Guess v. Bureau of Prisons et al
Filing
12
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 5/19/16. (jbk, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
Leonard Guess,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
Bureau of Prisons,
:
FCI Fort Dix,
:
Warden J. Hollinworth,
:
K. Evans,
:
Bureau of Prisons Health Services, :
:
Defendants.
:
CIV. NO. 16-1759 (RMB)
OPINION
RENÉE MARIE BUMB, U.S. District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon the transfer of
Plaintiff’s prisoner civil rights complaint from the United States
District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Compl., ECF No.
1; Transfer Mem. and Order, ECF Nos. 9, 10.) Plaintiff is a prisoner
presently confined in the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”)
Schuylkill, in Minersville, PA. (Id., ECF No. 1 at 8.) He brings this
civil action seeking monetary damages for an alleged civil rights
violation arising out of an incident that occurred in December 2014,
while he was incarcerated in FCI Fort Dix, in Fort Dix, New Jersey.
(Compl., ECF No. 1.)
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I.
IFP STATUS
Plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(a) and 1915(A) (App. for IFP, ECF No. 2.) The U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania did not grant
Plaintiff’s IFP application before transferring the case to this
Court. (M.D. Pa. Docket Sheet, ECF No. 11.) Because this Court has
not received a certified copy of Plaintiff’s prisoner trust account
for the six-month period preceding the filing of this Complaint, the
Court will deny Plaintiff’s IFP application without prejudice, and
administratively terminate this action. The case is subject to
reopening upon Plaintiff’s submission of the certified prison trust
account statement required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) or payment of
the $400 filing fee.
The Court is required to review a prisoner’s civil rights
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) and § 1915A.1 The Court must
dismiss any claims that are: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fail
to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court will allow Plaintiff
1 This Court’s conclusive screening of Plaintiff’s claims is
reserved until he pays the filing fee or properly obtains in forma
pauperis status. See Izquierdo v. New Jersey, 532 F. App’x 71 (3d
Cir. July 25, 2013) (district court may decide whether to dismiss
the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) after leave to proceed
IFP is granted).
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to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies discussed
below, together with his complete IFP application.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
The Complaint
Plaintiff alleges the following occurred while he was a prisoner
in FCI Fort Dix. On December 29, 2014, K. Evans, a prison staff member,
attacked him from behind. He threw Plaintiff down head and shoulder
first into a concrete wall between the third and second floor
stairwell. Plaintiff temporarily lost consciousness and awoke in a
defensive lock maneuver with Evans’s knee between Plaintiff’s neck
and left shoulder. Plaintiff never resisted and did not cause the
incident.
Plaintiff was taken to the emergency room at Robert Wood Johnson
Hamilton
University
Hospital.
He
was
diagnosed
with
acromioclavicular separation, head injury, left shoulder strain, and
lumbar strain. Plaintiff was returned to FCI Fort Dix, where he was
placed in the Special Housing Unit pending a disciplinary proceeding.
Plaintiff
names
five
defendants,
each
in
their
official
and
individual capacities: the Federal Bureau of Prisons, FCI Fort Dix,
Warden J. Hollinworth, K. Evans, and Bureau of Prisons Health
Services.
B.
Standard of Review
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A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.)
“[A] court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint.” Id. A court need not accept legal conclusions as
true. Id. Legal conclusions, together with threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, do not suffice to state a claim.
Id. Thus, “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin
by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at
679. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. If
a complaint can be remedied by an amendment, a district court may
not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but must permit the
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amendment. Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d
Cir. 2002).
C.
Bivens Actions
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971), the Supreme Court held that
damages may be obtained for injuries caused by “a violation of the
Fourth Amendment by federal officials.” Bivens also extends to Eighth
Amendment claims by prisoners. See e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14 (1980). In the limited settings where Bivens applies, “the implied
cause of action is the ‘federal analog to suits brought against state
officials under ... 42 U.S.C. § 1983.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675–76
(quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n. 2 (2006)). “If a
federal
prisoner
in
a
BOP
facility
alleges
a
constitutional
deprivation, he may bring a Bivens claim against the offending
individual officer, subject to the defense of qualified immunity.”
Corr. Services. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72 (2001).
D.
Official Capacity Claims
“An action against government officials in their official
capacities constitutes an action against the United States; and
Bivens claims against the United States are barred by sovereign
immunity, absent an explicit waiver.” Lewal v. Ali, 289 F. App’x 515,
516 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 483 (1994);
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Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 717 (3d Cir. 1979); see also
Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali v. United States, 482
F.3d 1157, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (Bivens action can be maintained
against a defendant in his or her individual capacity only)).
Therefore, to avoid dismissal, Plaintiff may wish to eliminate the
official capacity claims under Bivens in an amended complaint.
E.
The BOP, Bureau of Prison Health Services, and FCI Fort
Dix Are Not Proper Defendants to a Bivens action.
In FDIC v. Meyer, the Supreme Court expressly declined “to
expand the category of defendants against whom Bivens-type actions
may be brought to include not only federal agents but federal agencies
as well.” 510 U.S. at 484; Albert v. Yost, 431 Fed. App’x 76, 81 (3d
Cir. 2011) (Bivens claim can be asserted against individual federal
officers, not federal entities). To cure the deficiency in the
present complaint, Plaintiff may wish to exclude these entities as
defendants in an amended complaint.
F.
Claims Against Warden J. Hollinworth
1.
Excessive Force
Plaintiff’s claims against Warden Hollinworth are based on his
role as K. Evan’s supervisor, and the warden’s responsibility for
“overseeing prisoners[’] lives and health in his custody.” (Compl.
ECF No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges Hollinworth should have known “that
his lack of supervision and training of defendant Evans, would place
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the Prison’s population at risk.” (Id.) He also alleged that use of
excessive force on inmates by prison staff members is a regular
occurrence, and the staff members are not punished. (Id. at 6.)
For Bivens actions, as with liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
there is no liability of a supervisor solely for the unconstitutional
conduct of an employee. Dinote v. Danberg, 601 F. App’x 127, 131 (3d
Cir. 2015) (citing Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307,
316 (3d Cir. 2015) reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes,
135 S.Ct. 2042 (2015). Supervisory liability can only be shown if
the
supervisor
(1)
“̔with
deliberate
indifference
to
the
consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or
custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm,’” or (2)
“‘participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others
to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and
acquiesced’ in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct.” Id.
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claim against J. Hollinworth
may proceed only on Plaintiff’s allegation that his deliberate
indifference may be shown by the regular occurrence of excessive
force against inmates, and the failure to discipline the offending
prison staff members. Plaintiff’s claim that the Warden should have
known his failure to train and supervise Evans would result in Evan’s
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alleged
misconduct
is
insufficient
to
establish
deliberate
indifference. “To establish liability on a failure to train claim
under § 1983, plaintiffs ‘must identify a failure to provide specific
training that has a causal nexus with their injuries and must
demonstrate that the absence of that specific training can reasonably
be said to reflect a deliberate indifference to whether the alleged
constitutional deprivations occurred’” Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d
197, 207 n.7 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125
F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997)). Therefore, Plaintiff may wish to amend
his claims against the warden.
2.
Inadequate Medical Care
Bivens actions have been extended to Eighth Amendment claims
based on inadequate medical care of prisoners. See e.g. Ruiz v.
Federal Bureau of Prisons, 481 F. App’x 738, 741 (3d Cir. 2012)
(prisoner’s claim against BOP Director “could have proceeded if
properly pled [but] he did not allege in any of his complaints that
[the] Director
. . . had any personal involvement in the denial of
his medical care”) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Argueta v. U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 71–72 (3d Cir. 2011).
To state an Eighth Amendment claim, “a prisoner must show that the
defendants exhibited ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs.’” Tsakonas v. Cicchi, 308 F. App’x 628, 631-32 (3d Cir. 2009)
8
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Supervisors
may be liable for their subordinates Eighth Amendment violation “if
it is shown that they, ‘with deliberate indifference to the
consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or
custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.’” Id.
(quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Det. Ctr.,
372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir.2004) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area
Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Plaintiff alleged that he filed a BOP Administrative Remedy
request for his grievances concerning the Bureau of Prisons Health
Services, but the grievance was not answered until four months later,
after Plaintiff was transferred to a different prison. Plaintiff
fails to state a supervisory claim of deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs by Warden Hollinworth.
First, Plaintiff has completely failed to allege what treatment
he was prescribed after he was released from the emergency room with
a dislocated shoulder and muscle strains. Second, even if Plaintiff
alleges in an amended complaint what treatment was prescribed for
his injuries but was denied by prison medical staff, he has failed
to plead facts establishing the warden’s supervisory liability. The
allegation that the warden was aware of Plaintiff’s complaint about
his medical care because Plaintiff filed an Administrative Remedy
9
request is insufficient to establish supervisory liability. See
Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (allegations
that prison official “responded inappropriately to later-filed
grievances
about
[the
prisoner’s]
medical
treatment”
did
not
establish deliberate indifference to a serious medical need).
Plaintiff will have the opportunity to cure this deficiency in the
present complaint by filing an amended complaint.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, in the accompanying Order filed
herewith, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s IFP application without
prejudice and administratively terminate this action. Plaintiff may
reopen this action by curing the deficiency in his IFP application,
and he will also be permitted to file an amended complaint to cure
the deficiencies in the present complaint.
s/RENÉE MARIE BUMB__________
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: MAY 19, 2016
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