SCHMOTZER v. RUTGERS UNIVERSITY-CAMDEN et al
Filing
28
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 1/24/2018. (tf, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CHELSEA SCHMOTZER,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 15-6904(JBS/DEA)
v.
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY-CAMDEN,
JEFFREY L. DEAN, individually
and in his capacity as
Athletic Direct, Rutgers
Camden, and MATTHEW DEVER,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendants.
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
This dispute comes before the Court by way of the motion of
Defendant Matthew Dever (hereinafter, “Dever”) for summary
judgment. [Docket Item 26.] For the reasons that follow, the
motion will be granted. The Court finds as follows:
1.
In this action, Plaintiff Chelsea Schmotzer
(hereinafter “Plaintiff”), a former member of the Rutgers
University-Camden’s women’s volleyball team, alleges that she
was coerced into a sexual relationship with Dever, who was her
volleyball coach, and that the University acted with deliberate
indifference to her claims of sexual assault and harassment.
Plaintiff contends that she repressed memories of her sexual
relationship with Dever between 2011 and 2014, and that she only
realized the extent of the sexual assault and harassment after a
traumatic event triggered her memory.
2.
On June 21, 2017, the Court granted summary judgment
in favor of Defendants Rutgers University-Camden and Jeffrey L.
Dean after finding that the undisputed facts showed that
Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
[Docket Items 24 & 25.] Dever failed to properly join his codefendants’ motion for summary judgment, and instead belatedly
filed a “me-too” letter stating simply that “[t]he motion for
summary judgment filed by Rutgers-Camden accurately sets forth
the facts and law, and applies equally to Dever.” [Docket Item
17.] Plaintiff objected to Dever’s “me-too” letter as untimely,
prejudicial, and procedurally-deficient. [Docket Item 20.] The
Court sustained Plaintiff’s objection to Dever’s attempted
joinder without prejudice to Dever’s opportunity to file a
proper Rule 56 motion within 21 days of the Court’s Order. [Id.
at 3 n.1.] As the Court explained:
At a minimum, to be docketed as a motion, the ‘me-too’
motion should be submitted in the form of a motion, filed
on the docket, and contain a statement of the relief sought
and a statement that no brief is necessary and that no
separate L. Civ. R. 56.1 statement is necessary because the
party joins in those submissions filed by other counsel.
[Id.]
3.
Dever timely filed the motion for summary judgment now
pending before the Court. [Docket Item 26.] In his motion, Dever
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satisfied the minimum requirements set forth in the Court’s June
21, 2017 Opinion: he filed the motion within 21 days; he
properly filed his motion as a “motion” on the docket; he
included a brief statement of relief sought; and the motion
included a statement that a brief and L. Civ. R. 56.1 statement
were unnecessary because Dever was relying on and incorporating
the previous pleadings and submissions of his co-defendant,
Rutgers University-Camden. [Id.]
4.
Plaintiff timely filed opposition to Dever’s motion
for summary judgment. [Docket Item 27.] In her opposition,
Plaintiff argues that, because “Defendant Dever literally
reiterates his ‘Me Too Letter’ but pastes it under a caption . .
. [he] still fails to comply with proper motion requirements.”
[Id. at 1.] Plaintiff also incorporates and reiterates the
arguments previously raised in response to the motion for
summary judgment filed by Defendants Rutgers University-Camden
and Jeffrey Dean: principally, that this case should be not be
dismissed on the basis of statute of limitations because
Plaintiff repressed the sexual assaults by Devers until the
triggering event in April/May 2014. [Id. at 2.]
5.
First, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment is timely and procedurally sufficient. As
described supra, Dever satisfied the minimum requirements for a
summary judgment motion that incorporates the arguments
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previously raised by his co-defendants, including their
statement of material facts not in dispute, as required by L.
Civ. R. 56.1(a). Thus, the Court deems Dever’s motion properly
filed.
6.
The Court next considers if there is a genuine dispute
of material fact whether the statute of limitations bars
Plaintiff’s claims against Dever. It is undisputed that
Plaintiff’s claims under Title IX, Section 1983, and Monell are
subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Generally, a cause
of action accrues, and the limitations period begins to run,
“when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon
which the action is based.” Montanez v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of
Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Kach v. Hose,
589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009)).
7.
Dever argues1 that Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued
when he allegedly coerced Plaintiff into a sexual relationship
(at the latest, in September 2010), that Plaintiff was aware of
her injury at least through the time she contacted Dever’s wife
in October 2011, and that the Complaint was not filed until
September 2015. [Docket Item 24 at 18.] Plaintiff, on the other
1
As noted supra, Dever indicates in the pending motion that he
is relying on and fully incorporating the previous pleadings and
submissions of his co-defendant Rutgers University-Camden. Thus,
the Court treats arguments previously raised by Defendant
Rutgers University-Camden as also made by Dever.
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hand, claims2 she is entitled to the benefit of New Jersey’s
discovery rule on the grounds that she repressed memories of the
sexual harassment until 2014, and that her September 2015
Complaint was timely filed less than two years after she “awoke”
to her memories of abuse. [Id.]
8.
The Court incorporates the facts and discussion of law
set forth in its Opinion of June 21, 2017, as if restated
herein. [Docket Item 24.]
9.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff and Dever ended their
sexual relationship in August or September 2010 and that
Plaintiff was still aware of her alleged injury and expressing
her grievance when she contacted Dever’s wife 13 months later.
[Id. at 19.] After careful re-examination of the record and
relevant case law, the Court again concludes that the statute of
limitations expired in September 2012 (two years after the last
sexual encounter) and that New Jersey’s discovery rule does not
call for equitable relief in this instance. It is wellestablished that:
The purpose [of the discovery rule] is to ensure that a
party is not barred from pursuing an action before he or
she has a reasonable basis for believing he or she actually
2
Again, as noted supra, Plaintiff “reiterates” her earlier
position that the case should not be dismissed on the basis of
the statute of limitations. And Plaintiff has not raised any new
factual allegations or arguments in her opposition to Dever’s
motion. Accordingly, the Court will assume for purposes of
deciding this motion that Plaintiff fully incorporates any and
all previously-raised arguments.
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as a claim. Once the party has a reasonable basis for
believing he or she has a claim, the justification for the
discovery rule ceases. There is no equitable reason to toll
the statute of limitations for a party who reasonably
should know that a claim exists.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 828 F. Supp.
287, 298 (D.N.J. 1993) (emphasis added). Here, it is undisputed
that Plaintiff had a reasonable basis for believing she had a
claim against Dever when the relationship ended in August or
September 2010. She was aware of the wrong that had been
inflicted and the person or persons responsible for it.
10.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the
statute of limitations period could be tolled from October 2011
(when Plaintiff confronted Mrs. Dever) until May 2014 (when
Plaintiff allegedly regained her memory), and even assuming that
admissible expert testimony could establish that Plaintiff’s
memories were completely repressed beginning on the day she
confronted Mrs. Dever and ending on the day of regained memory,
it is undisputed that at least 16 more months elapsed between
when Plaintiff “awoke” (May 2014) and when she filed the
Complaint (September 2015). Thus, taking into account the 13
months between the sexual relationship ending and when Plaintiff
contacted Mrs. Dever to complain about Matthew Dever’s
misconduct, there were at least 29 months (i.e., more than two
years) where Plaintiff’s memory was unimpaired elapsed between
Plaintiff’s injury and the filing of the Complaint. Plaintiff’s
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claims are thus time-barred by the two-year statute of
limitations.
11.
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons stated
in this Court’s June 21, 2017 Opinion, Plaintiff’s claims
against Matthew Dever are time-barred and the Court will grant
Dever’s motion for summary judgment. An accompanying Order shall
be entered.
January 24, 2018
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge
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