STILE v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS et al

Filing 46

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 6/19/2017. (tf, n.m.)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
JAMES STILE,
Plaintiff,
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS,
et al.,
Defendants.

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CIV. NO. 16-3832 (RMB)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:
JAMES STILE
FCI-Fort Dix
P.O. Box 2000
Fort Dix, New Jersey 08640
Plaintiff, pro se
JESSICA ROSE O’NEILL
Office of the U.S. Attorney
District of New Jersey
401 Market Street, 4th Floor
P.O. Box 2098
Camden, NJ 08101
On behalf of Defendants
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff’s motions
for a temporary restraining order (ECF Nos. 7, 25, 33) in this
prisoner civil rights action.

For the reasons discussed below,

the Court denies Plaintiff’s motions.

The Court also denies

Plaintiff’s second request for an extension of time to file a
reply to Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment.
No. 45.)

(ECF

I.

BACKGROUND
On October 20, 2016, Plaintiff filed an amended prisoner

civil rights complaint, and this Court permitted several claims
to proceed and dismissed the remaining claims. (Opinion, ECF No.
8 at 29-30.)

Plaintiff is a prisoner in FCI Fort Dix.

His FTCA

and Bivens claims arise out of Plaintiff’s requests for time off
from his work assignment to spend in the law library, and his
allegation

that

limitations.
The

work

assignment

exceeds

his

medical

(Am. Compl., ECF No. 5.)

Court

retaliation

his

allowed

claims

one

against

Officer Colina, to proceed.

of
his

Plaintiff’s
work

First

supervisor,

Amendment
Corrections

(Opinion, ECF No. 8.)

Plaintiff

alleged that Colina filed a disciplinary report against him on
December

2,

2015,

in

retaliation

for

grievance against Colina that same day.
disciplinary

report,

Colina

alleged

Plaintiff

filing

(Id. at 20.)

Plaintiff

a

In the

offered

him

a

bribe in exchange for agreeing not to reduce Plaintiff’s work
hours.

(Id.)

proceed.

The Court permitted this retaliation claim to

(Id.)

The Court also allowed Plaintiff’s “class of one” equal
protection claim against Colina and Burns to proceed.
21.)
him

(Id. at

Plaintiff alleged Colina and Burns discriminated against
by

docking

his

pay

by

up
2

to

one-hour

per

day

when

he

received his medications, more than any other inmate’s pay was
docked for the same reason.

(Id. at 21.)

The Court permitted Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims to
proceed against several defendants.
23.)

(Opinion, ECF No. 8 at 22-

First, Plaintiff alleged that Colina compelled him to

perform work that was prohibited by his work limitations given
by the Fort Dix medical department.

(Id. at 23.)

Second,

Plaintiff alleged the assistant medical director, Wilkes, was
aware that Plaintiff was being forced to work beyond his medical
limitations.

(Id. at 24.)

Wilkes failed to obtain Plaintiff’s

medical records for many months, refused to review Plaintiff’s
MRI

reports,

and

refused

to

review

the

Social

Administration’s ruling on Plaintiff’s disability.

Security

(Id.)

Third, Officer Kwartin was in charge of job changes in the
area of the prison where Plaintiff worked.

(Id.)

Plaintiff

alleged Kwartin refused to authorize a job change for Plaintiff
after he was advised of Plaintiff’s disability.

(Id.)

Fourth,

Plaintiff alleged his mental health provider, Rehwinkle, denied
his requests for more frequent mental health treatment based on
exacerbation of his panic disorder and PTSD; and that Rehwinkle
caused him undue suffering by delaying the recommendation that
he

be

removed

from

his

job

assignment.

(Id.

at

25-27.)

Finally, the Court allowed Plaintiff’s FTCA claim(s) to proceed.
(Id. at 28.)
3

II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Plaintiff’s Motions
1.

Plaintiff

Plaintiff’s First Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order (“TRO”)
filed

his

first

motion

for

a

TRO

amended complaint was served on the defendants.

before

the

(Mot. for TRO

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (“Pl’s First Mot. for TRO”) ECF
No.

7.)

The

gravamen

of

Plaintiff’s

motion

is

that

“mass

punishment” against Fort Dix prisoners based on the action of
one

prisoner,

such

as

the

suspension

of

TRULINCS

[email

privileges]; 4 p.m. curfews; lockdowns; and reduced hours of law
library

access;

interferes

courts.

(Id. at 12.)

with

Plaintiff’s

access

to

the

Plaintiff alleged:

As should be readily apparent to this Court
at this time, this Petitioner has a case
load of litigation that some small law firms
do not and cannot entertain even with modern
day tools such as computer word processing
programs, databases, internet, online access
to the Electronic Court Filing System (ECF),
secretaries, and paralegals.
(Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff

supplemented

November 7, 2015.
Civ.

P.

65,

ECF

his

first

motion

for

a

TRO

on

(Supp. to Mot. for TRO Pursuant to Fed. R.
No.

13.)

Plaintiff

asserted

he

suffered

irreparable harm when the Superior Court of Kennebec County in
Maine denied his motion for an extension of time to file a reply
to the Respondent’s response.

(Id. at 1.)
4

Further,

Plaintiff

claims that due to the sanctions imposed by F.C.I. Fort Dix,
Plaintiff failed to timely file an appeal, and the Kennebec
County Superior Court entered an order granting relief to the
respondent.

(Id.)

Plaintiff then filed a motion to compel the

Court to issue the requested TRO.

(Mot. for U.S.D.C. to Grant

TRO Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 as Was Motioned for by Pl. in
ECF No. 7, ECF No. 25.)

On February 28, 2017, Plaintiff filed

an affidavit in support of his first motion for a TRO.

(Aff. of

Pl., ECF No. 29.)
Prior to service of the amended complaint, counsel for the
Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) made a special appearance to
respond to Plaintiff’s first motion for a temporary restraining
order.

(BOP Letter, ECF No. 14.)

The BOP argued Plaintiff’s

first TRO motion is entirely based on his First Amendment right
of

access

to

courts

claim,

which

screening the amended complaint.

the

(Id.)

Court

dismissed

when

Plaintiff opposes the

BOP’s letter response as untimely and improperly informal.

(ECF

No. 25.)1
2.

Plaintiff’s Second Motion for a TRO

On March 29, 2017, after Defendants filed an answer to the
1

The BOP’s letter was not untimely because the Amended Complaint
had not yet been served.
The Court will accept the BOP’s
informal letter response to Plaintiff’s first motion for a TRO
because there is no prejudice to Plaintiff.
See Veverka v.
Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 649 F. App’x 162, 167 (3d Cir.
2016) (district courts have substantial discretion to depart
from their local rules.)
5

amended complaint and a motion for partial summary judgment,
Plaintiff
relief.

filed

a

second

motion

for

preliminary

(Mot. for Restraining Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

65 (“Pl’s Second Mot. for TRO”) ECF No. 33.)
TRO

injunctive

restraining

Plaintiff,

and

Defendant
asks

the

Colina

Court

against Colina as a deterrent.

to

Plaintiff seeks a

from

retaliating

levy

a

(Id. at 1.)

monetary

against
sanction

Pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a), when there is notice of a motion
for preliminary injunctive relief on the adverse party, as with
Plaintiff’s second motion, the Court may issue a preliminary
injunction, rather than a temporary restraining order.
In support of this motion, Plaintiff alleges Colina goes
out of his way to “encounter” Plaintiff when he is trying to
avoid him, and during these encounters, Colina has said things
like, “we will see who gets the last laugh.”

(Pl’s Second Mot.

for TRO, ECF No. 33 at 1-2.)

Furthermore, on more than one

occasion,

serve

Colina

refused

to

Plaintiff arrived at “last call.”

Plaintiff

dinner

(Id. at 3-5.)

when

Plaintiff

alleges these acts were in retaliation for Plaintiff filing this
lawsuit.

(Id.)

Plaintiff
Steinberg.

also
(Id.

alleges
at

a

retaliation

6-7.)

Plaintiff

claim

against

contends

that

Dr.
he

voluntarily attended psychological services for one-and-a-half
years, and in February 2017, he chose to discontinue, as was his
6

right under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Dr.

Steinberg

declined.

summoned

Plaintiff

(Id. at 7.)

to

(Id.)
see

On March 23, 2017,
him,

and

Plaintiff

Dr. Steinberg threatened to write an

Incident Report, so Plaintiff complied.

(Id.)

Dr. Steinberg

told Plaintiff if he did not continue in psychological services,
he

would

be

disciplined.

(Id.)

Dr.

Steinberg

wrote

a

Disciplinary Report against Plaintiff for refusing to obey an
order.

(Id. at 8.)

Plaintiff stated “[i]t is of significan[t] consequence that
these actions against Stile are occurring at a time when Stile
had filed a Motion for (TRO) Temporary Restraining Order to
prohibit F.C.I. Fort Dix from imposing “mass punishment” against
Plaintiff Stile and other inmates similarly situated at F.C.I.
Fort Dix.”

(Id.)

The Federal Defendants responded by letter to Plaintiff’s
second motion for preliminary injunctive relief.
Letter, ECF No. 37.)

(Fed. Defs’

The Federal Defendants argue that the

retaliation claims in Plaintiff’s motion are not connected to
the claims in his amended complaint.

(Id.) Before Plaintiff can

amend his complaint to include new claims of retaliation, he
must first exhaust his administrative remedies.
B.

(Id.)

Standard of Law

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)-(b)(1) provides:
(a) Preliminary Injunction.
7

(1)
Notice.
The
court
may
issue
a
preliminary injunction only on notice to
the adverse party.
(2) Consolidating the Hearing with the
Trial on the Merits. Before or after
beginning the hearing on a motion for a
preliminary injunction, the court may
advance the trial on the merits and
consolidate it with the hearing. Even when
consolidation is not ordered, evidence
that is received on the motion and that
would be admissible at trial becomes part
of the trial record and need not be
repeated at trial. But the court must
preserve any party's right to a jury
trial.
(b) Temporary Restraining Order.
(1) Issuing Without Notice. The court may
issue
a
temporary
restraining
order
without written or oral notice to the
adverse party or its attorney only if:
(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a
verified complaint clearly show that
immediate and irreparable injury, loss,
or damage will result to the movant
before the adverse party can be heard
in opposition; and
(B) the movant's attorney certifies in
writing any efforts made to give notice
and the reasons why it should not be
required.
The same four-factor test is applied to requests for a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction.
e.g.

Opticians

America,

920

Ass’n

of

America

F.2d

187,

191-92

v.

Independent
(3d

Opticians

See
of

Cir.1990)(preliminary

injunction); DePinto v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 514 F.Supp.2d 633,
8

636 (D.N.J. 2007)(temporary restraining order).
produce

sufficient

evidence

preliminary relief.
192.

that

all

The movant must

four

factors

favor

Opticians Ass’n of America, 920 F.2d at

The four factors are:
“[1] the likelihood that the applicant will
prevail on the merits at final hearing; [2]
the extent to which the plaintiffs are being
irreparably harmed by the conduct complained
of; [3] the extent to which the defendants
will
suffer
irreparable
harm
if
the
preliminary injunction is issued; and [4]
the public interest.” Bill Blass, Ltd. v.
Saz Corp., 751 F.2d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 1984).

Id.
“The

purpose

of

a

preliminary

injunction

is

merely

to

preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on
the merits can be held.”
U.S. 390, 395 (1981).

University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451
“Preliminary injunctive relief is an

‘extraordinary remedy, which should be granted only in limited
circumstances.’”

Ferring

Pharmaceuticals,

Inc.

v.

Watson

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014)(quoting
Novartis

Consumer

Health,

Inc.

v.

Johnson

&

Johnson–Merck

Consumer Pharm. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 586 (3d Cir.2002) (quotation
marks omitted)).
C.

The movant bears the burden of proof.

Id.

Analysis

In his first motion for a TRO, Plaintiff seeks to preclude
“mass punishment” practices at FCI Fort Dix, alleged to be in
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and
9

interference with his First Amendment right of access to the
courts.

The alleged “mass punishment” practices at FCI Fort Dix

have nothing to do with the claims in the amended complaint that
this Court permitted to proceed.
Preliminary injunctive relief is not a tool for prisoners
to use to regulate “in every way, every day, the terms and
conditions of plaintiff's confinement simply because they are
‘in

court’

desired

to

and

regardless

be

stopped

of

the

with

the

relation
claim

of

in

the

the

activity

complaint.”

Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, No. CIV S-07-0375 GEB GGH
P, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009).

Plaintiff

cannot establish the likelihood of success on the merits of his
claims by raising new, unrelated claims.

Therefore, the Court

denies Plaintiff’s first motion for a TRO.
Plaintiff’s second motion for preliminary injunctive relief
is based on new allegations of retaliation by Colina and others.
For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff is not likely to
succeed on the merits of his retaliation claims.

See Snee v.

Barone, 359 F. App’x 281, 284 (3d Cir. 2009)(affirming district
court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief where prisoner
failed

to

establish

likelihood

of

success

on

the

alleged infringement of his constitutional rights).
To
state
a
claim
for
retaliation,
a
plaintiff must allege that: (1) he was
engaged
in
constitutionally
protected
10

merits

of

conduct, (2) “he suffered some ‘adverse
action’
at
the
hands
of
the
prison
officials”; and (3) “his constitutionally
protected conduct was ‘a substantial or
motivating factor’ in the decision” to take
that action. Rauser [v. Horn], 241 F.3d
[330] 333 [3d Cir. 2001].
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 376 (3d Cir. 2012).

The inquiry

into whether an alleged “adverse action” is sufficient to deter
a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional
rights is an objective inquiry, and presents a question of fact.
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 376 (3d Cir. 2012).
alleged
trying

conduct
to

stating

of

avoid

that

insufficient

him,

they
to

approaching
cursing

will

deter

Plaintiff

a

when

Colina’s

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

suing

him,

who

see

for
the

last

was

laugh

person

gets
of

exercising a constitutional right.

ordinary

firmness

and
is
from

See Burgos v. Canino, 358 F.

App’x 302, 306 (3d Cir. 2009) (“threats alone do not constitute
retaliation . . .”)(citing

Maclean v. Secor, 876 F.Supp. 695,

699 (E.D.Pa. 1995)(collecting cases)).
Plaintiff

also

alleges

that,

in

February

2017,

Colina

refused to serve Plaintiff dinner when he arrived late to the
dining hall.

(Pl’s Second Mot. for TRO, ECF No. 33 at 2.)

Plaintiff admits that Colina “relented” but “served only two
hamburger buns with two sausages and nothing more.”
This

is

also

an

insufficient

retaliation claim.
11

adverse

action

(Id. at 3.)
to

state

a

Similarly, Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation on March 21,
2017, is based, in part, on allegations that Colina embarrassed
Plaintiff by yelling at him in front of others.

(Id. at 4.)

The fact that Plaintiff was embarrassed by Colina yelling at him
is

not

a

sufficient

“adverse

action”

to

state

a

claim

for

retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.
Plaintiff also alleges Colina refused to serve him dinner
on

March

21,

2017.

Plaintiff

is

not

likely

to

succeed

establishing the causation element of retaliation.

in

Plaintiff

admits he was not assigned to eat in the particular dining hall
where Colina refused to serve him; he went there only because he
was too late to go to his assigned dining hall. (ECF No. 33 at
3-4.)

A

retaliation

claim

will

fail

if

the

defendant

establishes that the same decision would have been made absent
any retaliatory motive.

See Watson, 834 F.3d at 426 (citing

Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334 (“once a prisoner demonstrates that his
exercise
motivating

of

a

constitutional

factor

in

the

right

was

challenged

a

substantial

decision,

the

or

prison

officials may still prevail by proving that they would have made
the

same

decision

absent

the

protected

conduct

for

reasons

reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.)
Finally,
causation
Steinberg.

Plaintiff

requirement

of

is

not

his

likely

retaliation

to

succeed

claim

on

the

against

Dr.

Plaintiff alleged Dr. Steinberg wrote an Incident
12

Report against him around the time when Plaintiff filed his
first motion for a TRO.

Dr. Steinberg has nothing to do with

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding “mass punishment” in his first
motion for a TRO.

Furthermore, Dr. Steinberg is not a defendant

to this action.

It is difficult to imagine why Dr. Steinberg

would retaliate against Plaintiff for bringing this action or
his subsequent motion for a TRO.

See Royster v. Beard, 308 F.

App’x 576, 579 (3d Cir. 2009)(affirming summary judgment for
defendants

on

grievances

retaliation

did

not

adverse action).

name

claims

the

where

defendants

previously

who

filed

purportedly

took

For all of these reasons, the Court will deny

Plaintiff’s second motion for preliminary injunctive relief.
III. PLAINTIFF’S SECOND REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME
On May 25, 2017, this Court granted Plaintiff’s request for
an extension of time, until August 3, 2017, to file a reply to
Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment.
No. 44.)

(Order, ECF

With six weeks remaining to file a reply to the

defendants’ motion, Plaintiff requested an additional extension
of

time.

Plaintiff

(Mot.
has

not

for

Further

shown

good

Ext.
cause

of

Time,

why

a

ECF

further

No.

45.)

extension

should be granted.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

discussed

above,

the

Court

denies

Plaintiff’s motions for relief injunctive relief under Fed. R.
13

Civ. P 65, and denies his request for an extension of time to
file a reply to Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment.

An appropriate order follows.

s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
Dated: June 19, 2017

14