HAMILTON v. COLALILLO et al
Filing
9
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 3/18/2016. (tf,n.m.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
___________________________________
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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HON. MARY EVA COLALILLO, et al.,
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Defendants.
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___________________________________:
BRIAN HAMILTON,
Civ. No. 16-64 (NLH)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Brian Hamilton, # 4304162
Camden County Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 90431
330 Federal St.
Camden, NJ 08101
Plaintiff Pro se
HILLMAN, District Judge
Plaintiff Brian Hamilton, a pretrial detainee confined at
the Camden County Correctional Facility in Camden, New Jersey,
filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF
No. 1), and submitted an application to proceed in forma
pauperis (ECF No. 1-3).
On January 12, 2016, this Court found
Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application to be complete
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and granted Plaintiff leave to
proceed without prepayment of fees. (ECF No. 2).
At this time the Court must screen the Complaint to
determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or
malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);
seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b); or brings a claim with respect to prison
conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
For the reasons set forth
below, the Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
I.
BACKGROUND
In his Complaint, Plaintiff generally alleges that the
Camden County Prosecutor’s Office, together with the Camden
County Court (Law Division, Criminal Part), have violated, and
continue to violate, the rights of pre-trial detainees who are
arrested without a warrant.
Plaintiff further asserts that
these actions “appear[] to be a covert conspiracy amongst the
heads of departments within the Camden County Law Division
(judges, prosecutors, public defenders) to knowingly, purposely,
arbitrarially [sic] and capriciously deny the class 1 [pre-trial
1
Although Plaintiff references a “class” several times (Compl.
4, 5, 8), the instant Complaint is signed only by Plaintiff and
does not assert those facts and allegations sufficient to
maintain a class or collective action. Therefore, the Court
need not consider the issues that arise in cases where multiple
plaintiffs are involved, such as joinder, FED. R. CIV. P. 20, or
class certification, FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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detainees] their constitutional right to a probable cause
hearing.” (Compl. 5, ECF No. 1).
Plaintiff also provides more specific facts and asserts
that on May 23, 2015, he attended a meeting with “a prosecuting
attorney,” who offered Plaintiff a plea bargain. (Id.).
Plaintiff further alleges that this attorney informed him that
“any redress he would be seeking would be considered ‘moot’
because a ‘true bill’ indictment had been returned.” (Id.).
Nevertheless, Plaintiff alleges that the prosecutor told him the
State would still be willing to grant him a probable cause
hearing.
Plaintiff states that he refused this offer because he
believed his rights had already been violated, and he believed
that any probable cause hearing would be “‘rubber-stamped’ in
favor of the State.” (Id.).
Plaintiff names two defendants.
First, he names Mary Eva
Colalillo, who Plaintiff describes as “chief counsel” in the
Camden County Prosecutor’s Office. (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Colalillo “refuses to calendar
probable cause hearings for pre-trail [sic] detainees arrested
without warrants and systematically renders motions for Gerstein
hearings moot by forwarding to the jurats (CDR)
complaint/warrants to the grand jury which in turn rubber stamps
a ‘true bill’ of indictment[.]” (Id.).
Plaintiff also names
Deborah Silverman-Katz, who Plaintiff states is an assignment
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judge in the superior court, as a defendant.
Plaintiff alleges
that she “sanction[s] the inaction of the Camden County
Prosecutor’s Office to provide probable cause hearing by failure
to calendar the same.” (Id. at 3).
II.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104–134, §§
801–810, 110 Stat. 1321–66 to 1321–77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”),
district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in
which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental employee
or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with
respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
The PLRA
directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is
frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
This action is subject to sua
sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)
and 1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma
pauperis and is seeking relief from government employees.
Every complaint must comply with the pleading requirements
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 8(a)(2) requires
that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
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“Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give
the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
93 (2007) (citations omitted).
While a complaint ... does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds”
of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do ... .
Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level .
. . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citations omitted).
That is, a complaint must assert “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
“A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair
Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n. 3 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
“The plausibility determination is ‘a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.’” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780,
786-87 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679); see also
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations
5
omitted).
Thus, a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” and “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(citations omitted).
In general, where a complaint subject to statutory
screening can be remedied by amendment, a district court should
not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but should permit the
amendment. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992); Grayson
v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002)
(noting that leave to amend should be granted “in the absence of
undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, unfair prejudice, or
futility of amendment”), cited in Thomaston v. Meyer, 519 F.
App’x 118, 120 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013); Urrutia v. Harrisburg County
Police Dept., 91 F.3d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1996).
Finally, in determining the sufficiency of a pro se
complaint, the Court must be mindful to accept its factual
allegations as true, see James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d
675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012), and to construe it liberally in favor
of the plaintiff, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient
facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
6
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted).
B. Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108
S.Ct. 2250, 2255, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641
F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
III. DISCUSSION
A. No Personal Involvement
As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not make specific
allegations regarding the two named defendants.
His general and
conclusory allegations that each of the defendants violates the
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rights of pre-trial detainees is insufficient to state a cause
of action. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (holding that
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”).
Moreover, although Plaintiff describes a specific instance
— the meeting that took place on May 23, 2015 (Compl. 5, ECF No.
1) — Plaintiff does not allege that either defendant
participated in said meeting or in the alleged resulting
constitutional violation.
The Third Circuit has “consistently
held that ‘[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be
predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.’”
Batts v. Giorla, 550 F. App'x 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)); see
also Tenon v. Dreibelbis, 606 F. App'x 681, 688 (3d Cir. 2015)
(§ 1983 claims may not be based on vicarious liability, each
defendant must have “personal involvement, including
participation, or actual knowledge and acquiescence, to be
liable”).
Because Plaintiff has not plead any facts which
suggest that either defendant was aware of, or involved in, the
specific events which Plaintiff alleges violated his
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constitutional rights, he has not adequately plead a cause of
action against them.
B. Claims Against the Camden County Prosecutor
“[A] state prosecuting attorney who act[s] within the scope
of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution”
is not amenable to suit under § 1983. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 418, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); LeBlanc v.
Stedman, 483 F. App’x 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(finding prosecutors immune from suit where they are acting
within the scope of their duties in a criminal prosecution and
noting that the protection includes a prosecutor’s activities
with preparing and filing charging documents); Green v. United
States, 418 F. App’x 63, 66 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(“[P]rosecutors enjoy immunity from suit for damages under §
1983 for actions performed within their authority) (citations
omitted); Darby v. Geiger, 441 F. App’x 840 (3d Cir. 2011).
Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff means to assert claims
against Defendant Colalillo which relate to actions within the
scope of her prosecutorial duties, such as the initiation and
pursuit of a criminal prosecution, any such claims would be
subject to dismissal with prejudice.
C. Claims Against Judge
Judges are generally immune from suit. Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11, 112 S. Ct. 286, 288, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991).
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If the
actions underlying the complaint were judicial and were not
performed “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction,” then
this immunity is absolute, regardless of whether the judicial
acts were malicious, corrupt, or wrong. Id. at 11–13, 112 S.Ct.
286; see also Pittman v. Martin, 569 F. App'x 89, 91 (3d Cir.)
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 458, 190 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2014).
Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff means to assert claims
against Defendant Silverman-Katz which relate to actions that
were judicial in nature and were not performed in the complete
absence of all jurisdiction, any such claims would be subject to
dismissal with prejudice.
IV.
PLAINTIFF’S SUPPLEMENTAL SUBMISSIONS
The Court notes that Plaintiff has submitted several
documents since the initial filing of his Complaint. (ECF Nos.
3-7).
Specifically, Plaintiff has submitted a letter indicated
that he received a notice from this Court regarding the filing
of his Complaint without an envelope (ECF No. 3); a “Notice of
Fault and Opportunity to Cure and Contest Acceptance” which was
submitted to the State court and also includes a demand for
discovery (ECF No. 4); a letter to “Attorney Soast” requesting
full and complete discovery for his state indictment (ECF No.
5); a letter addressed to this Court stating that Plaintiff
considers a response letter which he received from the New
Jersey Attorney General’s Office to be a “threat” against him
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for exercising his constitutional rights (ECF No. 6); and a
request for entry of default against Defendants in this matter
(ECF No. 7).
The Court has considered each of these submissions
and determines that no action is required by the Court at this
time.
The Court notes, however, that the response letter from
the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office (ECF No. 6 at 3-4) is
not a “threat” as alleged by Plaintiff.
Rather, it is a
legitimate response to alleged grievances and liens which
Plaintiff attempted to assess against several State employees.
Additionally, Plaintiff is not entitled to the entry of
default against Defendants in this matter. (ECF No. 7).
Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, Defendants have not been
served and, therefore, were under no obligation to file an
Answer.
As explained to Plaintiff in the Court’s January 12,
2016 Opinion and Order (ECF No. 2), summons in this case would
not issue until such time as the Court could conduct a sua
sponte screening.
Because the Court now dismisses the Complaint
as a result of its sua sponte screening, summons shall not
issue.
V.
MOTION FOR PRO BONO COUNSEL
In light of the Court’s dismissal of this Complaint,
Plaintiff’s motion for pro bono counsel (ECF No. 1-4) is
dismissed as moot.
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VI.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint will be dismissed
without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Because it is possible, although highly unlikely given the
substantial prosecutorial and judicial immunity issues, that
Plaintiff may be able to amend or supplement his complaint with
facts sufficient to overcome the deficiencies noted herein,
Plaintiff shall be given leave to file, within 45 days, an
application to re-open accompanied by a proposed amended
complaint. 2 See Denton, 504 U.S. at 34; Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
___s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN
United States District Judge
Dated: March 18, 2016
At Camden, New Jersey
2
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed,
it supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect,
unless the amended complaint specifically refers to or adopts
the earlier pleading. See West Run Student Housing Associates,
LLC v. Huntington National Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir.
2013)(collecting cases); see also 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1476 (3d ed. 2008). To avoid
confusion, the safer practice is to submit an amended complaint
that is complete in itself. Id.
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