DAISEY v. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 6/27/2016. (tf, n.m.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DANIELLE DAISEY,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 15-8091 (JBS/AMD)

v.
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, et
al.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants.

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Danielle Daisey filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit
alleging that the New Jersey Division of Child Protection
(“NJDCP”) violated her constitutional rights in their actions to
remove her children, S.W., G.W., M.G., D.G., and S.G., from her
care. Numerous defendants are named in the suit for their role
in the removal and ensuing custody-related hearings, including
the NJDCP, various DCP supervisors, case workers, and employees,
DCP-affiliated doctors and therapists, Ocean City police
officers, Plaintiff’s law guardian and public defender, and the
New Jersey Attorney General. (Compl. [Docket Item 1] at 2.)
The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s application to
proceed in forma pauperis [see Docket Item 2], and now must
screen the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court
finds as follows:

1.

According to the Complaint, on August 16, 2011, Cape

May police officers and state case workers entered Danielle
Daisey’s home, questioned her children, determined that they
were being abused and “in imminent danger,” and took S.W. and
G.W. into custody. (Compl. “Procedural History,” ¶¶ 1-5.)
Plaintiff was assigned a public defender and a fact-finding
hearing took place on November 30. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.) She alleges
that the charges against her were dismissed that day but that
NJDCP failed to return her children to her. (Id. ¶ 8.) Although
the Complaint is unclear, it appears that Plaintiff had three
other children, M.G., D.G., and S.G., in 2013, 2014, and 2015,
which Defendants also subsequently removed from Plaintiff’s
custody. (Id. ¶¶ 9-11.) She complains that doctors affiliated
with NJDCP required her to undergo a medical evaluation and to
take therapy, parenting classes, and medication as a condition
for regaining custody of her children. (Id. Count III, ¶¶ 1-3; &
Count VII, ¶¶ 1-2.) She alleges that the public defender
assigned to represent her failed to advise her properly. (Id.
Count II, ¶¶ 1-3.) Finally, Plaintiff complains that she
requested transportation assistance and housing assistance from
Defendants, which Defendants improperly denied. (Id. Count V, ¶
6 & Count VI, ¶¶ 13-14.) Plaintiff argues that these actions
violated her constitutional rights, and she seeks various
remedies, including damges for her pain and suffering as well as

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an injunction from the Court, ordering Defendants to return her
children. (Id. “Injunction Relief,” ¶¶ 1-7.)
2.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to review

Plaintiff’s Complaints and dismiss sua sponte any claim that is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8, a claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not require detailed
factual allegations, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007)). To prevent a summary dismissal, a complaint must
allege sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to show that
the claim is plausible on its face. A facially plausible claim
is one that would “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In determining the
sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must construe it
liberally in favor of the plaintiff. United States v. Day, 969
F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). The court will not credit legal
conclusions or “recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678; see also Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 128
(2010).
3.

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court finds

that it fails to state a claim over which a federal court would
have subject matter jurisdiction. Although Plaintiff has clothed
her complaint in the garb of a civil rights action, her
Complaint boils down to a demand to regain custody of her
children. Plaintiff does not allege, for example, that
Defendants failed to abide by the law in the removal of her
children, nor does she take issue with the legality of the law
itself. Indeed, she notes several times that she “was afforded a
fact finding hearing” after her children were taken from her
custody, appeared to have been served with notice to appear
before a court, and was assigned a public defender. (See, e.g.,
Count I, ¶ 12, Count IV, ¶ 1, Count VI, ¶¶ 7, 8.) Rather,
Plaintiff’s primary complaint against the various Defendants is
that their removal decisions were simply wrong. She repeatedly
complains that the evidence of abuse was “false” and
“misleading” and that Defendants removed her children “‘without
showing a probable cause of imminent danger’ when actual harm
has not been proven or a ‘substantial risk of harm.’” (See,
e.g., Compl. Count I, ¶ 11 & Count VI, ¶ 7.) She also challenges
the order, permitted by statute, see N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.58, that she

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undergo medical examinations, take medication, and participate
in classes.
4.

This Court does not have jurisdiction over such

matters. The New Jersey Legislature “adopted comprehensive
legislation for the protection and welfare of the children of
this State,” and child abuse and neglect cases are controlled by
Title 9 of the New Jersey Statutes. New Jersey Div. of Youth and
Family Serv. v. M.C. III, 990 A.2d 1097, 1107 (N.J. 2010). New
Jersey law makes clear that “the Superior Court, Chancery
Division, Family Part has exclusive original jurisdiction over
noncriminal proceedings under this act alleging the abuse or
neglect of a child.” N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.24 (emphasis added). New
Jersey law also mandates “[a]ll noncriminal cases involving
child abuse” to be “transferred to [New Jersey family court]
from other courts . . . .” N.J.S.A. 9:6-9.22; see also Cesare v.
Cesare, 713 A.2d 390, 399 (N.J. 1998) (noting the “family
courts’ special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters”).
Moreover, appeals from any “final order or decision in a case
involving child abuse” under Title 9 are taken to New Jersey
appellate courts, not to federal court. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.70. Even
when a complaint is “drafted in tort, contract, ‘or even under
the federal constitution,’” if the complaint involves matters of
domestic relations, it is generally not within the federal
court’s jurisdiction. New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs.
v. Prown, No. 13-7776, 2014 WL 284457, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 24,

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2014) (citation omitted). These statutory provisions are
consistent with the well-settled general understanding that the
“‘whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife,
parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to
the laws of the United States.’” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504
U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94
(1890)). To the extent that Plaintiff seeks review of the
removal determinations, this Court lacks jurisdiction to
entertain her claims.
5.

Even if this Court had federal subject matter

jurisdiction, the doctrine of abstention would still bar the
present action, since it appears from Plaintiff’s Complaint that
proceedings were held in state court. All doctrines of
abstention serve two common purposes: “to avoid premature
constitutional adjudication in the federal courts,” Hull v.
Petrillo, 439 F.2d 1184, 1188 (2d Cir. 1971), and “to ensure the
proper relationship between the state and the federal
judiciary.” Crane v. Fauver, 762 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1985)
(internal citations and quotation omitted). In this case,
depending on whether a final outcome has been reached in state
removal proceedings, a fact which the Complaint does not make
clear, Plaintiff’s claims would be barred by either the RookerFeldman doctrine or the Younger doctrine of abstention.
6.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is not a model of clarity, but

at the very least, the allegations indicate that there were

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removal proceedings in New Jersey family court. She alleges, for
example, that she was assigned to a public defender, who
wrongfully advised her to plea. (See Compl. Count II.) Factfinding hearings were held after her children were removed. (See
id. Count VI.) Plaintiff also notes that she was “order[ed]” to
participate in therapy and to undergo medical examinations (see
id. Count VI, ¶ 12), determinations that are made by the trial
court. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.58.
7.

The dates alleged in the Complaint – 2011, 2013, 2014,

and 2015 – suggest that removal proceedings have long concluded
and that Plaintiff is now protesting the trial court’s final
orders of removal. If this is indeed the case, Plaintiff’s suit
is barred by Rooker-Feldman. “[U]nder what has come to be known
as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts are
precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final
state-court judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463
(2006); see also Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild
LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 169 (3d Cir. 2010) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine
prohibits district courts from reviewing proceedings “already
conducted by the ‘lower’ tribunal to determine whether it
reached its result in accordance with law.”) (quotations and
citation omitted). The doctrine applies “where a party in effect
seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision
to a lower federal court.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 466 (citation
omitted). Four requirements must be met: (1) the federal

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plaintiff must have lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff
complains of injuries caused by state-court judgments; (3) the
state court judgments were rendered before the federal suit was
filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to
review and reject the state judgments. Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d
at 166 (quotation omitted).
8.

Assuming that state court proceedings have concluded,

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to bar Plaintiff’s claims.
Most of the injuries alleged in the Complaint stem from the
removal of Plaintiff’s children, and Plaintiff seeks an
injunction from the court to return her children to her. This
Court cannot review, negate, void, or provide relief that would
invalidate decisions in the state court matter. Thus, to the
extent she directly challenges the state court’s findings of
removal and asks this Court to overturn those judgments, her
claims are barred. See Johnson v. City of New York, 347 Fed.
App’x 850, 852 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s
dismissal of plaintiff’s claims that child services improperly
removed his children for abuse and neglect, because RookerFeldman doctrine barred review); White v. Supreme Court of N.J.,
319 Fed. App’x 171, 173 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming district
court’s refusal to hear child custody case under RookerFeldman); New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. Prown,
No. 13-7776, 2014 WL 284457, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014)

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(holding that Rooker-Feldman barred review of state proceedings
concerning child custody).
9.

Even if one of Plaintiff’s removal cases is still

pending before the New Jersey state court, Younger would bar
those claims. The Younger doctrine reflects “a strong federal
policy against federal-court interference with pending state
judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.”
Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457
U.S. 423, 431 (1982). Under Younger, federal court should
abstain from enjoining state civil proceedings that implicate
important state interests. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of
United Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, 339 Fed. App’x 232,
236 (3d Cir. 2009). Younger abstention is warranted when: (1)
there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature;
(2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests;
and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to
raise federal claims. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of United
Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, 339 Fed. Appx. 232 (3d Cir.
2009).
10.

All three requirements are satisfied here. First,

Plaintiff’s ongoing state proceedings are judicial in nature,
since removal proceedings are before the New Jersey Superior
Court. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.24. Second, Plaintiff’s Complaint
implicates important state interests. Issues relating to child
custody generally fall under the umbrella of “domestic

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relations,” and the Supreme Court has long noted state
tribunals’ “special proficiency . . . over the past century and
a half in handling issues that arise” in the area. Ankenbrandt
v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992); see also Marshall v.
Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 307 (2006). Particularly where the
question revolves around the status of a domestic relationship,
in this case, the custody status of a child, the case implicates
“difficult questions of state law bearing on policy questions of
substantial public import whose importance transcends the result
in the case [] at bar,” and is more appropriate for a state
court. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 705-06; see also Mayercheck v.
Judges of Pa. Sup. Ct., 395 Fed. App’x 839, 942 (3d Cir. 2010)
(noting that domestic relations exception divests federal courts
of jurisdiction over cases involving a decree of child custody);
Matusow v. Tans-County Title Agency, LLC, 545 F.3d 241, 245 (3d
Cir. 2008) (stating same). Finally, there is no reason why
Plaintiff may not raise her constitutional claims in the state
proceedings. See Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of United
Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, 339 Fed. App’x 232, 239 (3d
Cir. 2009). (“To satisfy the third prong of Younger, it is
sufficient ‘that constitutional claims may be raised in statecourt judicial review of the administrative proceeding.’”
(quoting Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schools,
Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 629 (1986))).

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11.

Additionally, the New Jersey Division of Child

Protection is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The
Eleventh Amendment immunizes states from suit by private parties
in federal court, and the immunity extends to state agencies and
departments, or if the named Defendant is an “arm of the state.”
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir.
2001). New Jersey courts have long held that the NJDCP is,
“beyond dispute,” an “arm of the state” for purposes of
sovereign immunity. Izquierdo v. New Jersey, No. 12-7298, 2014
WL 234186, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 21, 2014) (Debevoise, J.); see
also Sweet-Springs v. Dep’t of Children and Families, No. 12706, 2013 WL 3043644, at *5-6 (D.N.J. June 17, 2013) (finding
predecessor to NJDCP protected by Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity); Pena v. Div. of Child & Family Servs., No. 08-1168,
2010 WL 3982321, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2010) (predecessor to
NJDCP was entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment);
Simmerman v. Corino, 804 F. Supp. 644, 650 (D.N.J. 1992)
(finding predecessor to NJDCP entitled to sovereign immunity and
noting that it is “created by statute and is answerable to other
State agencies.”); New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
D.C., 571 A.2d 1295, 1299 (1990).1

1

To the extent Plaintiff sues the Public Defender’s Office, it
is also immune from suit. It is “equally well-established in
this District that the Office of the Public Defender is a state
agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Izquierdo v.
New Jersey, No. 12-7298, 2014 WL 234186, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 21,
2014); see also, Hughes v. State of New Jersey, No. 11–1442,
2012 WL 761997, at *3 (D.N.J. March 7, 2012) (citing Peterson v.
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12.

Plaintiff sues the individual case workers and police

officers involved in the removal of Plaintiff’s children, as
well as the doctors who were involved in evaluating and
prescribing her treatment. New Jersey law, however, exempts from
liability police officers and “designated employee[s] of the
division” who assist in the removal of a child from the home.
See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.29 (“Any person or institution acting in good
faith in the removal or keeping of a child pursuant to this
section shall have immunity from any liability, civil or
criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed as a
result of such removal or keeping.”) Likewise, New Jersey law
extends immunity to the doctors and therapists involved in
protective custody proceedings. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.20 (“Any
physician or director of a hospital or similar institution who
takes a child into protective custody pursuant to this act shall
have immunity from any civil and criminal liability that might
otherwise be incurred or imposed.”) To the extent Plaintiff
challenges the order to accept medical evaluations and certain
services, such orders originate from the New Jersey Family
Court, which this Court has no jurisdiction to review. See
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.58 (“In cases where, in the opinion of the court,
an individual found to have abused or neglected a child appears

Rinkus, No. 10–5316, 2011 WL 2148312 (D.N.J. May 31, 2011) (“The
Office of the Public Defender is an agency established by the
State of New Jersey, in the Executive Branch, to fulfill the
State's obligation to provide representation to indigent
criminal defendants.”).)
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to be in need of therapeutic services, the court may order the
individual to accept such services or evaluation for such
services, including, but not limited to, homemaker services,
functional education, group self-help programs, and professional
therapy . . . .”)
13.

Finally, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against her public

defender and law guardian must also be dismissed. Section 1983
authorizes suit against any person who, “under color of law,”
deprives a citizen of his or her constitutional rights. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983. It is well-settled, however, that a public
defender, despite being paid by the State, does not “act under
color of state law” within the meaning of § 1983, and cannot
subject to liability under that statute. See Polk Cnty. v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (holding that “a public
defender does not act under color of state law when performing a
lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel” to a criminal
defendant because they serve as independent advocates and, by
nature of their function and duty, are not servants to an
administrative superior); Black v. Bayer, 672 F.2d 309, 317
(1982) (explaining that “exposing court-appointed counsel to
liability . . . would deter many qualified, competent lawyers
from accepting court appointments” and holding that “courtappointed counsel are absolutely immune from civil liability
under § 1983.”). And, even though Plaintiff states that her
public defender “conspired” with NJDCP, a state agency, to

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deprive her of her constitutional rights, the Complaint contains
no facts whatsoever that gives rise to an inference that there
was an agreement between her public defender and NJDCP officials
to deprive Plaintiff of her rights. See Watkins v. Weber, 546 F.
Supp. 2d 182, 187 (D.N.J. 2008) (dismissing plaintiff’s § 1983
claims against public defender defendants because there were no
facts that would suggest a conspiracy between the public
defenders and prosecutors).
14.

In sum, and for all of the foregoing reasons,

Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. Because any amendment
would be unfruitful, the dismissal is with prejudice. The
accompanying Order will be entered.

June 27, 2016
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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