LASK v. MELONI et al
Filing
26
OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 12/1/16. (js)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SUSAN CHANA LASK,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 15-7606 (NLH/JS)
OPINION
v.
LOUIS K. MELONI, et al.
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
JAMIE GOLDMAN, ESQ.
200 Centennial Avenue
Suite 200
Piscataway, New Jersey 08854
On behalf of Plaintiff
ROBERT LOUGY, ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY
By: Akeel A. Qureshi, Deputy Attorney General
25 Market Street, P.O. Box 116
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
On behalf of Defendants
HILLMAN, District Judge
Plaintiff Susan Chana Lask, Esq. brings this suit against
the Honorable Louis R. Meloni, a Superior Court Judge in New
Jersey.
According to Lask, when she appeared before the judge
as a pro se litigant, the judge made “conclusion driven, biased
decisions favoring [Lask’s adversary]” (Compl. ¶2), and held an
ex parte “meeting” concerning the case without Lask present
(Compl. ¶ 32), all because Judge Meloni and Lask’s adversary are
allegedly “friends,” and Lask’s adversary is allegedly the
judge’s “crony.” (Compl. ¶ 1, 3)
The suit also names Assignment
Judge Deborah Silverman Katz as a Defendant, because she
allegedly has supervisory power over Judge Meloni.
The Complaint asserts three claims: (1) § 1983 / Due
Process violations; (2) “violations of Article I, Section 1 of
the New Jersey Constitution (Substantive Due Process) N.J.S.A.
10:6-1 et seq.”; and (3) § 1983 / First Amendment retaliation. 1
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint.
For the reasons
stated herein, the Court will grant the motion as to the federal
law claims (Counts 1 and 3); and decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim
(Count 2).
I.
Lask alleges that Judge Meloni took the following actions:
•
“In August, 2014, with no basis in law or fact, Meloni
ordered Plaintiff Lask to release her confidential
attorney-client communications to [her adversary].”
(Compl. ¶ 18)
•
“In
August,
2014,
[Judge
Meloni]
permitted
[Plaintiff’s adversary] to lie . . . so that [the
judge]
could
rule
in
favor
of
[Plaintiff’s
adversary.]” (Compl. ¶ 19)
•
“In August, 2014 . . . [Judge Meloni] . . . refused
any adjournment to Plaintiff on a motion schedule.”
(Compl. ¶ 20)
1
The Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
2
•
“On October 31, 2014, without basis in law or fact,
[Judge Meloni] dismissed two counts of Plaintiff’s
complaint.” (Compl. ¶ 22)
•
While on the bench, in open court, during various
hearings
[Judge
Meloni]
allegedly
“encouraged”
Plaintiff’s adversary to “intimidate” Plaintiff,
“interrupted” Plaintiff, stated that Plaintiff “was
in discovery default,” and “dismissed [Plaintiff’s
case] without prejudice.” (Compl. ¶¶ 24, 30, 31)
•
“[I]gnored Plaintiff’s several motions.” (Compl. ¶
25)
•
Denied or “refused
(Compl. ¶ 27)
•
On January 26, 2015, Judge Meloni allegedly held an
“ex parte meeting” on the record with all counsel
present (except Plaintiff) “on the pretense that it
was the trial date” for Plaintiff’s case. (Compl. ¶
32) 2
to
grant”
Plaintiff’s
motions
Lask has sued Judge Meloni in his official and personal
capacities.
Judge Silverman Katz is sued only in her official
capacity.
Lask seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as
monetary damages.
II.
2
While the complaint alleges an ex parte “meeting,” the
official transcript of the “meeting,” which Plaintiff attaches
to her complaint, is entitled “Transcript of Hearing,” bears the
docket number CAM-L-1791-14, and appears to be prepared by an
official court reporter. The transcript begins, “THE COURT: All
right. This is the matter of Lask v. Florence, et al., docket
number L-1791-14. Counsel will you enter your appearances?”
(Compl. Ex. C)
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When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court
must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as
true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005).
It is well
settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Under the liberal federal pleading rules, it is not
necessary to plead evidence, and it is not necessary to plead
all the facts that serve as a basis for the claim. Bogosian v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 562 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977).
However, “the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . do require that the
pleadings give defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Baldwin Cnty.
Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149-50 n.3 (1984)
(quotation and citation omitted).
A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks
“‘not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether
the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the
claim.’” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007)
(quoting Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009)(“Our decision in
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Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions’
. . . .”); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009)(“Iqbal . . . provides the final nail in the coffin for the
‘no set of facts’ standard that applied to federal complaints
before Twombly.”).
III.
A.
The § 1983 claims for money damages are barred by absolute
judicial immunity
A judicial officer in the performance of his or her duties
has absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his
or her judicial acts.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991).
“A
judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he
took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he
has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)(citation omitted).
All of the allegations in Lask’s complaint relate to
actions taken by Judges Meloni and Silverman Katz in their
capacities as judges.
Lask has not set forth any facts that
would plausibly support a conclusion that either of the judges’
actions were taken in clear absence of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, Lask’s § 1983 claims for money damages are
barred.
B.
The § 1983 claims for injunctive relief are barred by
statute
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The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 amended 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to provide that “in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless
a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The complaint does not allege that a declaratory decree was
violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable.
Additionally, the injunctive relief Lask seeks only addresses
actions taken by the judges in their judicial capacities.
Accordingly, Lask’s § 1983 claims for injunctive relief are
barred.
C.
The Court declines to issue declaratory relief
Lask requests “a declaratory judgment that the actions,
conduct and practices of Defendants complained of herein violate
the laws of the United States and the State of New Jersey.”
(Compl. “Prayer for Relief” ¶ A)
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, district courts “may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is
or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. 2201(a)(emphasis added).
Whether
to exercise this permissive grant of jurisdiction is within the
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discretion of the District Court. Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp.,
751 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2014).
Given the nature and disposition of the other claims
asserted, the Court declines to issue declaratory relief. See
generally Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547, 1552 (11th Cir. 1985)
(“A declaration that Judge Peeler’s past conduct violated
Emory’s constitutional rights and Georgia law would be nothing
more than a gratuitous comment without any force or
effect.”)(internal citation and quotation omitted); Johnson v.
McCuskey, 72 F. App’x 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2003)(declining to
“‘declare that Magistrate Judge Bernthal and Judge McCuskey
acted improperly in various ways when deciding the motion for a
change of venue.”).
D.
The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining state law claim
The Third Circuit has repeatedly stated, “‘where the claim
over which the district court has original jurisdiction is
dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to
decide the pendent state law claims unless considerations of
judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties
provide an affirmative justification for doing so.’” Hedges v.
Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000)(citing 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3), and quoting Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45
F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995))(emphasis added); cf. Sarpolis v.
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Tereshko, 625 F. App’x 594, 600 (3d Cir. 2016)(affirming
district court’s retention and exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(3) because the district court had
“an affirmative justification for exercising supplemental
jurisdiction.”)(quoting Hedges).
The Court finds no sufficient affirmative justification for
retaining supplemental jurisdiction of the remaining state law
claim.
That claim will be dismissed without prejudice to Lask’s
right to refile in the appropriate state forum.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
will be granted as to the federal law claims.
The remaining
state law claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
Dated: December 1, 2016
At Camden, New Jersey
__s/ Noel L. Hillman
_
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
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