BROOKS v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al
Filing
35
OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 3/29/2018. (rtm, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CLARENCE BROOKS, JR.,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 15-8589 (JBS/KMW)
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and
ANNA WEAVER,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendants.
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
In this action, Plaintiff Clarence Brooks, Jr. alleges,
inter alia, that Defendant Anna Weaver (“Weaver”) negligently
and/or carelessly caused him to be injured when her car struck
his from behind in a five-car accident on the entrance ramp
connecting Blackwood-Clementon Road to Route 42 near Bellmawr,
New Jersey, on May 6, 2014. [Docket Item 4, Am. Compl, ¶¶ 8-9,
19-25.] Pending before the Court is Weaver’s unopposed motion
for summary judgment [Docket Item 20]; the Court notes that
Weaver’s fellow defendant, the United States of America, does
not oppose Weaver’s motion for summary judgment on all claims
and cross-claims against her [Docket Item 22]. Weaver claims
that the evidentiary record allows any reasonable finder of fact
only to conclude that she did not operate her car in a negligent
or careless manner, in that she was stopped herself when she was
struck and was, effectively, the middle car in the accident when
her car then went on to strike Plaintiff’s car. For the reasons
discussed below, the Court will grant Weaver’s motion for
summary judgment as to the personal injury claim against her, as
well as any cross-claims. The Court finds as follows:
1.
Background. 1 On May 6, 2014, Weaver, Plaintiff, and
Staff Sergeant Stephen Mehlhaff, acting in his capacity on
behalf of defendant United States of America, were all involved
as the drivers of three separate vehicles in the five-car
accident on the entrance ramp connecting Blackwood-Clementon
Road with Route 42. The evidentiary record (including the
deposition testimony of Plaintiff, Weaver, and Mehlstaff and the
interrogatory responses of Weaver) supports the contention that
Plaintiff’s car was ahead of both Weaver and Mehlstaff. Weaver
argues that the evidentiary record shows conclusively that, as
she approached Plaintiff’s car, she was driving at a safe speed
and gradually came to a complete stop. [Docket Item 20-2 at 2.]
At that time, Sgt. Mehlhaff’s car rear-ended Weaver’s car. Id.
Weaver’s car hit Plaintiff’s car, id., and immediately
thereafter, Sgt. Mehlhaff’s car also rear-ended Plaintiff’s car.
1For
purposes of the instant motion and pursuant to L. Civ. R.
56.1, the Court looks to the Amended Complaint [Docket Item 4]
when appropriate, Defendant’s Statement of Uncontested Material
Facts [Docket Item 20-2 at 1-6], and related exhibits and
documents [Docket Items 20-3 through -8].
[Docket Item 20-2 at 4.] Sgt. Mehlhaff testified that he first
hit Weaver’s car, that she had been at a complete stop when he
struck her, and that he then hit Plaintiff’s car (which was also
at a complete stop). Id. Plaintiff testified that he felt two
hits to his car. Id. at 4-5. Although Plaintiff testified that
he believed the car with the “soldiers” was the first to hit
him, he testified that he assumed it was Weaver’s car that hit
him the second time, and that he made “several ‘assumptions.’”
Id. at 5.
2.
Standard of Review. At summary judgment, the moving
party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once
a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the
burden shifts to the non-moving party, who must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). In
reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court is required
to examine the evidence in light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and resolve all reasonable inferences in that
party's favor. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999);
Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). A factual
dispute is material when it “might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law,” and genuine when “the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A factual assertion
in the movant’s Statement of Facts, citing to the record, is
deemed undisputed when the opponent fails to dispute it with its
own counter-citation to the record.
3.
Analysis. Weaver argues, and the Court agrees, that
the evidentiary record, including the above testimony as well as
police reports, photographs, and diagrams [Docket Items 20-3
through -8], does not raise a genuine dispute of material fact
that Weaver operated her car in any negligent or careless
manner, because there is no genuine dispute that Weaver was
stopped when she was hit from behind, and that it was that
collision that pushed her car into Plaintiff’s car, thereby
serving as one cause of the injuries he suffered that day.
4.
Plaintiff did not oppose this motion and does not
point to any evidence in the record from which a reasonable
finder of fact could support a finding that Weaver was not
stopped when she was struck and her car pushed into Plaintiff’s
car, or that Weaver engaged in any act or omission that
constituted operating her car in a negligent or careless manner.
5.
Under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must show, in order
to maintain a prima facie claim of negligence, 1) the existence
of a duty; 2) a breach of that duty; 3) proximate cause; and 4)
damages as a result. Filipowicz v. Diletto, 350 N.J. Super. 552,
558 (App. Div. 2002). Under New Jersey law, “[n]egligence is a
fact which must be shown and which will not be presumed.” Long
v. Landy, 35 N.J. 44, 54 (1961). “The mere showing of an
incident causing the injury sued upon is not alone sufficient to
authorize the finding of an incident of negligence. . . . The
burden of proving the charge of negligence is upon the plaintiff
and must be sustained by proof of circumstances from which
defendant’s want of due care is a legitimate inference.” Id.
6.
The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute of
material fact that Weaver did not breach a duty of care owed to
Plaintiff. The standard for such a duty of care is “the conduct
of the reasonable [person] of ordinary prudence under the
circumstances.” Ambrose v. Cyphers, 29 N.J. 138, 144 (1959).
7.
The undisputed evidence shows that Weaver was struck
from behind while her car was stopped and her car was pushed
into Plaintiff’s car. Nothing in this fact pattern would allow a
reasonable finder of fact to conclude that Weaver conducted
herself in any way that deviates from “the conduct of a
reasonable [person] of ordinary prudence under the
circumstances.”
8.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that it “is
elementary that a following car in the same lane of traffic is
obligated to maintain a reasonably safe distance behind the car
ahead, having due regard to the speed of the preceding vehicle
and the traddic upon the condition of the highway. Failure to do
so resulting in a collision, is negligence and a jury should be
so instructed.” Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 10
(1969)(internal citations omitted). There is no evidence here
from which a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that
Weaver failed to meet this standard. Accordingly, a reasonable
finder of fact could not conclude that Weaver was negligent and
therefore liable to Plaintiff (or to Defendant United States of
America on a cross-claim).
9.
Accordingly, the Court will grant Weaver’s Motion for
summary judgment dismissing the negligence claim against her as
well as any cross-claims. The accompanying Order will be
entered.
March 29, 2018
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge
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