MACKLIN v. COUNTY OF CAMDEN et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 6/28/2016. (tf, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MALIK Y. MACKLIN,
Plaintiff,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
v.
COUNTY OF CAMDEN; CAMDEN
COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT a/k/a
METRO DIVISION; CHIEF OF
POLICE JOHN SCOTT THOMSON;
WILLIAM FRETT; NICHOLAS RAO;
ANTHONY AMATO; JOHN DOES 1-10
(f/n of Metro Division Police
Officers, individually and in
official capacities) j/s/a,

Civil Action
No. 15-7641 (JBS/AMD)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants.

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Plaintiff Malik Y. Macklin
alleges that one evening in September of 2013, three police
officers from the Camden County Police Department used excessive
force when they assaulted and arrested him without probable
cause as he was walking down the street, causing severe bodily
injuries. (Compl. [Docket Item 1.]) Less than one month after
the incident, Plaintiff and his mother reported the incident to
the Camden County Police Department’s Internal Affairs Office,
which investigated the allegations of excessive force.
Approximately two years later, Plaintiff sued the three
individual police officers, along with the County of Camden, the

Camden County Police Department, and the Chief of Police John
Scott Thomson [misstated as “Thomas”], bringing claims under the
U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions as well as various tort claims
under state law.
Defendants moved for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), or alternatively for summary judgment under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(b), on the state tort claims because Plaintiff failed
to file a notice of claim within 90 days of his injury, as
required under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (“NJTCA”),
N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq. [Docket Item 9.] Plaintiff admits that a
notice of claim was not filed, but he and his mother filed a
complaint with the Camden County Police’s internal affairs
office shortly after the incident, which he argues effectively
placed Defendants on notice of their potential liability.
Because the Court holds that under New Jersey law such a
complaint does not “substantially comply” with the notice
requirement under the NJTCA, Defendants’ motion will be granted,
and the state tort claims will be dismissed. The Court finds as
follows:1

1

The facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ Complaint and from
undisputedly authentic documents upon which Plaintiff explicitly
relies in his Complaint. See In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props.,
Inc., Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999). Because
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains state tort claims subject to the
notice requirement under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, and
Plaintiff asserts that he substantially complied with the notice
requirement, the documents related to these matters submitted by
2

1.

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he was walking home

after a game of basketball on or around 9:00 p.m. on the evening
of September 27, 2013, when he was stopped by a police car with
several police officers inside, three of whom Plaintiff
identified as Defendants William Frett, Nicholas Rao, and
Anthony Amato. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, 7, 11.) The encounter began with
questions from Defendant Frett but escalated quickly. According
to the Complaint, the officers, allegedly without any
provocation, threw Plaintiff to the ground and assaulted him
with punches and kicks until Plaintiff’s family members came
onto the scene. (Id. ¶¶ 9-13.) Plaintiff was arrested and
charged with resisting arrest, aggravated assault, obstruction
of justice, and eluding an officer of the law but was later
exonerated by a jury. As a consequence of the incident,
Plaintiff suffered “severe bodily injuries,” emotional distress,
and pain and suffering. (Id. ¶¶ 15-17.)
2.

Shortly after the incident, Plaintiff’s mother, Malika

Macklin, filed a complaint with the Internal Affairs department

both Plaintiff and Defendants will be considered in connection
with the pending motions to dismiss. See Pension Ben. Guar.
Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d
Cir. 1993)) (“[A] court may consider an undisputedly authentic
document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to
dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the document.”).
Neither party raises an objection to the Court’s reliance on
these documents to decide the pending motion. For purposes of
these motions, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations as
true.
3

at the Camden County Police Department, which was memorialized
in a “Reportable Incident Form” with the date of October 1,
2013. (See Ex. A to Def. Reply [Docket Item 13-1]; see also
Cert. of Malika Macklin [Docket Item 12] ¶ 8.) Ms. Macklin
complained that her son was arrested by police officers after
they received a report of a person with a gun, and that officers
“jacked” him up. She stated that when she came outside, her son
was “on a gurney being attended to by medical personnel,” and
complained to Internal Affairs that her son “was ‘targeted’ and
mistreated physically.” (Ex. A to Def. Reply.) Plaintiff also
reported the excessive force incident to Officer Angel Nieves, a
detective in the Office of Internal Affairs, and signed a
citizen complaint form on October 15, 2013. (See Cert. of Malik
Macklin [Docket Item 12] ¶ 13; Ex. C to Def. Reply [Docket Item
13-1].) At Plaintiffs’ criminal trial, Officer Nieves confirmed
that he investigated the complaint of excessive force by
Plaintiff and his mother but ultimately concluded that no
excessive force was used. (See Ex. C to Pl. Br. [Docket Item 12]
Tr. at 61:11-25.)
3.

This Complaint was filed in the Superior Court of New

Jersey in Camden County approximately two years after the
incident, in September 2015, and was removed to this Court

4

shortly thereafter.2 Plaintiff asserts claims for excessive force
and negligent hiring and training under the United States and
New Jersey Constitutions (Compl. Counts One, Two, and Four), as
well as common law tort claims for assault, negligence, and
abuse of process. (Id. Counts One, Three and Five.)
4.

When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. A motion to dismiss may
be granted only if a court concludes that the plaintiff has
failed to set forth fair notice of what the claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests that make such a claim plausible on
its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007).
5.

Although the court must accept as true all well-

pleaded factual allegations, it may disregard any legal
conclusions in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d
Cir. 2009). “If the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

2

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claims and state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
5

complaint has alleged – but it has not shown – that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
6.

In its partial motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) or alternatively for summary judgment, Defendants seek
to dismiss Plaintiff’s asserted state law claims for assault,
negligence, and abuse of process for failure to comply with the
notice requirement under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act
(“NJTCA”).3
7.

Under the NJTCA, “parties suing public entities must

comply with strict requirements for notifying and suing those
entities.” Feinberg v. State, D.E.P., 644 A.2d 593, 597 (N.J.
1994). The NJTCA bars suit against a government agency or
employee unless the party seeking to bring the action has
presented those claims “in accordance with the procedure set
forth in this chapter.” N.J.S.A. 59:8-3. The NJTCA is specific

3

The remaining claims, asserted under the United States and New
Jersey Constitutions, and are not at issue here. (See Compl.
Counts One, Two, and Four.) Compliance with the NJTCA’s notice
requirements is not required for Plaintiff’s federal or state
constitutional claims. (Pl. Br. at 3.) See Cty. Concrete Corp.
v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 174 (3d Cir. 2006) (“It is
true that the NJTCA’s notice requirements do not apply to
federal claims, including § 1983 actions, or to state
constitutional torts.” (internal citations omitted)); see also
Owens v. Feigin, 947 A.2d 653, 654 (N.J. 2008) (holding that
notice requirement does not apply to claims under the New Jersey
Civil Rights Act). Thus, the only claims in this case subject to
dismissal for failure to file a notice of claim are the state
tort claims.
6

about the information that must be included in a notice of claim
and how it must be presented to the public entity. The claim
notice must include, among other things, (1) the name and
address of the claimant; (2) the address for sending
communication about the claim (2) the “date, place, and other
circumstances of the occurrence” which gave rise to the claim;
(3) a “general description of the injury, damage, or loss
incurred so far as it may be known at the time”; (4) the name of
the public entity, employee, or employees causing the injury;
and (5) the amount claimed as of the date of presentation of the
claim, “including the estimated amount of any prospective
injury, damage or loss, insofar as it may be known at the time
of the presentation of the claim, together with the basis of
computation of the amount claimed.” N.J.S.A. 59:8-4. In
addition, “the notice is triggered by the occurrence of the
injury,” Beauchamp v. Amedio, 751 A.2d 1047, 1053 (N.J. 2000),
and must be filed with the public entity within ninety (90) days
of the claim’s accrual, or the plaintiff is barred from
recovering damages. See N.J.S.A. 59:8-8.
8.

These specific notice requirements are meant to

achieve several goals. They allow the public entity time to
review the claim and to promptly investigate the facts and
prepare a defense while the incident is fresh; provide the
entity with an opportunity to settle meritorious claims before a
7

lawsuit is filed; afford them an opportunity to correct the
conditions which gave rise to the claim; and “inform the State
in advance as to the expected liability or indebtedness that it
may be expected to meet.” Velez v. City of Jersey City, 850 A.2d
1238, 1242 (N.J. 2004) (quoting Beauchamp, 751 A.2d at 1053).
9.

It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not file a notice

of claim with the Camden County Police Department prior to
filing this Complaint. Plaintiff and his mother did, however,
make written and oral complaints with the Internal Affairs
Office about the use of excessive force, which was investigated
by Officer Nieves. The question for the Court is whether those
complaints substantially complied with the NJTCA’s notice
requirement. The Court holds that they did not.
10.

The equitable doctrine of substantial compliance

prevents the barring of legitimate claims due to technical
defects. Lebron v. Sanchez, 970 A.2d 399, 406 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2009); Henderson v. Herman 862 A.2d 1217 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2004). The doctrine provides that technical notice
defects will not defeat a valid claim as long as the notice that
given “substantially satisfies the purposes for which notices of
claims are required.” Lebron, 970 A.2d at 405-06 (quoting
Lameiro v. W. N.Y. Bd. of Educ., 347 A.2d 377, 379 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1975)); see also Johnson v. Does, 950 F. Supp. 632,
635 (D.N.J. 1997). “Although the doctrine of substantial
8

compliance has occasionally been applied in the tort claims
context, it has been limited carefully to those situations in
which notice, although both timely and in writing, had technical
deficiencies that did not deprive the public entity of the
effective notice contemplated by the statute.” D.D. v. Univ. of
Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 61 A.3d 906, 923 (2013).
11.

As an initial matter, the Court rejects Defendant’s

argument that Plaintiffs’ complaint to the Camden Police
Department fails to substantially comply with the notice
requirement as a matter of law because it was not in writing.
(See Def. Reply Br. [Docket Item 13] at 3-4 (citing Velez v.
City of Jersey City, 817 A.2d 409, 417 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2003) and Meale v. City of Egg Harbor City, No. 14-5860,
2015 WL 3866222, at *6 (D.N.J. June 23, 2015)).) Reading
Plaintiffs’ allegations liberally, it is apparent that
Plaintiff’s and his mother’s complaints both resulted in a
written statement to Internal Affairs. Plaintiff certified that
he gave a statement to Officer Nieves, and the statement
“recorded” the physical injuries he sustained as a result of the
alleged “beating.” (Ex. A to Pl. Br. ¶ 15.) He also asserted
that he signed a complaint form but “was not given a copy of the
statement” or the form that he signed. (Id. ¶ 16.) Likewise, in
her written certification, Ms. Macklin confirmed that her son
made “written and oral complaints to Internal Affairs in October
9

2013.” (Ex. B to Pl. Br. ¶ 9.) According to the document
Defendants themselves produced, Ms. Macklin’s own complaint to
the Camden County Police Department was also recorded in
writing. (See Ex. A to Def. Br.) Defendants’ argument that
Plaintiff gave only an oral statement is thus unpersuasive.
12.

Plaintiff argues that the complaints that he and his

mother lodged with Internal Affairs substantially complied with
the NJTCA’s notice requirement because they informed the Camden
County Police Department of the specifics of the incident and
alleged misconduct within a 90-day period. While the Court does
not have a copy of Plaintiff’s written statement, Plaintiff’s
certification states that, in his complaint to Internal Affairs,
Plaintiff “described the incident and the excessive use of force
upon me by the officers involved in my September 27, 2013
arrest.” He also noted the physical injuries that he suffered.
(Ex. A to Pl. Br. ¶ 15.) Ms. Macklin likewise certified that her
son’s complaints to Internal Affairs contained “detailed
accounts of the brutal use of force on September 27, 2013 and
the injuries sustained.” (Ex. B to Pl. Br. ¶ 9.) Moreover, based
on the information given to him, Officer Nieves was able to
conduct an investigation into Defendants’ alleged misconduct.
(See Ex. C to Pl. Br.) Finally, the signed complaint forms
Defendants attached show that Plaintiff and his mother reported
the alleged misconduct to the Camden Police Department sometime
10

in October of 2013, well within 90 days of Plaintiff’s injury.
(See Exs. A & C to Def. Br.; see also Ex. A to Pl. Br. ¶ 13; Ex.
B to Pl. Br. ¶ 8 (noting that Plaintiff reported the incident
shortly after his release from jail in October 2013).) Viewing
these facts in light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s
written report appeared to give a sufficiently detailed account
of the “who, what, when, and where” of the incident upon which
his assault claim is based.
13.

Notwithstanding the specificity of Plaintiff’s report,

which the Court does not dispute, the Court finds that the
written complaint to Internal Affairs did not substantially
comply with the NJTCA’s notice requirements, because it failed
to give notice of a potential civil suit for damages against the
police department and the amount of damages claimed. As noted
above, the purpose behind the notice of claim requirement is not
only to allow the public entity time to investigate the facts
and correct the conditions which gave rise to the claim, but to
communicate a party’s intention of filing a civil action so that
the entity may prepare appropriately by, for example, examining
its expected liabilities and indebtedness, preparing a defense,
preserving evidence, and foreclosing the possibility of suit by
settling meritorious claims. See Beauchamp v. Amedio, 751 A.2d
1047, 1052-53 (N.J. 2000) (explaining that notice of claim
requirement serves particular goals, including providing the
11

public entity with an adequate opportunity “to settle
meritorious claims prior to the bringing of suit,” to
“investigate the facts and prepare a defense,” and to “inform
the state in advance as to the indebtedness or liability that it
may be expected to meet.” (internal quotations and citations
omitted)).
14.

In this case, the complaint to Internal Affairs was

simply a request for the police department to look into an
alleged incident of wrongdoing. The “Citizen Complaint
Information Form,” which explains the potential outcomes of
filing an Internal Affairs complaint and which Plaintiff signed
after making his report, makes no mention of civil liability:




If our investigation reveals that a crime might have
been committed, the county prosecutor will be
notified. You might be asked to testify in court.
If our investigation results in an officer being
charged with a violation of department rules, you
might be asked to testify in a department hearing.
If our investigation reveals that the complaint is
unfounded or that the officer acted properly, the
matter will be closed.

(Ex. C to Def. Br.) As the above illustrates, and as Plaintiff
would have understood it, the filing of a complaint with the
Internal Affairs Office would expose the officers involved to
internal disciplinary measures or criminal liability, but not to
money damages. Not every civilian complaint to a police
department alleging an incident of police misconduct results in
the filing of a lawsuit, and Defendant is not required to
12

interpret Plaintiff’s request to investigate an incident as an
indication of future litigation to come.
15.

This Court was faced with a similar set of facts in

Ingram v. Twp. of Deptford, 911 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295 (D.N.J.
2012). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that a police officer
used excessive force in removing her from a municipal court
proceeding, and registered her complaint against the officer by
describing the incident in detail in a municipal court complaint
form which she filled out the same day. 911 F. Supp. 2d 291. The
Court held that the plaintiff’s written complaint did not
substantially comply with the notice of claim requirement. In
addition to the fact that the complaint had not been filed with
the appropriate entity being sued – the police department – the
Court noted that Plaintiff’s statement “contained neither an
amount of damages claimed – as required by [N.J.S.A.] § 59:84(f), nor any language suggesting that Plaintiff sought civil
damages for her injuries.” Id. at 295. Because Plaintiff’s
complaint was nothing more than “what it plainly purports to be:
a statement in support of possible criminal charges” against the
defendant, it did not constitute substantial compliance with the
notice requirements of the NJTCA. Id. Platt v. Gonzalez, No. 096136, 2011 WL 2413264, at *4 (D.N.J. June 9, 2011).
16.

At least two other courts in this district have come

to a similar conclusion. In Meale v. City of Egg Harbor City,
13

No. 14-5860, 2015 WL 3866222, at (D.N.J. June 23, 2015), the
plaintiff complained to the prosecutor’s office that she had
repeatedly been sexually assaulted by a police officer after she
agreed to act as a confidential informant for him. Based on
plaintiff’s statements, the prosecutor’s office investigated the
plaintiff’s allegations and criminally charged the officer with
official misconduct. 2015 WL 3866222, at *1. Even though the
plaintiff’s complaint spawned an investigation, the district
court held that it did not substantially comply with the NJTCA’s
notice of claim requirements, because it did not sufficiently
put the police department and the city on notice of a potential
civil suit. 2015 WL 3866222, at *5-6. Most notably, in Platt v.
Gonzalez, No. 09-6136, 2011 2413264, at *4 (D.N.J. June 9,
2011), another court in this district concluded that a
plaintiff’s Internal Affairs complaint with the police
department describing misconduct by the defendant police
officers did not substantially comply with the requirements of
the NJTCA. A complaint filed with Internal Affairs, explained
the court, was not merely the “case of an attempted [NJTCA]
notice with a technical flaw,” and therefore “could not be
considered a notice pursuant to the [NJTCA].” Id.
17.

The same reasoning applies here. Although Plaintiff’s

report to Internal Affairs certainly made Defendants aware of
potential misbehavior, there are no particular facts that would
14

make it reasonable to conclude that Defendants were on notice of
a potential civil suit for money damages. For example, although
Plaintiff described the incident and his injury, he did not
appear to indicate “the estimated amount of any prospective
injury, damage or loss, . . . together with the basis of
computation of the amount claimed,” as required in a traditional
claim notice. N.J.S.A. 59:8-4. Nor is there any allegation that
the complaint was made with the assistance of an attorney.
Plaintiff’s Internal Affairs complaint did not serve the purpose
of a notice of claim – to alert a public entity of the
possibility of damages so that they may have an opportunity to
address a monetary demand for damages and prepare and plan for a
civil suit.4 Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion
to dismiss the state law claims.5

4

Indeed, if the Court were to hold otherwise – that a typical
civilian complaint like Plaintiff’s substantially complies with
the NJTCA’s notice requirements – the detailed and specific
provisions of N.J.S.A. 59:8–4–8 describing the filing of a
formal notice of claim would be rendered meaningless.
5 According to the certifications by Plaintiff and his mother,
the complaints to Internal Affairs concerned only an allegation
of excessive force. (See Ex. A to Pl. Br.) There is no
suggestion from either the Complaint or Plaintiff’s submissions
that Macklin or his mother raised an abuse of process claim with
Internal Affairs, or that such a claim was ever investigated by
Officer Nieves. Thus, the abuse of process claim must separately
be dismissed because no notice, constructive or otherwise, was
ever filed. See Cty. Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d
159, 174 (3d Cir. 2006) (dismissing tortious interference with
contract claim and civil conspiracy claim because alleged notice
made no mention of those claims); Wunschel v. City of Jersey
City, 477 A.2d 329, 338 (N.J. 1984) (holding that claimant had
15

18.

Defendant also seeks to dismiss any and all claims

against the County of Camden because Camden County may not be
held liable for the police officers’ actions under the theory of
respondeat superior. (See Def. Br. at 7-8.) Defendant is correct
that in civil rights actions, municipalities and government
officials are not liable for the unconstitutional conduct of
employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (“A defendant
in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the
alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the
operation of respondeat superior.”). Thus, to the extent
Plaintiff seeks to hold Camden County or Police Chief John Scott
Thomson vicariously responsible for the constitutional torts of
their subordinates, those claims will be dismissed.
19.

A municipality or policymaker defendant may, however,

be held liable if the defendant, “with deliberate indifference
to the consequences, established and maintained a policy,
practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional
harm.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Detention
Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and
citation omitted); see also Mulholland v. Gov’t Cty. of Berks,

not substantially complied with the notice of claim requirement
by filing workers’ compensation petition because the petition
failed to give notice of an intention to sue for tort of
wrongful death).
16

Pa., 706 F. 3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that municipality
“‘can be held responsible as an entity when the injury inflicted
is permitted under its adopted policy or custom.’” (quoting Beck
v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996))). A
policymaker defendant may also be held responsible “if he or she
participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed
others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had
knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.”
A.M. ex rel. J.M.K., 372 F.3d at 586; see also Argueta v.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 71 (3d Cir.
2011).
20.

In Count Two of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants Camden County and Police Chief Thomson “developed and
maintained policies or customs exhibiting deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of persons in the
County of Camden . . . which caused Plaintiff, Malik Y.
Macklin’s, rights to be violated.” (Compl. Count Two, ¶ 3.)
Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants “inadequately
and improperly investigate[d] citizen complaint and police
misconduct,” “inadequately supervise[d] and train[ed] its police
officers,” and “did not require appropriate in-service training
or retraining of officers who were known to have engaged in
police misconduct.” (Id. ¶ 4.) As a consequence, Plaintiff
asserts that the individual police officers who engaged in the
17

alleged misconduct “believed that their actions would not be
properly monitored by supervisory officers and that misconduct
would not be investigated or sanctioned, but would be
tolerated.” (Id. ¶ 5.)
21.

The Court reads these allegations against the County

of Camden and Police Chief Thomson as independent claims for
liability separate from claims under the theory of respondeat
superior. Because Defendants have only sought the dismissal of
the claims based in respondeat superior, the question of whether
the Complaint states plausible claims for relief for failure to
train and failure to supervise is left for another day. In the
meantime, Camden County and Police Chief Thomson will remain as
defendants in this action as to the constitutional claims.
22.

Although Defendants have not moved to dismiss the

Camden County Police Department as a party, the Court notes that
“[i]n Section 1983 actions, police departments cannot be sued in
conjunction with municipalities, because the police department
is merely an administrative arm of the local municipality, and
is not a separate judicial entity.” Padilla v. Twp. of Cherry
Hill, 110 Fed. App’x 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting DeBellis
v. Kulp, 166 F. Supp. 2d 255, 264 (E.D. Pa. 2001)). If all
counsel agree, they are invited to submit a consent order
dismissing the Camden County Police Department as a party. See
also Evans v. City of Newark, No. 14-120, 2016 WL 2742862, at *9
18

(D.N.J. May 10, 2016) (dismissing New Jersey State Police
because it is “indisputably” an agency of the State, not
amenable to suit under § 1983).
23.

The only remaining defendants in this case are unnamed

John Doe police officers. (See Compl.) There is nothing before
the Court or on the docket to suggest that Plaintiff has
identified and named these individuals, and it follows that
there is no indication that they were ever served with the
Complaint or Amended Complaint. The time for service under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(m) has long expired,6 and Plaintiff has neither
moved to extend time for service nor demonstrated good cause for
his noncompliance. See McCurdy v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery,
157 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1998). Moreover, the Court does not
have the ability to direct service on these unnamed Defendants
because Plaintiff has failed to specifically identify them and
has not moved for discovery to uncover their names. Accordingly,
the Court will exercise its discretion and dismiss these
defendants. See, e.g., Catlett v. N.J. State Police, No. 12-153,
2015 WL 9272877, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2015) (Simandle, J.)
(dismissing John Doe defendants because plaintiff neither served
nor sought discovery on the identity of the individuals within
the time limit of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)); Mote v. Murtin, No. 07-

6

Plaintiff's Complaint was filed on October 21, 2015. The 90-day
period of Rule 4(m), Fed. R. Civ. P., expired January 19, 2016.
19

1571, 2008 WL 2761896, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa. July 11, 2008)
(dismissing John Doe defendants because plaintiff has made no
showing of good cause for failing to effectuate service within
specific time limit).
24.

For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the state tort claims with
prejudice. Defendants Camden County Police Department and John
Does 1-10 will also be dismissed from the case. An accompanying
order will be entered.

June 28, 2016
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

20