SEAGRAVES v. TREACHLER et al

Filing 5

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 3/29/2016. (tf, n.m.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MARK LEE SEAGRAVES,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 15-7801 (JBS-AMD)

v.
DAVID TREACHLER, et al.,

OPINION
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
Mark Lee Seagraves, Plaintiff Pro Se
#758662C
South Woods State Prison
215 S. Burlington Road
Bridgeton, NJ 08302
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Mark Lee Seagraves
(“Plaintiff”), submission of a civil rights complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (Complaint, Docket Entry 1), and motion to
amend the complaint, (Docket Entry 4). At this time, the Court
must review the complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A to determine whether it should be dismissed as
frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set

forth below, the Court will deny the motion to amend and permit
the complaint to proceed in part.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action against
Defendants David Treachler, Ray Skradzinski, the Salem County
Sheriff’s Office, Salem County, and the Salem County
Correctional Facility (“SCCF”). The following factual
allegations are taken from the complaint and are accepted for
purposes of this screening only. The Court has made no findings
as to the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations.
On June 13, 2015, Plaintiff submitted a request to the SCCF
kitchen for a vegetarian meal for religious purposes. (Complaint
at 7). 1 The next day he submitted the same request to the
chaplain, David Treachler. Treachler denied Plaintiff’s request
and told Plaintiff that if he had medical reasons for requesting
a vegetarian meal, he should contact the medical department.
(Id.). Plaintiff spoke with several corrections officers about
his request, and they all referred Plaintiff to Captain Rielly.
Plaintiff requested a meeting with Captain Rielly on or
about July 1, 2015; however, he never received a response. (Id.
at 8). Plaintiff filed another request for a meeting on July 23,

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At the time Plaintiff filed this complaint he was a pretrial
detainee at SCCF. He has since been convicted, sentenced, and
relocated to South Woods State Prison.
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2015, but received no response. (Id.). Plaintiff thereafter
filed this complaint on October 30, 2015. By Order dated
November 6, 2015, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis. (Docket Entry 2). On December 7,
2015, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint to add
Captain Rielly as a defendant and to add to his claims against
the other defendants. (Motion to Amend, Docket Entry 4).
Plaintiff asserts Treachler violated his right to practice
Islam by not permitting him to have a vegetarian meal, “causing
me to either have to eat meat against my religion or to go
hungry because I cannot eat the meat on the food trays.”
(Complaint at 8). He further asserts claims against the Warden,
Sheriff’s Office, Salem County, and SCCF. Plaintiff asks for
$1,000,000 in damages for pain, suffering, and mental anguish.
(Id.).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996)
(“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental
employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim
with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
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The

PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject
to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(b) because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in
forma pauperis.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’”

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte
screening for failure to state a claim, 2 the complaint must
allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

2

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x
120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230,
232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1));
Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x. 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007)
(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). Although
pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants
still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,
245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
B. Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
§ 1983. Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second,
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that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person
acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir.
2011); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.
1994).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Amend
Plaintiff moves to amend his complaint to add claims
against Captain Rielly, Warden Skradzinski in his official
capacity for “for failure to train and supervise defendants as
to abiding by the policies and procedures regarding this
lawsuit,”, and against Treachler in his official capacity.
(Motion to Amend ¶¶ 1-3).
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits
a party to amend a pleading once as a matter of course twentyone (21) days after serving the pleading or twenty-one (21) days
“after a responsive pleading or service of a motion under Rule
12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
15(a)(1)(A)-(B). As no responsive pleadings have yet been filed,
Plaintiff may amend his complaint once as of right. The proposed
amended complaint is still subject to this Court’s screening. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A.
The proposed amended complaint does not state valid claims
for relief. When an amended complaint is filed, the original
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complaint no longer performs any function in the case and cannot
be utilized to cure defects in the amended complaint, unless the
relevant portion is specifically incorporated in the new
complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes omitted). The proposed
amended complaint does not specifically adopt or incorporate the
original complaint; thus, if this Court were to grant the
motion, the original complaint would be null and void. The
proposed amended complaint does not contain a statement of the
facts and would have to be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); see also Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a).
Even if the Court were to read the proposed amended
complaint together with the complaint, the claims raised in the
proposed amended complaint would still be subject to dismissal.
A suit against a county official in his official capacity is a
suit against the county itself. Monell v. New York City Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). Thus, Treachler,
Skradzinski, and Rielly are only liable in their official
capacities when Salem County itself would be liable. Under
Monell, a county is only liable under § 1983 when “execution of
a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers
or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy, inflicts the injury.” Id. at 694. The complaint
and proposed amended complaint, even when read together, do not
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sufficiently allege there was a relevant Salem County policy
that was the moving force behind the alleged violation.
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that Warden Skradzinski
“failed to train and supervise defendants as to abiding by the
policies and procedures regarding this lawsuit” is insufficient
under Iqbal. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009);
see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir.
2009) (“[A] complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to 'show' such an
entitlement with its facts.”). Plaintiff must set forth facts
that would indicate “‘the failure amounts to “deliberate
indifference” to the rights of persons with whom those employees
will come into contact.’” Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d
217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Carter v. City of Phila., 181
F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999)). Furthermore, failure to
adequately train subordinates can generally only constitute
deliberate indifference if the failure has caused a pattern of
violations. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011); Bd. of
Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409
(1997). Plaintiff has not alleged such a pattern exists.
The proposed amended complaint also fails to make out a
claim against Captain Rielly in his individual capacity.
Plaintiff asserts the captain is liable as “he failed to respond
to the Plaintiff’s requests after being fully advised of same
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violations,” (Motion to Amend ¶ 3), but allegations that Captain
Rielly responded inappropriately to Plaintiff’s grievances do
not establish his personal involvement in the actual violation.
See Davis v. Samuels, 608 F. App'x 46, 48-49 (3d Cir. 2015);
Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App'x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006). Plaintiff
has not alleged sufficient facts for this Court to reasonably
infer Captain Rielly was personally involved in the denial of
the religious meal, Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207
(3d Cir. 1988) (“A defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.”), therefore
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against him.
As the proposed amended complaint would be subject to
dismissal for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s motion to
amend is denied without prejudice.
B.

Monell Claims
Plaintiff seeks relief from Salem County, the Salem County

Sheriff’s Office, and SCCF. Plaintiff argues the county is
liable for its employees’ actions as it “owns the county jail
thus is responsible for all employees and volunteers.”
(Complaint at 8). He further asserts the Sheriff’s Office
“oversees the county jail, thus allowing its employees and
volunteers to violate my rights.”) (Id.).
“A municipality cannot be held liable for the
unconstitutional acts of its employees on a theory of respondeat
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superior.” Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d
Cir. 2014) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
691 (1978)). As previously noted, a county is only liable under
§ 1983 when “execution of a government's policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. “Liability is imposed when the
policy or custom itself violates the Constitution or when the
policy or custom, while not unconstitutional itself, is the
moving force behind the constitutional tort of one of its
employees.” Thomas, 749 F.3d at 222 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Salem County.
He has not identified a policy or custom enacted by the county
itself that caused the alleged constitutional violation, or
provided facts that would support an inference that the policy
or custom was a “moving force” behind Plaintiff being denied a
religious meal. His claims against the county must therefore be
dismissed at this time. As Plaintiff may be able to allege facts
that would support municipal liability, the claims against Salem
County shall be dismissed without prejudice.
The claims against the Sheriff’s Office and SCCF must also
be dismissed. “In Section 1983 actions, police departments
cannot be sued in conjunction with municipalities, because the
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police department is merely an administrative arm of the local
municipality, and is not a separate judicial entity.” Padilla v.
Twp. of Cherry Hill, 110 F. App'x 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The claims
against SCCF must be dismissed as a jail is not a “person” under
§ 1983. See, e.g., Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726
F. Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not
a “person” under § 1983). As the Sheriff’s Office and SSCF are
not proper defendants in a § 1983 action, the claims against
them will be dismissed with prejudice.
B. Exercise of Religion
Plaintiff argues Treachler violated his right to practice
his religion by denying him access to a vegetarian meal. The
First Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment, protects prisoners’ free exercise of religion. DeHart
v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 50 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing O’Lone
v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)). To make out a claim for
denial of an individual's free exercise rights under the First
Amendment, an individual must show that he has a sincerely held
religious belief, and the institution's imposition on that
belief is not reasonably related to a legitimate institutional
interest. Id. at 51-52 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987)).

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“[P]risoners generally are entitled to religiously
acceptable meals while in prison.” Potts v. Holt, 617 F. App'x
148, 150 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d
186, 192 (3d Cir. 2006); Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 217
(3d Cir. 2003); DeHart, 227 F.3d at 52, 59 & n.8). Plaintiff
states his religion prohibits him from eating meat. (Complaint
at 8). Construing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, as the
Court must do at this preliminary screening stage, this Court
preliminarily finds that Plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to
state a plausible claim for relief against Treachler only, as he
is the one Plaintiff alleges actually denied him the vegetarian
meal.
As this Court must construe pro se pleadings liberally, the
Court also reviews the complaint under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, (“RLUIPA”) 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-1 et seq. “RLUIPA protects ‘any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief[.]’” Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A)). RLUIPA provides “‘greater
protection’ for religious liberty than is provided by the First
Amendment.” Payne v. Doe, No. 15-2489, 2016 WL 123624, at *4 (3d
Cir. Jan. 12, 2016) (citing Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. at 863).
Construing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor at this time,

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there are sufficient facts to permit his RLUIPA claim to proceed
against Treachler at this time.
Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged personal involvement
by Warden Skradzinski. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195,
1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Plaintiff alleges “the warden is Mr.
Treachler’s boss, thus allowing the chaplain to violate my
rights.” (Complaint at 8). “Government officials may not be held
liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates
under a theory of respondeat superior.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 676 (2009). State actors are liable only for their own
unconstitutional conduct. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366
(3d Cir. 2012).
The Third Circuit has identified two general ways in which
a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts
undertaken by subordinates: (1) “liability may attach if they,
with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established
and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly
caused [the] constitutional harm”; or (2) “a supervisor may be
personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in
violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate
them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and
acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct.”
Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir.
2014) (internal citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds sub
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nom Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015). This Court cannot
plausibly find liability under either theory as Plaintiff has
not set forth any facts indicating Warden Skradzinski either
established a policy that resulted in Plaintiff being denied his
religious meal, or that he was aware of and condoned his staff’s
actions. Plaintiff’s claims against Warden Skradzinski shall be
dismissed without prejudice.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion to amend

his complaint is denied. His Free Exercise and RLUIPA claims
shall be permitted to go forward against Defendant Treachler
only. The claims against the Salem County Sheriff’s Office and
SCCF are dismissed with prejudice. The claims against Salem
County and Warden Skradzinski are dismissed without prejudice.
An appropriate order follows.

March 29, 2016
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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