BUSH v. HOLLINGSWORTH

Filing 8

OPINION filed. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 10/13/2015. (drw)n.m.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LARRY L. BUSH,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Petitioner,
Civil Action
No. 15-6704 (JBS)

v.
JORDAN HOLLINGSWORTH,

OPINION
Respondent.

APPEARANCES:
Larry L. Bush, Petitioner Pro Se
# 17417-198
RRM Baltimore
302 Sentinel Drive, Suite 200
Annapolis Junction, Maryland 20701
John Andrew Ruymann, Esq.
Office of the United States Attorney
402 East States Street
Suite 430
Trenton, New Jersey 08608
Attorney for Respondent Jordan Hollingsworth
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Larry L. Bush, a federal prisoner confined at RRM
Baltimore, Annapolis Junction filed this Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Docket Entry 1).
Having reviewed the written submissions of the parties, and for
the reasons expressed below, this Court will dismiss the
petition as moot.

BACKGROUND
Petitioner was sentenced by the District of Maryland to a
year-and-a-day custodial period after violating the terms of his
probation. (Docket Entry 1 at 2-3). On February 25, 2015, he was
sent to FCI Fort Dix, New Jersey to serve his sentence. (Docket
Entry 1 at 3). Petitioner alleged the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP’)
was using outdated information that indicated there were pending
charges against him, when in fact there were no outstanding
charges, as justification to delay decision as to when he would
be placed in a residential re-entry center (“RRC”). (Docket
Entry 1 at 3). After delaying several months, the BOP finally
began the evaluation process in June 2015, four months from
Petitioner’s “max out” date of October 22, 2015. (Docket Entry 1
at 3-4). Petitioner did not receive any decision from the BOP
until August 26, 2015, when he was informed he would not be
placed in a RRC because there were no available beds. (Docket
Entry 1 at 4).
Petitioner subsequently filed this petition on August 31,
2015, asking the Court to order the BOP to transfer him to a
RRC. (Docket Entry 1 at 6). He alleged the BOP violated his due
process rights and the Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110–199, April 9, 2008 (“Second Chance Act”), when it failed to
conduct a timely evaluation for his placement in a RRC. See 18
U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1) (“The Director of the Bureau of Prisons
2

shall, to the extent practicable, ensure that a prisoner serving
a term of imprisonment spends a portion of the final months of
that term (not to exceed 12 months), under conditions that will
afford that prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and
prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into the community.”).
He further alleged that he knew of another inmate at Fort Dix
who was scheduled to arrive at a RRC facility on September 23,
2015, one day after Petitioner would have arrived if he had
received a thirty-day placement, in spite of the BOP’s assertion
there were no available beds. (Docket Entry 1 at 5). This Court
ordered Respondent to order on an expedited basis of ten days on
September 22, 2015. (Docket Entry 2).
On September 30, 2015, Petitioner submitted a change of
address informing the Court that he had be moved to the
Community Solutions, Inc., in Wilmington, Delaware, on September
17, 2015. (Docket Entry 4). Respondent entered its appearance on
October 2, 2015, and moved to dismiss the petition as moot as
Petitioner had been assigned to a RRC facility in Wilmington,
Delaware. (Docket Entry 6).
DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
Petitioner challenged the decision of the BOP denying him
placement at a halfway house. Section 2241 of Title 28 of the
United States Code provides in relevant part:
3

(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless ... He is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Section 2241 is the only statute that
confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal
prisoner who is challenging not the validity but the execution
of his sentence.” Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485–86 (3d Cir.
2001). This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under § 2241
to consider the instant petition because Petitioner was
incarcerated in New Jersey when he filed the petition, and he
challenges the denial of early release on federal grounds. See
Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241–44 (3d Cir.
2005); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478–79 (3d Cir.1990).
Moreover, if the BOP incorrectly determined his eligibility for
early release, this error carries a potential for a miscarriage
of justice that can be corrected through habeas corpus. See
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986); Barden, 921 F.2d at
479.
B. Mootness
The exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence
of a case or controversy because Article III of the Constitution
limits the judicial power of federal courts to “cases or
controversies” between parties. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. “The
‘case or controversy requirement subsists through all stages of

4

federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate. . . . The
parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of
the lawsuit.’” Chestnut v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 592 F. App'x
112, 113 (3d Cir. 2015) (omission in original) (quoting Lewis v.
Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477–78 (1990)). “‘[T]hroughout
the litigation,’ the party seeking relief ‘must have suffered,
or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the
defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.’” United States v. Juvenile Male, 131 S. Ct. 2860,
2864 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna,
523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)).
Here, Petitioner asks this Court to compel the BOP to place
him in a RRC facility. The change of address form indicates
Petitioner was placed in such a facility on September 17, 2015.
(Docket Entry 4). Moreover, the BOP’s inmate locator indicates
Petitioner is now placed at Baltimore RRM. BOP Inmate Locator,
available at http://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited October
8, 2015). Petitioner has already received all the relief this
Court could have ordered if it had granted a Writ of Habeas
Corpus. Thus, his placement in a RRC facility renders his
petition moot because Petitioner is no longer threatened with
“an actual injury traceable to the [BOP] and likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spencer, 523 U.S.
at 7; see also Wilson v. Reilly, 163 F. App'x 122, 125 (3d Cir.
5

2006) (When the Parole Board provided habeas petitioner with the
relief sought in his § 2241 petition, this rendered his habeas
claim moot). This Court will therefore dismiss the Petition as
moot.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court will dismiss the
Petition as moot. An accompanying Order will be entered.

October 13, 2015
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

6