SAMUELS v. SKRADZINSKI et al

Filing 3

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 11/30/2015. (drw)n.m.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________________
DUSTIN LAMAR SAMUELS,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civ. No. 15-7362 (RBK) (AMD)
:
v.
:
:
WARDEN SKRADZINSKI, et al.,
:
OPINION
:
Defendants.
:
_________________________________________ :
ROBERT B. KUGLER, U.S.D.J.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee currently detained at the Salem County Correctional
Facility in Woodstown, New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with a civil rights complaint filed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
At this time, this Court must screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)B)
and 1915A to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted or because it seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from suit. For the following reasons, the complaint will be permitted
to proceed in part.
II.

BACKGROUND

The allegations of the complaint will be construed as true for purposes of this screening
Opinion. The complaint names the following defendants: (1) Warden Skradzinski; (2) Deputy
Warden; (3) Health Department; (4) Sgt. Welch; (5) C.O. Sobkiw; (6) C.O. Dacciaio; and (7)
C.O. Cleveland.

The allegations of the complaint stem from an incident that occurred on February 10,
2015 while plaintiff was at the Salem County Correctional Facility. He claims that a response
team was called into his unit on that date. Subsequently, plaintiff was handcuffed by Sobkiw
who kicked plaintiff a number of times in his genital region. Plaintiff also alleges that Welch
repeatedly kicked, kneed and punched him in the head which caused his head to slam to the
ground. Cleveland punched him in his right side and Dacciaio punched plaintiff in his neck, left
side and rib cage.
Plaintiff then went to the medical department where a doctor could clearly see his
swollen head and busted lip. Plaintiff explained to the doctor the cause of his injuries. However,
the doctor told him that he would be alright and sent him to the detention unit cell #26.
While still handcuffed and now in cell #26, Dacciaio punched plaintiff repeatedly in the
head while he was told to shut his mouth.
Plaintiff alleges he suffered severe pain and requests monetary damages.
III.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of
his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.

2

Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of
a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged
deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v.
Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104–134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321–66
to 1321–77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),
seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a
claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts
to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App'x
230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F.
App'x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). That standard is set forth in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
as explicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. To survive the court's
screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d

3

Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions' or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U .S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519 (1972). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
IV.

DISCUSSION

A. Defendant Health Department
Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against the Health Department as the Health
Department is not considered a “person” under § 1983. See Ruff v. Health Care Adm’r, 441 F.
App’x 843, 845-46 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing Fischer v. Cahill¸474 F.2d 991, 992, (3d
Cir. 1973) (per curiam)). Therefore, plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the Health Department will
be dismissed with prejudice.
To the extent that the complaint could be construed as containing state law claims against
the Health Department, this Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those
claims. See 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3); T.R. v. Cnty. of Delaware, No. 13-2931, 2013 WL 6210477, at
*8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2013) (declining supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims over one
defendant where there are no viable claims against that defendant, despite the fact that plaintiff

4

may have plead plausible claims against another defendant) (citation omitted); see also Nadal v.
Christie, No. 13-5477, 2014 WL 2812164, at *8 (D.N.J. June 23, 2014).
B. Defendants Welch, Sobkiw, Dacciaio and Cleveland
As a pretrial detainee at the time of the incident giving rise to the complaint, plaintiff’s
allegations against the correctional officer defendants, Welch, Sobkiw, Dacciaio and Cleveland
(collectively the “correctional officer defendants”) “are considered under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which prohibits the State from imposing punishment on
those who have not yet been convicted of a crime, rather than the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.” Robinson v. Beckles, No. 10-0362, 2015 WL
4511693, at *4 (D. Del. July 24, 2015) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)).
Courts apply an objective standard when considering a pretrial detainee’s claim of excessive
force. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472-73 (2015). Thus, “a pretrial detainee
must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively
unreasonable.” Id. at 2472. This objectiveness “turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each
particular case.’” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). “A court must
make this determination from the prospective of a reasonable officers on the scene, including
what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. Additionally, in
Kingsley, the Supreme Court explained that:
A court must also account for the “legitimate interests that stem
from [the government's] need to manage the facility in which the
individual is detained,” appropriately deferring to “policies and
practices that in th[e] judgment” of jail officials “are needed to
preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540, 547, 99 S. Ct. 1861,
60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).
Considerations such as the following may bear on the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used: the
5

relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount
of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made
by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity
of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by
the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting. See,
e.g., Graham, supra, at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865.
Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473.
Applying this standard, the Court will permit plaintiff’s claims against the correctional
officer defendants to proceed past screening based on the allegations in the complaint.
C. Defendants Warden Skradzinski & Deputy Warden
Plaintiff also names Warden Skradzinski and the Deputy Warden as defendants. He
claims that they are liable because they failed to investigate his complaints of assault from their
officers at the Salem County Correctional Facility.
At the outset, this Court notes that plaintiff cannot rely solely on a respondeat superior
theory of liability against a defendant for Section 1983 liability. See Alexander v. Gennarini, 144
F. App’x 924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“Section 1983 liability cannot be found solely on
the basis of respondeat superior.”). Instead, a plaintiff must allege that a supervisor had a
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. See Rode v. Dellaciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d
Cir. 1988). “Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of
actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted).
In this case, plaintiff states that the Warden and Deputy Warden are liable because they
failed to investigate his complaints. Nevertheless, failure to respond to his complaints about the
correctional officer defendants does not state a Section 1983 claim against these defendants.
Indeed, a plaintiff appealing grievances to the prison administrator is typically not enough to
impose knowledge against the prison administrator of the wrongdoing. See Gordon v.
6

Scarborough, No. 12–1057, 2013 WL 1145754, at *4 (D.Del. Mar. 18, 2013) (“[A]fter-the-fact
review of a grievance is not enough to establish personal involvement for a § 1983 claim.”);
Croom v. Wagner, No. 06–1431, 2006 WL 2619794, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 11, 2006) (“[N]either
the filing of a grievance nor an appeal of a grievance to Warden Wagner is sufficient to impose
knowledge of any wrongdoing.”) (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208; Pressley v. Blaine, No. 01–
2468, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30151, at *17 (W.D.Pa. May 17, 2006) (citing Garfield v. Davis,
566 F. Supp. 1069, 1074 (E.D.Pa. 1983))); see also Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App'x 925, 925 (3d
Cir. 2006) (allegations that prison officials responded inappropriately to inmate's later filed
grievances do not establish the involvement of those officials in underlying deprivation);
Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App'x 924, 925 (3d Cir.2005) (per curiam) (“Section 1983
liability cannot be found solely on the basis of respondeat superior. The District Court properly
dismissed Alexander's claims as against Defendants Klem and Burks, as the allegations related to
these defendants merely assert their involvement in the post-incident grievance process.”)
(internal citation omitted). Furthermore, this is not a situation where plaintiff has alleged an
ongoing violation that could potentially make these two supervisory defendants liable. See
Cardona v. Warden – MDC Facility, No. 12-7161, 2013 WL 6446999, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 6,
2013) (collecting cases and noting that a plaintiff may have a claim against a supervisory
defendant who reviewed a grievance where the plaintiff alleges an ongoing violation). Indeed,
the complaint stems from the correctional officer defendants purported use of excessive force on
one occasion. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a Section 1983 claim against Warden
Skradzinski and the Deputy Warden and the Section 1983 claims against these two defendants
will be dismissed without prejudice.

7

To the extent that the complaint could be construed as containing state law claims against
Warden Skradzinski and the Deputy Warden, this Court will decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over them. See 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3); T.R., 2013 WL 6210477, at *8; see also Nadal,
2014 WL 2812164, at *8.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s claims against the correctional officer defendants
shall be permitted to proceed. Plaintiff’s federal claims against the Health Department shall be
dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and the
Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims against
this defendant (to the extent they are raised). Plaintiff’s federal claims against defendants
Warden Skradzinski & Deputy Warden shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim and the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law
claims against these two defendants (to the extent they are raised). An appropriate Order will be
entered.

DATED: November 30, 2015
s/Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge

8