MATOS et al v. LAIELLI et al
Filing
33
OPINION. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 10/26/2016. (TH, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
VICTORIA MATOS and BRUCE
BULLOCK,
:
Hon. Joseph H. Rodriguez
:
Civil Action No. 15-cv-8140
Plaintiffs,
:
v.
OPINION
:
LAUREN LAIELLI, CHRISTOPHER
:
DODSON, VICTOR E. GUADALUPE,
PAULO PEREIRA, HARRY R. ALBERT, :
FRANK X. BALLES, ATLANTIC
COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE AND
:
ATLANTIC COUNTY,
:
Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on motion of Defendants Lauren
Laielli, Christopher Dodson, Victor E. Guadalupe, Paulo Pereira, Harry R.
Albert, and Frank X. Balles for partial dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(c). The Court has reviewed the submissions of the
parties and decides this matter without oral argument in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b). For the reasons stated here, the
motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
Background
Plaintiffs, Victoria Matos and Bruce Bullock, were employed by the
New Jersey Department of Children and Families as Family Service
Specialists. Plaintiffs allege that they were wrongfully arrested and
prosecuted in connection with their November 6, 2014 work assignment of
escorting a juvenile to a court hearing in the Atlantic County Courthouse.
Plaintiffs allege that upon entering the courthouse, the juvenile was
confronted by a sheriff’s officer, but ignored a direction from one of the
officers and proceeded to enter the elevator with Bullock. At that point,
multiple sheriff’s deputies entered the elevator, restrained, and allegedly
assaulted the juvenile. Bullock witnessed the assault, but allegedly did not
interfere in any way. (Compl., ¶¶16-20.) As Matos approached the
elevator, she was pushed out of the way by one of the sheriff’s officers.
(Compl., ¶22.) After the juvenile was taken into custody by the sheriffs,
Matos complained about the way she was treated and the way the juvenile
had been treated. (Compl., ¶23.)
When Bullock left the courthouse to go to his vehicle and retrieve
paperwork, he was followed by several of the individual defendants and he
used his phone to record their actions. This resulted in the sheriffs placing
him in handcuffs and bringing him into the courthouse in their custody.
(Compl., ¶¶25-26.) Defendant Albert allegedly told Bullock that he would
be released and no further action would be taken if he deleted the video
that he had taken. (Compl., ¶28.)
After the Defendants learned that Plaintiffs intended to file an
internal affairs complaint against them, Plaintiffs allege that they
collectively decided to file criminal charges against the Plaintiffs, knowing
that there was no basis for those charges. (Compl., ¶¶30-32.) Plaintiffs
were fired from their jobs based on the false allegations of the Defendants.
The charges against them proceeded to trial in the Atlantic City Municipal
Court, where they were acquitted of all charges. (Compl., ¶¶37-39.)
Although he was not involved in the original encounter with
Plaintiffs, Defendant Balles is alleged to have ratified and endorsed the
arrest and prosecution of the Plaintiffs for the purpose of protecting the
sheriff’s officers from civil liability and other consequences of their
misconduct. (Compl., ¶61.) Further, Balles allegedly made it clear to the
Plaintiffs’ criminal attorneys that his office was prosecuting the Plaintiffs to
protect the Atlantic County Sheriff’s Office from criticism and civil liability,
and that all charges could be dropped in exchange for an agreement
protecting the sheriff and his officers. (Compl., ¶36.)
Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs have brought their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as
well as New Jersey state law. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's
federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff's state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Standard on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that a party may move
for judgment on the pleadings. The movant under Rule 12(c) must show
clearly that no material issue of fact exists and that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Rosenau v. Uniford Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221
(3d Cir. 2008) (citing Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d
289, 29091 (3d Cir. 1988)). A motion under Rule 12(c) is reviewed under
the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Turbe v.
Government of the Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court may
dismiss a complaint “for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege
facts that raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
While a court must accept as true all allegations in the plaintiff's complaint,
and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Phillips v. County
of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008), a court is not required to
accept sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations,
unwarranted inferences, or unsupported conclusions. Morse v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The complaint must
state sufficient facts to show that the legal allegations are not simply
possible, but plausible. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Discussion
Defendants have argued that all claims against Sheriff Balles should
be dismissed because the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to suggest
that Sheriff Balles had personal involvement in, or knowledge of, an alleged
constitutional violation; nor does the Complaint set forth any facts
regarding an illegal policy of custom which Sheriff Balles allegedly created
that resulted in a constitutional deprivation. The Court disagrees.
The Complaint alleges that Defendant Balles made it clear to the
Plaintiffs’ criminal defense attorneys that all charges could be dropped in
exchange for an agreement protecting the sheriff and his officers. (Compl.,
¶36.) It also alleges that Balles was aware that the charges were false and,
despite this awareness, conspired with Defendants to pursue the charges in
order to protect his office and his employees against claims of civil liability
for their misconduct. (Compl., ¶¶41, 42.) The Complaint alleges that Balles
ratified and endorsed the arrest and prosecution of Plaintiffs for the
purpose of protecting the sheriff’s officers from civil liability and other
consequences of their misconduct. (Compl., ¶¶52 and 61.) Finally,
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that the false arrest and malicious prosecution
would not have occurred without the official endorsement of Defendant
Balles. (Compl., ¶67.) The Court finds these allegations sufficient for
claims against Balles in his individual capacity to survive the instant
motion. 1
Similarly, the Court finds that conspiracy has been sufficiently pled.
To state a claim for civil conspiracy in New Jersey, a Plaintiff must allege:
a combination of two or more persons acting in
concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a
lawful act by unlawful means, the principal element
of which is an agreement between the parties to
inflict a wrong or injury upon another, and an overt
act that results in damage.
Insofar as any claims have been asserted against Balles in his official
capacity, they are dismissed as duplicative of the claims against the County.
See Baez v. Lancaster County, 487 Fed. Appx. 30, 32 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The
claim against Warden Gaurini in his official capacity is duplicative of the
suit against the County. As a result, summary judgment was properly
granted in favor of the County and Warden Guarini in his official
capacity.”); Kean v. Henry, 523 Fed. Appx. 879, 882 (3d Cir. 2013).
1
Banco Popular North America v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 177, 876 A.2d 253
(2005). Thus, to state a claim for civil conspiracy, plaintiffs must allege
that a defendant (1) entered into an agreement with at least one other
person, (2) for the purpose of committing an unlawful act, and (3) one of
the conspirators then took at least one overt act in furtherance of the
agreement, and (4) plaintiff suffered some damage as a result.
The Complaint alleges that after they learned the Plaintiff Matos was
considering filing an Internal Affairs complaint against them, Defendants
Dodson, Laielli, Guadalupe and Pereira “conferred and decided to file
criminal charges against the Plaintiffs. Their plan was approved by
Defendant Albert.” (Compl., ¶32.) In addition, Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges
that all of the individual defendants including Sheriff Balles “conspired to
falsely create probable cause through fabricated statements to bring about
criminal charges against Ms. Matos and Mr. Bullock.” (Compl., ¶1.)
Further, it is alleged that Defendants participated in the fabrication of
probable cause “in the hopes of protecting themselves against claims of civil
liability for their misconduct in the handling of the incident . . . on
November 4, 2014 at the Atlantic County Courthouse.” (Compl., ¶42.)
Accordingly, the Court finds that civil conspiracy has been pled adequately.
However, it appears that Plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim, as well
their common law defamation claim, 2 must be dismissed for failure to
comply with the notice requirements of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.
See County Concrete Corp. v. Township of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 174-75
(3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the NJTCA notice requirements apply to a civil
conspiracy claim).
The NJTCA sets forth the procedures a claimant must follow before
bringing a tort claim against the state, or, as is relevant here, a “local public
entity.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:1–1 et seq. The statute defines a “local public
entity” as “a public entity other than the State.” § 59:8–2. The claim must
include seven items: (1) name and address of the claimant, (2) the address
to which the notice will be sent, (3) the “date, place and other
circumstances of the occurrence or transaction” giving rise to the claim, (4)
a description of the injury, damage or loss incurred, (5) the name or names
of the public entity, employee or employees causing the injury, (6) the
In New Jersey, an action for defamation requires the plaintiff to establish:
“(1) the assertion of a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(2) the unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party; and (3)
fault amounting to at least negligence by the publisher.” DeAngelis v. Hill,
180 N.J. 1, 12-13 (2004). Because defamation is a tort claim, a plaintiff
must comply with the notice requirements under the NJTCA. See Brown v.
City of Essex County New Jersey, No. 10-3980, 2010 WL 5139880, *3
(D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2010).
2
amount of damages claimed, and (7) the signature of the claimant. §§ 59:8–
4, 59:8–5.
A claim for injury or damages against a local public entity “shall be
filed with that entity” within 90 days after the accrual of the cause of action.
§§ 59:8–7, 59:8–8. A claim “may be presented to a local entity by delivering
it or mailing it certified mail to the entity” and the claim “shall be deemed
to have been presented in compliance with this section . . . if it is actually
received at . . . [a] local public entity within the time prescribed . . . .” §
59:8–10(a)–(b). “[C]onstructive service” of the public entity can be
achieved by serving the required notice “upon any employee of that entity.”
§ 59:8–10(c). Although the statute sets a 90–day time limit to file the claim,
a claimant may file the notice within two years, with permission of the court
and if late notice will not prejudice the defendant, upon a showing of
“extraordinary circumstances for [her] failure to file notice of claim” within
the 90–day period. § 59:8–9.
Here, Plaintiffs have neither pled nor shown compliance with the
notice requirements of the NJTCA. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims of
defamation and civil conspiracy must be dismissed. See Velez v. City of
Jersey City, 850 A.2d 1238, 1246 (N.J. 2004).
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Defendants’ motion will be granted in part and
denied in part. An appropriate Order will be entered.
Dated: October 26, 2016
/s/ Joseph H. Rodriguez
JOSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ
U.S.D.J.
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