FAVORS v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al
Filing
2
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 5/9/16. (jbk, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
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Defendants.
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DUJUAN A. FAVORS,
Civ. No. 16-1940 (NLH)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Dujuan A. Favors
412 B South White Horse Pike
Lindenwold, NJ 08021
Plaintiff Pro se
HILLMAN, District Judge
Plaintiff Dujuan Favors filed this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1), and submitted an
application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1-1).
The
Court finds Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application to be
complete pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and grants Plaintiff
leave to proceed without prepayment of fees.
At this time the Court must screen the Complaint to
determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or
malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
1
For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
I.
BACKGROUND
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following:
The State of New Jersey/Camden County Detention
Center/local authorities denied me the right to test
the legality of the Texas detainer; issued a
Governer’s [sic] warrant based upon known false
statements by the State of Texas in concert with the
Camden County Sheriff’s Office. Texas provided known
false statements by probation officials, [and]
conspired with New Jersey to effectuate an interstate
kidnapping in violation of [the] UCEA.
(Compl. 2, ECF No. 1).
Plaintiff brings claims alleging denial of due process,
violations of unspecified constitutional rights, as well as
various tort claims such as kidnapping and conspiracy.
He seeks
relief in the amount of five million dollars.
II.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104–134, §§
801–810, 110 Stat. 1321–66 to 1321–77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”),
district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in
which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental employee
or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with
respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
The PLRA
directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is
frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
This action is subject to sua
sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)
and 1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma
pauperis and is seeking relief from government employees.
Every complaint must comply with the pleading requirements
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 8(a)(2) requires
that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
“Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give
the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
93 (2007) (citations omitted).
While a complaint ... does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds”
of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do ... .
Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level .
. . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citations omitted).
That is, a complaint must assert “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
“A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair
Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n. 3 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
“The plausibility determination is ‘a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.’” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780,
786-87 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679); see also
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations
omitted).
Thus, a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” and “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(citations omitted).
In general, where a complaint subject to statutory
screening can be remedied by amendment, a district court should
not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but should permit the
amendment. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992); Grayson
v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002)
(noting that leave to amend should be granted “in the absence of
undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, unfair prejudice, or
futility of amendment”), cited in Thomaston v. Meyer, 519 F.
App’x 118, 120 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013); Urrutia v. Harrisburg County
Police Dept., 91 F.3d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1996).
Finally, in determining the sufficiency of a pro se
complaint, the Court must be mindful to accept its factual
allegations as true, see James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d
675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012), and to construe it liberally in favor
of the plaintiff, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient
facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted).
B. Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108
S. Ct. 2250, 2255, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641
F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Statute of Limitations
A complaint pursuant to § 1983 is “characterized as a
personal injury claim and thus is governed by the applicable
state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury claims.”
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citing Cito v. Bridgewater Twp. Police Dep’t, 892 F.2d 23, 25
(3d Cir. 1989)); see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276,
105 S. Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); Green v. New Jersey, 625
F. App’x 73, 76 (3d Cir. 2015).
In New Jersey, § 1983 claims
are subject to New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations on
personal injury actions. See Dique, 603 F.3d at 185; see also
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14–2.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are
subject to this two-year period.
“While state law governs the applicable statute of
limitations, federal law controls when a § 1983 claim accrues.”
Green, 625 F. App’x at 76 (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
388, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007)).
Accrual occurs,
and the statute of limitations begins to run, as soon as a
plaintiff has a complete cause of action. See Wallace, 549 U.S.
at 388.
Here, Plaintiff certifies that the events giving rise
to his claims occurred on February 13, 2011 and March 23, 2011,
approximately. (Compl. 3, ECF No. 1).
Therefore, the statute of
limitations period began to run, at the latest, on March 23,
2011.
However, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dated April 7, 2016 —
more than five years after the date Plaintiff’s claims accrued.
Therefore, it is time-barred as beyond the two-year statute of
limitations, and will be dismissed. See Ostuni v. Wa-Wa's Mart,
532 F. App'x 110, 111-12 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Although
the running of the statute of limitations is ordinarily an
affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious from the face
of the complaint and no development of the record is necessary,
a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua sponte under §
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.”)
(citations omitted).
B. Amended Complaint
This Court notes that the instant Complaint is essentially
a reiteration — and to a large extent a duplicate — of a
complaint Plaintiff filed before this Court in 2011 in Case No.
11-2750. See Complaint, Favors v. State of N.J., 11-2750 (NLH)
(D.N.J. filed May 13, 2011), ECF No. 1.
In that case, this
Court denied Plaintiff in forma pauperis status due to his
failure to comply with the requirements 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2);
namely, Plaintiff did not submit a certified copy of the prison
trust fund account statement for the six month period
immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. See Order,
Favors v. State of N.J., 11-2750 (NLH) (D.N.J. May 20, 2011),
ECF No. 2.
The May 20, 2011 Order further informed Plaintiff
that he could have the matter reopened if, within 30 days after
entry of the order, he either pre-paid the $350 filing fee or
filed a complete in forma pauperis application.
Plaintiff
failed to fulfill either requirement and, instead, filed the
instant new Complaint — which fails to reference his previous
filing — and a new in forma pauperis application.
Had Plaintiff paid the filing fee or submitted an in forma
pauperis application within the 30 day time frame provided, his
previous case, Case No. 11-2750, would have been reopened
pursuant to this Court’s May 20, 2011 Order, and Plaintiff’s
claims would not have been subject to a statute of limitations
bar, assuming the original complaint was timely. See Houston v.
Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S. Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988); see
also Dasilva v. Sheriff's Dep't, 413 F. App'x 498, 502 (3d Cir.
2011) (citing Urrutia v. Harrisburg Cty. Police Dep't, 91 F.3d
451, 457 n.8 (3d Cir. 1996)) (holding that the statute of
limitations is met when a complaint is “submitted” to the clerk
before the statute runs; formal filing of the complaint relates
back to the date of submission); McDowell v. Delaware State
Police, 88 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1996) (same).
However,
Plaintiff waited nearly five years before taking action.
This Court finds that the approximately five-year delay in
the filing of these documents is unreasonable; and will not
serve to reopen the original case, Case No. 11-2750, pursuant to
this Court’s May 20, 2011 Order. See, e.g., Lawson v.
Hoisington, No. 11-171, 2014 WL 3627230, at *6 n.4 (E.D. Pa.
July 22, 2014) (suggesting that an unreasonable delay in curing
a defect in an in forma pauperis motion precludes tolling of the
statute of limitations); Scary v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 202
F.R.D. 148, 152 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (collecting cases) (holding that
a seventeen-month delay in paying the fee was unreasonable).
C. Equitable Tolling
This Court further finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to
equitable tolling on the facts and procedural posture currently
before us.
As an initial matter, “[e]quitable tolling is a
rare remedy to be applied in unusual circumstances . . . .”
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 396.
“It is only appropriate ‘(1) where
the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the
plaintiff's cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some
extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her
rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or
her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.’” Omar v. Blackman,
590 F. App'x 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel.
Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).
Further, “[t]o obtain the benefit of equitable tolling, a party
also must show that ‘she exercised due diligence in pursuing and
preserving her claim.’” Id. (quoting Santos, 559 F.3d at 197);
see also Vasquez v. Batiste, No. 14-4366, 2015 WL 6687549, at *3
(D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2015).
Here, Plaintiff has provided no justification or
explanation for the nearly five-year delay.
Therefore, there is
no basis to apply the rare exception of equitable tolling. See,
e.g., Santos v. Gainey, 417 F. App'x 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2010)
(holding that because plaintiff did not explain why he waited
almost two years before initiating the process in a prison for
completing the in forma pauperis application, federal equitable
tolling should not apply to him).
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint will be dismissed
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
However, this dismissal will
be without prejudice to Plaintiff presenting an argument in
favor of equitable tolling. See Dasilva, 413 F. App'x at 502.
Therefore, Plaintiff shall be given leave to file, within 45
days, an application to re-open accompanied by a submission
which addresses, in writing, the issue of equitable tolling. 1 See
Denton, 504 U.S. at 34; Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
__s/ Noel L. Hillman______
NOEL L. HILLMAN
United States District Judge
Dated: May 9, 2016
At Camden, New Jersey
1
To the extent he intends to file a proposed amended complaint
with this writing, Plaintiff should note that when an amended
complaint is filed, it supersedes the original and renders it of
no legal effect, unless the amended complaint specifically
refers to or adopts the earlier pleading. See West Run Student
Housing Associates, LLC v. Huntington National Bank, 712 F.3d
165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013)(collecting cases); see also 6 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1476 (3d ed.
2008). To avoid confusion, the safer practice is to submit an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id.
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