GOODE et al v. CAMDEN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al

Filing 117

OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 1/9/2020. (rtm, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
__________________________________
:
Margaret GOODE, et al.,
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
Civil No. 16-3936 (RBK/JS)
v.
:
:
OPINION
CAMDEN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et :
al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
__________________________________
KUGLER, United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Margaret Goode and Rena Pierce’s
Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 112) of a portion of the Court’s November 22, 2019
Opinion (Doc. No. 109). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED.
I.

BACKGROUND
This case concerns allegations that the Camden City School District attempted to purge

itself of its older teachers by deliberately sabotaging their performance evaluations. See Goode v.
Camden City Sch. Dist., No. 16-03936, 2019 WL 6243156, at *1–4 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2019) (setting
forth in detail the facts of this case). Plaintiffs Goode and Pierce were two of the teachers caught
up in the alleged purge; Defendant Hye-Won Gehring was the co-principal at Goode’s school,
while Defendant Keith Miles was the principal at Pierce’s. Id. at *1–3. In addition to various claims
based on age-discrimination, Goode and Pierce assert that Defendants retaliated against them for
activity protected both by the First Amendment and by the New Jersey Conscientious Employee
Protection Act (“CEPA”), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 et seq., as “whistle-blowing.” Goode, 2019 WL

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6243156, at *1. Goode points to five instances of speech she asserts are protected by the First
Amendment and CEPA; Pierce points to nine. Id. at *10–11.
The Court’s November 22, 2019 Opinion and Order (Doc. Nos. 109, 110) granted in part
and denied in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 95). In particular, the
Court found that Goode did not engage in any activity that touched upon matters of public concern,
as required to invoke First Amendment protection, while Pierce only engaged in a single type of
activity. Goode, 2019 WL 6243156, at *9–12. When the Court analyzed Plaintiffs’ CEPA claims,
it found that the test for whether activity is protected whistle-blowing is substantially similar to
the public concern inquiry under the First Amendment. Id. at *15. As such, the Court reached the
same result, finding that Goode did not engage in any protected whistle-blowing activity and that
Pierce engaged in one type of protected activity. Id. The present motion contends that the Court
clearly erred in its analysis of whether Plaintiffs engaged in whistle-blowing under CEPA, and
thus seeks to vacate that portion (Section III.C.i) of the Court’s prior Opinion.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Motions for reconsideration are governed by Local Civil Rule 7.1(i), which allows a party

to seek reconsideration by the court in matters that the party believes the judge has “overlooked.”
Carney v. Pennsauken Twp. Police Dep’t., No. 11-7366, 2013 WL 4501454, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug.
21, 2013); Church & Dwight Co. v. Abbott Labs., 545 F. Supp. 2d 447, 449 (D.N.J. 2008). “The
standard for reargument is high and reconsideration is to be granted only sparingly.” Yarrell v.
Bartkowski, Civ. No. 10-5337, 2012 WL 1600316, at *3 (D.N.J. May 7, 2012) (citing United States
v. Jones, 158 F.R.D. 309, 314 (D.N.J. 1994)). To be successful on a motion for reconsideration, a
petitioner has the burden to demonstrate: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the
availability of new evidence that was not available when the court issued its order; or (3) the need

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to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. Max’s Seafood Café ex rel.
Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). A motion under Rule 7.1(i) may
address only those matters of fact or issues of law which were presented to, but not considered by,
the court in the course of making the decision at issue. See, e.g., Fellenz v. Lombard Inv. Corp.,
400 F. Supp. 2d 681, 683 (D.N.J. 2005). A motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for raising
new arguments.
III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs assert that the Court committed a clear error of law by applying an overly

stringent standard when assessing whether Plaintiffs engaged in whistle-blowing activity protected
by CEPA. (Doc. No. 112-1 (“Pl. Brief”) at 5–10). CEPA creates six categories of protected whistleblowing activity, five of which are relevant here. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3a.(1) (“Section 3a.(1)”) applies
when the employee “[d]iscloses or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body” illegal
employer activity, while N.J.S.A. 34:19-3a.(2) (“Section 3a.(2)”) similarly applies to disclosures
of “fraudulent or criminal” employer activity. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c.(1) (“Section 3.c(1)”) applies
when an employee “[o]bjects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or practice which
the employee reasonably believes” is illegal, while N.J.S.A. 34:19-3.c(2) (“Section 3.c(2)”) applies
when the employee objects to employer activity that is “fraudulent or criminal,” and N.J.S.A. 3419-3.c(3) (“Section 3.c(3)”) applies when the employee objects to employer activity that is
“incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare
or protection of the environment.” Plaintiffs assert that they are bringing claims under all five of
these sections, and that all five of these sections apply to every instance of allegedly protected
activity that Goode and Pierce engaged in. (Pl. Brief at 6–7).

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In Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court found that claims under
Section 3.c(3) have unique requirements that do not apply to other sections of CEPA. 754 A.2d
544, 550 (N.J. 2000). Plaintiffs disagree with the Court’s interpretation of what those “unique
requirements” are. Plaintiffs read Estate of Roach to mean that Section 3.c(3) claims alone require
proof that the employee’s complaints involved matters of the public interest, and that therefore
Plaintiffs’ complaints may serve as the basis for claims under Sections 3.a(1), 3.a(2), 3.c(1), and
3.c(2) regardless of whether those complaints touched on matters of public concern. (Pl. Brief at
6–7). As a result, they assert that the Court erred by finding the CEPA whistle-blowing inquiry
similar to the First Amendment public concern test for their Section 3.a(1), 3.a(2), 3.c(1), and
3.c(2) claims.1
In in its prior Opinion, the Court considered Estate of Roach, and construed its holding far
more narrowly. See Goode, 2019 WL 6243156, at *14 (citing Estate of Roach). As “mere
disagreement with the Court’s decision is not a basis for reconsideration,” Plaintiffs’ motion could
be denied without spilling any more ink. Muraveva v. City of Wildwood, No. 17-916, 2019 WL
3818302, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2019). But because the Court did not fully explain its
interpretation of Estate of Roach in its prior Opinion, it will do so here, in the interest of clarity.
The Estate of Roach plaintiff brought claims under Sections 3a, 3.c(1), 3.c(2), and 3.c(3).
Relying on an earlier New Jersey Supreme Court case, Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 707 A.2d
1000 (N.J. 1998), the defendant argued that “employees must specifically prove their complaints
involve a matter of public interest” in order bring a claim under any section of CEPA. 754 A.2d at
550. The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected that argument:
Defendant's reliance on Mehlman is misplaced. In that case, we specifically
considered whether a plaintiff must know the exact source of public policy when
asserting a CEPA claim under section 3c.(3). Because Mehlman pertained solely to
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Plaintiffs appear to accept that the two inquiries are similar for purposes of Section 3.c(3) claims.

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a complaint brought under section 3c.(3), our holding in that case does not import
the requirements of that section to other parts of CEPA . . . . [W]e are satisfied that
the Legislature did not intend to hamstring conscientious employees by requiring
that they prove in all cases that their complaints involve violations of a defined
public policy.
Id. That is, Estate of Roach simply holds that plaintiffs bringing claims under Section 3.c(3) have
the unique requirement of proving that their claims involved “violations of a defined public
policy,” that and plaintiffs proceeding under other sections of CEPA do not.
In its prior Opinion, the Court in no way required Plaintiffs to prove that their complaints
involved violations of a defined public policy in order to bring claims under Sections 3.a(1), 3.a(2),
3.c(1), and 3.c(2). Rather, the Court simply identified and enforced two restrictions on CEPA’s
protection that cut across all sections of the statute: (1) that CEPA does not protect wholly private
grievances; and (2) that CEPA does not shield “vague and conclusory complaints.” Goode, 2019
WL 6243156, at *15 (internal quotation omitted) (citing cases). Since Estate of Roach did not
address either of these restrictions, the case did not hold that they are cabined to Section 3.c(3)
claims. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ primary argument for reconsideration fails.2
Plaintiffs also argue that the Court overlooked certain dispositive factual matters. (Pl. Brief
at 10–21). However, Plaintiffs do not actually point to any factual matters the Court overlooked;
rather, they assert that if the Court applied their preferred test for whistle-blowing, all of Goode
and Pierce’s complaints would be sufficient to survive summary judgment. As the Court will not
be applying this lower standard, this argument also fails.

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Plaintiffs attempt to argue that CEPA does protect wholly private grievances, (Pl. Brief at 9–10), but again they are
simply disagreeing with the Court’s interpretation of certain cases, rather than identifying any controlling decisions
the Court overlooked.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. An Order

follows.
Dated: 1/09/2020

/s/ Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge

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