MILES v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Filing
42
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 12/21/2017. (dmr)
[Dkt. No. 35]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
ANESHA MILES,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 16-787 (RMB/KMW)
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
CINDY AVES, M.D.; & COOPER
UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL,
OPINION
Defendants.
BUMB, United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon the filing of a
motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) by defendants Dr.
Cindy Aves, M.D. (“Dr. Aves”) and Cooper University Hospital
(“Cooper”)(collectively, the “Cooper Defendants”) seeking
dismissal of all claims against them as time-barred. [Dkt. No.
35]. Because proper consideration of the Cooper Defendants’
motion requires reference to facts outside of the pleadings, the
Court will convert the motion into a motion for summary judgment
and provide the parties with additional time to submit further
materials in support and opposition of such motion.
I.
Background
Plaintiff Anesha Miles (“Plaintiff”) filed the initial
complaint in this matter on February 12, 2016, naming the United
States as the sole defendant. [Dkt. No. 1]. Plaintiff alleged
that Dr. Eric Chang, D.O. -- a surgeon employed by the United
States through CamCare Health Corporation -– performed a
dilation and curettage with ablation (“D&C”) surgical procedure
on Plaintiff at Cooper on March 17, 2014, which resulted in the
termination of Plaintiff’s pregnancy. [Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 7-13].
According to Plaintiff, she was subjected to a pre-surgical
pregnancy test which revealed that she was pregnant. [Id. at ¶
10]. The results of this test, however, were not conveyed to
Plaintiff, and Plaintiff consented to the D&C without knowing
that she was pregnant. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a one-count
complaint alleging negligence against the United States.
On March 8, 2017 the Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend
the complaint to add the Cooper Defendants. [Dkt. No. 19]. On
March 21, 2017 Plaintiff filed the amended complaint. [Dkt. No.
20]. In addition to the allegations of the initial complaint,
Plaintiff alleged in the amended complaint that Dr. Aves, a
Cooper employee not employed by the United States through
CamCare Health Corporation, either assisted Dr. Chang in
performing the D&C or performed it herself. [Dkt. No. 20 at ¶
13, 16]. Plaintiff added a negligence count against Dr. Aves and
negligence and “corporate negligence” counts against Cooper.
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On May 2, 2017, the Cooper Defendants filed the currently
pending motion, seeking to dismiss all claims against them on
statute of limitations grounds. [Dkt. No. 35].
II.
Legal Standard
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). In reviewing a plaintiff's allegations, a district
court “must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations as
well as all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them,
and construe those allegations in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 n.1 (3d Cir.
2012). A motion to dismiss for failure to comply with a statute
of limitations will only be granted “where the complaint
facially shows noncompliance with the limitations period.”
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385
(3d Cir. 1994).
When undertaking this review, courts are limited to the
allegations found in the complaint, exhibits attached to the
complaint, matters of public record, and undisputedly authentic
documents that form the basis of a claim. See In re Burlington
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997);
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Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998
F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). “If, on a motion under Rule
12(b)(6) . . . matters outside the pleadings are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one
for summary judgment under Rule 56 . . . [and] [a]ll parties
must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the
material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(d).
III. Analysis
The Cooper Defendants argue that all claims asserted
against them are time-barred. Each of Plaintiff’s claims sounds
in medical malpractice. N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-2 requires a plaintiff
to file a medical malpractice action within two years after the
cause of action “accrued.” Plaintiff underwent the D&C on March
17, 2014. (Dkt. No. 20 at ¶ 11). The parties do not dispute that
this is the date on which Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued.
As such, Plaintiff had two years from March 17, 2014 to file her
complaint.
As noted above, Plaintiff timely filed her initial
complaint against the United States on February 12, 2016.
Further, Plaintiff concedes in her opposition to the present
motion that the two-year statute of limitations had run before
March 8, 2017, when she filed the amended complaint adding
claims against the Cooper Defendants. [Dkt. No. 37 at 3].
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Plaintiff argues, however, that the claims against the Cooper
Defendants are not subject to dismissal because the amended
complaint “relates back” to the date of the filing of the
initial complaint.
Whether an amendment relates back to the original complaint
is a question of federal procedural law, not state law, and thus
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) controls. See Loudenslager v. Teeple, 466
F.2d 249, 250 (3d Cir. 1972). Specifically, Plaintiff relies
upon Fed. R. Civ. P 15(c)(1)(c), which provides that
An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of
the original pleading when:
. . .
(C)
the amendment changes the party or the naming of
the party against whom a claim is asserted, if
Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the
period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the
summons and complaint, the party to be brought in
by amendment:
(i)
received such notice of the action that it
will not be prejudiced in defending on the
merits; and
(ii)
knew or should have known that the action
would have been brought against it, but
for a mistake concerning the proper
party's identity.
Accordingly, to decide whether the amended complaint
relates back, the Court must determine whether, among other
things, the Cooper Defendants received sufficient notice –actual or constructive -- of Plaintiff’s suit within 90 days of
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February 19, 2016 (the period provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m))
such that they would not be prejudiced in defending any claims
against them, and whether, when they received that notice, they
knew or should have known that they would have been named in the
suit but for a mistake on Plaintiff’s part. Id.; see also Garvin
v. City of Philadelphia, 354 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2003)(citing
Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 196 (3d
Cir. 2001))(recognizing two methods of imputing notice to newly
named defendants).
As noted, the notice requirement of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i) can
be satisfied by actual or imputed notice. There are two methods
of imputing knowledge to a newly named defendant in the context
of relation back: the “shared attorney” method and the “identity
of interest” method. See Garvin, 354 F.3d at 222 (citing
Singletary, 266 F.3d at 196). The “shared attorney” method “is
based on the notion that when the originally named party and the
parties sought to be added are represented by the same attorney,
‘the attorney is likely to have communicated to the latter party
that he may very well be joined in the action.’” Id. The
“identity of interest” method is based on the assumption that
when two parties are “closely related in their business
operations or other activities . . . the institution of an
action against one serves to provide notice of the litigation to
the other.” Id. (citing Singletary, 266 F.3d at 197). As the
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Cooper Defendants and the United States are represented by
separate counsel, only the “identity of interests” method is
relevant here.
The parties dispute whether either of the Cooper Defendants
had the requisite notice within the period provided by Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(i). In support of their arguments, however, both
Plaintiff and the Cooper Defendants rely on information not
found in the amended complaint. The Cooper Defendants deny that
they received actual notice of Plaintiff’s suit and argue, among
other things, that CamCare (Dr. Chang’s employer) and Cooper do
not share an “identity of interests” because they “maintain
entirely separate business operations and day-to-day activities,
and therefore cannot be characterized as closely related or
intertwined entities.” [Dkt. No. 35-2 at 18-19; Dkt. No. 40 at
12]. Further, the Cooper Defendants contend, even were this
Court to find that Cooper had received notice, there cannot
possibly be an “identity of interests” between Dr. Aves and any
other defendant, as she ceased her employment with Cooper in
November 2015, and was never an employee of the United States.
[Dkt. No. 37-2 at 19; Dkt. No 40 at 11]. Plaintiff, on the other
hand, argues that Dr. Chang and Cooper shared an “identity of
interests” based on testimony provided by Dr. Chang at his
deposition, and that Cooper received actual notice of
Plaintiff’s claims via a letter of representation sent to Cooper
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in April, 2014 from Plaintiff’s counsel containing a request for
Plaintiff’s medical records.
In order to resolve these disputes, and thus determine
whether Plaintiff’s amended complaint relates back to the date
of the filing of the initial complaint, the Court must consider
this information, which is beyond that included in the amended
complaint. Therefore, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), the
Court will convert the Cooper Defendants’ motion to a motion for
summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Pursuant to Rule
12(d), when the Court treats a motion as one for summary
judgment, “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity
to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.”
Id. Accordingly, the parties will be directed to agree upon a
briefing schedule for submission of supplemental briefing and
submission of evidence on the relation back issue in compliance
with Local Civil Rule 56.1.
An accompanying Order shall issue on this date.
s/ Renee Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
DATED: December 21, 2017
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