DOUGHERTY et al v. DOUGHERTY et al

Filing 96

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 11/8/2017. (tf, n.m.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KEVIN DOUGHERTY and KEITH
DOUGHERTY,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiffs,
Civil Action
No. 15-8541 (JBS/AMD)

v.
TRACEY ADAMS-DOUGHERTY, et
al.,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants.
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
The Complaint in this case was dismissed upon motions of
the Defendants in a Memorandum Opinion and Order filed September
21, 2016 (Docket Items 85 & 86).

The Court found, in its

detailed 28-page opinion, that Plaintiffs’ claims against the
various defendants were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
(Id. at Docket Item 85.)
Plaintiff Keith Dougherty thereafter filed a Notice of
Appeal on September 26, 2016, docketed at Appeal No. 16-3729,
which the Court of Appeals dismissed on October 25, 2016 (Docket
Item 89.)
Five months later, on March 29, 2017, Plaintiffs Kevin T.
Dougherty and Keith Dougherty filed a motion to reinstate
(Docket Item 90), followed by their motion to supplement the
record (Docket Item 91), their motion to supplement with new law

(Docket Item 92), and their motion to supplement with new
clarification of law (Docket Item 93).

Plaintiff Keith

Dougherty also signed and submitted a document captioned “Oral
Argument Demand” on July 5, 2017 (Docket Item 94).
The Court will reopen this docket for the limited purpose
of addressing these submissions (Docket Items 90-93).
Plaintiffs’ motions will be decided without oral argument
pursuant to Rule 78, Fed. R. Civ. P., and Plaintiffs’ request
for oral argument (Docket Item 94) will be denied.1
Motion to Reinstate
(Docket Item 90)
Plaintiffs’ post-appeal motion to reinstate is filed
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., and asserts that the
various federal judges of this Court and of the Third Circuit
are corrupt and incompetent.

The motion seeks relief from the

final judgment of this Court entered on September 21, 2016.

The

motion attaches recent exhibits from Plaintiff Kevin T.
Dougherty’s state court appeal in Kevin T. Dougherty v. Tracey
Adams Dougherty, A-001958-16T3 (Exhibit A), and a request to add
a Fair Credit Reporting Act violation coupled with argument that

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Rather than giving reasons why the opportunity for oral
argument would be beneficial, the Plaintiffs’ Oral Argument
Demand (Docket Item 94) presents 12 pages of insults and nonsequiturs directed at lawyers and the undersigned and other
members of the judiciary. Plaintiffs’ written submissions
(Docket Items 90-93] will suffice and no purpose would be served
by oral argument upon Plaintiffs’ motion to reinstate this case.
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Defendant Camden County in the present case was in default and
that this Court should not have considered the County
Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
at pp. 21-23.)

(See Docket Item 90-1, Exhibit A

Also attached to the motion is a copy of a

“Notice of Reporting to Credit Agencies” pertaining to Kevin T.
Dougherty, apparently pertaining to Child Support Debts assessed
by the Camden County Probation Division.
Exhibit B.)

(See Docket Item 90-2,

The motion also attaches a document entitled

“Business Disclosure [debt collection and related activities]
General Agreement as of” (indecipherable), naming Keith
Dougherty as a person agreeing to provide financial advice.
(See Docket Item 90-3, Exhibit C.)
The final judgment was entered in this case on September
21, 2016.

A motion to grant relief from a final judgment under

Rule 60(b)(6) may be granted for “any other reason that
justifies relief.”

Rule 60(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.

This

provision of the rules may be invoked to seek relief from a
final judgment in situations not covered by subparts 60(b)(1)(5), where the movant demonstrates that setting aside the
judgment is necessary due to extraordinary or exceptional
circumstances.

Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535-36 (2005).

Generally, the movant must demonstrate “extraordinary
circumstances” for setting aside a final judgment under clause
(6).

Ackerman v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199, 200, 202
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(1950).

For example, a movant’s assertion, as in the present

case, that the trial court has committed legal error does not
warrant relief from a judgment, since the correction of legal
errors is a function of the court of appeals and not for
repetitive litigation of the same issues in the district court.
Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 173
(3d Cir. 2004); see also Arrieta v. Battaglia, 461 F.3d 861 (7th
Cir. 2006) (relief based on mistake of law and relief under Rule
60(b)(6) are mutually exclusive).
The Third Circuit has further indicated that “a showing of
extraordinary circumstances involves a showing that without
relief from the judgment, ‘an extreme and unexpected hardship
will result.’”

Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 255

(3d Cir. 2008), quoting Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1163
(3d Cir. 1977) (internal quotes omitted).
In the present case, Plaintiffs in fact filed an appeal to
the Third Circuit to assert legal error and obtain appellate
review, and they failed to prosecute the appeal resulting in its
dismissal.

Seeking reconsideration of the final judgment of a

matter already litigated in this court is not a substitute for
appeal.
Moreover, Plaintiffs continue to reassert the same nonmeritorious arguments as have previously been addressed by this
court in the opinion and final judgment of September 21, 2016.
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It is not easy to decipher Plaintiffs’ blend of arguments,
insults, and diatribe.

Plaintiffs essentially continue to argue

that this federal court should review conduct of judges and
litigants in Kevin Dougherty’s state court action as well as
state-authorized assessments of child support.

A person

aggrieved by a state court judgment has the remedy of an appeal
within the state court system, and not to the federal court,
which does not sit in supervision of the state courts.

For

reasons explained at length in this court’s Opinion of September
21, 2016 granting Defendants’ dismissal motions, Plaintiffs are
wrong on the law.

There is no reason to repeat this Court’s

analysis here, and Plaintiffs point to nothing pertinent that
this Court has overlooked.
Motions to Supplement the Record
(Docket Items 91, 92 & 93)
Nor do Plaintiffs’ supplemental submissions (Docket Items
90, 91, 92, and 93) provide meaningful support for setting aside
the final judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).

A few verbatim excerpts

suffice to show what Plaintiffs submit in place of responsible
legal argument.

“The 3rd Cir ‘is the most corrupt and

incompetent assemblence of ‘lawyers and judges in the nation’
[where they have created a State within a State] in Violation of
Article IV of the Constitution,” (Docket Item 90, 3/29/17 at pp.
2-3) [misspellings and brackets in original]; “[how do you do it

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‘as incompetent jackasses’ saying ‘interference with Keith
Dougherty’s right to [engage] commerce across state lines’ is
not protected ‘but Gangs crossing [state] Borders to steal drug
proceed are.” (Docket Item 91) [misspellings and brackets in
original].
Keith Dougherty’s tone became more menacing and threatening
in his submission of May 8, 2017, stating among other threats:
If you do not know Keith Dougherty is the
“debt collection assignee” You will die for
your “communist stupidity” ... like
Braveheart Longshanks “just as good” ...
you’ll still be dead...
(Docket Item 92 at p.12).

Such threats are intolerable and have

no place in civil society.

Plaintiffs are hereby warned that

mailing or delivering a threat of harm to a United States judge,
a federal law enforcement officer, or other federal officer or
employee engaged in official duties is a federal crime.
Furthermore, on May 24, 2017, Plaintiff Keith Dougherty
alleged:
It is a waste of Keith Dougherty’s time to
“explain it to you” but I will explain it to
a Jury (whether a 7th Amendment Jury or a
6th Amendment Jury is to be determined).
(Docket Item 93 at p.3.)

Keith Dougherty attached a copy of a

recent Supreme Court decision, Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 581
U.S.

2017 WL 2216933 (May 22, 2017) (interpreting Article

10(a) of the Hague Service Convention and remanding to Court of

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Appeals to consider whether Texas law authorizes the methods of
service used by Water Splash to effectuate service in Canada), a
precedent having no bearing upon the issues in this case.
Finally, in Docket Item 94, filed July 5, 2017, Plaintiff
Keith Dougherty takes issue with decisions of the Third Circuit
in unrelated matters deciding constitutional issues, and he
seeks again to relitigate the determination in this case, while
it was pending in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania before
transfer, to enlarge the time for the Voorhees Defendants to
respond or otherwise plead.

This Court thoroughly addressed the

issue involving enlargement of time in its Memorandum Opinion
filed September 21, 2016.

It will not be addressed again.
Conclusion

This Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to raise
grounds supporting good cause to set aside this Court’s final
judgment of September 21, 2016 under Rule 60(b)(6).

The

accompanying Order will be entered denying Plaintiffs’ motions.

November 8, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge

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