GLASPIE v. GLOUCESTER COUNTY NEW JERSEY et al
Filing
55
OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 8/22/18. (dd, ) n.m.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________________
LEON GLASPIE,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civ. No. 15-7691 (RBK) (AMD)
:
v.
:
:
COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER, et al.,
:
OPINION
:
Defendants.
:
_________________________________________ :
ROBERT B. KUGLER, U.S.D.J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Leon Glaspie, a federal prisoner incarcerated at SCI Benner Township in
Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, filed a civil rights complaint arising from a violation of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”). Currently pending before this Court is Defendant Gloucester
County’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 41) and Plaintiff’s
motion for leave to amend the complaint (ECF No. 48). For the following reasons, Defendant’s
motion to dismiss the complaint is granted and Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint is denied.
II.
BACKGROUND
The Court adopts and recites the relevant factual history of the case as set forth by the New
Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division:
On November 5, 2008, [Plaintiff], while serving a five-year
federal sentence for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 371, was granted furlough from a federal halfway house in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to look for work. On that date, along
with a co-defendant, he robbed a bank in Deptford, New Jersey, and
fled the scene, injuring a police officer along the way. He was not
apprehended until November 24, 2008. After the arrest, he was
housed in the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center (“FDC”),
where he continued to serve his sentence for the conspiracy while
awaiting disposition of the new charge of escape, 18 U.S.C.A. § 751.
On January 5, 2009, the Deptford Police Department lodged a
detainer against [Plaintiff]. … In early April 2009, Gloucester
County indicted [Plaintiff] for second-degree robbery, N.J.S.A.
2C:15-1(a)(2), and second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery,
N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, 15-1(a)(2).
On April 27, 2009, the Gloucester County Prosecutor, pursuant
to the IAD, submitted a certification in support of a state writ to the
United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons,
requesting [Plaintiff]’s temporary release to New Jersey authorities.
The date scheduled for arraignment on the indictment was June 1,
2009. The Gloucester County Superior Court issued a companion
order to produce to the County Sheriff, demanding [Plaintiff]’s
delivery to the county jail for purposes of the hearing. Accordingly,
on June 1, 2009, [Plaintiff] was transported, or “shuttled,” to
Gloucester County, arraigned, and returned to the Philadelphia FDC
that same day.
On July 16, 2009, [Plaintiff] was indicted on the federal escape
charge. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 751. He entered a guilty plea to the
offense on August 26, 2009, and on December 15, 2009, was
sentenced to twenty-seven months of imprisonment.
In the interim, the Gloucester County Superior Court issued
additional writs to produce [Plaintiff] for proceedings on July 27,
August 31, and October 23, 2009. On each occasion, [Plaintiff] was
shuttled from the Philadelphia FDC to New Jersey, and returned the
same or the following day.
On February 25, 2010, [Plaintiff] was transferred to Big Sandy,
a federal penitentiary in Inez, Kentucky. The Gloucester County
Prosecutor then lodged a second detainer against [Plaintiff] with Big
Sandy. After [Plaintiff] requested final disposition from New Jersey
under the IAD, he was transported to New Jersey from Kentucky on
June 26, 2010. See N.J.S.A. 2AL159A-3.
In September 2010, a superseding indictment issued charging
[Plaintiff] with second-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2);
second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, 151(a)(2); third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a);
and first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1).
State v. Glaspie, 60 A.3d 821, 822-23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
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Plaintiff filed a motion in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Trial Division, to dismiss the
indictment based on a violation of the anti-shuttling provision of the IAD. (ECF No. 1 at p. 6).
Specifically, Plaintiff argued that the four instances of shuttling between the Philadelphia FDC
and the Gloucester County Correctional Facility in 2009 violated the IAD. (See id.). The trial
court denied Plaintiff’s motion on December 22, 2010. See Glaspie, 60 A.3d at 823. On March
3, 2011, Plaintiff entered a guilty plea to second-degree robbery on the superseding indictment.
See id. Plaintiff was sentenced on April 15, 2011. See id.
Plaintiff appealed the denial of his motion and on February 28, 2013, the Superior Court
of New Jersey, Appellate Division, granted Plaintiff’s appeal and ordered that the indictment be
dismissed with prejudice based on violation of the IAD’s anti-shuttling provision. See id. at 827.
The State appealed, and Plaintiff remained imprisoned in a New Jersey correctional facility until
November 25, 2013, when the New Jersey Supreme Court denied review of the Appellate
Division’s decision. (See ECF No. 1 at p. 6).
On or about October 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 asserting that he is entitled to monetary damages for the period of time between June 1,
2009 and November 25, 2013, during which he was illegally detained and unlawfully imprisoned.
(See ECF No. 1 at pp. 6-7). On September 7, 2016, this Court issued an opinion dismissing all
claims against the State of New Jersey, New Jersey Department of Corrections, Judge Walter L.
Marshall, Jr., and Prosecutor Mary K. Pyffer and proceeding Plaintiff’s claim against Gloucester
County. (See ECF No. 5).
Gloucester County now moves to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). (See ECF No. 41). Gloucester County argues that the statute of limitations
on Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim has expired, or in the alternative, that Plaintiff has failed
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to plead facts sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See id. at pp. 6-8). Plaintiff filed
a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss and Gloucester County filed a reply in support
of its motion. (See ECF Nos. 45 & 47).
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint. (See ECF No. 48).
In the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff seeks to assert the following claims against
Gloucester County: (1) negligence for failing to abide by the provisions of the IAD; (2) failure to
train employees on the provisions of the IAD; and (3) false imprisonment. (See ECF No. 48 at pp.
2-12). Additionally, Plaintiff appears to reassert the previously dismissed constitutional violation
claims against Judge Walter L. Marshall, Jr. and Prosecutor Mary K. Pyffer. (See ECF No. 48 at
pp. 14-20).
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
In resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, under Rule 12(b)(6), “‘courts
accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may
be entitled to relief.’” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)); see also Zimmerman v. Corbett,
873 F.3d 414, 417-18 (3d Cir. 2017); Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d
Cir. 2010). In other words, a complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764
F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In addition to the allegations of the complaint, a court may consider
matters of public record, documents specifically referenced in or attached to the complaint, and
documents integral to the allegations raised in the complaint. Mele v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
359 F.3d 251, 255 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004).
Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Glunk v. Noone, 689 F. App’x 137, 139 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a
claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
B. Amendment under Rule 15(a)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) permits a party to amend his pleading before trial as
a matter of course in limited circumstances, or otherwise with the consent of the opposing party or
the court’s leave. Plaintiff filed his motion to amend two months after Gloucester County’s
motions to dismiss, and was therefore not within the 21-day window to amend as of right under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1). Rule 15(a)(2) permits Plaintiff to amend “only with the
opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
Although the court should freely give leave when justice so requires, the decision to grant
leave to amend a complaint rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Massarsky v.
General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 125 (3d Cir. 1983). The court may deny leave to amend
only if (a) the moving party’s delay in seeking amendment is undue, motivated by bad faith, or
prejudicial to the non-moving party; or (b) the amendment would be futile, meaning that the
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complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2010); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113,
115 (3d Cir. 2000). In assessing “futility,” the court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency
as applies under Rule 12(b)(6). Shane, 213 F.3d at 115.
IV. DISCUSSION
A.
Motion to Dismiss Original Complaint
Gloucester County argues that Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim is time-barred as his
cause of action began to accrue at the time he was transported from the Philadelphia FDC to New
Jersey on June 1, 2009. (See ECF No. 41 at p. 4). Therefore, under the two-year statute of
limitations applicable to § 1983 actions, Gloucester County contends that Plaintiff should have
filed his complaint in 2011. (See id.). In the alternative, Gloucester County argues that Plaintiff
has failed to plead a viable constitutional claim. (See id. at p. 6).
In Wallace v. Kato, the Supreme Court expounded on the difference between the
interrelated torts of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, explaining that:
false imprisonment consists of detention without legal process, a
false imprisonment ends once the victim becomes held pursuant to
such process-when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate
or arraigned on charges. Thereafter, unlawful detention forms part
of the damages for the “entirely distinct” tort of malicious
prosecution, which remedies detention accompanied, not by absence
of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal process.
549 U.S. 384, 389-90 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
The torts, although related, are
analytically different. A false imprisonment claim covers damages during the time of a plaintiff’s
detention up until the issuance of process or arraignment, whereas from that point forward any
damages sought must be based on a malicious prosecution claim. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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1. Detention without Legal Process (False Imprisonment)
To state a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that he was detained;
and (2) that the detention was unlawful. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389. The statute of limitations
for a § 1983 claim alleging false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment begins to
run when the false imprisonment ends. See id. False imprisonment ends when the § 1983 claimant
becomes held pursuant to the institution of his criminal proceedings, that is, when the claimant is
arraigned on charges. Id. Although the § 1983 claimant could file a suit for false imprisonment
once he is detained without legal process, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until he
is detained pursuant to legal process. Id. at 390 n.3.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts demonstrating an unlawful detention
without legal process by Gloucester County. After his arrest on November 24, 2008, Plaintiff
states that the Gloucester County police took him to the Philadelphia FDC to finish serving the
remainder of his prior federal sentence. (See ECF No. 1 at p. 5). Plaintiff does not appear to allege
that he was in Gloucester County’s custody prior to the institution of his state criminal proceedings,
which began when he was arraigned on June 1, 2009.
Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff was falsely imprisoned by Gloucester County prior
to the initiation of his legal process, any claim for false imprisonment is time-barred. The twoyear statute of limitations for a potential false imprisonment claim began running on June 1, 2009,
when Plaintiff’s false imprisonment ended. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim
shall be dismissed with prejudice.
2. Wrongful Institution of Legal Process (Malicious Prosecution)
While Plaintiff does not explicitly plead a cause of action for malicious prosecution in his
complaint, he seeks damages for his imprisonment in a state correctional facility beginning from
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his arraignment on June 1, 2009 until his release on November 25, 2013. (See ECF No. 1 at pp.
6-7). Any damages Plaintiff incurred as a result of this detention would only be available if
Plaintiff were to succeed on a claim for malicious prosecution, and not for a claim of false
imprisonment. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389-90.
A constitutional claim for malicious prosecution in the Third Circuit requires a plaintiff to
establish the following elements: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the
criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable
cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to
justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure
as a consequence of a legal proceeding. McKenna v. City of Phila., 582 F.3d 447, 461 (3d
Cir.2009) (citing Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)). The plaintiff has
the burden to establish each of the elements of his § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. See
Camiolo v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 334 F.3d 345, 362-63 (3d Cir. 2003).
To satisfy the favorable termination element, the Third Circuit requires that a prior criminal
case had been disposed of in a way that indicates the innocence of the accused. See Malcomb v.
McKean, 535 F. App’x 184, 186 (3d Cir. 2013); Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 (3d Cir.
2002); Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 156 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that “a plaintiff claiming malicious
prosecution must be innocent of the crime charged in the underlying prosecution.”). Accordingly,
“a malicious prosecution claim cannot be predicated on an underlying criminal proceeding which
terminated in a manner [that is] not indicative of the innocence of the accused.” Kossler v.
Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2009). The purpose of the favorable termination requirement
is to avoid the possibility of a claimant’s succeeding in a tort action after being validly convicted
in the underlying criminal case. Id. Such a result would contravene the “strong judicial policy
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against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction.”
Id. (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994)).
The IAD, to which New Jersey and the United States are parties, establishes procedures by
which a member state, including the United States, may procure a prisoner from another member
jurisdiction for trial. See Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148 (2001). The IAD “may be
triggered when the state in which the trial is to be had, the receiving state, lodges a ‘detainer’ with
the state in which a prisoner is incarcerated, the sending state.” Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439,
441 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 979 (1988). Article IV(e) of the IAD,1 commonly
referred to as the “anti-shuttling” provision provides “that if the prisoner is returned to the sending
state before trial, the charges against him must be dismissed.” Id. at 442.
As Plaintiff’s complaint acknowledges, and as the Appellate Division’s opinion confirms,
Plaintiff’s state criminal charges were dismissed due to a procedural violation of the IAD. See
Glaspie, 60 A.3d at 826-27 (“[W]e have no alternative but to conclude that the IAD means what
it says, even when the violation may appear to be merely technical.”). Plaintiff has not alleged
any facts indicating that, despite the explicit language in the Appellate Division’s opinion, his
conviction was overturned because he was innocent of the underlying state robbery charges.
Additionally, at no point during the criminal proceedings and subsequent appeal is Plaintiff alleged
to have asserted his innocence or disputed the veracity of his guilty plea. Thus, the dismissal of
1
The anti-shuttling provision states:
If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint
contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's (sic) being returned to
the original place of imprisonment pursuant to article V(e) hereof,
such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any
further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing
the same with prejudice.
18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2, art. IV(e).
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Plaintiff’s state criminal charges due to a violation of the IAD’s anti-shuttling provision is not a
basis to allege that his criminal proceeding ended in a favorable termination. See Lara v. Johnson,
141 F.3d 239, 243 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, opinion modified, 149 F.3d 1226 (5th Cir. 1998)
(alleged IAD violation did not cause “a possibility that an innocent man was convicted and
imprisoned”); Banks v. Hickenlooper, No. 16-1725, 2016 WL 9632940, at *2 (Oct. 26, 2016)
(noting that “[d]ismissal of criminal charges due to violations of the IAD does not bear on
Plaintiff’s innocence.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 is
dismissed with prejudice.
B.
Motion to Amend
A plaintiff may assert a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of
constitutional rights. That section provides,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State … subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the alleged deprivation was
committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police
Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
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1. Negligence Claim
In his proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Gloucester County was negligent
in wrongfully and illegally imprisoning him. (See ECF No. 48 at pp. 2-6). This proposed
amendment is futile, however, as negligence is not actionable under § 1983.
The Supreme Court has held that “liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically
beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
848 (1998). “[M]erely negligent misconduct will not give rise to a claim under § 1983; the state
defendant must act with a higher degree of intent.” Burton v. Kindle, 401 F. App'x 635, 637 (3d
Cir. 2010) (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849). Indeed, the Supreme Court has long held that prison
authorities’ mere negligence in and of itself does not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights. See
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986);
Singletary v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 193 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001). The United States
Constitution is not a “font of tort law.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8, 848 (“[T]he Constitution does
not guarantee due care on the part of state officials.”); Innis v. Wilson, 334 F. App’x 454, 457 (3d
Cir. 2009). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s attempt to bring a negligence claim against Gloucester County
would be futile as he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
2. Failure to Train Claim
Plaintiff’s amended complaint also attempts to assert a claim against Gloucester County
for failing to train, educate, and properly inform its employees on the requirements of the IAD.
(See ECF No. 48 at p. 6). Without any additional facts, Plaintiff alleges that Gloucester County
has a policy and custom of transferring inmates into its jurisdiction in violation of the IAD. (See
id.at p. 7). Plaintiff claims that this policy and Gloucester County’s failure to train its employees
led to a pattern of IAD violations in his case. (See id. at p. 8).
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A municipality “‘can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes
the constitutional violation at issue.’” Carswell v. Borough of Homestead, 381 F.3d 235, 244 (3d
Cir. 2004) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)), cert. denied, 546 U.S.
899 (2005). “There must be a ‘direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the
alleged constitutional deprivation’ to ground municipal liability.” Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller,
Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 249-50 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385). “Thus, municipal liability
attaches only when ‘execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers
or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.’”
Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
“Policy is made when a ‘decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal
policy with respect to the action’ issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Id. (quoting
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). A plaintiff can establish a
custom “by showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or
authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.” Id. (citing
Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480; Fletcher v. O'Donnell, 867 F.2d 791, 793-94 (3d Cir.) (“Custom may
be established by proof of knowledge and acquiescence.”), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919 (1989). “In
either instance, a plaintiff must show that an official who has the power to make policy is
responsible for either the affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a well-settled
custom.” Id. (citing Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480).
Failure to train or supervise claims “are generally considered a subcategory of policy or
practice liability.” See Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom., Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015). Thus, the plaintiff must
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allege facts suggesting that “the constitutional injury was caused by the failure to implement the
supervisory practice or procedure.” Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir.
2010); City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 (“the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis
for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights
of persons with whom the police come into contact” but it will not suffice “to prove that an injury
or accident could have been avoided if an officer had better or more training”).
Here, Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a claim against Gloucester County for
municipal liability under § 1983. The amended complaint does not set forth sufficient facts to
establish that Gloucester County instituted or maintained a policy, practice, or custom that directly
caused a constitutional harm to Plaintiff.
The allegations included in Plaintiff’s amended
complaint set forth only “vague assertions” of policy, custom, or practice that are insufficient to
plead municipal liability. See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995).
Other than these conclusory and generalized assertions about unspecified patterns of misconduct,
Plaintiff has plead no facts to support the existence of any policy, custom, or practice beyond his
own transfer to New Jersey.
Moreover, the specific facts surrounding Plaintiff’s transfers to New Jersey contradict his
assertion that Gloucester County promulgated and maintained a policy that caused his alleged
constitutional violation. As detailed in the Appellate Division’s opinion, attached as an exhibit to
the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff was first transferred to New Jersey following the
issuance of an order from the Superior Court of New Jersey demanding Plaintiff’s delivery to the
Gloucester County jail. See Glaspie, 60 A.3d at 823. Thereafter, the Superior Court issued three
additional writs to produce Plaintiff for proceedings. See id. These facts indicate that Plaintiff
was not transferred pursuant to a policy established by Gloucester County, but rather was
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transferred pursuant to orders issued by the Superior Court, which is a division of the State of New
Jersey. See Dey-El v. Rosenberg, No. 14-7091, 2015 WL 4391399, at *4 (D.N.J. July 15, 2015)
(“The Superior Court is an entity of the State of New Jersey.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s attempt
to raise a failure to train claim against Gloucester County is futile because he fails to state a claim
for municipal liability under § 1983 based on the allegations of the proposed amended complaint.
3. Remaining Claims
The remaining claims asserted in Plaintiff’s amended complaint are similarly futile. As
discussed above, Plaintiff’s false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims against
Gloucester County fail. Additionally, as previously discussed in this Court’s screening opinion
dated September 7, 2016 (ECF No. 5), Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Walter L. Marshall, Jr. and
Prosecutor Mary K. Pyffer are barred by judicial and prosecutorial immunity. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint is denied.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Gloucester County’s motion to dismiss the original complaint
will be granted and Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint will be denied. An appropriate order
will be entered.
DATED: August 22 , 2018
s/Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
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