SCOTT v. MANENTI et al
Filing
17
OPINION filed. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 1/6/2016. (drw)n.m.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOSEPH SCOTT,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 15-7213 (JBS-AMD)
v.
JOHN MANENTI, et al.,
OPINION
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Joseph Scott, Plaintiff Pro Se
#04194-015
FCI Fairton
P.O. Box 420
Fairton, NJ 08320
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Joseph Scott’s (“Plaintiff”),
submission of a civil rights complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971), (Docket Entry 1), motion for the appointment of
counsel (Docket Entry 10), and motion for a preliminary
injunction, (Docket Entry 9).1 At this time, the Court must
1
Plaintiff filed two substantively identical motions for a
preliminary injunction, Docket Entries 8 and 9. Docket Entry 8
shall be dismissed as superseded by Docket Entry 9. Plaintiff’s
request for counsel made in Docket Entry 9 shall be addressed as
part of his formal motion, Docket Entry 10.
review the complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to determine
whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
concludes that the complaint will proceed against Defendants
Morales and Manenti, and the remainder of the defendants shall
be dismissed. Defendants Morales and Manenti shall be ordered to
show cause why an injunction should not issue, and Plaintiff’s
motion for counsel is denied without prejudice. Plaintiff’s
motions to amend the complaint, (Docket Entries 11 and 13), are
denied without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action against
Defendants Mark Kirby, Dr. Angud, Dr. Morales, Dr. Manenti,
Regional Director Norwood, and the General Counsel of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) in their individual
capacities. (Docket Entry 1 at 2).2 The following factual
2Although
Plaintiff does not explicitly state that Warden Kirby
is only being sued in his individual capacity, the Court
concludes after an examination of the complaint that Plaintiff
only intended to assert claims against the warden in his
individual capacity. Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir.
1990), aff'd, 502 U.S. 21 (1991). To the extent the complaint
could be interpreted as asserting claims against Warden Kirby in
his official capacity, however, such a claim would be barred as
the real party in interest, the United States, has sovereign
immunity from suit. Tucker v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs.,
2
allegations are taken from the complaint and are accepted for
purposes of this screening only. The Court has made no findings
as to the veracity of Plaintiff’s allegations.
Plaintiff is a convicted and sentenced federal prisoner
currently confined at FCI Fairton, New Jersey. Plaintiff states
that on October 13, 2013, he submitted a request for medical
attention to his right shoulder. (Docket Entry 1 ¶ 1). Dr.
Morales gave Plaintiff a cortisone injection on November 27,
2013. (Docket Entry 1 ¶ 2). Nearly a year later, an unidentified
physician’s assistant determined Plaintiff’s shoulder had not
improved and arranged for a consultation with an orthopedic
surgeon. (Docket Entry 1 ¶ 3). The evaluation occurred on
January 27, 2015, at which time the orthopedist gave Plaintiff a
corticosteroid injection and diagnosed him with a torn rotator
cuff. (Docket Entry 1 ¶ 4). He indicated a MRI might be
necessary if Plaintiff remained in pain. (Docket Entry 1 ¶ 4).
588 F. App'x 110, 115 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The United States may not
be sued without its consent . . . and a Bivens action cannot be
maintained against a federal official in [his] official capacity
since such an action would essentially be one against the United
States.”). Sovereign immunity likewise bars Plaintiff’s request
for injunctive relief from Warden Kirby in his official
capacity. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S.
682, 687 (1949)(holding that request for declaratory and
injunctive relief against the government based on the actions of
individual defendant officers was an action against the United
States); accord Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane
Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 85-86 (1991).
3
After a few months, Plaintiff’s shoulder pain had not
improved. The orthopedic surgeon then recommended Plaintiff have
a MRI. (Docket Entry 1 ¶ 5). Medical Director Manenti denied
Plaintiff’s request for a MRI on June 16, 2015, due to
“incomplete clinical management.” (Docket Entry 1 ¶ 6).
Plaintiff asked for assistance from Drs. Morales and Angud; they
responded by instructing Plaintiff to submit another grievance
in order to get authorization from the Region. (Docket Entry 1 ¶
7). As of the filing of the complaint, Plaintiff has not
received a MRI on his shoulder.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996)
(“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental
employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim
with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The
PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject
to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
4
because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking redress from a
government official.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007)
(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte
screening for failure to state a claim,3 the complaint must
allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
3
“[T]he legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to § 1915A is identical to the legal
standard employed in ruling on 12(b)(6) motions.” Courteau v.
United States, 287 F. App'x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).
5
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
B. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics
In Bivens, the Supreme Court created a federal counterpart
to the remedy created in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Egervary v.
Young, 366 F.3d 238, 246 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Bivens actions are
simply the federal counterpart to § 1983 claims brought against
state officials”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1049 (2005). In order
to state a claim under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a
deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States; and (2) that the deprivation of the right was
caused by a person acting under color of federal law. See Couden
v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 491 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Collins v.
F.B.I., Civ. No. 10–3470, 2011 WL 1627025, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr.
28, 2011) (“The Third Circuit has recognized that Bivens actions
are simply the federal counterpart to § 1983 claims brought
against state officials and thus the analysis established under
one type of claim is applicable under the other.”).
6
III. ANALYSIS
A. Eighth Amendment Claims
The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment requires that prison officials provide inmates with
adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04
(1976). In order to set forth a cognizable claim for a violation
of his right to adequate medical care, an inmate must allege:
(1) a serious medical need; and (2) behavior on the part of
prison officials that constitutes deliberate indifference to
that need. Id. at 106.
To satisfy the first prong of the Estelle inquiry, the
inmate must demonstrate that his medical needs are serious.
“Because society does not expect that prisoners will have
unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to
medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if
those needs are ‘serious.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9
(1992).
The second element of the Estelle test requires an inmate
show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to
his serious medical need. “The hallmark of an Eighth Amendment
violation arises when such medical treatment, or the withholding
of medical treatment, is accompanied by knowing indifference to
the pain or risk of serious injury this will cause, such as by
‘persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of
7
permanent injury.’” Andrews v. Camden Cnty., 95 F. Supp. 2d 217,
228 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109
(3d Cir. 1990)).
Deliberate indifference may be found where the prison
official (1) knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment
but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) intentionally
delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical
reason; or (3) deliberately prevents a prisoner from receiving
needed medical treatment. See Pierce v. Pitkins, 520 F. App'x
64, 66 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192,
197 (3d Cir. 1999)).
1. Drs. Manenti and Morales
Construing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, as the
Court must do at this preliminary screening stage, this Court
preliminarily finds that Plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to
state a plausible claim for relief against Drs. Manenti and
Morales. The complaint sufficiently pleads facts suggesting Dr.
Manenti denied Plaintiff a procedure ordered by a physician for
a non-medical purpose, i.e., “incomplete clinical management,”
(Docket Entry 1 ¶
6), and established the policy that led to
the constitutional violation. (Docket Entry 1 at 10, para. 11).
Plaintiff also alleges he informed Dr. Morales that he was in
“excruciating pain” in October 2013, yet Dr. Morales delayed
referring Plaintiff to the orthopedist until January 2015.
8
(Docket Entry 1 at 10, para. 12). The complaint fails to state a
cause of action against the other defendants, however.
2. Dr. Angud
Plaintiff alleges no facts that would support an inference
that Dr. Angud denied Plaintiff treatment. Plaintiff’s complaint
only indicates she informed him he would have to file a
grievance in order to get authorization for a MRI. (Docket Entry
1 ¶ 7). Plaintiff’s conclusory statement that “she’s involved in
the delayed access to a MRI” is insufficient to suggest she
acted with deliberate indifference. (Docket Entry 1 at 6). In
the absence of facts that specifically allege how she was
involved in denying medical treatment and how she exhibited
deliberate indifference towards Plaintiff’s condition,
Plaintiff’s claims against her must be dismissed without
prejudice.
3. Director Norwood
Plaintiff’s claims against Director Norwood must be
dismissed as well. Plaintiff alleges Director Norwood knew about
Plaintiff’s case due to the receipt of Plaintiff’s grievances
and the investigations he conducted into those grievances.
(Docket Entry 1 at 10, para. 9). Plaintiff states, without any
supporting facts, that Director Norwood “(1) knew of plaintiff’s
need for medical treatment but intentionally refused to provide
it (2) delayed necessary medical treatment for non-medical
9
reasons or (3) prevented plaintiff from receiving needed or
recommended treatment from the orthopedic surgeon physician.”
(Docket Entry 1 at 11, para. 13). Under Iqbal, “a pleading that
offers . . . a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff must allege
specific facts that would permit the Court to reasonably infer
Director Norwood acted with the necessary state of mind.
Plaintiff’s claims against Director Norwood are dismissed
without prejudice.
4. Warden Kirby
Plaintiff also has not sufficiently pled Warden Kirby’s
individual liability. He concedes “Warden Kirby did not commit
the medical violations,” but argues “he became responsible for
them when he failed to correct them in the course of his
supervisory responsibilities.” (Docket Entry 1 at 6).
“Government officials may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of
respondeat superior [and] a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official's own
actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676;
see also Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012). To
state a claim for supervisory liability for denial of medical
care, a plaintiff must allege facts indicating that “a state
10
official, by virtue of his or her own deliberate indifference to
known deficiencies in a government policy or procedure, has
allowed to develop an environment in which there is an
unreasonable risk that a constitutional injury will occur, and
that such an injury does occur.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med.
Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 320 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042
(2015). Allegations that a supervisor responded inappropriately
to Plaintiff’s grievances about his medical treatment do not
establish personal involvement of the supervisor in the
treatment. See Davis v. Samuels, 608 F. App'x 46, 48-49 (3d Cir.
2015); Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App'x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006).
To the extent Plaintiff asserts Warden Kirby is liable
under a failure-to-supervise theory, see Barkes, 766 F.3d at
316, his claim also fails. Generally, failure to adequately
supervise can constitute deliberate indifference only if the
failure has caused a pattern of violations. Connick v. Thompson,
131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan
Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997). Plaintiff has
not alleged there has been a pattern of violations of prisoners’
right to medical care, nor has he alleged that Warden Kirby was
the relevant policymaker. In fact, his complaint indicates Dr.
Manenti is the policymaker on medical issues. (Docket Entry 1 at
11
10, para. 11). Plaintiff’s claims against Warden Kirby shall be
dismissed without prejudice.
5. General Counsel
Plaintiff’s claims against the BOP General Counsel must
also be dismissed. Plaintiff bases his claims against the
General Counsel on his purported failure to adequately respond
to Plaintiff’s grievances. As is the case with Warden Kirby,
this is not enough to suggest he was deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s medical needs. See Davis v. Samuels, 608 F. App'x
46, 48-49 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding sending a grievance to the
office of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons does not
establish personal liability); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988). Plaintiff’s claims against the
General Counsel are dismissed without prejudice.4
4
In the event Plaintiff wishes to pursue those claims that have
been dismissed without prejudice, he may move to amend his
complaint in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
Any motion to amend must be accompanied by a proposed amended
complaint. Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint
is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Ibid. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file
an amended complaint that is complete in itself. Ibid.
12
B. Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff also requests this Court provide injunctive
relief in the form of an order requiring Defendants to provide
him with a MRI and any other necessary medical care. (Docket
Entry 9). To secure the extraordinary relief of a preliminary
injunction, Petitioner must demonstrate “(1) a likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) that [he] will suffer irreparable
harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary
relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving
party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.” KOS
Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004).
All four elements must be satisfied in order to grant the
injunction. Roberts v. Ferman, 448 F. App'x 254, 256 (3d Cir.
2011).
A court “may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary
restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount
that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages
sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or
restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 65(c). A narrow exception to the
requirement exists when “a balance of the equities of the
potential hardships that each party would suffer as result of a
preliminary injunction . . . weighs overwhelmingly in favor of
the party seeking the injunction.” Elliott v. Kiesewetter, 98
F.3d 47, 60 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Temple Univ. v. White, 941
13
F.2d 201, 220 (3d Cir. 1991)(adopting balance of equities
exception to bond requirement).
As Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim has survived
screening under § 1915A, Defendants shall be ordered to show
cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue within 21
days of service requiring the administration of an MRI. See Fed.
R. Civ. Pro. 65(a)(1). Defendants shall address the bond
requirement in their response.
C. Appointment of Counsel
Plaintiff asks this Court to appoint pro bono counsel to
represent him in this matter on the grounds that he has no legal
education and will need assistance throughout the proceedings.
(Docket Entry 10 ¶¶ 2-5). Appointment of counsel is a privilege,
not a statutory or constitutional right. Brightwell v. Lehman,
637 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 2011). Section 1915 permits a court
to request that an attorney represent any person who is unable
to afford counsel on his own. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Plaintiff
is not presently eligible for the appointment of counsel as he
has not demonstrated he is unable to afford an attorney. The
motion shall be denied without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to
request the appointment of counsel at a later time.5 Plaintiff is
advised that the appointment of counsel is not guaranteed.
5
In the event Plaintiff elects to seek the appointment of
counsel again, he should address the factors enumerated in
14
D. Motions to Amend
Plaintiff has filed two motions to amend his complaint.
(Docket Entries 11 and 13). Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure permits a party to amend a pleading once as a
matter of course twenty-one (21) days after serving the pleading
or twenty-one (21) days “after a responsive pleading or service
of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is
earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a)(1)(A)-(B). As no responsive
pleadings have yet been filed, Plaintiff may amend his complaint
once as of right. The proposed amendments to the complaint,
however, do not state valid claims for relief. The dismissal is
without prejudice, and Plaintiff may refile his motion if he
able to correct the deficiencies noted herein.6
Plaintiff’s first “motion” seeks to add a “deliberate
indifference claim.” (Docket Entry 11 at 1). He argues
the refusal of defendants, Manenti, Morales, Angud,
Kirby, Norwood, and General Counsel to deny or delay of
[sic] access to treatment, and the interference with
medical judgment by factors unrelated to prisoners
medical needs, and failure to carry out medical orders
and recommendations by a specialist to him constitute
Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993): (1) the
plaintiff's ability to present his or her own case;(2) the
complexity of the legal issues; (3) the degree to which factual
investigation will be necessary and the ability of the plaintiff
to pursue such investigation; (4) the amount a case is likely to
turn on credibility determinations;(5) whether the case will
require the testimony of expert witnesses; and (6) whether the
plaintiff can attain and afford counsel on his own behalf.
6 See supra note 4.
15
deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical
needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
(Docket Entry 11 at 3). This is the exact claim that was raised
in the original complaint. Deliberate indifference is an element
of an Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claim, it is not
an independent cause of action. Plaintiff also repeats his
allegation that there was a policy of denying medical care that
was too expensive. (Docket Entry 11 at 3; Docket Entry 1 ¶ 13).
As the proposed claim does not set out a basis on which relief
could be granted, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), Plaintiff’s first
motion to amend the complaint is denied. (Docket Entry 11).
Plaintiff’s second motion to amend seeks to add a claim
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). (Docket Entry 13).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680. The FTCA “operates as a limited
waiver of the United States's sovereign immunity.” White–Squire
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010). Under
the Act, the United States is liable “in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. An FTCA plaintiff may sue only
the United States, may seek only monetary damages, and may not
recover for mental or emotional damages in the absence of
physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (providing jurisdiction
for “civil actions on claims against the United States, for
money damages” and providing that incarcerated felons may not
16
bring actions “for mental or emotional injury suffered while in
custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”); CNA v.
United States, 535 F.3d 132, 138 n.2 (3d Cir.2008) (“The
Government is the only proper defendant in a case brought under
the FTCA.”); Robinson v. Sherrod, 631 F.3d 839, 841 (7th Cir.
2011) (holding that the FTCA does not provide for equitable
relief). Federal constitutional violations are not cognizable
under the FTCA. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477–78
(1994).
A plaintiff suing under the Act must present the offending
agency, in this case the BOP, with notice of the claim,
including a “sum certain” demand for monetary damages. White–
Squire, 592 F.3d at 457. “Because the requirements of
presentation and a demand for a sum certain are among the terms
defining the United States's consent to be sued, they are
jurisdictional.” Ibid. (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 584, 587 (1941)). These requirements cannot be waived.
Ibid. (citing Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047, 1049 (3d
Cir. 1971)).
Plaintiff states “[t]he regional office of the northeast
regional office of the FBOP, received F.T.C.A. on 10/5/2015.
Claim no. TRT-NER-2016-00186. See Attachment.” (Docket Entry 13
at 2). No attachment was provided to the Court. The Court cannot
determine what claims were contained in his October 5, 2015
17
notice and therefore potentially exhausted, nor whether the
notice set forth a certain sum of damages. Therefore, the motion
must be denied for failure to sufficiently allege the
jurisdictional basis for Plaintiff's FTCA claim. See Kaufman v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 245 F.2d 918, 920 (3d Cir. 1957) (“The
party asserting it has the burden of proving all the
jurisdictional prerequisites.”). Plaintiff may refile his motion
to amend his complaint to include the FTCA claim in accordance
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.7
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Manenti and Morales shall proceed at this time. The
remainder of the defendants are dismissed at this time for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Defendants Manenti and Morales shall show
cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue within 21
days of service. Plaintiff’s motions to amend his complaint are
denied without prejudice.
An appropriate order follows.
January 6, 2016
Date
7
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
See supra note 4.
18
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?