LANGFORD v. GLOUCESTER TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT et al
Filing
74
OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 9/21/2018. (tf, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
___________________________________
:
CRYSTAL LANGFORD,
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Civil No. 16–01023 (RBK/AMD)
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:
OPINION
Plaintiff,
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v.
:
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GLOUCESTER TOWNSHIP POLICE
:
DEPARTMENT, et al.
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Defendants. :
___________________________________ :
KUGLER, United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 67) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond (Doc. No. 71).
Because Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 72)
supersedes the Motion for Extension of Time to Respond, the Motion for Extension of Time to
Respond is DISMISSED AS MOOT. For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, the Court will
GRANT Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Crystal Langford (“Plaintiff”) is a forty-five-year-old black woman and resident
of New Jersey. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 11. In just one day, on April 29, 2014,
Langford had at least three encounters with police. See id. First, at approximately 11:00am, two
police officers from the Winslow Township Police Department (“Winslow PD”) cited her for
driving with an expired motor vehicle registration and ordered her car towed. Pl. St. Mat’l Fact
¶ 3. At approximately 12:30pm, Officer Kathleen Schultz drove her two miles to her home in
Sicklerville, New Jersey. Id.
One hour later, at approximately 1:30pm, Defendant Paul Fisher of the Gloucester
Township Police Department (“Gloucester PD”) responded to a 9-1-1 call to investigate a
purported assault that had occurred four miles from Langford’s home. Id. ¶ 1; Def. Rep. Br., 3.
The 9-1-1 caller, later identified as Antonia Nunez, witnessed a woman strike Shermaine Lewis
with a broomstick at her Sicklerville residence. Pl. St. Mat’l Fact ¶ 2. Nunez identified the
assailant as “Crystal” and described her as wearing a “hot pink” sweatshirt. Id. ¶ 2. Officer
Fisher responded to the call, arrived at Lewis’s home, and observed a broken door. Id. ¶ 4. He
then questioned Lewis, who confirmed the identity of the assailant as Crystal Langford. Id.;
Fisher Dep’n, 18–9; see also Master Incident Report, 4. Lewis informed Officer Fisher that
Langford had legal custody over Lewis’s biological children as well as a restraining order against
her. Pl. St. Mat’l Fact ¶ 6. Lewis provided an additional statement to Detective Anthony Massi
of the Gloucester PD and again confirmed the identity of her assailant as Crystal Langford. Id. ¶
12.
At approximately 2:00pm, Langford had her second encounter with the Winslow PD.
Officer Jeffrey Wyld knocked on her door, informed her that the Gloucester PD reported her
assault on Shermaine Lewis, and requested to inspect her hands. FAC ¶ 18; Pl. St. Mat’l Fact ¶
3. During this examination, Officer Schultz, the officer who had driven Langford home during
her first encounter with the police, returned and informed Officer Wyld that Langford was likely
with her during the alleged assault of Lewis. FAC ¶ 20. Both Winslow PD officers then left her
home. Id. ¶ 21.
Between Plaintiff Langford’s second and third encounter with the police, Gloucester PD
Defendants Officer Paul Fisher and Sgt. Thomas Knapp, Jr. prepared a warrant request for her
arrest. Pl. St. Mat’l Fact ¶¶ 17–9. They gathered evidence, interviewed witnesses, and created
an incident report of the assault. Id. Then, they contacted Assistant Prosecutor Bill Stass at the
Camden County Prosecutor’s Office. Id. Stass reviewed this information, which included the 91-1 call transcript, pictures of the scene, Lewis’s statement, and the incident report. Id. Stass
agreed that Crystal Langford should be charged with crimes relating to the assault against Lewis.
Id. Officer Fisher then filed the warrant request, and a municipal judge issued a warrant to arrest
Langford for crimes related to the incident. Id. Langford then encountered police for a third
time.
At approximately 8:00pm, Winslow PD arrested Langford pursuant to the warrant request
submitted by Officer Fisher and approved by Sgt. Knapp. Id. She informed the Winslow PD
that victim Lewis regularly made false reports to police departments. Id. ¶ 18. She revealed that
she had a restraining order against Lewis. Id. She also explained that such reports arose from
her longstanding legal custody of Lewis’s children. Id. In addition, Langford insisted she could
not have been involved in the alleged altercation because she was with Officer Schultz. Id.
Officers Schultz and Wyld, she claims, repeatedly informed the Gloucester PD that, given the
timing of the reported incident, it was unlikely for her to have been involved. FAC ¶ 31. The
Winslow PD transported Langford to the Gloucester PD, where she waived her Miranda rights,
provided a taped statement to Detective Massi, and denied all allegations.
The Gloucester PD charged Langford with Burglary, Aggravated Assault, Possession of a
Weapon for Unlawful Purpose, Unlawful Possession of a Weapon, and Criminal Mischief. Pl.
St. Mat’l Fact ¶ 17. She served one month at the Camden County jail and, upon release on her
recognizance, was under house arrest for approximately one year. Id. ¶ 19. A grand jury later
indicted her for violations of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2b(1)(Burglary), 2C:12-1b(1) (Aggravated Assault
– First Degree), 2C:12-1b(3) (Aggravated Assault – Third Degree), 2C:12-1b(7) (Aggravated
Assault – Third Degree), 2C:39-4d (Possession of a Weapon for Unlawful Purpose – Third
Degree), and 2C:39-5d (Possession of a Weapon for Unlawful Purpose – Fourth Degree). Id. ¶
20. After a bench trial on the merits, Crystal Langford was found “not guilty” on all counts. Id.
¶ 20–1.
Langford filed the instant lawsuit against Defendants Gloucester Township, Gloucester
PD, Officer Paul Fisher, Sgt. Thomas Knapp, Jr., Detective Anthony Massi, and John Doe
Defendants Nos. 1–10 on February 23, 2016. Doc. No. 1. The complaint alleges six causes of
action, which include violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and related New
Jersey state law claims. Doc. No. 55. More specifically, Counts I and II allege false arrest and
malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Id. Counts III and IV include related claims
under New Jersey state law. Id. Counts V, VI, and VII allege selective enforcement, and civil
rights and Monell violations under Section 1983. Id. Langford claims damages of $1,500,000
and requests additional damages for compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorneys’
fees and other costs. FAC ¶ 102.
Plaintiff Langford claims Defendants willfully ignored the statements made by her and
the Winslow PD in its request to charge, affidavits of probable cause, and evidence presented to
the grand jury in connection with the Plaintiff’s case. Id. ¶¶ 34–7. Plaintiff claims she had an
alibi, namely that her involvement with Officer Schultz during the first encounter precluded her
involvement in the Lewis assault. Id. ¶¶ 41–2. Specifically, Defendants ignored her history with
Shermaine Lewis, including past physical altercations and prior false reports. Id. ¶¶ 34, 37–8.
Plaintiff also claims Defendants should have been made aware of Nunez’s inability to
subsequently identify her at the Gloucester PD.
Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment on February 15, 2018 (Doc.
No. 67). This motion argues that summary judgment is warranted because there was probable
cause to arrest Plaintiff. Id. Defendants argue, in the alternative, that they are entitled to
qualified immunity. Id. The Court has considered the submissions of the parties, and the motion
for summary judgment is now ripe for review.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the Court finds “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The moving party must establish the nonexistence of a “genuine issue.” Aman v. Cort
Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996). This burden is satisfied when the
movant “produce[s] evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact” or by
“‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
If the party seeking summary judgment makes this showing, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party who must “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every]
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. The Court notes that the nonmoving party must “do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The nonmoving party must at least
present probative evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). Furthermore, “[w]hen opposing summary
judgment, the nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations, but rather must ‘identify those
facts of record which would contradict the facts identified by the movant.’” Corliss v. Varner,
247 F. App’x. 353, 354 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. v. Affiliated FM Ins.
Co., 311 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2002)).
The Court’s role in deciding the merits of a party’s motion for summary judgment is not
to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. As such, credibility determinations remain
within the province of the fact finder. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d
1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).
III.
DISCUSSION
A. False Arrest (Counts II and IV)
1. Gloucester Township and Gloucester PD
Plaintiff asserts a false arrest claim against Gloucester Township and the Gloucester PD.
A municipality cannot be held liable for unconstitutional acts of its employees on a theory of
respondeat superior, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), so
the Court will analyze Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims under the discussion of Monell (Count
VII). Plaintiff’s related state law claim of False Arrest is similarly barred by immunity. The
New Jersey Tort Claims Act (“NJTCA”) confers immunity to a public entity whether such injury
arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:2-1(a). Defendants Gloucester Township and the Gloucester PD therefore
have immunity against Plaintiff’s common law claim of false arrest.
2. Knapp, Fisher, Massi
Plaintiff claims the Defendants Fisher, Knapp, and Massi did not have probable cause to
arrest her under both Section 1983 and New Jersey state law. The New Jersey Civil Rights Act
(“NJCRA”) was modeled after 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and creates a private cause of action for
violations of civil rights secured under either the United States or New Jersey
Constitutions. Slinger v. New Jersey, No. 07–5561, 2008 WL 4126181, at *5–6 (D.N.J. Sept. 4,
2008), rev’d on other grounds, 366 F. App’x 357 (3d Cir. 2010); Armstrong v. Sherman, No. 09–
716, 2010 WL 2483911, at *5 (D.N.J. June 4, 2010). NJCRA provides, in pertinent part, a
private cause of action for
[a]ny person who has been deprived of any substantive due process or equal
protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or any substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the Constitution or laws of this State, or whose exercise or enjoyment of those
substantive rights, privileges or immunities has been interfered with or attempted
to be interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion by a person acting under
color of law . . . .
N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:6–2(c). Consistent with this language, this Circuit has interpreted state
claims for false arrest analogously to related Section 1983 claims. See Pettit v. New Jersey, No.
09-3735, 2011 WL 1325614, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2011) (collecting cases); see also Borden v.
Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 163 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008) (determining
protections under free speech clause of New Jersey Constitution are “generally interpreted as coextensive with the First Amendment”). This Court will therefore consider Plaintiff’s state and
federal false arrest claims together.
To establish a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that her
constitutional rights were violated and that a person acting under color of state law committed
the deprivation. Mattern v. City of Sea Isle, 131 F. Supp. 3d 305, 313 (D.N.J.2015) (citing West
v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). As such, the Court must identify the exact contours of the
underlying right said to have been violated and determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a
deprivation of a constitutional right at all. See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir.
2000).
Under federal and New Jersey law, a false arrest occurs when there is an arrest, and that
arrest lacks probable cause. See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir.
1995). There is probable cause when the facts and circumstances are “sufficient to warrant a
prudent man in believing that the [defendant] had committed or was committing an offense.”
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)); see
also Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1997). While probable cause “requires
more than mere suspicion . . . it does not require that the officer have evidence to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Orsatti v. N. J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482–83 (3d Cir. 1995).
Ultimately, the test for probable cause “is an objective one, based on ‘the facts available to the
officers at the moment of arrest.’” Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 819 (3d Cir.
1994) (quoting Beck, 379 U.S. at 96). For example, probable cause exists “[w]hen a police
officer has received a reliable identification by a victim of his or her attacker . . . .” Wilson v.
Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 791 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
This Court notes that the question of probable cause in a Section 1983 action is generally
one for the jury. See Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998). Courts may,
however, “conclude ‘that probable cause exists as a matter of law if the evidence, viewed most
favorably to Plaintiff, reasonably would not support a contrary factual finding,’ and may enter
summary judgment accordingly.” Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788–89 (3d
Cir. 2000) (quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997)).
Here, Defendants Fisher and Knapp reasonably believed the evidence represented
probable cause to arrest Plaintiff Crystal Langford. Most importantly, they arrested her pursuant
to a warrant issued by a municipal judge. In making this request, they provided investigation
reports, photos from the scene, and witness statements. See Complaint – Warrant, 000743. This
evidence included an eye-witness, Antonia Nunez, who called 9-1-1 and reported that she
observed an altercation. See 9-1-1 Call Tr. Nunez identified Plaintiff by her first name and
described the Plaintiff’s “hot pink” clothing.1 9-1-1 Call Tr. 2:3-5; Id. 2:7. In addition, Lewis
corroborated this information and filed a report with Gloucester PD. See Master Incident Report,
3-4; Fisher Dep’n. Defendants reviewed this evidence and contacted the Camden County
Prosecutor’s Office to assist in the determination of a warrant request. Pl. Mat’l Fact St. ¶ 16.
The Camden County Prosecutor’s Office agreed that Plaintiff should be charged with the
aforementioned crimes, and Defendants properly requested a warrant and summons to that effect.
Municipal Judge Nicholas Trabosh issued the warrant and thereby created a presumption
of probable cause. As this Circuit has explained, “one of the reasons for requiring a neutral
[judge] to evaluate probable cause is that an uninterested party is presumably better suited to
review and evaluate the facts than an officer pursuing a lead.” Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787; see
also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–4 (1948) (stating that “[t]he point of the Fourth
Amendment . . . is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
Plaintiff was later arrested wearing a pink sweater consistent with Nunez’s description. See
Camden County Prosecutor’s Office, Investigation Report, 3.
1
reasonable men draw from evidence,” but rather that “[i]ts protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached [judge] instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”).
Where, as here, an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, a plaintiff can prevail in a Section
1983 action in only limited circumstances, such as where the officer “made false statements or
omissions that created a falsehood in applying for a warrant,” Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834
F.3d 457, 468-69 (3d Cir. 2016) (alteration omitted) (quoting Wilson, 212 F.3d at 786-87), or
“where the warrant was ‘based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S.
535, 547 (2012) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3421, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 677 (1984)). This Circuit has extended this test to situations where affiants have omitted
information from the affidavit. See, e.g., United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 743 n.2 (3d Cir.
1993). Therefore, a successful challenge to an arrest warrant must show that defendants acted
“‘knowingly and deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or
omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant’ and “such statements or omissions
are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.’” Lincoln v. Hanshaw, 375 F. App’x
185, 189 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 399).
Plaintiff challenges the presumption of probable cause inherent in the warrant issuance.
She states that Defendants “absolute[ly] fail[ed] and refus[ed] to verify any exculpatory
information” offered by her. Pl. Opp’n Motion, 9. Specifically, the officers should have
checked whether Lewis had previously filed past false complaints against her. Pl. Mat’l Fact St.
¶ 18. Had Defendants considered this information, Plaintiff reasons, they would have realized
Lewis “made numerous false and frivolous complaints.” Pl. Opp’n Motion, 12. The warrant
application was therefore “filled with hearsay, unreliable false statements, and lack[ed] evidence
supporting charges against Plaintiff.” Pl. Compl. ¶ 51.
This Court, even when viewing the facts in Plaintiff’s favor, finds these arguments
unpersuasive. First, Plaintiff seems to confuse probable cause to arrest with a prosecutor’s
subsequent burden to prove an offense against her beyond a reasonable doubt. See Orsatti, 71
F.3d at 482–83 (“Probable cause . . . does not require that the officer have evidence sufficient to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Second, Plaintiff misconstrues much of the evidence
offered by Defendants. For example, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff and Lewis’s child
custody prior to the arrest. See Massi Dep’n, 13; Fisher Dep’n, 19. In addition, even if the 9-1-1
caller failed to identify Plaintiff in a subsequent picture lineup, both Defendants Massi and
Fisher found Lewis’s report of the assault to be credible at the time of the arrest. Massi Dep’n,
13. See Smart v. Twp. Of Gloucester, No. 16-138, 2007 WL 1186043, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 20,
2007) (explaining a single and credible witness is sufficient for a showing of probable cause to
arrest); see also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 588, 199 L. Ed. 2d 453 (2018)
(“[P]robable cause does not require officers to rule out a suspect’s innocent explanation of
suspicious facts.”).
Plaintiff similarly fails to offer evidence to raise a genuine dispute over the presumption
of probable cause. Like the issuance of the warrant, the Court here takes judicial notice that a
grand jury indicted plaintiff on the charges at issue. Pl. St. Mat’l Fact ¶ 20. A grand jury
indictment is prima facie evidence of probable cause to prosecute. See Trabal v. Wells Fargo
Armored Serv. Corp., 269 F.3d 243, 251 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that an indictment establishes
probable cause “by definition”). Still, Plaintiff Langford has not provided any probative
evidence to show that the indictment was “procured by fraud, perjury or other corrupt means.”
Woodyard v. Cty. of Essex, 514 F. App’x 177, 183 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Rose v. Bartle, 871
F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir. 1989)). Again, even if the Court views every inference in Plaintiff’s
favor, the allegations amount to little more than mere negligence on behalf of some of the
Defendants. Absent some factual showing by a preponderance of the evidence of a knowing and
deliberate disregard of the truth, Plaintiff cannot dispute the presumption of probable cause
consistent with a grand jury indictment. See Lincoln, 375 F. App’x at 189; see also Shepherd v.
Ambrosino, No. 07-4968, 2010 WL 2802238, at *4 (D.N.J. July 15, 2010).
The Court finds that Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for the crimes of
burglary, aggravated assault, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, unlawful
possession of a weapon, and criminal mischief. The Court therefore grants this part of
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
B. Malicious Prosecution (Counts I and III)
1. Gloucester Township and Gloucester PD
Plaintiff asserts a malicious prosecution claim against Gloucester Township and the
Gloucester PD. As explained above, a municipality cannot be held liable for unconstitutional
acts of its employees on a theory of respondeat superior, Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, so the Court
will analyze Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims under the discussion of Monell (Count VII).
Plaintiff’s state law claim of malicious prosecution is similarly barred by immunity. The New
Jersey Tort Claims Act (“NJTCA”) confers immunity to a public entity for acts of its employees
that constitute a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:2–
10, and the tort of malicious prosecution requires proof of actual malice. Defendants Gloucester
Township and Gloucester PD therefore have immunity against Plaintiff’s common law malicious
prosecution claim.
2. Knapp, Fisher, Massi
Plaintiff asserts a claim for malicious prosecution under Section 1983 and a related New
Jersey tort law claim against Officers Knapp, Fisher, and Massi. Doc. No. 1. The complaint
alleges that Defendants “initiated criminal charges with malice” and “without probable cause.”
FAC ¶¶ 58–9, 75.
Like the state and federal claim of false arrest above, the Court analyzes the state and
federal malicious prosecution claims together.2 In order to state a prima facie case for a Section
1983 claim of malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must
establish the elements of the common law tort as it has developed over time, and that there has
been some deprivation of liberty consistent with a “seizure” in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. See Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Estate of Smith v.
Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)); Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222
(3d Cir. 1998). There are four elements to the common law tort of malicious prosecution: (1) the
defendant instituted a criminal action against the plaintiff, (2) the defendant actuated the action
maliciously, (3) the action lacked probable cause, and (4) the action terminated in favor of the
plaintiff. See Wiltz v. Middlesex Cty. Office of Prosecutor, 249 F. App’x 944, 949 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citing Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Although Langford has adequately alleged the first and fourth element of malicious
prosecution, she has failed to allege facts demonstrating that any state actor acted with malice in
2
The common law claim for malicious prosecution has a similar probable cause element as a
1983 claim. See Lind v. Schmid, 67 N.J. 255, 263, 337 A.2d 365, 369 (1975).
instituting the proceeding against her or, as noted previously, that any state actor instituted the
action without probable cause. The Court notes that it is not enough to state, in conclusory
fashion, that the defendants acted with malice and that there was no probable cause for the
prosecution. Instead, Plaintiff Langford must state facts regarding the information known to the
person who instituted the proceeding, from which facts it could be concluded that the
prosecution was instituted without probable cause. See Carney v. Pennsauken Twp. Police
Dept., No. 11-7366, 2013 WL 2444043, at *3–4 (D.N.J. June 3, 2013); see also Pitman v.
Ottehberg, No. 10–2538, 2011 WL 6935274, at *11, *13–4 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2011).
While the Court has determined no jury could find that Defendants lacked probable cause
to effect the arrest, Section I.A, supra, Plaintiff takes a second bite at the probable cause apple by
insisting she had an alibi. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges she was “in custody” with the
Winslow PD during the incident, she informed the Defendants of her whereabouts, and
Defendants willfully ignored such “exculpatory information.” P. Res. Motion, 15.
Again, the Plaintiff confuses the legal test for probable cause. The test for probable
cause, as detailed above, is an objective one. The presence of probable cause under this
objective standard means that the arrest could legitimately have been brought even if some
persons acted with malice. See Wilson, 212 F.3d at 783; Stolinski v. Pennypacker, 772 F. Supp.
2d 626, 642-43 (D.N.J. 2011). The Supreme Court provided additional clarity in Davenpeck v.
Alford. There, the Court said, “an arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he
knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.” Davenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153
(2004). Thus, even if Defendants Fisher, Knapp, and Massi willfully failed to investigate
potentially relevant facts, a judge could still consider the totality of the circumstances and make a
reasonable and proper determination that probable cause existed. Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Credit
Union, 199 N.J. 381, 398, 972 A.2d 1112, 1122 (2009); Camiolo v. State Farm Fire and Cas.
Co., 334 F.3d 345, 363 (3d Cir. 2003).
Not only does Plaintiff fail to overcome the presumption of probable cause consistent
with the warrant and grand jury indictment, but she cites facts that contradict her core alibi
argument. For example, in her response brief, Plaintiff says the Winslow PD dropped her at
home at approximately 12:30pm, and then returned to investigate the assault at 2:08pm. Pl.
Opp’n Brief, 5–6. This admission contradicts Langford’s argument that she remained “in
custody” and reveals a window of time that is consistent with Lewis’s 1:30pm assault report.
Defendants highlight Langford’s inconsistencies and provide additional evidence to show the
proximity between her home and victim Lewis’s. Def. Reply Brief, 3. According to Google
Maps, a mere 4.1-mile distance or eight minutes driving separated the two. While the Court
need not consider whether the assault occurred as claimed by Lewis, Plaintiff’s inconsistent
factual assertions coupled with Defendants’ evidence satisfy the summary judgment standard and
show no genuine dispute as to whether Plaintiff was “in custody.”
The Court is satisfied that, as with the false arrest claim, if viewing all Plaintiff’s
allegations in a light most favorable, probable cause existed for her arrest barring her claim of
malicious prosecution.
C. Selective Enforcement (Counts V and VI)
1. Gloucester Township and Gloucester PD
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring a selective enforcement claim against Gloucester
Township and the Gloucester PD, she can only do so under a Monell theory. As such, the Court
will analyze this claim under the subsequent section on Monell.
2. Knapp, Massi, and Fisher
Plaintiff claims Defendants singled her out because of a racial animus and disregarded
her constitutional protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. FAC ¶¶ 84–6; 93.
To state a claim for relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. West, 487 U.S. at 48. The Equal
Protection Clause provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1. This is not a command that all persons be
treated alike, but rather a direction that all persons similarly situated be treated alike. See City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “The central purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct
discriminating on the basis of race.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976), or any
other suspect classification. To make an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must prove that a
defendant’s actions (1) had a discriminatory effect and (2) were motivated by a discriminatory
purpose. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
In order to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding selective enforcement, the
non-moving party “must demonstrate (1) that he was treated differently from other similarly
situated individuals, and (2) that this selective treatment was based on an “unjustifiable standard,
such as race, or religion, or some other arbitrary factor . . . or to prevent the exercise of a
fundamental right.” Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 184 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). A plaintiff therefore needs to “provide evidence of
discriminatory purpose, not mere unequal treatment or adverse effect.” Jewish Home of E. PA v.
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 693 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2012). For example, a
plaintiff must show that the “decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects.” Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985).
Defendants motion for summary judgment rightly points to the lack of evidence
supporting Plaintiff’s selective enforcement claim. In her response to these arguments, Plaintiff
provides no plausible evidence. For example, Plaintiff has not shown that any of the Defendants
disproportionately arrested minorities. Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub.
Safety-Div. of State Police, No. 02-5470, 2009 WL 900854, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2009). Nor
has Plaintiff adduced facts to support that any of the Defendants were part of a conspiracy to
mistreat or malign people based on her race. Id. at *8. Instead, Plaintiff’s response merely
restates the allegations in the complaint and thus fails to raise any dispute of material fact
regarding selective enforcement.
The Court therefore grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim.
D. Qualified Immunity
Defendants assert that even if, arguendo, a constitutional violation occurred, Defendant
Officers should be afforded qualified immunity. Since Plaintiff has not adduced evidence of a
constitutional violation, the Court will briefly consider arguments regarding qualified immunity.
The Court notes that, on summary judgment, qualified immunity is a question of law, but
disputed issues of material fact will preclude finding qualified immunity. Giles v. Kearney, 571
F.3d 318, 327 (3d Cir. 2009) (reversing the district court for finding qualified immunity in an
excessive force case where “such a legal conclusion . . . rests on a factual presumption that is
inappropriate on summary judgment.”); Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2002) (“a
decision on qualified immunity will be premature when there are unresolved disputes of
historical fact relevant to the immunity analysis.”).
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing discretionary
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Put another way, immunity
protects “‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” White v.
Pauly, 137 S.Ct. 548, 551, 196 L.Ed. 2d 463 (2017) (citing Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305,
308, 193 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2015)).
This Circuit considers two factors to determine whether a government official is entitled
to qualified immunity. Pollock v. The City of Phila., 403 F.App’x 664, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). The first factor requires a court to “decide
whether the facts . . . make out a violation of a constitutional right.” Id. (quoting Pearson, 555
U.S. at 232). The second factor requires a court to “decide whether the right at issue was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of [the] defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id.3 A right is “clearly
established” when “[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987).
Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that there was a warrant for her arrest. Instead, she takes
issue that the evidence offered to support the warrant was incomplete. Again, the Court points to
the breadth of facts and information gleaned by the Defendants and cited in the arrest warrant.
3
The Court may consider the factors of the two-prong test in any order. See Giles, 571 F.3d at
325 (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232).
Officer Fisher, Detective Massi, and Sgt. Knapp each faced specific facts and evidence that
provided a reasonable basis to conclude Plaintiff Langford engaged in the crimes at issue. More
germane to the issue of qualified immunity, Defendants relied on Assistant Prosecutor Bill Stass
at the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office who reviewed the facts and information to determine
what, if any, charges should be brought against Plaintiff. Again, Plaintiff has not provided
plausible evidence to show that Defendants obtained the warrant by perjury, fraud, or other
corrupt means. Plaintiff therefore has not shown that “a reasonable officer would not have relied
on the prosecutor’s advice.” Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 256 (3d Cir. 2010). As
such, the Court defers to the long-held presumption that “a police officer who relies in good faith
on a prosecutor’s legal opinion that the arrest is warranted under the law” is entitled to qualified
immunity claims “premised on a lack of probable cause.” Id. at 255–56. The Defendant officers
here, even if the Court assumes arguendo that a constitutional violation did occur, are entitled to
qualified immunity.
E. Monell Claim (Count VII)4
In the last count of the amended complaint, Plaintiff claims Gloucester Township and the
Gloucester PD violated her rights pursuant to Section 1983. Specifically, Plaintiff says
“Defendants instituted policies and procedures within the police department, with indifference to
the constitutional rights of the Citizens of Gloucester Township and Winslow Township,
including, but not limited to Plaintiff.” FAC ¶ 99. Plaintiff describes a policy of relying on
uncorroborated statements and failing to cooperate with other police departments. Id. ¶ 100.
4
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint lists this section as mistakenly as Count VI.
This policy, Plaintiff argues, permitted Defendants to willfully disregard Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. Id.
As explained, local government units are not liable under Section 1983 solely on a theory
of respondeat superior. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011); Monell, 436 U.S. at
694 (municipal liability attaches only “when execution of a government’s policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy, inflicts the injury” complained of); Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318
F.3d 575, 583–84 (3d Cir. 2003). To establish municipal liability under Section 1983, “a
plaintiff must show that an official who has the power to make policy is responsible for either the
affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a well-settled custom.” Bielevicz v.
Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d
1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). A plaintiff must show through the municipality’s deliberate conduct,
it was the moving force behind the plaintiff’s injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).
This Circuit explained in Natale,
A policy is made “when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish
municipal policy with respect to the action issues a final proclamation, policy or edict.”
A custom is an act “that has not been formally approved by an appropriate
decisionmaker,” but that is “so widespread as to have the force of law.”
There are three situations where acts of a government employee may be deemed to be the
result of a policy or custom of the governmental entity for whom the employee works,
thereby rendering the entity liable under § 1983. The first is where “the appropriate
officer or entity promulgates a generally applicable statement of policy and the
subsequent act complained of is simply an implementation of that policy.” The second
occurs where “no rule has been announced as policy but federal law has been violated by
an act of the policymaker itself.” Finally, a policy or custom may also exist where “the
policymaker has failed to act affirmatively at all, [though] the need to take some action to
control the agents of the government ‘is so obvious, and the inadequacy of existing
practice so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymaker
can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.’”
Natale, 318 F.3d at 584 (footnote and citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff fails to provide any evidence of an underlying constitutional violation
committed by the individual Defendants. For example, Plaintiff fails to provide any official
statements, ordinances, or regulations that amount to a policy. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
Plaintiff similarly provides no evidence showing that the government failed to respond to related
complaints. See Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 976 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing a failure of
Defendant to sustain excessive force complaints as creating a custom that tolerated the use of
excessive force). Instead, Plaintiff Langford repeats previous allegations that, even when
construed most favorably, amount to little more than mere negligence on the part of Defendant
officers. As this Circuit explained in Williams v. Borough of West Chester, “‘if a person has
suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of [any] individual police officer, the fact that the
departmental regulations might have authorized [unconstitutional action] is quite beside the
point.’” 891 F.2d 458, 467 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796,
799 (1986)). For these reasons, the Court finds no genuine dispute of material fact to support
Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim, and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted
on this claim.
F. Punitive Damages
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for
punitive damages because Plaintiff cannot establish that their conduct was motivated by evil
motive or intent. Since there is no finding of a constitutional violation, the Court only briefly
addresses the issue of punitive damages.
A plaintiff may recover punitive damages when a “defendant’s conduct is shown to be
motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the
federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983); see also Savarese v.
Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[F]or a plaintiff in a section 1983 case to qualify
for a punitive award, the defendant’s conduct must be, at a minimum, reckless or callous.
Punitive damages might also be allowed if the conduct is intentional or motivated by evil motive,
but the defendant’s action need not necessarily meet this higher standard.”).
As explained, even when viewing Plaintiff’s version of events and allegations most
favorably, no reasonable juror could conclude that the Defendants acted with reckless
indifference to Plaintiff’s federally protected rights by lawfully arresting him and prosecuting
him with probable cause. Punitive damages are therefore inappropriate in this matter.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the reasoning above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED.
Dated: 9/21/2018
s/ Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
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