PARKER v. ATLANTIC CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al

Filing 66

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 60 defendants' Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joel Schneider on 2/17/2017. (tf, )

[Doc. No. 60]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
DEWANE PARKER,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 15-8712 (JHR/JS)
v.
ATLANTIC CITY BOARD OF
EDUCATION, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The

Court

regrets

it

has

to

take

time

to

respond

to

defendants’ meritless Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. No. 60],
as

well

as

the

fact

that

a

notoriously

cash-strapped

school

district has to incur legal fees for the filing of a motion with
no basis in law or fact seeking to upset a non-consequential
discretionary

discovery

issue.

Defendants’

motion

asks

for

reconsideration of the Court’s January 9, 2017 Order [Doc. No.
56]

denying

defendants’

request

that

plaintiff

prepare

a

“relevancy log” as well as an in camera review of documents not
produced. The Court received plaintiff’s response to defendants’
motion [Doc. No. 62] and defendants’ reply [Doc. No. 64], and
exercises its discretion to decide defendants’ motion without
oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L. Civ. R. 78.1. For the
reasons to be discussed, defendants’ motion is denied.
1

Background
Plaintiff

held

the

position

of

Atlantic

City’s

School

District’s Director of Security from 2001 to June 30, 2015. By
all accounts plaintiff was a competent and qualified Director
with no performance issues. After plaintiff was not re-hired in
June 2015, defendants advertised for a new position, Coordinator
of Public Safety (“Coordinator”). The Coordinator position was
essentially

the

same

job

as

the

Director

of

Safety

position

plaintiff formerly held. After initially denying the Coordinator
position

to

plaintiff’s
School

plaintiff,

employment.

District’s

defendants

Defendants’

monitor.

agreed

hiring

Plaintiff

to

was

filed

reinstate

nixed

this

by

lawsuit

the
on

December 17, 2015, and alleged he was not re-hired in June 2015
because of discrimination and retaliation.
Although
satisfactory

plaintiff’s
from

2001

job

–

2015,

performance
and

was

defendants

admittedly
agreed

to

reinstate plaintiff to the new Coordinator position, defendants
are seeking plaintiff’s federal employment records from 1984 to
1998. 1 Plaintiff’s personnel records from his federal employment
will
about

undoubtedly
his

contain

salary,

confidential

benefits,

health

1

and

private

history,

etc.

information
Moreover,

Plaintiff’s resume indicates that from 1984 - 1987 he worked as
a Federal Police Officer with the GSA/Federal Protective
Service, from 1987 – 1988 as a Federal Police Officer with the
U.S. Department of the Interior, and from 1988 – 1998 as a
Personal Protection Team Commander/Federal Agent/Swat Commander
for the U.S. Department of Defense.
2

defendants

request

plaintiff’s

records

even

though

defendants

questioned plaintiff in detail at his deposition in another case
about his federal employment. Plaintiff objected to defendants’
document request.
Despite the questionable relevancy of plaintiff’s federal
employment records, the Court fashioned a fair, even-handed and
equitable resolution of the parties’ discovery dispute at the
oral argument held on January 9, 2017. 2 In order to protect the
private, confidential and irrelevant information in plaintiff’s
personnel records, the Court directed plaintiff to obtain the
requested
relevant

records
to

and

determine

to
if

only

produce

the

the

plaintiff

records
has

the

“that

are

necessary

qualifications for the job of Coordinator of Public Safety.” Tr.
of January 9, 2017 Oral Argument (“Tr.”) 39:17-19. 3 The Court
noted plaintiff’s counsel was an officer of the Court and it

2

Since plaintiff was seeking the positon of Coordinator of
Public Safety, the Court deemed plaintiff’s federal employment
records relevant to whether plaintiff had the following
necessary qualifications for the position:
2. A minimum of ten (10) years’ experience in the
field of Federal State or Municipal Law Enforcement.
Candidate
must
submit
all
academy
and
training
certifications.
3. Five (5) years of experience as Supervisor of
Federal, State or Municipal Law Enforcement personnel.
The Court rejected defendants’
requested records were relevant.
3

other

arguments

for

why

the

The Court’s complete Oral Opinion is located at Tr. 36:2041:25.
3

expected

counsel

to

comply

with

its

obligation

to

produce

responsive documents. Id. 39:24 to 40:2. The Court also noted
that

if

plaintiff’s

counsel

had

a

good

faith

question

about

whether a document was responsive he should send the document to
the Court for an in camera review. Id. 40:2-9. The Court denied
defendants’ request that plaintiff Bates stamp and produce a log
of the documents in plaintiff’s files not produced along with an
explanation

for

why

the

documents

were

not

produced.

Specifically, the Court stated:
Counsel, here’s what I’m going to do about that.
I’m not going to require plaintiff to do that for this
reason. Because if I ask plaintiff to do that in this
case, then I would have to ask every party in every
case to do the same thing. I’m not asking the
defendant to log every record it has and to say why
it’s not being produced.
The Court relies on the good judgment and
professional obligations of counsel to fulfill their
duties honorably and completely. I have no reason to
believe that that won’t be done by either plaintiff or
defendant in this case. And that’s why at the end I
added -- and it happens -- if, in plaintiff’s
judgment,
there’s
a
legitimate
question
whether
something should be produced or not, I’ll look at
those records in camera.
And I’ve done this in the past in many, many,
many, many cases and haven’t run into a problem. I
have no reason to believe both of you won’t comply
with your professional obligations. And from what I’ve
seen and know of you in this and other cases, that’s
what you’ve always done and that’s what you’ll
continue to do.

4

Id. 41:6 to 41:24. Defendants ask for reconsideration of the
denial of their request for the preparation of a document log
and an in camera review.
Discussion
A

motion

for

reconsideration

is

an

“extremely

limited

procedural vehicle.” Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Greate Bay Hotel and
Casino,

Inc.,

830

F.

Supp.

826,

831

(D.N.J.

1992);

Polizzi

Meats, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 931 F. Supp. 328, 338-39
(D.N.J.

1996).

remedy"

and

is

Indeed,

reconsideration

granted

"sparingly."

is

"an

extraordinary

NL

Indus.,

Inc.

v.

Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996).
Defendant

argues

manifest

injustice

will

result

unless

the

Court’s Order is reconsidered. 4 Brief at 2. Despite this plea,
however, defendants cite no law or fact the Court overlooked
when it issued its Order. See Resorts Int’l, Inc., 830 F. Supp.
at 831 ("Courts in this district have consistently interpreted
the word ‘overlooked’ as the dominant term in the rule”). Nor
have

defendants

cited

any

law

or

fact

to

support

their

arguments.
Despite their protestation to the contrary, the crux of
defendants’

argument

is

that

they

do

not

trust

plaintiff

to

produce the documents the Court directed be produced. Defendants

4

A motion for reconsideration may be granted to prevent manifest
injustice, Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3rd Cir. 1999).
5

are concerned that plaintiff’s counsel will act as the “sole
gatekeeper”

of

the

documents

received

in

response

to

their

authorizations. Brief at 4. “Defendants’ central concern with
the Court’s ruling … is that Defendants have been completely
excluded from the review process … and the right to challenge
any documents Plaintiff withholds from production.” Id. at 5-6.
Instead, defendants want plaintiff to produce a log of documents
withheld

and

to

submit

them

Defendants’

motion

is

to

the

Court

for

an

in

camera

review.

First,

Magistrate

denied

Judges

have

for

a

broad

number

of

authority

reasons.

to

manage

discovery. As the parties know, “matters of docket control and
the conduct of discovery are committed to the sound discretion
of the Court.” In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 685 F.2d
810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982); Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Stillwell,
C.A. No. 15-8251 (AET), 2017 WL 557336, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 10,
2017). The Court’s discretion is broad. Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc.
v.

General

Included

Motors

within

Corp.,

the

786

Court’s

F.2d

564,

568

(3d

discretion

is

the

Cir.

1994).

ability

to

determine what is discoverable, the terms of the discovery and
limitations on discovery. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
This is precisely what the Court did when it issued its Order.
The

Court

importance

has
of

already
the

expressed

requested

its

federal
6

skepticism

employment

about

records

the
going

back before 1998 in a case addressing the failure to re-hire
plaintiff in 2015. Further, although defendants profess to want
to verify plaintiff’s credentials for the Coordinator position,
defendants

offered

to

reinstate

plaintiff

to

the

Coordinator

job. Presumably, this would not have been done unless defendants
believed plaintiff was qualified for the position. This raises a
legitimate

question

plaintiff’s

old

will

the

get

about

employment
records

defendants’
records.

they

true

Thus,

need

motivation

although

to

verify

for

defendants
plaintiff’s

qualifications, there is no need to create more “make work” for
plaintiff
marginal

and

the

relevance

Court.
of

This

is

plaintiff’s

especially
federal

true

given

employment

the

records.

Defendants argue the records “are key to Defendants’ affirmative
defenses.” Reply Brief at 1. Nothing could be further from the
truth. The key issue in the case is whether defendants’ failure
to re-hire plaintiff in 2015 was because of claimed budgetary
concerns or whether the failure to re-hire was a pretext to get
rid of plaintiff. Plaintiff’s federal employment records from
1984

–

1998

have

little

or

nothing

to

do

with

plaintiff’s

pretext claim.
Another

reason

plaintiff’s

motion

is

denied

is

because

there is no support for defendants’ position that plaintiff is
required to produce a “document” or “relevancy log.” Defendants’
due process argument is frivolous. Brief at 6. Defendants do not
7

cite

a

single

case

to

support

their

argument.

If

the

Court

accepts plaintiff’s due process argument then parties could make
the same complaint every time their discovery request is denied.
The

notion

that

the

denial

of

a

routine

discovery

request

violates due process is preposterous. The fact there is no legal
support for defendants’ argument is evidenced by the fact that
defendants

resort

to

relying

on

authority

requiring

that

a

privilege log be produced (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)). This
Rule is clearly not applicable here. The Federal Rules do not
require the production of a “document” or “relevancy log” of the
sort that defendants request. The Court agrees with plaintiff
that

“the

log

Defendants

seek

will

impose

an

[unnecessary]

onerous and undue burden upon Plaintiff and the Court.” Brief at
9.
Perhaps

most

importantly,

defendants’

motion

is

denied

because there is no reason to question plaintiff’s compliance
with the Court’s Order. Plaintiff’s production is no different
than any other document production in a case. It is fundamental
to our litigation system that parties rely on each other’s good
faith and professional responsibilities to comply with the Rules
of

Civil

Procedure.

As

noted

in

Poole

ex.

rel.

Elliott

v.

Textron, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 494, 507 (D. Md. 2000), “[t]he rules
of discovery must necessarily be largely self-enforcing.

The

integrity of the discovery process rests on the faithfulness of
8

parties

and

counsel

to

the

rules--both

the

spirit

and

the

letter.” Furthermore, the “discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules

are

meant

to

function

without

the

need

for

constant

judicial intervention, and that [the] Rules rely on the honesty
and good faith of counsel in dealing with adversaries.” Hopei
Garments (Hong Kong), Ltd. v. Oslo Trading Co., C.A. No. CIV
0932

(MBM),

1988

WL

25139,

at

*3

(S.D.N.Y.

March

8,

1988);

accord Younes v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 312 F.R.D. 692, 709 (D.N.J.
2015). Absent this trust the Court system would collapse. If the
Court granted defendants’ motion then litigants would routinely
ask

Courts

to

umpire

routine

document

productions.

This

is

unworkable.
Defendants have not given one good reason why they question
plaintiff’s

conviction

to

follow

the

Court’s

Order.

In

the

absence of good cause to believe plaintiff will not follow the
Court’s Order, the Court will not police plaintiff’s document
production. The same is true for defendants. If plaintiff was so
inclined

he

could

make

the

same

arguments

as

to

defendants’

document production that defendants are making as to plaintiff.
That is, that he wants to check that defendants are producing
responsive documents. If plaintiff made this request the Court
is confident defendants would not want to be put to the bother
and expense of preparing a production log every time they decide
documents

are

non-responsive

or
9

irrelevant.

Defendants

would

undoubtedly

argue

they

understand

and

will

follow

their

professional obligations. The same is true for plaintiff. All
parties in the case will be treated equally. To date no party
has given the Court reason to believe they will not produce
relevant and non-privileged responsive documents. This being the
case, defendants’ request that it police plaintiff’s document
production is denied.
Defendants argue that unless their motion is granted they
“would

have

records

no

way

withheld[.]”

of

evaluating

Reply

Brief

the
at

responsiveness
3.

However,

of

the

any
same

situation exists in every case when a document production is
made. In the absence of good cause that does not exist here,
parties have to rely on the good faith and integrity of opposing
counsel

to

do

what

they

are

supposed

to

do.

Otherwise,

our

litigation system could not survive.
Conclusion
For

the

reasons

discussed

herein,

the

Court

will

deny

defendants’ request that it impose special precautions to assure
plaintiff complies with the Court’s January 9, 2017 Order. There
is no need for a document or relevancy log and an in camera
review in the case. 5

5

The Court also denies defendants’ motion because an in camera
review is not necessary. Simply because a party requests an in
camera review does not necessarily mean it will be granted.
Nishika, Ltd. v. Fugi Photo Film Co., Ltd., 181 F.R.D. 465, 467
(D.
Nev.
1998)(citation
omitted);
F.T.C.
v.
Hope
Now
10

ORDER
Accordingly,

for

the

foregoing

reasons,

it

is

hereby

ORDERED this 17th day of February, 2017, that defendants’ Motion
for Reconsideration is DENIED.

s/Joel Schneider
JOEL SCHNEIDER
United States Magistrate Judge

Modifications, LLC, C.A. No. 09-1204 (JBS/JS), 2011 WL 2634029,
at *5 (D.N.J. July 5, 2011)(the decision whether to engage in an
in camera review rests in the sound discretion of the district
court). Where a showing has not been made that an in camera is
necessary, a court should deny the request. Id.; Makky v.
Chertoff, 489 F. Supp. 2d 421, 441 (D.N.J. 2007). Here, it is
clear what documents the Court Ordered plaintiff to produce. The
only documents that have to be produced are those discussing
plaintiff’s experience and qualifications for the Coordinator of
Public Safety position. The Court is confident plaintiff can
make an accurate determination as to what is relevant without
its intervention. An in camera review of irrelevant documents is
wasteful and will not be done.
11