GROHS v. LANIGAN et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 12/31/2019. (rss, n.m.)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
________________________
STEVEN GROHS,
Petitioner,
v.
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
SPECIAL TREATMENT UNIT,
et al.,
Respondents.
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THE HONORABLE RENÉE MARIE BUMB
Civ. No. 15-8024 (RMB)
OPINION
BUMB, United States District Judge
On November 10, 2015, Petitioner Steven Grohs filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1).
Respondents opposed the petition. (ECF No. 19).
On March 27, 2019, the Honorable Jerome B. Simandle, D.N.J.,
denied the petition and a certificate of appealability.1 (ECF No.
24). Petitioner now moves for reconsideration of that order or, in
the
alternative,
for
relief
from
judgment.
(ECF
No.
25).
Respondents oppose the motion. (ECF No. 28). For the reasons stated
below, the Court denies the motion.
1
The matter was reassigned to the undersigned on August 7, 2019.
(ECF No. 29).
I.
BACKGROUND
In September 2008, Petitioner was indicted in Camden County,
New Jersey, on fifteen counts of luring a child, criminal sexual
contact, child welfare endangerment, and related offenses arising
from his contact with a 14-year-old boy when Grohs was 42. (ECF
No.
19-3).
Petitioner
entered
a
guilty
plea
to
a
charge
of
attempted luring or enticing a child in violation of N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2C:13-6 on December 15, 2008. (ECF No. 19-4). On February
20, 2009, and pursuant to his guilty plea, Petitioner was sentenced
to five years’ imprisonment, with 728 days of jail credit. (ECF
No. 19-6; ECF No. 19-7).
On February 22, 2011, the Attorney General of the State of
New Jersey petitioned the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division,
Cumberland
County,
to
involuntarily
civilly
commit
Petitioner as a sexually violent predator under New Jersey’s
Sexually Violent Predator Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27.24 to .38 (“SVPA”). (ECF No. 19-8). The court granted the petition and
involuntarily
civilly
committed
Petitioner
to
the
Special
Treatment Unit (“STU”) in Avenel, New Jersey on February 24, 2011.
(ECF No. 19-9).
Following
the
exhaustion
of
his
state
court
remedies,
Petitioner filed his § 2254 petition with this Court on November
10, 2015. (ECF No. 1). By Order entered January 13, 2016, the Court
construed the sole claim of the petition as raising “th[e] issue
2
whether Petitioner’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel for failing to advise him adequately of the civil
commitment consequences of his plea.” (ECF No. 7).
Respondents argued in their answer that Petitioner failed to
meet § 2254’s “in custody” requirement because the custodial
portion of his criminal sentence ended on February 22, 2011 when
he was civilly committed to the STU.2 Judge Simandle concluded that
“to the extent the Petition is challenging Petitioner’s criminal
conviction, he was not ‘in custody’ for purposes of § 2254(a) at
the time the Petition was filed.” (ECF No. 23 at 12). Judge
Simandle further concluded that Petitioner could not challenge his
civil
commitment
because
he
had
done
so
in
a
prior
§
2254
proceeding which had been denied with prejudice on March 27, 2018.
See Grohs v. Main, No. 14-5268, 2018 WL 1522705 (D.N.J. Mar. 27,
2018). Finally, Judge Simandle reviewed the merits of Petitioner’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and concluded Petitioner
was not entitled to habeas relief or a certificate of appealability
Petitioner now moves for reconsideration of that order or, in
the alternative, for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60. Respondents oppose the motion. The Court
2
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
permits a federal court to entertain a petition for writ of
habeas corpus on behalf of a person in state custody, pursuant
to the judgment of a state court “only on the ground that he is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
3
considers the motion on the papers without oral argument. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 78(b).
II.
DISCUSSION
When a party seeks reconsideration of a judgment, the judgment
may be altered or amended if the party seeking
reconsideration shows at least one of the
following grounds: (1) an intervening change
in the controlling law; (2) the availability
of new evidence that was not available when
the court granted the motion for summary
judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear
error of law or fact or to prevent manifest
injustice.
Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d
669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA
Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). Disagreement
is not an appropriate basis for reconsideration. United States v.
Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345 (D.N.J. 1999). Here,
Petitioner asserts his claim under the third prong, the need to
correct a clear error of law or fact to prevent manifest injustice.
(ECF No. 25 at 16).
“Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final
judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set
of circumstances including fraud, mistake, and newly discovered
evidence.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528 (2005). However,
the Supreme Court has held that Rule 60(b)(6) motions in § 2254
proceedings
must
be
treated
as
second
or
successive
habeas
petitions in certain circumstances. Id. at 538. An argument that
4
“a previous ruling which precluded a merits determination was in
error - for example, a denial for such reasons as failure to
exhaust, procedural default, or statute-of-limitations bar” does
not make the instant motion an unauthorized second or successive
§ 2254 petition.3 Id. at 532 n.4.
Petitioner argues: (1) the Court erred when it concluded that
Petitioner failed to meet the in-custody requirement and sought
impermissible second or successive § 2254 relief; and (2) a
certificate
of
appealability
should
issue
because
reasonable
jurists could disagree whether Petitioner failed to meet the incustody requirement.
Whether construed as a motion for reconsideration under Rule
59 or for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b), Petitioner is not
entitled to relief. Although he frames his argument as one of
“mistake,” the crux of Petitioner’s motion is that he disagrees
with Judge Simandle’s decision. Disagreement with the Court’s
decision is not a proper basis for a motion for reconsideration.
Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 340-41 (3d Cir. 1999) (“A request
for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) cannot be used as a substitute
for an appeal.”) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). “[A]
movant
seeking
relief
under
Rule
60(b)(6)
[must]
show
3
The Court notes that Judge Simandle did consider the merits of
Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim but gives
Petitioner the benefit of the doubt on this issue.
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‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying the reopening of a final
judgment. Such circumstances will rarely occur in the habeas
context.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 (internal citations omitted).
The Court denies Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration or,
in the alternative, for relief from judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration or, in the alternative, for relief from judgment
is denied.
An appropriate order follows.
Dated:
December 31, 2019
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
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