REED v. SCHEFFLER et al

Filing 23

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 10/28/2016. (tf, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

WILLIAM A. REED, JR.
as personal representative
for ELSIE M. REED, an
incompetent individual, and
WILLIAM A. REED, JR.,
individually,

1:16-cv-00423-NLH-AMD
OPINION

Plaintiff,
v.
KAREN SCHEFFLER
Mayor of the Borough of
Palmyra, TRACY KILMER
Housing Official, Borough of
Palmyra, BOROUGH OF PALMYRA,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
PETER M. KOBER
1876 GREENTREE ROAD
CHERRY HILL, NJ 08003
On behalf of plaintiff
RICHARD L. GOLDSTEIN
ASHLEY L. TOTH
MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER, COLEMAN & GOGGIN, PA
WOODLAND FALLS CORPORATE PARK
200 LAKE DRIVE EAST
SUITE 300
CHERRY HILL, NJ 08002
On behalf of defendant Karen Scheffler

HILLMAN, District Judge
This case involving allegations of, inter alia, due process
and free speech violations arises out of the application of the
Borough of Palmyra’s ordinance requiring a certificate of

occupancy prior to the sale of a home.

Presently before the Court

is the motion of defendant Karen Scheffler, the Mayor of Palmyra,
to dismiss plaintiff’s free speech and defamation claims.

For the

reasons expressed below, defendant’s motion will be granted.
BACKGROUND
According to his complaint, plaintiff, William A. Reed, Jr.,
held powers of attorney over the affairs of his mother, Elsie M.
Reed, who owned a home at 28 Pear Street in Palmyra, New Jersey.
Ms. Reed lived in the home until July 2012.

In early 2013,

plaintiff wished to sell the house in “as is” condition.

The tax

assessed value of the property as of January 7, 2013 was $134,900.
In February 2014, plaintiff found a buyer who was in the home
remodeling business, and after several inspections of the
property, offered plaintiff $95,000.

By the end of February 2014,

the buyer had secured a mortgage and the parties were ready to
close on the property no later than April 1, 2014 because time was
of the essence for the buyer.
On February 27, 2014, plaintiff sent an email to defendant
Tracy Kilmer, who is the Borough’s housing official, to inquire
about the Borough’s ordinance requiring a home owner to obtain a
certificate of occupancy (“COO”) from the Borough prior to the
sale of a home.

Kilmer replied to plaintiff’s email and informed

him that such an ordinance, Ordinance 2013-25, was in effect and
plaintiff was required to obtain a COO.
2

Kilmer performed an

inspection of the property on March 10, 2014 and found 33 code
violations.

Plaintiff was afforded until April 30, 2014 to

correct the code violations.
Plaintiff claims that even though the buyer still wished to
purchase the property after the March 10, 2014 inspection report,
the parties could not go through with the sale by the April 1,
2014 deadline without a COO.

Ultimately, the sale fell through.

By September 2014, plaintiff, after “great hardship and expense,”
fixed the code violations.

On September 16, 2014, Kilmer re-

inspected the property and issued a COO to plaintiff.

On December

15, 2014, the property sold to a different buyer for $115,000.
On February 2, 2015, plaintiff attended the Borough’s council
meeting, where he spoke about Ordinance 2013-25.

Plaintiff shared

the hardship and expense he experienced because of the COO
requirement.

The Mayor of Palmyra, defendant Karen Scheffler, was

in attendance at the meeting.
On February 3, 2015, plaintiff was interviewed by Todd
McHale, a reporter for the Burlington County Times newspaper.
Plaintiff was quoted as saying, “a lot of older people in this
town are going to be shocked when they go to sell their homes,”
and that “there’s going to be a lot of people who are going to be
shocked . . . of what they face when selling a home in the
Borough.

I was shocked.”

McHale reported that plaintiff believed

3

that the Borough housing inspections “go too far.”

This article

was published in the Times’ on-line edition that day.
On February 4, 2015, the Time’s on-line edition published an
article concerning McHale’s interview of Scheffler in her official
capacity as the Borough’s mayor in response to plaintiff’s
comments.
•

Scheffler is reported as saying:

"the house was in extreme disrepair - dangerous even - and
had been vacant for some time"

•

"properties of this sort negatively affect the entire
neighborhood and bring down property values"

•

"this property was a real eyesore for the neighborhood and a
liability for Mr. Reed"

•

"there were many deficient areas, including electrical and
plumbing problems, numerous holes, leaks, lack of CO
detectors, a lack of hot water, crumbled chimney cement, no
working stove and exposed wiring.”

(Compl. ¶¶ 62-66.)
Plaintiff advances seven counts against Kilmer, Scheffler,
and the Borough.

Plaintiff claims that Kilmer and the Borough

violated his due process rights under the “takings clause” when
they required him to comply with Ordinance 2013-25 in February
2014, even though the effective date of that Ordinance was on hold
until April 1, 2014.

Plaintiff also claims that Scheffler, in her

individual and official capacities, violated his right to free
4

speech under the U.S. and New Jersey constitutions.

Plaintiff

further claims that Scheffler and the Borough are liable for
defamation.
Scheffler has moved to dismiss the claims plaintiff has
asserted against her.

Plaintiff has opposed Scheffler’s motion.
DISCUSSION

A.

Subject matter jurisdiction

Plaintiff has brought his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, as well as the New Jersey constitution and New Jersey state
law.

This Court has jurisdiction over plaintiff’s federal claims

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
B.

Standard for Motion to Dismiss

When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must accept all
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and view them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005).

Evancho v. Fisher,

It is well settled that a

pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Under the liberal federal pleading

rules, it is not necessary to plead evidence, and it is not
necessary to plead all the facts that serve as a basis for the
5

claim.

Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 562 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir.

1977).

However, “[a]lthough the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

do not require a claimant to set forth an intricately detailed
description of the asserted basis for relief, they do require that
the pleadings give defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Baldwin Cnty.

Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149-50 n.3 (1984) (quotation
and citation omitted).
A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks “‘not
whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim.’”
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007) (quoting
Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly
expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions’ . . . .”);
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Iqbal
. . . provides the final nail-in-the-coffin for the ‘no set of
facts’ standard that applied to federal complaints before
Twombly.”).
Following the Twombly/Iqbal standard, the Third Circuit has
instructed a two-part analysis in reviewing a complaint under Rule
12(b)(6).

First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should

be separated; a district court must accept all of the complaint's
well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal
6

conclusions.
1950).

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210 (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at

Second, a district court must then determine whether the

facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the
plaintiff has a “‘plausible claim for relief.’”
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).

Id. (quoting

A complaint must do more than allege

the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.

Id.; see also Phillips v.

Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that
the “Supreme Court's Twombly formulation of the pleading standard
can be summed up thus: ‘stating . . . a claim requires a complaint
with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ the
required element.

This ‘does not impose a probability requirement

at the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of’ the necessary element”).

A court need not credit

either “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions” in a complaint
when deciding a motion to dismiss.

In re Burlington Coat Factory

Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997).

The defendant

bears the burden of showing that no claim has been presented.
Hedges v. U.S., 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr
Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir.
1991)).
A court in reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must only
consider the facts alleged in the pleadings, the documents
attached thereto as exhibits, and matters of judicial notice.
7

S.

Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181
F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999).

A court may consider, however, “an

undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an
exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based
on the document.”

Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol.

Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).

If any other

matters outside the pleadings are presented to the court, and the
court does not exclude those matters, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion will
be treated as a summary judgment motion pursuant to Rule 56.

Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b).
C.

Analysis
1.
Plaintiff’s free speech violation claims (Counts V
and VI)

It is well-established that a concerned citizen who speaks
his mind to a town’s officials or the newspaper is protected by
the First Amendment. 1

Pomykacz v. Borough of West Wildwood, 438 F.

Supp. 2d 504, 512–13 (D.N.J. 2006) (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[A] major purpose of [the First] Amendment
was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“The protection

1

The parties agree that the analysis of plaintiff’s free speech
claims is the same under the U.S. constitution and the New Jersey
constitution. See Wiley Mission v. New Jersey, 2011 WL 3841437,
at *18 (D.N.J. 2011) (citing State v. Cameron, 498 A.2d 1217,
1127–28 (N.J. 1985) (explaining that the New Jersey Supreme Court
has consistently equated the meaning of Article I, Paragraph 3
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment)).
8

given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.”)).

The Supreme Court has

explicitly held that an individual has a viable claim against the
government when he is able to prove that the government took
action against him in retaliation for his exercise of First
Amendment rights.

Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir.

1997) (citing Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)); see also Eichenlaub v. Township of
Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 284 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that a
landowner's speech at a township board of supervisors meeting
relating to zoning dispute, for which township allegedly
retaliated against him and his family, was entitled to First
Amendment protection).
In the same vein, public officials are also afforded the
protections of the First Amendment.

“[P]ublic employees do not

surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their
employment.”

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006).

The

First Amendment protects some expressions related to the speaker's
job.

Id. at 421.

“So long as employees are speaking as citizens

about matters of public concern, they must face only those speech
restrictions that are necessary for their employers to operate
efficiently and effectively.”

Id. at 419 (explaining that when

public employees make statements pursuant to their official
9

duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline).

Moreover, public

officials who perform discretionary duties within the scope of
their employment are “‘shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.’”

Hogan v. Township of Haddon, 278 Fed. Appx.

98, 104 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)).

Qualified immunity is not a defense to

liability; it is an absolute immunity from suit.

Id. (citing

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001)).
Under this backdrop, “Government actions, which standing
alone do not violate the Constitution, may nonetheless be
constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a desire
to punish an individual for exercise of a constitutional right.”
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotations and
citations omitted).

Thus, in order to prevail on a First

Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show:

(1)

constitutionally protected conduct, (2) retaliatory action
sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising
his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link between the
constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory action.
Id. at 530.

“[T]he key question in determining whether a
10

cognizable First Amendment claim has been stated is whether ‘the
alleged retaliatory conduct was sufficient to deter a person of
ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights.’”
Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing
McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Suppan v.
Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Accepting all of the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint as
true, plaintiff’s First Amendment claims against Scheffler fail.
Plaintiff availed himself of his First Amendment rights and
expressed his concerns over the Borough’s COO ordinance at the
Borough council meeting and to the local newspaper.

Scheffler

availed herself of her First Amendment rights to respond to the
same newspaper about plaintiff’s statements he made at the council
meeting and to the newspaper.
Plaintiff does not allege that Scheffler’s statements caused
him to be fearful of exercising his rights to speak to the council
or the newspaper thereafter.

Plaintiff’s complaint is also

lacking any allegations that plaintiff was prevented from
obtaining a COO or selling his mother’s home as a result of his
statements to the council or the newspaper.

There are simply no

allegations that plaintiff’s free speech rights were chilled, or
that he suffered any sort of retaliation. 2

2

Thus, plaintiff’s free

Any First Amendment claim based on the assertion that the
retaliation took the form of defamatory statements must fail in
light of our determination below that plaintiff has failed to make
11

speech violation claims must be dismissed.
2.

Plaintiff’s defamation claim (Count VII)

Plaintiff alleges that Scheffler’s statements to the
newspaper amount to defamation.

The standard for pleading and

proving a defamation claim is different from a free speech
violation claim.

To establish defamation under New Jersey law, a

plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) made a false and
defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) communicated
the statement to a third party, and (3) had a sufficient degree of
fault.

Mangan v. Corporate Synergies Group, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 2d

199, 204 (D.N.J. 2011) (citing Singer v. Beach Trading Co., 379
N.J. Super. 63, 79, 876 A.2d 885 (App. Div. 2005)).
Whether a statement is defamatory depends on “‘its content,
verifiability, and context.’”

Id. (citing Lynch v. N.J. Educ.

Assoc., 161 N.J. 152, 167, 735 A.2d 1129 (1999)).

To qualify as a

defamatory statement, the statement must be able to be proven true
or false.

Id.

Statements of pure opinion do not satisfy this

requirement because such statements only “reflect a state of
mind,” and therefore generally “cannot be proved true or false.”
Id.

Statements of opinion do not receive “a wholesale defamation

exemption,” however, if the statements “imply false underlying
objective facts.”

Id. (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,

497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990) (other citations omitted).

out a defamation claim.
12

Generally, a defamatory statement is one that subjects an
individual to contempt or ridicule, and harms a person’s
reputation by lowering the community’s estimation of him or by
deterring others from wanting to associate or deal with him.

G.D.

v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300, 310 (N.J. 2011) (citations omitted).
Whether words can reasonably be construed as defamatory is a
question of law for the Court in the first instance.

Cibenko v.

Worth Publishers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 761, 764 (D.N.J. 1981) ; Ward
v. Zelikovsky, 643 A.2d 972, 978 (N.J. 1994).
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Scheffler told the
newspaper the following:
•

“the house was in extreme disrepair - dangerous even - and
had been vacant for some time”

•

“properties of this sort negatively affect the entire
neighborhood and bring down property values”

•

“this property was a real eyesore for the neighborhood and a
liability for Mr. Reed”

•

“there were many deficient areas, including electrical and
plumbing problems, numerous holes, leaks, lack of CO
detectors, a lack of hot water, crumbled chimney cement, no
working stove and exposed wiring.”

(Compl. ¶¶ 62-66.)
Even though plaintiff generally alleges that all of
Scheffler’s statements were false, plaintiff does not specifically
13

allege in his complaint that the fact portions of Scheffler’s
statements were not true.

Scheffler’s statements that the house

“had been vacant for some time” and “there were many deficient
areas, including electrical and plumbing problems, numerous holes,
leaks, lack of CO detectors, a lack of hot water, crumbled chimney
cement, no working stove and exposed wiring” are fact statements
that plaintiff does not specifically allege to be false. 3

Thus, a

defamation claim based on these statements is not actionable.
The remaining statements can be classified as the opinions of
Scheffler.

Plaintiff argues that the innuendo Scheffler created

by her opinions falls into the type of opinion statements that are
actionable because they imply false underlying facts.
Specifically, plaintiff argues that a reader of Scheffler’s
statements, taken collectively, form the impression that
plaintiff, who was responsible for the upkeep of 28 Pear Street,
was the type of person who would allow his property to fall into
disrepair to the extent that it became an eyesore and devalue
other homes in the neighborhood.

Plaintiff claims that this false

impression harmed his reputation and estimation of him in the

3

Plaintiff argues that the inspection reports, photographs of the
property, and testimony of inspectors can be produced to factcheck Scheffler’s statements. The problem with plaintiff’s
position is that it is his obligation under Rule 8 and
Twombly/Iqbal to plead facts which suggest that Scheffler’s
statements were false. Without such allegations in the complaint,
the Court cannot accept that Scheffler’s statements were false for
the purposes of resolving Scheffler’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
14

community.
Accepting as true that Scheffler’s statements imply that
plaintiff was derelict in taking care of his mother’s home, these
statements do not rise to the level of contempt or ridicule, or of
such a nature to harm plaintiff’s reputation in the community.
As a primary matter, plaintiff has not pleaded facts to
suggest that his reputation has been harmed.

Plaintiff simply

contends that he was insulted and feels that his reputation was
harmed.

This pleading failure to fatal to his defamation claim.

To further drive home the point that Scheffler’s statements
do not support a viable claim for defamation, a look at two cases
is illustrative.

In McCausland v. City Of Atlantic City, 2006 WL

1451060, at *1 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2006), the Appellate
Division affirmed the trial judge’s determination that Atlantic
City’s mayor did not defame the plaintiff, the president of the
Police Benevolent Association, in statements made by the mayor to
the Atlantic City Press.

The mayor stated to the newspaper that

the plaintiff was “someone who has mastered the art of suburban
warfare, has no connection to Atlantic City, and has contributed
nothing to the city, but takes all he can out of the city.”
McCausland, 2006 WL 1451060 at *1.

The Mayor was also quoted as

“definitely questioning McCausland's leadership as the president
of the PBA.”

Id.

In another Atlantic City Press article, the

mayor stated that the plaintiff was “persona non grata,” had “lost
15

the confidence of the rank-and-file PBA membership and was on his
way out.”

Id.

In addition to these statements to the press, the plaintiff
claimed that the mayor instigated an Internal Affairs
investigation of him by claiming he was rude, loud and offensive
at a City Council meeting; in a memorandum the mayor claimed that
plaintiff had lied to the Chief of Police regarding a rumored
sick-out during President's Day weekend and sought disciplinary
action against plaintiff; and the mayor also allegedly told
another police officer that plaintiff was “a piece of sh-t.”

Id.

The plaintiff claimed that the mayor’s statements tarnished
his reputation throughout the community.

In affirming the trial

court, the appellate court reiterated that it was the court's
responsibility to distinguish non-actionable obscenities,
vulgarities, insults, epithets, name-calling, verbal abuse, and
statements of rhetorical hyperbole from true defamatory language.
Id. (citation omitted).

The appellate court “agree[d]

completely” with the trial judge and found that the alleged
comments did constitute actionable defamation.

Id.

The court

noted, “No matter how obnoxious, insulting or tasteless these
comments may be, they are a part of life for which the law of
defamation affords no remedy.”

Id. (citations omitted).

The

court concluded that the alleged statements by the mayor did not
rise to the level of injuring the plaintiff’s reputation, or to
16

deter others from having any contact with him, or stated, implied,
or suggested specific facts that can be proven false.

Id.

Similarly, in Ferraro v. City of Long Branch, 714 A.2d 945,
949 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), a former municipal worker
sued the mayor of the City of Long Branch for defamation.

The

plaintiff suffered a massive heart attack while shoveling snow
from City Hall steps, and stated to a reporter for a newspaper
article that the mayor repeatedly ordered him to perform manual
labor that was not part of his job in order to humiliate him.

The

reporter interviewed the mayor for a response to the plaintiff’s
claims, and the mayor stated that the plaintiff’s claims were
without merit.

Ferraro, 714 A.2d at 950.

The mayor further

stated, “‘Nobody ever did anything to harm Mr. Ferraro, and I'm
sure that's exactly what will come out as this matter progresses.
. . . It's unfortunate that he's chosen this method of attack.
the notion is to embarrass us, I think it's unfortunate.’”

If

Id.

The mayor also released to the newspaper plaintiff’s medical
report, which changed plaintiff’s cause of injury on the steps
from a cardiac ailment to a psychotic depression.

Id.

The appellate court found that the plaintiff’s cause of
action against the mayor for defamation based upon his statements
regarding the frivolous nature of plaintiff's suit and the release
of the medical report was properly dismissed.

Id. at 956.

The

court determined that the mayor “was merely offering his opinion
17

or adopting as his own the opinion of another, and he did so in
response to a public official’s public allegations as reported in
the press.”

Id. (citations omitted).

These two cases about alleged defamatory statements by a
town’s mayor to a newspaper demonstrate that plaintiff’s
defamation claim in this case against his town’s mayor is
similarly unavailing.

Moreover, the law recognizes a difference

between statements made by officers in formal discharge of their
governmental duties and those made in other contexts, including
during activities connected to the office but not directly and
strictly in the exercise of committed functions.

Conte v. Mayor

and Council, City of Garfield, 2003 WL 22019955, at *3 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (citing Burke v. Deiner, 97 N.J. 465
(1984)) (other citations omitted).

Public statements of elected

officials are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for
defamation when the statements are made while they are “engaged in
the discharge of duties imposed on them by law,” and “statements
made in other contexts enjoy only qualified immunity.”
(citations omitted).

Id.

Additionally, under the New Jersey Tort

Claims Act, “A public employee is not liable if he acts in good
faith in the execution or enforcement of any law,” N.J.S.A. 59:3–
3, and a public employee’s good faith negates the “actual malice”
standard for an actionable defamation claim.

Jobes v.

Evangelista, 849 A.2d 186, 192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
18

In short, a person has the right “to enjoy one's reputation
free from unjustified smears and aspersions,” but that right must
be weighed against “[t]he significant societal benefit in robust
and unrestrained debate on matters of public interest.

The law of

defamation attempts to strike the proper balance between
protecting reputation and protecting free speech.”
Kenny, 15 A.3d at 310 (citations omitted).

G.D. v.

Here, the statements

Scheffler made to the Burlington County Times, although arguably
harsh, related to a municipal ordinance, the reasons for its
enforcement and existence, and the effect non-compliance could
have on property values in the town.

All of these issues related

directly to her duties and responsibilities as mayor.

The

statements do not constitute defamation.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, defendant Scheffler’s motion
to dismiss plaintiff’s claims against her must be granted.

An

appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: October 28, 2016
At Camden, New Jersey

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

19