SMALLS v. RIVIERA TOWERS CORPORATION et al

Filing 89

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 9/21/2017. (dmr)

[Dkt. Nos. 24, 25, 27, 29, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 52, 76, 78, and
83]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

PATRICIA SMALLS,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 16-847 (RMB/KMW)
v.

OPINION

RIVIERA TOWERS CORP., et al.,
Defendants.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon several motions:
(1) the Motion of Defendants’ PHH Mortgage Corporation (“PHH”),
Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”), and American
Express Bank FSB (“Amex”) (collectively the “Loan Defendants”),
to Dismiss the Complaint [Docket No. 24]; (2) the Motion of
Defendants Coldwell Banker Real Estate Services, LLC d/b/a,
Coldwell Banker Residential Mortgage, and Lourdes Mercado to
Dismiss the Complaint [Docket No. 25]; (3) the Motion of
Defendants Robert J. Buckalew, Esq. and Buckalew Frizzell
Crevina LLP(collectively, the “Buckalew Defendants”) to Dismiss
the Complaint [Docket No. 27]; (4) the Motion by Defendant Judge
Carlo Abad to Dismiss the Complaint [Docket No. 29]; (5) the
Motion by Defendant Fein, Such, Kahn & Shephard, P.C. (“Fein,
Such”) to Dismiss the Complaint [Docket No. 34]; (6) the Motion
by Defendants Riviera Towers Corporation (“Riviera Towers”) and

Kenneth Blane (collectively the “Riviera Defendants”) to Dismiss
the Complaint [Docket No. 35]; (7) the Motion by Defendant
Senator Robert Menendez to Dismiss the Complaint [Docket No.
36]; (8) the Motion by Defendant Amariles Diaz to Dismiss the
Complaint [Docket No. 39]; (9) the Motion by Defendant West New
York Police to Dismiss the Complaint [Docket No. 40]; (10) the
Motion by Defendants The Honorable Stanley Chesler and The
Honorable Theodore McKee (the “Federal Judges”) to Dismiss the
Complaint [Docket No. 78]; (11) the Motion by Defendants The
Honorable Glenn A. Grant, Governor Chris Christie, and Hudson
County Prosecutor’s Office to Dismiss the Complaint [Docket No.
83].

Several of the foregoing Defendants also move for

Imposition of a Pre-Filing Injunction [Docket Nos. 24, 35, 78].
Defendant Michael Signorile also moves to Vacate Default [Docket
No. 76] (All defendants are collectively referred to as the
“Defendants”).

Finally, Plaintiff Patricia Smalls also moves

for a Change of Venue [Docket No. 52].
For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Signorile’s
Motion to Vacate Default [Docket No. 76] is GRANTED; all
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s
Motion for Change of Venue [Docket No. 52] is DISMISSED as moot.
Plaintiff shall also show cause why she should not be barred
from filing additional pleadings relating to the subject matter

2

of this lawsuit, as well as three prior federal lawsuits, that
is, the eviction from her West New York, New Jersey, apartment.
BACKGROUND
This is not Plaintiff Patricia Smalls’ first complaint
involving claims by her that she was wrongfully evicted from her
apartment in Riviera Towers, a co-op located in West New York,
New Jersey.
In or around 2011, Defendant Riviera Towers filed suit
against Plaintiff, in a case captioned Riviera Towers Corp. v.
Patricia Smalls, Docket No. HUD-L-438-11, based on allegations
that Smalls failed to pay certain maintenance charges
associated with her apartment.

See Docket Sheet in Docket No.

HUD-L-438-11 (Tomlin Cert. Ex. D).1

Riviera Towers did not

join PHH or otherwise give PHH notice of the lawsuit.

Riviera

Towers obtained a default judgment against Smalls on December
7, 2011.

See December 7, 2011, Order in Docket No. HUD-L-438-

11 (Tomlin Cert. Ex. E).

Among other things, Smalls was found

liable to Riviera Towers in the amount of $10,056.15,2 and
Smalls’ interest in the apartment, including any ownership in
1

The Court considers the docket sheets and filings in prior
lawsuits involving Smalls as they are matters of public record.
See Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The
“Tomlin Cert.” refers to Docket No. 24-2, attached to the Loan
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
2

This figure subsequently was reduced to $8,133.50.
12, 2012, Order (Tomlin C e r t . E x s . E a n d F ).
3

See June

the co-op, was terminated.

Id.

Riviera Towers was awarded

possession of the unit and authorized to sell it to pay off the
outstanding maintenance charges.

Id.

and the unit was sold in April 2014.
[Docket No. 1], Tomlin Dec. Ex. L.

Smalls then was evicted,
See Complaint at p. 6

See also Schedule of

Disbursement of Sale Proceeds (Tomlin Dec. Ex. G).3
Plaintiff thereafter filed an action in this District,
Civil Action No. 12-6312, against Defendant Riviera Towers and
Blane, as well as ten other defendants who are not named here
(the “First Federal Action”).

In an Opinion and Order entered

August 9, 2013, The Honorable Stanley R. Chesler, now a
defendant herein, set forth the facts as follows:
Plaintiff, a former shareholder and tenant of Riviera
Towers, a 427-unit co-op located in West New York, New
Jersey, has brought suit against a total of 12
defendants for their roles in evicting her on August
1, 2012. Plaintiff, who is an African-American woman,
had been a shareholder/owner of Riviera Towers since
September 1998. In 2010, Plaintiff apparently fell
behind on some portion of her monthly maintenance
costs. In or about January 2011, the RTC Board
brought suit in New Jersey Superior Court to recover
the past-due maintenance fees. Plaintiff alleges that
the Riviera Towers Corporation . . . failed to provide
her with monthly maintenance statements from December
2009 to November 2011. Plaintiff failed to timely
answer the complaint and was marked in default, though
Plaintiff asserts that she was never properly served.
Plaintiff appeared before the Superior Court to object
3

Riviera Towers’ sale of the unit netted surplus sale proceeds,
which were deposited into the New Jersey Superior Court Trust
Fund and subsequently obtained by PHH pursuant to a court order
dated September 2, 2016. See September 2, 2016, Order in Docket
No. HUD-L-438-11 (Tomlin Dec. Ex. H).
4

to an entry of default judgment, and the Court entered
a judgment of $8,133.50 in favor of RTC. On July 23,
2012, RTC advised Plaintiff that she would be evicted
on August 1, 2012, if she did not satisfy the
judgment. Plaintiff failed to pay, and RTC followed
through on its eviction warning by changing the locks
on the apartment and barring Plaintiff from entering
the building. Plaintiff alleges that she was singled
out because of her race and gender, and that the RTC
Board did not evict its other shareholders who were
behind in their maintenance payments.
Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action:
(1) violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 (“Conspiracy Against
Rights”); (2) violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (“
Deprivation of Rights”); (3) violation of 42 U.S.C. §
3601 (“Fair Housing Act and Criminal Interference with
Right to Fair Housing”); (4) violation of 15 U.S.C. §
689 (“Unlawful Acts and Omissions”); (5) violation of
18 U.S.C. § 876 (“Mailing Threatening
Communications”); (6) breach of fiduciary duty; (7)
breach of the duty of loyalty; (8) lack of good faith;
(9) breach of the duty of care; (10) unequal
treatment of shareholders; (11) intentional infliction
of emotional distress; (12) race discrimination; (13)
sex discrimination; and (14) age discrimination.
See Smalls v. Riviera Towers Corp. et al., Civil Action No. 126312 (SRC), Docket No. 50, at 1-2.
Upon the Defendants’ motion, Judge Chesler dismissed the
First Federal Action without prejudice.

Plaintiff filed a

motion for reconsideration as well as a motion for recusal, and
Judge Chesler denied both motions.

Upon failing to amend her

complaint within the time provided for by the Court, Judge
Chesler dismissed the complaint with prejudice on January 16,
2014.

See id. [Docket Nos. 63, 68].

5

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed another action in this District
against Defendants Buckalew, Frizzell, PHH, Fein Such, and
several other defendants not named herein.

See Smalls v.

Buckalew Frizzell Crevina, et al., Civil Action No. 13-4637 (the
“Second Federal Action”).

As Judge Chesler observed, this

action dealt with the alleged participation of the defendants in
the eviction of Plaintiff from her West New York, apartment.

On

June 25, 2014, Judge Chesler dismissed the complaint without
prejudice and Plaintiff never sought leave of court to file an
amended complaint.

See Civil Action No. 13-4637 [Docket No.

47].
At the same time the Second Federal Action was pending,
Plaintiff filed a third federal action, Civil Action No. 134698, against defendants who were involved in the state court
eviction proceeding.

See Smalls v. Sarkisian et al., Civil

Action No. 13-4698 (the “Third Federal Action”).

Eight of these

defendants, the Honorable Hector R. Velazquez, P.J.Ch., the
Honorable Mitchel E. Ostrer, J.A.D., the Honorable Marie P.
Simonelli, J.A.D., Chief Justice Stuart Rabner, John Tonelli,
the Executive Director of New Jersey’s Advisory Committee on
Judicial Conduct, and Lieutenant Robert McGrath of New Jersey’s
Division of Criminal Justice were dismissed by Judge Chesler in
an Opinion and Order entered December 13, 2013.

In a subsequent

Opinion and Order entered June 2, 2014, Judge Chesler dismissed
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the remaining defendants, former Assistant United States
Attorney Susan Handler-Menahem, Felix Roque, the Mayor of West
New York, and West New York police captain Michael Zitt.
Turning to the within action, the fourth federal action
filed by Plaintiff, the Court agrees with the moving Defendants’
general characterization that the allegations here are the same
as those in the First Federal Action.

Although Plaintiff’s

Complaint is rambling and disjointed, the key allegations can be
summarized as follows:
• Riviera Towers filed an action against Plaintiff in
2011, in New Jersey state court, seeking unpaid
maintenance fees;
• Riviera Towers obtained a judgment against Plaintiff
in the amount of $8,133.50, which Plaintiff failed to
pay, resulting in her eviction from Riviera Towers;
and
• Plaintiff asserts that the state court action was
unauthorized or illegal, that Riviera’s actions were
motivated by racism, and that her eviction from her
co-op constitutes theft.
• Plaintiff asserts that each named Defendant engaged
in conspiratorial acts related to the “illegal”
eviction.
As for the specific claims against Defendants Riviera
Towers and Blane, the Court finds that they are barred under the
doctrine of res judicata.

Res judicata bars a claim where the

following elements are satisfied: (i) a final judgment on the
merits in a prior suit; (ii) the prior suit involved the same
parties or their privies and (iii) the subsequent suit is based
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on the same cause of action.

United States v. Athlone Indus.,

Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984)(citations omitted).
three elements of res judicata are present here.

All

First, there

was a final judgment in the earlier suit, because the Court
dismissed the First Federal Action with prejudice on January 16,
2014.

Second, the earlier action involved the same parties

because Riviera Towers and Blane were specifically named as
defendants.

Third, the two cases clearly involve the same cause

of action. In both cases, Plaintiff alleges that the defendants
wrongfully sued her in state court for delinquent maintenance
fees, obtained a judgment against her in the amount of $8,133.50
which she failed to pay, evicted her, that the eviction was
tantamount to theft, and that the defendants were motivated by
racism against her.

In sum, the “acts complained of” and the

“material fact alleged in each suit” are the same, and “the
witnesses and documentation required to prove [the] allegations
[are] the same.”

Id. at 984.

Thus, the two cases involve the

same cause of action, and the claims against Riviera Towers
Corporation and Mr. Blane are dismissed with prejudice.

The

same is true for Defendants PHH, AmEx, Buckalew Frizzell, Fein
Such, who were dismissed on the same claims in the prior federal
actions.
Even if Plaintiff’s claims were not barred by res judicata,
her claims fail to state viable causes of action against all
8

Defendants.

Smalls cannot maintain any claims under 18 U.S.C. §

241 or 18 U.S.C. § 242 because they are criminal statutes which
do not authorize private rights of action or give rise to civil
liability.

Smalls’ claims for alleged constitutional violations

fare no better.

There is no direct cause of action under the

United States Constitution.

See, e.g., Love v. N.J. State

Police, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69562, at *15 n. 10 (D.N.J. May
26, 2016).

Rather, the vehicle for pursuing constitutional

claims is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
266, 271 (1994).

See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.

While Smalls does not explicitly assert a

claim under Section 1983, even construing her Complaint as
attempting to do so, it fails to do so.

There are two essential

elements of a Section 1983 claim alleging deprivation of
constitutional rights:

(1) whether the conduct complained of

was committed by a person acting under color of state law and
(2) whether this conduct deprived the plaintiff of a
constitutional right.
(1981).

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535

Additionally, because Smalls alleges a Fourteenth

Amendment violation, she also must demonstrate state action.
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).
Here, the private defendants are not state actors, and any
actions or inactions taken by these defendants in respect to
their rights under the applicable loan documents cannot be said
to involve state action or action under the color of state law.
9

See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)(noting that
Section 1983 excludes from its reach “merely private conduct, no
matter how discriminatory or wrongful”)(quoting Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948));

see also McCabe v. Mut. Aid

Ambulance Serv., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103766, at *15
(W.D.Pa. Aug. 7, 2015)(“It is well recognized, that the
Constitution protects citizens from infringement of their rights
by the government, not by private parties.”)(citing Flagg Bros.,
Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978)).4
Moreover, while Smalls vaguely claims that the various
defendants engaged in a conspiracy, her allegations are
conclusory and are not sufficient to state a civil rights
conspiracy claim.

See Mikhaeil v. Santos, 646 Fed. Appx. 158,

162 (3d Cir. 2016)(affirming dismissal of constitutional/Section
1983 claims where defendants were private actors and plaintiff
failed to adequately allege conspiracy); accord Evans v.
Gloucester Twp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84952, at *34 (D.N.J.
June 29, 2016)(conclusory statement that defendants “acted in
concert” insufficient to state a claim for conspiracy to deprive
plaintiff of constitutional rights); Voth v. Hoffman, 2016 U.S.

4

While FNMA is a government-sponsored enterprise and operates
under the conservatorship of the Federal Housing Finance Agency,
it is not considered to be a state actor for purposes of Section
1983 or constitutional claims. See, e.g., Kropek v. Sullivan,
35 F.Supp. 3d 880, 893 (E.D. Mich. 2014)(collecting cases); Dias
v. Fannie Mae, 990 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1062 (D. Hi. 2013)(same).
10

Dist. LEXIS 57289, at *31 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2016)(dismissing
claim of conspiracy to violate civil rights because plaintiff
failed to plead facts supporting the claim).

In sum, Smalls has

failed to set forth any plausible factual allegations which
support the conclusion that these defendants are liable for any
alleged violation of her constitutional rights.
Finally, her claims, putting aside all defects, are timebarred.

Claims brought under Section 1983 are subject to the

forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.
See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); see also Cito v.
Bridgewater Township Police Dep’t., 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir.
1989).

New Jersey imposes a two-year limitations period for

claims alleging personal injury.

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.

Here, Smalls complains about her eviction in 2012, yet she did
not file this lawsuit until February 2016.

Her claims,

therefore, are untimely and are dismissed for this additional
reason.
Moreover, as to the Defendants Senator Robert Menendez,
Governor Chris Christie, Judge Theodore McKee5, Judge Stanley

5

Plaintiff accuses the Federal Defendants of violating her
constitutional rights under the “4th, 5th, 7th and 14th
Amendments,” and of violating two federal criminal statutes, 18
U.S.C. § 241 and § 242. Compl. p. 9, 11. Plaintiff asserts
claims against AUSA Blaine in response to a March 21, 2014
letter he wrote to Plaintiff in his capacity as Chief of the
Office’s Civil Division. Compl. p. 11; see also Dkt. Entry No.
1-2 at 44 (enclosing the letter). AUSA Blaine’s letter
11

responded to Plaintiff’s March 27, 2017 letter inquiring about
the status of her prior civil rights complaint. Dkt. Entry No.
1-2 at 44. The letter reiterated that the U.S. Attorney’s Office
would not “take any action with respect to [Plaintiff’s]
complaint” and that there was no pending “investigation relating
to [Plaintiff’s] complaint.” Id. Plaintiff asserts claims
against AUSA Blaine because, she alleges, the letter was “very
nasty” and because AUSA Blaine supposedly “knew [Plaintiff’s]
co-op was taken unlawfully” but, nevertheless, refused to help
her. Compl. p. 11.
Plaintiff’s claims against AUSA Campion focus on his
representation of AUSA Handler-Menahem in the Third Federal
Court Action. Plaintiff accuses AUSA Campion of “falsely
stat[ing] that [Plaintiff] was evicted based on [a] NJ Superior
Court Judgment that never existed.” Id. Though Plaintiff does
not identify in her Complaint the allegedly false statement upon
which the claim is based, it appears to be based on the brief
that AUSA Campion submitted in connection with his motion to
dismiss the Third Federal Court Action. There, citing
Plaintiff’s own Complaint and a decision from this Court in the
First Federal Court Action, AUSA Campion wrote that “the Board
of the Riviera Towers Corporation sue[d] Plaintiff ... for her
alleged failure to pay required monthly maintenance fees” and
that, after judgment was entered against her, “Plaintiff was
evicted due to her failure to satisfy the [state court]
judgment.” Simunovich Decl., Exhibit 14 at 1.
Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Chesler stem from
decisions he issued in connection with each of Plaintiff’s prior
federal lawsuits. Compl. p. 9. She states that Judge Chesler
“committed fraud upon the court and changed [the] facts of the
case to help [the] defendant[s],” deprived her of her “stolen
home,” and dismissed all of her cases “before any discovery … in
violation of [her] rights to due process, jury trial or [to] be
treated fairly.” Id.
And, lastly, Plaintiff asserts a claim against Judge McKee
based on a decision he wrote on behalf of the Judicial Council
of the Third Circuit in response to Plaintiff’s complaint of
judicial misconduct. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff takes issue
with the fact that Judge McKee referred to the judicial
misconduct charge as “frivolous”; she also seems to take issue
with a statement in the decision relating to Plaintiff’s
timeliness in paying maintenance charges. Id.
12

Chesler, Judge Amarilis A. Diaz, Judge Glenn A. Grant, former
Assistant United States Attorneys Paul Blaine and Mitchell
Campion, West New York Police Department, and Hudson County
Prosecutor’s Office, motions are all granted for the sound
reasons set forth in their respective briefs.

In a nutshell,

the claims are either barred under principles of wellestablished immunity or the claims are so conclusory that they
fail to state any legally cognizable claims.
Finally, Defendant Signorile moves to vacate the default
entered by the Clerk of the Court on February 3, 2017.

A

decision to set aside the entry of default pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(c) is left primarily to the discretion of the
District Court.

Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189

F.2d 242, 244 (3d Cir. 1951).

The Third Circuit announced that

it "does not favor entry of defaults or default judgments."
United States of America v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728
F.2d 192, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1984).

The Court went on to state "we

Although Plaintiff’s allegations focus on conduct
undertaken by these Defendants in their official capacities, it
is possible that Plaintiff intends to assert individual
liability claims against one or more of the Federal Defendants.
Plaintiff appears to allege that these Defendants were
personally involved in a conspiracy to violate her
constitutional rights and, as a remedy, she seeks compensatory
and punitive damages, and other forms of relief. Id. at p. 1314. Moreover, the overall tenor of the Complaint suggests an
intention to hold these Defendants personally responsible for
their alleged actions. These allegations fail because they fail
to state any legally cognizable claim.
13

require doubtful cases to be resolved in favor of the party
moving to set aside the default judgment 'so that cases may be
decided on the merits.'”

Id. at 195.

See also, Gross v. Stereo

Component Systems, Inc., 700 F.2d 120, 122(3d Cir.1983);
Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Company, Ltd., 691 F.2d 653, 656
(3d Cir. 1982).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), states that for good
cause shown, the Court may set aside the entry of default.

Some

factors to be considered for "good cause" to set aside the entry
of default under Rule 55(c) or a default judgment under Rule
60(b)(1) are: (1) whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced; (2)
whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether
the default was the result of the defendant's culpable conduct."
United States of America, 728 F.2d at 195.
It appears that Plaintiff's sole allegation against
Defendant Signorile is that he sent Plaintiff "a letter dated
September 19, 2014 saying the WNYP [West New York Police]
arrested [] me without a warrant is legal."
11, 8(g)(h).

See Complaint, pg.

This statement in no way supports Plaintiff’s

conclusory allegation the Defendant conspired against her to
extort money from her or take her home.
Moreover, there is no evidence before the Court of culpable
conduct by Defendant Signorile.

The standard for "culpable

conduct" is the "willfulness" or "bad faith" of a non-responding

14

defendant. See Hritz v. Woma Corporation, 732 F.2d 1178, 1183 (3d
Cir. 1984. "Appropriate application of the culpable conduct
standard requires that as a threshold matter, more than mere
negligence be demonstrated.”

Id. at 1183.

Accordingly, the

Motion to Vacate the entry of default is GRANTED.6
Finally, several Defendants seek an order from this Court
barring Plaintiff from filing additional pleadings arising from
or related to her eviction from her West New York apartment.

As

set forth above, Smalls has attempted to litigate her grievances
arising from her eviction in at least four federal lawsuits, as
well as other various filings in state court and elsewhere.
Indeed, Plaintiff states in her Complaint:
I have written over 200 complaints, over 15 judges – 5
different courts, Governor Christie, Senator Menendez,
Senator Booker, West New York May, NJ_DOJ, FBI-Newark,
NJ Attorney General, Hudson Prosecutors Office, West
New York Police and others who all took an oath to
uphold the U.S. Constitution.
Complaint, at p. 7. [Docket No. 1, at 7].

She has also had “78

criminal complaints, [in Jersey City Municipal Court], against
the defendants.”

Id. at 11.

6

Defendant Signorile also seeks the opportunity to file a
responsive pleading. The Court sees no reason to file a
responsive pleading, presumably a Motion to Dismiss, which will
address the sole conclusory allegation against the Defendant,
that is, that he transmitted a letter from the Hudson County
Prosecutor’s Office saying that the West New York Police
Department’s warrantless arrest was legal. The Court cannot
conceive any claim that would survive a motion to dismiss.
15

“Courts have uniformly sanctioned litigants who attempt to
relitigate issues already decided against [them] . . . .”
Dunleavy v. Gannon, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9679, at *18 (D.N.J.
Jan. 26, 2012)(citing Napier v. Thirty or More unidentified Fed.
Agents, Employees or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080 (3d Cir. 1988);
Balthazar v. Atlantic City Med. Ctr., 279 F. Supp. 2d 574, 594
(D.N.J. 2009)).

Among other things, “District Courts may issue

an injunction requiring a litigant who has repeatedly filed
complaints alleging claims that have already been fully
litigated to receive Court approval before filing further
complaints.”

Id. at *19(citing Matter of Packer Ave., Assoc.,

884 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1989)).
As a result, Plaintiff will be required to show cause
within twenty days of this Order why her pattern of conduct,
which has caused the expenditure of countless resources,
judicial and otherwise, does not justify a tailored pre-filing
injunction that provides as follows:
• Without prior leave of this Court, Plaintiff Patricia Smalls
should be prohibited, when proceeding pro se, from filing
any lawsuits against any of the Defendants or others not
yet named relating to the loss of her apartment or personal
belongings at Riviera Towers;
• Leave of Court will be freely granted upon Plaintiff showing
through a properly filed petition that a specific proposed
filing (i) can survive a challenge under Rule 12 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and (ii) is not barred by
principles of claim or issue preclusion;

16

• Plaintiff must attach a copy of the pre-filing injunction to
any subsequent pro se lawsuit that relates to the loss of
her apartment or personal belongings at Riviera Towers; and
• The injunction shall not apply to the filing of timely
notices of appeal of any decision rendered by this Court in
this action.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, all pending Motions
to Dismiss are granted.
dismissed as moot.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Change Venue is

An Order to Show Cause why a narrowly

tailored pre-filing injunction shall issue.

An accompanying

Order will be filed with this Opinion.

s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 21, 2017

17