HOOKS v. PIERCE et al

Filing 7

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 4/21/17. (jbk, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TERRANCE D HOOKS,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 16-3300 (JBS-AMD)

v.
OFFICER RICK PIERCE; OFFICER
ELLIOT HERNANDEZ; OFFICER L
SANTIAGO,

OPINION

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
Terrance D. Hooks, Plaintiff Pro Se
988589B/878633
Kintock - SWSP
3 West Industrial Blvd
Bridgeton, NJ 08302
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Terrance Hooks’s
(“Plaintiff”), submission of a civil rights complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Complaint, Docket Entry 1. At this time,
the Court must review the complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) and 1915A to determine whether it should be dismissed
as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons

set forth below, the Court concludes that the complaint will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action against Bridgeton

Police Officers Rick Pierce, Elliot Hernandez, and L. Santiago
Complaint ¶ 4. The following factual allegations are taken from
the complaint and are accepted for purposes of this screening
only. The Court has made no findings as to the truth of
Plaintiff’s allegations.
Plaintiff states the officers “falsetify [sic] information
and tampered with evidence and paper work statement mislead on
trial not for truth violated Terrance Hooks constitutional
rights and sent Mr. Hooks to State Prison.” Id. ¶ 6. He “wants
justice serve on claim of false imprisonment. A violation of
public servant workers policy of Bridgeton Police Department.”
Id.
Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of $1,300,000 in
damages. Id. ¶ 7. He requests the appointment of pro bono
counsel and an investigator “to certain [sic] false facts which
are fabricated not for the truth on records and transcripts and
other files.” Id.

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996)
(“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental
employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim
with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The
PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject
to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner
proceeding in forma pauperis and is seeking relief from
government employees.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte

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screening for failure to state a claim,1 the complaint must
allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007)
(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). Although
pro se pleadings are liberally construed, plaintiffs “still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted).

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“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x
120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230,
232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1));
Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x. 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
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B. Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
§ 1983. Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second,
that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person
acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir.
2011); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.
1994).
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff indicates he wishes to file false arrest and
false imprisonment claims against the officers. The complaint
also appears to assert malicious prosecution and due process
claims as well.

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A. False Arrest and Imprisonment
Plaintiff alleges the officers are responsible for his
false arrest and imprisonment. “The Fourth Amendment prohibits
government officials from detaining a person in the absence of
probable cause.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911,
913 (2017). “To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth
Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an
arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable
cause.” James v. City of Wilkes–Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d
Cir. 2012). “[W]here the police lack probable cause to make an
arrest, the arrestee has a claim under § 1983 for false
imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest.”
O'Connor v. City of Phila., 233 F. App’x 161, 164 (3d Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged false arrest and
false imprisonment claims. He has not set forth any facts
regarding the arrest that would support a reasonable inference
that defendants arrested him without probable cause. Although
Rule 8 does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it
requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). As Plaintiff may be able to allege facts that would

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support these claims, he shall be given leave to amend his
complaint.
B. Malicious Prosecution
The complaint could also reasonably be read to raise
malicious prosecution claims against the officers. To prevail on
a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, Plaintiff must set forth
facts indicating:
(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2)
the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff's favor;
(3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause;
(4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose
other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5)
the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent
with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal
proceeding.

Woodyard v. Cty. of Essex, 514 F. App'x 177, 182 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citing McKenna v. City of Phila., 582 F.3d 447, 461 (3d Cir.
2009)). Malicious prosecution claims do not accrue until charges
are dismissed. Ginter v. Skahill, 298 F. App’x 161, 163 (3d Cir.
2008) (citing Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1996)).
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for malicious
prosecution as there is no indication in the complaint that the
proceedings ended favorably to him. Indeed, Plaintiff
specifically states the officers’ actions “sent [him] to state
prison,” indicating he was convicted. Complaint ¶ 6. As such,
any claim for malicious prosecution has not yet accrued, meaning
Plaintiff may not bring this claim unless and until he is able
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to meet the “favorable termination” requirement. See Bronowicz
v. Allegheny Cty., 804 F.3d 338, 346 (3d Cir. 2015) (“‘[A] prior
criminal case must have been disposed of in a way that indicates
the innocence of the accused in order to satisfy the favorable
termination element.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Kossler
v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2009))); see also Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (holding § 1983 plaintiffs may
not “recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction
or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,”
until they have shown “that the conviction or sentence has been
reversed on direct appeal . . . or called into question by a
federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus” or
otherwise rendered invalid). If Plaintiff’s conviction is
overturned on direct appeal or post-conviction relief, or by
some other means, he may file a new complaint raising this
claim.
C. Due Process Evidence Fabrication
The complaint may also be reasonably construed as raising a
due process claim based on the fabrication of evidence. To
sufficiently plead this claim, Plaintiff must set forth enough
facts for the Court to plausibly infer that “there is a
reasonable likelihood that, without the use of that evidence,
the defendant would not have been convicted.” Halsey v.
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Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 294 (3d Cir. 2014). “[F]abrication
claims must draw a meaningful connection between [plaintiffs’]
conviction and the use of fabricated evidence against them.” Id.
294 n.19.
Here, Plaintiff has not set forth sufficient facts
supporting his allegation, such as what the alleged fabricated
evidence was beyond a conclusory statement regarding “evidence
of CDS and surveillance video,” Complaint ¶ 4, the circumstances
regarding the officers’ involvement in the fabrication, and the
ability of that evidence to affect the result of Plaintiff’s
trial. This claim is dismissed without prejudice; however,
Plaintiff is denied leave to amend this claim at this time.
Success on Plaintiff’s claim that fabricated evidence used
against him at trial resulted in his conviction would
necessarily invalidate that conviction. This claim is therefore
barred by Heck at this time. See Long v. Atlantic City Police
Dep't, 670 F.3d 436, 447 (3d Cir. 2012) (claim that defendants
conspired to obtain a conviction by “committing perjury and/or
fabricating evidence” barred by Heck).
D. Leave to Amend
As Plaintiff may be able to amend his false arrest and
false imprisonment claims,2 he shall be given leave to move to

2

Depending on the circumstances of the arrest, these claims may
also be barred by Heck. The Court is unable to make that
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amend these claims. Plaintiff should note that when an amended
complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer performs
any function in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects
in the amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is
specifically incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller
& Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990)
(footnotes omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all
of the allegations in the original complaint, but the
identification of the particular allegations to be adopted must
be clear and explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course
is to file an amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id.
The amended complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that are
currently Heck-barred.
As the complaint is being dismissed, Plaintiff’s request
for pro bono counsel is denied at this time. See Tabron v.
Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993) (requiring claim to have
“some merit in fact and law” before appointing pro bono
counsel). Plaintiff may request the appointment of counsel again
in the event he files a motion to amend.

determination at this time as the complaint contains no facts
regarding the arrest.
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V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s complaint is

dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim, 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

April 21, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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