KUHAR et al v. PETZL COMPANY et al

Filing 269

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Granting 188 Motion in Limine to Exclude Defendant Bailey's Liability Expert Testimony. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joel Schneider on 12/4/2018. (dmr)

[Doc. No. 188]
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
Nicholas Kuhar et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 16-0395 (JBS/JS)

Petzl Co. et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the “Motion in Limine to
Exclude Defendant Bailey’s Liability Expert Testimony and Report”
[Doc. No. 188] (“motion”) filed by plaintiffs. The Court received
the

opposition

of

defendant

Bailey’s

Corporation

(“Bailey’s”)

[Doc. No. 200] and recently held oral argument. For the reasons to
be set forth herein, plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED. 1
Background
Since the parties are obviously familiar with the case and
its fact and procedural background, the Court incorporates by
reference the discussion in its Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting the motions to strike plaintiffs’ liability expert report
filed by Bailey’s and Uintah Fastener & Supply, LLC (“Uintah”).

1

All parties declined the opportunity to present live testimony
in connection with these motions and asked the Court to decide the
motion on the papers.
1

See Mem. Op. & Order, Nov. 27, 2018 [Doc. No. 257]. By way of brief
background, the present action is a products liability case arising
from plaintiff Nicholas Kuhar’s use of defendants’ safety harness
while working on the roof of a barn. 2 Plaintiff was allegedly using
the harness when a bolt broke in two, causing him to fall thirtyseven (37) feet and sustain serious injuries. Plaintiffs’ claim is
primarily focused on design and manufacturing defects associated
with the bolt. However, as to Bailey’s, plaintiffs claim Bailey’s
chose an improper rope. Bailey’s did not design or manufacture the
harness or the bolt. Rather, Bailey’s purchased the harness and
packaged it with a rope before retailing it to plaintiff in January
2006. See Def.’s Opp. at 1-2; Petzl Mot. Summ. J., Br. at 1 [Doc.
No. 193-2].
On or about March 27, 2018, Bailey’s produced a four-page
report from its liability expert, Dr. J. Nigel Ellis (“Ellis”).
See

Mot.

at

1;

Ellis

Report

[Doc.

No.

188-1].

Ellis

is

a

professional engineer and board-certified safety professional with
a Ph.D. in photochemical processes. Mot. at 1. It has not been
alleged that Ellis has any metallurgical expertise. In his report,
Ellis opined as to “whether and to what extent the defendants, or
others, acted in a negligent manner” and how “their conduct, if

2

Any reference by the Court to the singular “plaintiff” shall
refer only to Nicholas Kuhar.
2

any, [contributed] to Mr. Kuhar’s fall.” Ellis Report at 1; see
Mot. at 1. Specifically, Ellis expressed the following opinions:
(1)

(2)
(3)

(4)

Bailey’s sold the Micrograb under the Petzl
tradename and were [sic] generally marketing
arborists supplies which was for Mr. Kuhar’s
primary tree business.
Bailey’s sale of the flipline used was not the cause
of a fractured bolt in the Petzl rope grab product.
Bailey’s shipments included product instructions
for Petzl and the Flipline with wire core and proper
use was the responsibility of the user, Mr. Kuhar.
The plaintiff has the responsibility to follow all
instructions and labels.
. . . .

(7)
(8)
(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

There was a lack of clarity of the witnesses to
describe Mr. Kuhar’s fall.
Bailey’s made no changes to the Petzl product.
The allegation of obscuration of the scratch marks
on the B53 bolt by the rope is absurd based on my
observation of the assembly at the plaintiff’s
attorney’s offices.
Proper fall protection devices are easily available
through safety dealers nationwide with technical
help on recommended applications.
There was a failure of the chain of custody of the
Petzl broken bolt/nut and any suggestion of a role
played by Bailey in manufacturing or alteration or
instructions for use with ropes regarding fliplines
based solely on one section of Mr. Kurth’s
testimony is inappropriate and conflicts with other
Petzl deponents. This is not a scientific finding.
The M[i]crograb was sold by Bailey’s in an
unaltered
state
from
the
manufacturer
and
Bailey[’]s played no part in the design or
manufacturer [sic] of the product.
The flipline used by the plaintiff is consistent
with the instruction distributed with the product.
The flipline was used in a damaged condition but
the failure of the bolt was not related to the use
of this flipline.

3

Ellis Report at 3-4. 3
Plaintiffs now move to strike Ellis’ report contending it
fails to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702
and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Plaintiffs

generally

allege

Ellis’

report

and

the

opinions

contained therein must be excluded because they do not result from
reliable

principles

and

methodologies.

See

Mot.

at

4.

More

specifically, plaintiffs allege that “Dr. Ellis does not make
reference to any tests or industry methods conducted on the bolt
or any other evidence” and “never ties any reliable scientific
information to his opinions.” Id. at 4, 7. Plaintiffs assert Ellis’
opinions amount to “bare conclusions” that merely rely on his
“word.” Id. at 7. In contrast, Bailey’s argues Ellis’ testimony is
admissible in response to the nature and form of the allegations
contained in plaintiffs’ expert report. See Def.’s Opp. at 4.
Bailey’s “assumes” the scope of admissible expert testimony under
Daubert must “encompass the right to rebut statements made by” an
expert witness proffered by an adversary. Id. at 4. To this end,
Bailey’s contends Ellis’ rebuttal to plaintiffs’ expert’s opinion
that it “supplied the wrong rope” results from reliable methods.

3

Bailey’s stipulated to withdraw Ellis’ testimony relating to
opinions five (5) and six (6). See Mot. to Withdraw [Doc. No. 242];
Order, Sept. 25, 2018 [Doc. No. 244].
4

Id. As discussed herein, the Court will grant plaintiffs’ motion
and strike Ellis’ report in full.
Discussion
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence a district court acts as
a “gatekeeper” to “ensure that any and all expert testimony or
evidence is not only relevant, but also reliable.” Daubert, 509
U.S. at 589; Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 144 (3d Cir.
2000). This basic obligation “applies to all expert testimony.”
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 562 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). Thus,
whenever a party seeks to admit expert testimony the judge must
make an initial determination concerning its substance to assure
“a standard of evidentiary reliability.” Id. (quoting Daubert, 509
U.S. at 589-90).
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of
expert testimony, permitting a witness “qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to testify
in the form of an opinion, provided that:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702; see generally Daubert, supra. The burden is on
the party proffering expert testimony to prove its admissibility

5

by a preponderance of the evidence. Daubert 509 U.S. at 592 n.10
(citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987)).
As stated in Rule 702, in order to be admissible expert
testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact. The Court has
discretion

to

determine

whether

expert

testimony

is

helpful.

Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 217 (3d Cir.
2006). An expert’s opinion is not helpful if it opines as to the
governing law of the case. Id.

In addition, expert testimony

covering an area known and within the knowledge of a layperson is
not helpful. Bryan v. Shah, 351 F. Supp. 2d 295, 302 n.14 (D.N.J.
2005). Further, expert testimony is not helpful “when the untrained
layman would be qualified to determine . . . the particular issue
without

enlightenment

from

those

having

a

specialized

understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.” Senese v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 661 Fed. App’x 771, 775 (3d Cir. 2016)
(citation omitted).
Rule 702 has been described by the Third Circuit as embodying
a “trilogy of restrictions on expert testimony: [1] qualification,
[2] reliability, and [3] fit.” Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp.,
U.S.A., 350 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Schneider v.
Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 2003)). First, the witness must
be qualified to testify as an expert, which requires “the witness
possess specialized expertise.” Id. Second, the testimony must be
reliable, which demands that the expert’s inferences or assertions
6

“be derived by the scientific method” and not by “subjective belief
or unsupported speculation.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590; Fedorczyk
v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 75 (3d Cir. 1996).
Third, the testimony must “fit” the case, in that it “must be
relevant for the purposes of the case and must assist the trier of
fact.” Schneider, 320 F.3d at 404.
Ellis’ expert report will be stricken because it is replete
with

subjective

assistance

to

beliefs

the

and

factfinder.

bare

speculation

Ellis

also

that

offers

a

is

of

no

number

of

inadmissible legal opinions that seek to instruct the jury on the
result to reach. In addition, Ellis addresses fact issues that are
the province of the jury. These deficiencies run afoul of the
reliability and fit requirements of Rule 702 and Daubert, and
demand that defendants’ motion be granted. The Court will address
each of Ellis’ opinions in sequence.
1. Opinion No. 1
Ellis’ first opinion states as follows:
Bailey’s sold the Micrograb under the Petzl tradename
and were [sic] generally marketing arborists supplies
which was for Mr. Kuhar’s primary tree business.
Ellis Report at 3.
The Court finds Ellis’ first opinion does not “fit” the case
because it merely addresses a fact question that does not require
expert testimony. Therefore, the opinion is not helpful and is
stricken. Further, the proposed testimony does not “aid the jury
7

in resolving a factual dispute” for the reason that the facts Ellis
addresses are apparently not in dispute. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591
(citation omitted). For these reasons, the Court strikes Ellis’
first opinion.
2. Opinion No. 2
Ellis’ second opinion states as follows:
Bailey’s sale of the flipline used was not the cause of
a fractured bolt in the Petzl rope grab product.
Ellis Report at 3.
Ellis’ second opinion is based upon his subjective belief and
speculation concerning the factual issue of causation, and as such,
offers no aid to the factfinder. Ellis did no analysis to support
opinion two and merely relies on his bare conclusion. Further,
there is no indication Ellis’ theory of causation was derived by
the

application

of

reliable

scientific

principles

or

methodologies. Ellis fails to spell out his reasoning or cite to
any evidence to support his opinion. Consequently, his opinion
fails to satisfy the reliability and fit requirements of Rule 702
and Daubert; see also Holman Enters., 563 F Supp. 2d at 472-73
(striking expert report because it was replete with speculations
and

“blanket

conclusions”

that

did

“nothing

to

assist

the

factfinder”).
Because expert testimony aids the jury in making factual
determinations,

such

as

causation,

8

the

testimony

must

be

predicated upon evidence and not mere speculation and conclusory
statements. Oddi, 234 F.3d at 146; Worrell v. Elliot & Frantz, 799
F. Supp. 2d 343, 349 (D.N.J. 2011) (citation omitted). “An expert
opinion is not admissible if the court concludes that an opinion
based upon particular facts cannot be grounded upon those facts.”
Fedorczyk, 82 F.3d at 75. In the absence of evidentiary support,
an expert’s testimony is of no assistance to the factfinder and
insufficient to establish causation. See Worrell, 799 F. Supp. 2d
at 349; Oddi, 234 F.3d at 146 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)) (“A court may conclude that there is
simply

too

great

a

gap

between

the

data

and

the

opinion

proffered.”). This is the case with regard to opinion two because
there is no analysis to support Ellis’ conclusion as to why the
bolt broke.
Ellis’ report, including opinion two, is focused primarily on
the standard of care allegedly established by regulations and
industry practices in the field of fall protection. See generally
Ellis Report. Notably, Ellis does not speak to the issue of what
caused the bolt to break prior to opining Bailey’s had nothing to
with the break. Nor does Ellis present any empirical evidence or
reasoning to support his opinion. This “gap between the data and
the opinion proffered” by Ellis is fatal to opinion two. Oddi, 234
F.3d at 146 (citation omitted); see Holman Enters., 563 F. Supp.
2d at 473 (“Without providing any sort of gauge for the basis of
9

his decision either from his own extensive experience in the
industry or some industry standards or guidelines, [the expert’s]
statements do nothing to assist the factfinder.”).
Since Ellis provides no analysis to support opinion two, the
Court finds opinion two does not “reliably flow from the facts
known” to him. Oddi, 234 F.3d at 146 (quoting Heller v. Shaw
Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999)). Ellis’ second
opinion amounts to a “blanket conclusion[]” and nothing more. See
Holman Enters., 563 F. Supp. 2d at 473 (“It is merely a restatement
of certain evidence without any insight into the expert’s own
analysis or bases for his opinion.”). As such, opinion two does
not satisfy the reliability or fit requirements of Rule 702. 4 For
the foregoing reasons, the Court strikes Ellis’ second opinion.
3. Opinion No. 3
Ellis’ third opinion states as follows:
Bailey’s shipments included product instructions for
Petzl and the Flipline with wire core and proper use was
the responsibility of the user, Mr. Kuhar.
Ellis Report at 3.
Ellis’ third opinion is stricken because it is predicated
upon

his

subjective

beliefs

and

speculation,

not

evidence.

Accordingly, the opinion is of no assistance to the jury. More

4

Opinion two is also stricken because Ellis is not qualified to
give an opinion as to why the bolt broke. Ellis has no expertise
regarding bolt fracture analysis or metallurgical issues.
10

importantly,

however,

Ellis’

second

opinion

“is

an

obvious

conclusion of law inappropriate for an expert report.” Holman
Enters., 563 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
District courts “must limit expert testimony so as to not
allow experts to opine on ‘what the law require[s].’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Leo, 941 F.2d 181, 196-97 (3d Cir. 1991)). “This
prohibition on experts testifying as to [] [] legal conclusions is
‘so well established that it is often deemed a basic premise or
assumption of evidence law – a kind of axiomatic principle.’” Id.
(quoting Casper v. SMG, 389 F. Supp. 2d 618, 621 (D.N.J. 2005)).
Hence, an expert witness cannot “merely tell the jury what result
to reach.” Krys v. Aaron, 112 F. Supp. 3d 181, 192 (D.N.J. 2015)
(citing Fed. R. Evid. 704(a) Advisory Committee’s Notes (1972));
see also Holman Enters., 563 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
In Holman Enterprises, the defendants proffered an expert
report that “conclude[d] nothing in the record would support” the
plaintiffs’ claim. Id. at 470. Subsequently, the plaintiffs moved
to strike the report, alleging the report was based on speculation,
insufficient facts, and improper legal conclusions. Id. at 471.
The court agreed, finding the report was “replete with legal
conclusions

and

speculation

that

ultimately

render[ed]

[the]

entire report deficient” and inadmissible. Id. 472. The court noted
that although the expert opined to a host of issues, he “provided
no analysis to support [his] blanket conclusions.” Id. at 473.
11

“Without providing any sort of gauge for the basis of his decision,
either from his own extensive experience in the industry or some
industry standards or guidelines, [the expert witness’] statements
do nothing to assist the factfinder.” Id.; see generally Daubert,
509 U.S. at 591-92. Regardless of the expert’s qualifications, or
the testimony’s reliability or fitness, an expert is “prohibited
from rendering a legal opinion.” Berckeley, 455 F.3d at 217.
In Berckeley the Third Circuit addressed how “the line between
admissible and inadmissible expert testimony” can be blurred in
the context of “customs and practices that implicate legal duties.”
Id. at 218. The decision reaffirmed that an expert’s opinion on
the issue of whether a party complied with and/or violated “legal
duties” is inadmissible, “because it would usurp the District
Court’s pivotal role in explaining the law to the jury.” Id. at
217-18 (precluding an “experienced former counsel” for the SEC
from offering opinions as to whether a party complied with legal
duties set by securities laws and regulations).
Ellis opines that Bailey’s included instructions with the
harness it sold to plaintiff back in 2006. For one, this opinion
is not a proper subject of expert testimony since it addresses a
fact issue to be decided by the jury. In addition, Ellis cites no
evidence to support his opinion. Nor does he indicate how he
determined what Bailey’s did or did not do over a decade ago.
Without the necessary analysis or evidentiary support, Ellis’
12

proposed testimony is inherently unfit for the case and of no aid
to the jury. See Worrell, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 349. Further, it fails
to “assist the factfinder toward resolution of the issues.” Holman
Enters., 563 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
Ellis also opines that proper use of the harness is the
“responsibility of the user.” Ellis Report at 3. Ellis’ assignment
of responsibility “implies some level of legal analysis on his
part”

because

plaintiff’s

it

part.

seeks

to

Holman

impose

Enters.,

a
563

legal
F.

duty

of

care

Supp.

2d

at

on

472.

Consequently, Ellis’ third opinion is unfit for the case pursuant
to Rule 702. For these reasons, the Court strikes opinion three.
4. Opinion No. 4
Ellis’ fourth opinion states as follows:
The plaintiff has the responsibility
instructions and labels.

to

follow

all

Ellis Report at 3.
The Court finds Ellis’ fourth opinion must be stricken for
failing to meet the fit requirement set forth in Rule 702 since
the opinion is not predicated upon evidence nor helpful to the
jury. Further, opinion four implicates a conclusion of law that
seeks to impose a duty of care on plaintiff. See Holman Enters.,
563 F. Supp. 2d at 472. Thus, for the reasons discussed above, the
Court strikes opinion four.

13

5. Opinion No. 7
Ellis’ seventh opinion states as follows:
There was a lack of clarity of the witnesses to describe
Mr. Kuhar’s fall.
Ellis Report at 4.
Ellis’ seventh opinion is a product of his own subjective
beliefs

and

speculation

without

any

supporting

analysis

or

evidence. As such, the opinion fails to satisfy Rule 702’s fit
requirement. Further, the subject of opinion seven is a fact
question for the jury, not a proper subject of expert testimony.
The jury will decide, not Ellis, as to whether the descriptions of
plaintiff’s fall are credible. Thus, for the reasons previously
discussed, the Court strikes opinion seven.
6. Opinion No. 8
Ellis’ eighth opinion states as follows:
Bailey’s made no changes to the Petzl product.
Ellis Report at 4.
Ellis’ eighth opinion must be stricken because it is not a
proper subject of expert testimony. Opinion eight addresses a fact
issue that will be addressed by the jury. The jury will decide,
not Ellis, the fact question of whether or not Bailey’s changed
Petzl’s product. As a result, Ellis’ eighth opinion fails to
satisfy the fit requirement of Rule 702. For the reasons previously
discussed, the Court strikes Ellis’ eighth opinion.

14

7. Opinion No. 9
Ellis’ ninth opinion states as follows:
The allegation of obscuration of the scratch marks on
the B53 bolt by the rope is absurd based on my
observation
of
the
assembly
at
the
plaintiff’s
attorney’s offices.
Ellis Report at 4.
Ellis’ ninth opinion addresses the following statement in
plaintiffs’ expert report: “The rope provided by Bailey’s in the
kit when assembled into the micrograb virtually obscured anyone’s
ability to see the bolt within the micrograb.” See Lynch Report at
2, 7 [Doc. No. 185-5]. The Court finds that Ellis’ ninth opinion
is predicated upon his subjective beliefs and speculation and, as
such, it does meet the fit requirements of Rule 702 and Daubert.
Whether or not Bailey’s rope obscured the bolt within the micrograb
is a question of fact the jury will decide. Ellis’ opinion in this
regard is not helpful to the jury. Thus, for the reasons previously
discussed, the Court strikes Ellis’ ninth opinion.
8. Opinion No. 10
Ellis’ tenth opinion states as follows:
Proper fall protection devices are easily available
through safety dealers nationwide with technical help on
recommended applications.
Ellis Report at 4.
Ellis’ tenth opinion will be stricken because it does “nothing
to assist the factfinder.” Holman Enters., 563 F. Supp. 2d at 473;

15

see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. The subject of opinion ten is a fact
question that will be addressed by the jury. The jury will decide,
not Ellis, the fact issue of whether fall protection devices are
generally available. Thus, opinion ten fails to satisfy Rule 702’s
fit requirement and is not helpful. For the reasons previously
discussed, the Court strikes Ellis’ tenth opinion.
9. Opinion No. 11
Ellis’ eleventh opinion states as follows:
There was a failure of the chain of custody of the Petzl
broken bolt/nut and any suggestion of a role played by
Bailey in manufacturing or alteration or instructions
for use with ropes regarding fliplines based solely on
one section of Mr. Kurth’s testimony is inappropriate
and conflicts with other Petzl deponents. This is not a
scientific finding.
Ellis Report at 4.
The Court finds Ellis’ eleventh opinion is the result of his
unsupported subjective beliefs and speculation, and as such, the
opinion is not fit for the case and is not helpful to the jury.
Chain of custody issues are plainly fact questions for the jury.
So too is an opinion addressing the credibility of the testimony
of a witness. Thus, for the reasons previously discussed, the Court
strikes Ellis’ eleventh opinion.
10. Opinion No. 12
Ellis’ twelfth opinion states as follows:
The M[i]crograb was sold by Bailey’s in an unaltered
state from the manufacturer and Bailey[‘]s played no
part in the design or manufacturer [sic] of the product.
16

Ellis Report at 4.
Ellis’ twelfth opinion will be stricken because it is not
predicated upon evidence and is of no assistance to the factfinder.
Further,

opinion

twelve

addresses

a

fact

issue

that

will

be

addressed by the jury. As a result, opinion twelve fails to satisfy
the

fit

requirement

of

Rule

702.

For

the

reasons

previously

discussed, the Court strikes Ellis’ twelfth opinion.
11. Opinion No. 13
Ellis’ thirteenth opinion states as follows:
The flipline used by the plaintiff is consistent with
the instruction distributed with the product. The
flipline was used in a damaged condition but the failure
of the bolt was not related to the use of this flipline.
Ellis Report at 4.
Ellis’ final opinion is not predicated on any analysis or
foundation and offers no assistance to the jury. As a result, the
opinion fails to satisfy Rule 702’s fit requirement. Ellis never
discusses the instructions the product came with, nor does he
indicate how he assessed the consistency of the instructions with
the product. Further, Ellis provides no basis for opining that the
flipline was used by plaintiff in a damaged condition. Thus, the
Court finds Ellis’ final opinion is based on his own subjective
beliefs and speculation. For the reasons already discussed, the
Court strikes the thirteenth opinion in Ellis’ expert report.
The Court agrees with Bailey’s that the proper procedures to
17

use

for

fall

protection

is

an

appropriate

subject

of

expert

testimony. Def.’s Opp. at 1-3. However, Ellis does not focus on
this subject in his report. Instead, Ellis mostly addresses fact
issues that are the province of the jury. Further, Ellis engages
in speculation and conclusory statements as to the opinions he
expresses. In addition, Ellis has no metallurgical expertise to
opine as to how and why the bolt broke. For these reasons the Court
strikes Ellis’ opinions.
Conclusion
For all the reasons discussed above, the Court finds Ellis’
report does not meet the Daubert admissibility standard and must
be stricken. 5

5

Bailey’s did not submit a supplemental expert report or an
affidavit in opposition to plaintiffs’ motion. Nor did Bailey’s
take advantage of the opportunity to present Ellis’ live testimony
when the Court heard oral argument on plaintiffs’ motion. In
addition, Bailey’s has not suggested that it has any new
information to add to its arguments. As was the case that existed
with regard to the Daubert motions directed to plaintiffs’ expert
report, it is therefore ripe to decide plaintiffs’ Daubert motion
without a further hearing. Bailey’s is not entitled to an “openended and never-ending opportunity to meet a Daubert challenge
until [defendant] ‘gets it right.’” Oddi, 234 F.3d at 154 (citation
omitted); Feit v. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 460 F. Supp.
2d 632, 638-37 (D.N.J. 2006) (separate Daubert hearing not
necessary where the court has ample information from which to
conclude that the expert lacks “good grounds” for his conclusions).
18

ORDER
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 4th day of December 2018, that
plaintiffs

“Motion

in

Limine

to

Exclude

Defendant

Bailey’s

Liability Expert Testimony and Report” [Doc. No. 188] is GRANTED.
Dr. Ellis’ March 27, 2018, liability expert report is hereby
STRICKEN in its entirety.
/s/ Joel Schneider
JOEL SCHNEIDER
United States Magistrate Judge
Date: December 4, 2018

19