DAVIS v. BURLINGTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 8/1/2016. (tf, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
___________________________________
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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BURLINGTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
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CORRECTIONS, et al.,
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Defendants.
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___________________________________:
RAYMOND P DAVIS,
Civ. No. 16-1551 (NLH)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Raymond P. Davis, # 66332
Burlington County Jail
P.O. Box 6000
Burlington, NJ 08060
Plaintiff Pro se
HILLMAN, District Judge
Plaintiff Raymond P. Davis, an individual confined at the
Burlington County Jail in Burlington, New Jersey, filed this
civil action asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF
No. 1).
On March 28, 2016, this Court granted Plaintiff’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis, and he was permitted
to proceed without prepayment of fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
At
this time the Court must screen the Complaint to determine
whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); seeks redress
against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b); or brings a claim with respect to prison conditions,
see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
For the reasons set forth below, the
Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice.
I.
BACKGROUND
In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that he was denied his
right to a fair disciplinary hearing.
Specifically, he states
that defendants falsified reports, did not investigate his case,
and refused to provide him with writing instruments so that he
could appeal his disciplinary decision. (Compl. 4, ECF No. 1).
Plaintiff also complains that his rights under the Eighth and
Ninth Amendment were violated when prison officials refused to
house him in a cell by himself, and instead placed him in the
same cell as an inmate who was on suicide watch. (Id. at 5).
Plaintiff requests that this Court review the video footage
of the incident which was the subject of his disciplinary
hearing.
Also, he seeks compensation for the time he spent in
Burlington County Jail as a result of the false disciplinary
report, and release from the jail while this matter is
investigated. (Id. at 5-6).
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II.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104–134, §§
801–810, 110 Stat. 1321–66 to 1321–77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”),
district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in
which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental employee
or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with
respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
The PLRA
directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is
frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
Every complaint must comply with the pleading requirements
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 8(a)(2) requires
that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
“Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give
the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
93 (2007) (citations omitted).
While a complaint ... does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
“grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
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not do ... . Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level
... .
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citations omitted).
That is, a complaint must assert “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
“A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair
Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n. 3 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
The determination of whether the factual allegations
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief is “‘a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.’” Bistrian v. Levi, 696
F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
Thus, a court
is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation,” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).
In general, where a complaint subject to statutory
screening can be remedied by amendment, a district court should
not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but should permit the
amendment. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992); Grayson
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v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002)
(noting that leave to amend should be granted “in the absence of
undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, unfair prejudice, or
futility of amendment”), cited in Thomaston v. Meyer, 519 F.
App’x 118, 120 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013); Urrutia v. Harrisburg County
Police Dept., 91 F.3d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1996).
Finally, in determining the sufficiency of a pro se
complaint, the Court must be mindful to accept its factual
allegations as true, see James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d
675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012), and to construe it liberally in favor
of the plaintiff, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient
facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted).
B. Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
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injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ... .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108
S. Ct. 2250, 2255, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641
F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Claims regarding cell assignment
As an initial matter, it is unclear from the Complaint
whether Plaintiff was a convicted prisoner or a pretrial
detainee at the time he filed this action.
Therefore, it is
unclear whether Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims
regarding his cell assignment should be analyzed under the
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. See Daniels v. Taylor, No. 135510, 2014 WL 3955372, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2014) (citations
omitted) (“Plaintiff's condition of confinement claim is
analyzed under the Eighth Amendment if he is a convicted
prisoner, but under the Fourteenth Amendment if he is a pretrial
detainee.”); see also Mestre v. Wagner, 488 F. App’x 648, 649
(3d Cir. 2012); Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir.
2005) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 529, 99 S. Ct.
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1861, 1869, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979)).
Regardless, whether
analyzed under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff has
failed to plead a cause of action relating his cell assignment.
To the extent Plaintiff asserts that prison officials
violated his constitutional rights simply by “not housing [him]
in a room by [himself]” (Compl. 5, ECF No. 1), he is mistaken.
See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 69
L. Ed. 2d 59 (1981) (deprivations resulting from “double
celling” of prisoners not a per se violation of Eighth
Amendment); Bell, 441 U.S. 520 (holding that the practice of
housing, primarily for sleeping purposes, two pretrial detainees
in individual rooms originally intended for single occupancy did
not amount to punishment and did not violate detainees’ rights
to due process).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff asserts that prison
officials violated his rights by housing him in the same cell as
an inmate who was on suicide watch, Plaintiff has failed to
provide factual allegations sufficient to state a claim.
To plead a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner
must allege that state officials acted with deliberate
indifference to a “substantial risk of serious harm to an
inmate.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 S. Ct. 1970,
128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).
To be liable, state officials must know
of and disregard an excessive risk to the inmate’s health or
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safety. Id. at 837; see also Laughlin v. Peck, 552 F. App'x 188,
191 (3d Cir. 2014).
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial detainees may be
subjected to restrictions and conditions of a detention facility
“so long as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to
punishment.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 536-37.
Fourteenth Amendment
conditions of confinement claims turn on the totality of
factors. See Love v. Camden Cty. Police, No. 14-6780, 2014 WL
6611428, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2014) (citing Hubbard, 538 F.3d
at 233 (“we do not assay separately each of the institutional
practices, but instead look to the totality of the conditions”)
(citation and brackets omitted)).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege any facts which
suggest a constitutional violation under either analysis.
Even
accepting as true Plaintiff’s assertion that his cellmate was on
suicide watch, there is nothing in the Complaint to suggest that
Plaintiff’s health or safety was at risk as a result of sharing
a cell with this individual, or that having to share his cell
with this individual amounted to punishment.
Further, the Third Circuit has consistently held that “a
plaintiff must demonstrate a defendant’s ‘personal involvement
in the alleged wrongs” in order set forth a claim under § 1983.
Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d
Cir. 2015) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207
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(3d Cir. 1988)).
“A plaintiff makes sufficient allegations of a
defendant’s personal involvement by describing the defendant’s
participation in or actual knowledge of and acquiescence in the
wrongful conduct. Id.; Tenon v. Dreibelbis, 606 F. App’x 681,
688 (3d Cir. 2015) (§ 1983 claims may not be based on vicarious
liability, each defendant must have “personal involvement,
including participation, or actual knowledge and acquiescence,
to be liable”); Batts v. Giorla, 550 F. App’x 110, 112 (3d Cir.
2013) (same).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to plead any factual
allegations suggesting that the named defendants had any role
in, or knowledge of, the decision to house Plaintiff in the same
cell as an inmate on suicide watch.
For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to plead a cause of
action with respect to his housing assignment and this claim
will be dismissed without prejudice.
B. Claims regarding disciplinary hearing
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L.
Ed. 2d 383 (1994), the Supreme Court held that before a § 1983
plaintiff may “recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions
whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence
invalid,” he must first “prove that the conviction or sentence
has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
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determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]” Id. at 486-87.
The
Supreme Court applied Heck to prison disciplinary proceedings in
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S. Ct. 1584, 137 L. Ed. 2d
906 (1997) (holding claims for declaratory relief and money
damages that necessarily implied the invalidity of the
punishment imposed by prison disciplinary proceedings are not
cognizable under § 1983).
Nevertheless, even where there has been no prior
invalidation of the resulting judgment, a prisoner may bring a §
1983 claim for monetary damages based on the denial of due
process during a prison disciplinary hearing, under certain
circumstances. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554, 94 S.
Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (stating that plaintiffs § 1983
“damages claim was . . . properly before the District Court and
required determination of the validity of the procedures
employed for imposing sanctions, including loss of good time,
for flagrant or serious misconduct”).
More specifically, where
a prison disciplinary hearing has not been previously
invalidated, a claim challenging a prison disciplinary hearing
is cognizable under § 1983 when the claim, if successful, would
not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the punishment
imposed. See Balisok, 520 U.S. 641; Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
U.S. 74, 82, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 1248, 161 L. Ed. 2d 253 (2005)
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(explaining distinction between challenges cognizable under §
1983 and those that are barred); see also, e.g. Harris v. Ricci,
595 F. App'x 128, 133 (3d Cir. 2014) (due process challenge to
prison disciplinary hearing was cognizable under § 1983 because
it did not imply the invalidity of the resulting sanctions).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Blango and Coleman
failed to conduct a fair disciplinary hearing.
However,
Plaintiff fails to provide sufficient factual allegations to set
forth a claim for relief under § 1983.
Specifically, Plaintiff
fails to explain either the circumstances of the incident which
resulted in the disciplinary hearing, or the allegedly deficient
procedures used during the disciplinary hearing.
In his
Complaint, Plaintiff alludes to false statements in a
disciplinary report and unseen video footage, but he does not
describe in any detail the underlying incident, the substance of
the statements or footage, the manner in which the disciplinary
hearing was conducted, or how it was constitutionally violative.
Finally, Plaintiff does not explain the sanctions imposed on him
as a result of the disciplinary hearing.
Plaintiff asserts that
the “falsified disciplinary report resulted in [his]
incarceration at [Burlington County Jail];” however, it would
seem a necessary prerequisite that Plaintiff was already
confined in the Burlington County Jail to have been subject to a
disciplinary hearing in the first place.
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Without more
information, the Court is unable to determine the basis for
Plaintiff’s cause of action, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and is
unable to discern whether Plaintiff’s due process challenges
imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, see Balisok, 520
U.S. 641.
Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff challenges the
outcome of his disciplinary hearing, itself, such a claim is not
cognizable in a claim under § 1983 for the reasons discussed
above. Id.; Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 74.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to be “released”
(Compl. 6, ECF No. 1), this type of claim is not cognizable in a
claim pursuant to § 1983 and is more appropriately brought in a
petition for writ of habeas corpus.
A habeas corpus petition is
the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the “fact or
duration” of his confinement, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 498–99, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), including
challenges to prison disciplinary proceedings that affect the
length of confinement, such as deprivation of good time credits,
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 124 S. Ct. 1303, 158 L.Ed.2d 32
(2004) and Balisok, 520 U.S. at 117. See also Wilkinson, 544
U.S. 74.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks this type of relief, he
may file an appropriate habeas petition.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For foregoing reasons, the Complaint will be dismissed
without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for
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failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Because it is possible that Plaintiff may be able to amend or
supplement his Complaint with facts sufficient to overcome the
deficiencies noted herein, Plaintiff shall be given leave to
file an application to reopen accompanied by a proposed amended
complaint. 1
See Denton, 504 U.S. at 34; Grayson, 293 F.3d at
108.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
___s/ Noel L. Hillman_____
NOEL L. HILLMAN
United States District Judge
Dated: August 1, 2016
At Camden, New Jersey
1
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed,
it supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect,
unless the amended complaint specifically refers to or adopts
the earlier pleading. See West Run Student Housing Associates,
LLC v. Huntington National Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir.
2013)(collecting cases); see also 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1476 (3d ed. 2008). To avoid
confusion, the safer practice is to submit an amended complaint
that is complete in itself. Id.
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