

2