BROOKS v. LUTHER et al

Filing 8

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/25/2016. (dmr)(n.m.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HAMEED BROOKS,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 15-6707 (JBS-KMW)

v.
ROBERT LUTHER, et al.,

OPINION
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
Hameed Brooks, Plaintiff Pro Se
315068C/976364
South Woods State Prison
215 Burlington Road South
Bridgeton, NJ 08302
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Hameed Brooks’ (“Plaintiff”),
submission of a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. (Docket Entry 1). By Order dated September 18, 2015, this
Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and ordered the Clerk to file
the complaint. (Docket Entry 3). The order was returned to the
Clerk’s office as undeliverable on September 30, 2015, (Docket
Entry 4), therefore the Court administratively terminated the
complaint pursuant to Local Civil Rule 10.1(a) on October 13,
2015, (Docket Entry 6). Plaintiff filed a change of address
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form, (Docket Entry 7), and the Clerk reopened the case for
judicial review.
At this time, the Court must review the complaint, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to determine whether it
should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. Because Plaintiff seeks to set aside his State Court
conviction, the Court concludes that the complaint will be
dismissed as Plaintiff’s claims must be brought in a petition
for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action against former

Camden County prosecutor Robert Luther, Investigator Aida
Marcello, Officer C. Cooley, and public defenders William Harris
and Chris Hoffner. (Docket Entry 1 at 4-6). The following
factual allegations are taken from the complaint and are
accepted for purposes of this screening only. The Court has made
no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiff’s allegations.
Plaintiff states that on November 2, 2006, he was
wrongfully convicted by a jury due to evidence fabricated by
Prosecutor Luther. (Complaint ¶ 1). He states he was acquitted
of a weapons charge for a gun placed on him by Officer Cooley,
who “also never gave Photo Array or Suspect Line up as
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Formality.” (Complaint ¶ 2). He further alleges Investigator
Marcello violated his Miranda1 rights on December 29, 2005, when
she forged Plaintiff’s signature. (Complaint ¶ 3). Plaintiff
further alleges Investigator Marcello lied during the pre-trial
hearing and stated Plaintiff “told on [himself].” (Docket Entry
1 at 5; Complaint ¶ 3). He states Mr. Harris “did not request
Due Process, did not put motion to suppress or any for that
matter, did not relay deals that were offered and blatantly lied
to [Plaintiff] on a previous case which terminated [his] pending
lawsuit with state troopers.” (Docket Entry 5 at 6). He claims
Mr. Hoffner “did not request for no type of Due Process rights,
no motions for anything or speedy trial, no bail reduction
motions, etc.” (Docket Entry 1 at 9). He finally alleges
Prosecutor Luther gave him an excessive bail. (Complaint ¶ 4).
Plaintiff asks this Court to investigate this matter.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996)
(“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental

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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim
with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The
PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject
to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner
proceeding in forma pauperis and is seeking relief from
government employees.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte
screening for failure to state a claim,2 the complaint must
allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210

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“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x
120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230,
232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1));
Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x. 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
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(3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “A complaint that pleads facts
‘merely consistent with a defendant's liability . . . stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.’ The plausibility determination is ‘a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense.’” Connelly v. Lane
Const. Corp., No. 14-3792, ___ F.3d ____, ____,

2016 WL 106159,

at *3 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 67879).
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007)
(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). Although
pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants
still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,
245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

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B. Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
§ 1983. Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second,
that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person
acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir.
2011); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.
1994).
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed at this time as the
relief he seeks, an investigation into and, presumably, reversal
of his convictions cannot be granted in a § 1983 proceeding.
Plaintiff’s claims must be brought in a petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

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“As a rule, habeas petitions and § 1983 complaints are not
‘coextensive either in purpose or effect.’ Where a state
prisoner seeks to attack the fact or duration of his conviction
or sentence, he must seek relief through a habeas petition, not
a § 1983 complaint.” Rushing v. Pennsylvania, No. 15-2656, 2016
WL 25579, at *2-3 (3d Cir. Jan. 4, 2016) (quoting Leamer v.
Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540 (3d Cir. 2002)); see also Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). “The underlying purpose of
proceedings under the ‘Great Writ’ of habeas corpus has
traditionally been to inquire into the legality of the
detention, and the only judicial relief authorized was the
discharge of the prisoner or his admission to bail, and that
only if his detention were found to be unlawful.” Leamer v.
Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Plaintiff’s allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel, due process and fair trial violations,
and other constitutional claims are an attack on the fact of his
conviction, especially considering the complaint does not
indicate Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages. As such,
Plaintiff must bring his claims under § 2254, not § 1983.
The Court declines to open a § 2254 action at this time as
Plaintiff must exhaust these claims, as well as any other claims
of constitutional violations he may have related to his
conviction and sentence, in the New Jersey courts before
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bringing a habeas action in federal court. The complaint
indicates Plaintiff is in the process of pursuing postconviction relief in the state courts. (Docket Entry 1 at 5).
Once that process is complete, Plaintiff may seek habeas relief
in this Court if necessary.3
The complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Leave to amend is denied as these claims must be brought in a
separate habeas petition, if necessary, after exhaustion of
state court remedies for post-conviction relief.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s complaint is

dismissed for failure to state a claim, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

January 25, 2016
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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The Court expresses no opinion as to whether Plaintiff has
ultimately complied with the procedural requirements of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),
or as to the merits of any forthcoming § 2254 petition.
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