SCANLON v. LAWSON et al

Filing 193

OPINION (REDACTED). Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 9/29/2020. (dmr)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

EDWARD SCANLON, IV
Civ. No. 16-4465 (RMB-JS)

Plaintiff
v.

OPINION
(REDACTED)

VALERIE LAWSON, et al.,
Defendants
APPEARANCES:
KEVIN T. FLOOD, Esq.
181 Route 206
Hillsborough, NJ 08844
On behalf of Plaintiff

PATRICK JOSEPH MADDEN, Esq.
Madden & Madden, PA
108 Kings Highway East, Suite 200
P.O. Box 210
Haddonfield, NJ 08033
On behalf of Defendants Robert
Surrency and Michael Baruzza

Balicki,

Veronica

BUMB, United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants Robert
Balicki

and

Veronica

Surrency’s

(“Defendants”)

motion

for

reconsideration of the Court’s Opinion and Order dated February
21, 2020 (Mot. for Reconsideration, Dkt. No. 168); Plaintiff’s
Reply

to

the

Motion

for

Reconsideration

Filed

by

Defendants

Veronica Surrency and Robert Balicki (“Pl’s Opp. Brief,” Dkt. No.

184) and Defendants’ Reply Brief (Defs’ Reply Brief, Dkt. No. 186.)
For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant the motion
for reconsideration and grant Defendants’ summary judgment, in
their individual and official capacities, on Plaintiff’s last
remaining claims, Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”) for failure to
protect based on Defendants’ failure to impose a no contact order
at

the

between

Cumberland
Juvenile

(“Jordan”)

and

County

Juvenile

Detention

Plaintiff

Detention

Officer

Edward

Center

(“JDO”)

Scanlon,

IV

(“CCJDC”)

Wesley

Jordan

(“Plaintiff”

or

“Plaintiff Scanlon”).
I.

BACKGROUND
The Court recited the procedural background in this matter in

its Opinion dated February 21, 2020, and need not repeat it for
the parties here. (Opinion, Dkt. Nos. 155, 156.) 1 The Court granted
summary

judgment

to

all

Defendants,

with

the

exception

of

Defendants Warden Robert Balicki and CCJDC Division Head Veronica
Surrency, primarily because Plaintiff had failed to file his claims
against them within the statute of limitations. (Opinions, Dkt.
Nos. 144, 147, 150, 151, 155.) Plaintiff did not oppose summary
judgment in favor of Defendants Balicki and Surrency on his tort

1

The Court filed both a sealed opinion (Dkt. No. 155) and a
redacted Opinion (Dkt. No. 156) and will cite to the sealed Opinion
hereafter.
2

claims. (Defs’ Summ. J. Brief, Dkt No. 116 at 21-23; 2 Pl’s Opp.
Brief, ECF No. 130 at 9.) Therefore, the Court’s Opinion was
restricted to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the only
remaining claims, Plaintiff’s § 1983 and NJCRA claims.
Defendants seek reconsideration of the denial of summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 and NJCRA failure to protect claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court quotes here from the
relevant portion of the Court’s Opinion:
The undisputed material facts show that on May
27, 2011, Tammie D. Pierce of the Juvenile
Justice Commission filed a criminal charge of
fourth degree aggravated assault against
Plaintiff for punching Jordan in the face in
the course of his duties on May 21, 2011. (Ex.
QQ, ECF No. 130-11 at 18.) In his deposition,
Jordan does not remember when he became aware
of the crime charges but during the internal
affairs investigation about the March 2012
fights, he recalled asking Surrency, two weeks
prior to the March 2012 fights, whether there
was a no contact order in place between
himself and Plaintiff. (Ex. KK at T39:17T42:13, ECF No. 130-10 at 119-20.) Jordan
specifically recalled another incident where
there were charges by an officer against a
juvenile and there was a no contact order in
place at CCJDC. (Ex. SS (video) at 25:25 to
27:07).
Surrency stated there was no policy at CCJDC
requiring a no contact order between a
juvenile and an officer the juvenile was
charged with assaulting. (Ex. EE at T108:3110:11.) Balicki agreed that there was no
written policy in the manual, but he thought
it would have been a good idea to have a no
2

Page citations refer to the page number assigned by the Court’s
electronic case filing system, CM/ECF.
3

contact order between a juvenile and the
officer with whom the juvenile was charged
with assaulting. (Ex. FF at T58:23-T59:16.)
The charge against Plaintiff by Jordan was not
resolved until April 23, 2012, when the
charges were dismissed with a plea. (Ex. M,
ECF No. 130-8 at 101.)
The Court held that:
a reasonable jury could conclude, on this
record, that Surrency and Balicki were
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk
of harm to a juvenile resident, by the failure
to have a no contact order, while criminal
charges were pending disposition, between a
juvenile and the officer whom the juvenile
assaulted.
(Opinion, Dkt. No. 155 at 31-34) (emphasis added.)
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Defendants’ Argument

Defendants Balicki and Surrency seek reconsideration alleging
an erroneous finding of fact by the Court when it attributed to
Defendant Balicki the testimony that it would have been a “good
idea” to have a no contact order between a juvenile and the alleged
victim officer. (See Brief in Supp. of Mot. for Reconsideration by
Surrency and Balicki (“Defs’ Brief”) Dkt. No. 169.) (Opinion, Dkt.
No. 155 at 31.) Defendants concede, in their reply brief, that the
statement was made by one of the dismissed Defendants, William M.
Burke,

the

Supervisor

of

New

Jersey

Juvenile

Commission’s

Compliance Monitoring Unit. (Def’s Reply Brief, Dkt. No. 186 at
5.) In fact, Defendant Balicki’s deposition testimony concerning

4

no contact orders was limited to the fact that there was no policy
or procedure in place to keep separate, during a pending criminal
proceeding, a juvenile resident and the JDO whom the juvenile was
criminally charged with assaulting. (Plaintiff’s Ex. FF at T66:1822, Dkt. No. 130-10 at 20.)
Both Defendants also suggest that it was a clear error of law
for the Court to rely on a factually distinguishable Third Circuit
case, Heggenmiller v. Edna Mahan Correctional Institution for
Women, 128 F. App’x 240 (3d Cir. 2005). In Heggenmiller, state
prisoners brought a § 1983 action against prison administrators
alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to the risk of
sexual assaults on inmates by guards. There was a policy at the
prison

prohibiting

sexual

contact

between

prison

guards

and

inmates. The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs in Heggenmiller
could

not

show

deliberate

indifference

by

the

administrative

defendants because the prison’s no contact rule was vigorously
enforced by the firing and/or prosecution of five of the six guards
responsible for the six documented sexual assaults between 1994
and 1998. Vigorous enforcement of the no contact order established
that the administrators took reasonable steps to reduce the risk
of sexual assaults. Defendants maintain that the present case is
not analogous to Heggenmiller because it was Plaintiff who had
assaulted Jordan in the past, not the other way around.

5

Finally, Defendants submit that it was a clear error of law
to find that they acted with deliberate indifference. Defendants
maintain there is nothing in the record to show that they were
aware that their failure to implement a policy for “no contact
orders” between a juvenile resident and the JDO whom the juvenile
was criminally charged with assaulting. Specifically, Defendants
highlight the fact that the record does not contain any prior
incidents at CCJDC where a JDO retaliated against a juvenile
resident under similar circumstances. Once they became aware of
Jordan arranging fights between Plaintiff and other juveniles in
March 2012, however, Defendants put a no contact order in place
between Plaintiff and Jordan at that time. (Defendants’ Statement
of Material Facts at ¶¶38-39; Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants
Statement of Material Facts admitting to ¶¶38-39). Furthermore,
Defendants argue there is no evidence that Jordan, by his actions
in March 2012, was retaliating against Plaintiff for assaulting
him. In essence, Defendants conclude there is no connection between
the lack of a policy for no contact order in this situation and
Plaintiff’s ultimate injuries.
B.

Plaintiff’s Counter-Argument

Plaintiff Scanlon acknowledges that William M. Burke, the
Supervisor

of

New

Monitoring

Unit,

not

Jersey

Juvenile

Defendant

Commission’s

Balicki,

was

the

Compliance
person

who

testified that it would have been a “good idea” to have a no
6

contact order between a juvenile resident and the officer he
assaulted, pending criminal proceedings regarding the assault.
(Pl’s Opp. Brief, Dkt. No. 184.) (See Burke Depo., Plaintiff’s Ex.
HH at T58:23-T59:16, Dkt No. 130-10 at 55.) Plaintiff argues that
this mistake by the Court only bolsters the Court’s decision that
Defendants Balicki and Surrency were deliberately indifferent to
his safety because it was Burke, who supervised all juvenile
detention centers for the State of New Jersey, who testified that
it would have been a “good idea” to have a no contact order in
place. Notably, however, Plaintiff points to no evidence that Burke
made this “good idea” known to Defendants Balicki and Surrency.
Plaintiff also argues that, while his case is factually
distinguishable,

the

Court

did

not

err

in

its

reliance

on

Heggenmiller in holding that vigorous enforcement of a no contact
order is a reasonable step to protect inmates from harm. As a final
point,

Plaintiff

contends

that

Defendants’

objection

to

the

Court’s finding of deliberate indifference is nothing more than an
attempt to relitigate an issue solely because they disagreed with
the Court’s decision. 3

3

After reading the parties’ briefs, the Court determined that it
would rule on the motion without oral argument under Federal rule
of Civil Procedure 78(b). (Text Order, Dkt. Nos. 185, 189.)
7

C.

Analysis

Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) requires a party filing a motion for
reconsideration to submit “a brief setting forth concisely the
matter or controlling decisions which the party believes the Judge
or Magistrate Judge has overlooked.” Mere disagreement with the
Court’s decision is not a sufficient basis for a motion for
reconsideration. See Rich v. State, 294 F. Supp. 3d 266, 273
(D.N.J. 2018) (collecting cases). “The purpose of a motion for
reconsideration … is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or
to present newly discovered evidence.” Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel.
Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)
(quoting Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir.
1985)).
1.

Factual Error

The Court clearly mistakenly attributed to Defendant Balicki
the statement that it would have been a “good idea” to have a no
contact order in place between a JDO and a juvenile resident of a
juvenile detention center, while criminal charges were pending
against

the

juvenile

for

assaulting

the

JDO.

As

the

parties

concede, the statement was made by a now-dismissed defendant,
William

M.

Burke,

who

was

a

supervisor

for

the

compliance

monitoring unit of the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission.
(See Burke Depo., Plaintiff’s Ex. HH at T58:23-T59:16, Dkt No.
130-10 at 55.) (This Court granted summary judgment as to Defendant
8

Burke because Plaintiff failed to bring a timely claim against
him. (Opinion, Dkt. No. 144.) This mistake informs the Court’s
reconsideration as follows.
2.
A

Deliberate Indifference

juvenile

detainee

has

a

Fourteenth

Amendment

liberty

interest in his personal security and well-being. A.M. ex rel.
J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Detention Center, 372 F.3d 572,
579 (3d Cir. 2004). To determine whether Defendants violated this
right, the Court must decide “‘what level of conduct is egregious
enough to amount to a constitutional violation and ... whether
there is sufficient evidence that [the Defendants'] conduct rose
to that level.’” Id. (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 809
(3d Cir. 2000) (alterations in A.M. ex rel. J.M.K.)) A substantive
due process violation “may be shown by conduct that ‘shocks the
conscience.’” Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833,

846-47

(1998)).

The

deliberate

indifference

standard

is

employed to determine whether, in the custodial setting of a
juvenile

detention

center,

the

defendants

were

deliberately

indifferent to the plaintiff’s personal security and well-being.
Id. “The question of whether conduct amounting to deliberate
indifference is sufficient to “shock the conscience” requires an
‘exact analysis of [the] circumstances’ in a given case.” Id. at
(quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850.) The deliberate indifference
standard is appropriate where the persons responsible for the
9

juvenile in a juvenile detention center had time to deliberate
concerning the juvenile’s welfare. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K., 372 F.3d
at 579.
It is significant to this Court’s reconsideration that it was
not the Warden, Defendant Balicki, who made the statement that
having a no contact order in a case like this would have been a
“good idea.” Upon his hiring as warden for CCJDC in 2008 or 2009,
Balicki was charged with revising all of CCJDC’s old written
policies. (Balicki Depo, Pl’s Ex. FF at T17:3-T19:5; T22:9-12; Dkt
No. 130-10 at 8-9.) The policies had to be updated every year, and
Balicki delegated the responsibility to update the policies to
Tammie Pierce and Veronica Surrency, and when Pierce left CCJDC,
he delegated the duty to Defendant Surrency, while maintaining his
authority

to

approve

the

policies.

(Id.

at

T22:18-T24:10.)

Surrency acknowledged that she had authority to create policy.
(Surrency Depo., Pl’s Ex. EE at T24:7-T25:13, Dkt. No. 130-9 at
192-93.)
With this in mind, it is undisputed that Burke, who made the
statement, did not have authority to make specific policies for
CCJDC, 4 but testified that such a policy would be left to the

4

Burke testified that if he learned of a serious incident at a
juvenile detention center, he would write a report that requested
an action plan from the juvenile detention center, describing how
they planned to address the issue. (Burke Depo., Pl’s Ex. HH at
T19:3-21.) As supervisor of the monitoring unit that evaluated
juvenile detention centers, if there was a problem, Burke would
10

individual facility. (Burke Depo., Pl’s Ex. HH at T58:23-T59:7.)
The only policies or procedures that Burke put in place were in
the

State’s

Manual

of

Standards

for

all

juvenile

detention

facilities; he could not tell the facilities what to put in their
SOPs. 5 (Id. at T52:3-13; T83:16-T84:2.) Plaintiff has pointed to
no evidence, and this Court can find none, where Burke shared his
belief about the propriety of a no contact order with either
Defendant Balicki or Defendant Surrency.
Moreover, while it may be that Burke, in his capacity as
supervisor of the compliance monitor unit for all New Jersey
juvenile detention centers, had knowledge of the use of no contact
orders from his experience at other juvenile detention centers,
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence of such knowledge or why
Burke thought it was a “good idea.” That Burke may have been
engaging in an evaluation with hindsight — an issue not explored
by Plaintiff — is also problematic.

More to the point, Plaintiff

points to no evidence that Burke shared this information with
Defendants Balicki and Surrency, or even recommended a no contact
order policy for any facility. Burke’s role in the Juvenile Justice
Commission was to monitor CCJDC’s compliance with the State’s

ask the detention center to come up with a solution because his
unit did not run the facilities. (Id. at T21:11-T22:2.)
5

SOPs stands for Standard Operating Procedures. (Burke Depo., Pl’s
Ex. HH at T97:10-11.)
11

Manual of Standards, and the Manual of Standards did not require
no contact orders under the circumstances at issue here. (Burke
Depo, Pl’s Ex. HH at T10:1-10; T58:23-T59:16.) The Manual of
Standards contains only general standards, a facility’s Standard
Operating Procedures were much more detailed. (Id. at T97:20T98:3.) Burke testified that a no contact order policy in “a
situation where a guard is injured by a juvenile inmate and charges
are pressed against that juvenile inmate” would be a policy for
the facility to make. (Id. at T58:23-T59:16.)
“[T]o defeat [a] summary judgment motion,” on a failure to
protect

claim

support

the

unreasonably

“[plaintiffs]

must

inference

that

disregarded

an

present

the

enough

defendants

objectively

evidence

‘knowingly

intolerable

risk

to
and
of

harm.’” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 132 (3d Cir. 2001)
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994)). “To be
liable on a deliberate indifference claim, a defendant prison
official must both ‘know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an excessive risk
to inmate health or safety.’” Id. at 133 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 837.)) “[T]he official must actually be aware of the existence
of the excessive risk; it is not sufficient that the official
should have been aware.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38.))
“[S]ubjective

knowledge

…

can

be

proved

by

circumstantial

evidence” if “the excessive risk was so obvious that the official
must have known of the risk.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.)
12

Plaintiff relies on the fact that Burke, who has expertise in
the State of New Jersey in the field of juvenile detention centers,
thought it was a good idea for the CCJDC to enact a no contact
order policy under the circumstances present here. The Third
Circuit has held that even when a policymaker fails to implement
a standard or recommended policy in the juvenile detention field,
such a failure constitutes negligence not deliberate indifference.
See Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 137-38 (failure to enact standard
or

recommended

policies

constitutes

negligence

not

deliberate

indifference).
As noted, Plaintiff had an opportunity to explore Burke’s
statement in discovery, but did not do so. Indeed, as the Court
found, Plaintiff failed to bring timely claims against Burke, the
only individual whom Plaintiff introduced as opining as to a no
contact

policy.

Plaintiff

has

introduced

no

evidence

that

Defendants Balicki and Surrency believed there was good reason to
have a no contact policy in place in situations such as those here.
In order for a jury to reasonably find deliberate indifference
by Defendants Balicki and Surrency for failing to enact such a
policy,

there

must

be

evidence

that

they

were

aware

of

the

existence of excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety or there must be
circumstantial evidence that the risk was so obvious they must
have known of it. Here, the only evidence Plaintiff has put forward
is that Jordan asked Defendant Surrency whether there was a no
13

contact order in place and she said there was not. (See Pl’s Ex.
SS (video recording) at 25:25 to 27:07, Dkt. No. 130-11 at 49-50.)
Indeed, Surrency testified that when Jordan asked her about the no
contact order, she was unaware of the incident between Jordan and
Plaintiff Scanlon from one year prior. (Surrency Depo., Pl’s Ex.
EE at T145:9-20, Dkt. No. 130-9 at 223.) Despite the lack of a
written policy, according to Surrency, an administrator could put
in place a no contact order to keep a juvenile and staff member
separate;

but unless the officer was the person who assaulted the

juvenile, a no contact order was not deemed necessary beyond the
day that the juvenile assaulted the officer.. (Id. at T105:24T107:4, T108:21-T109-2.) Moreover, although Jordan testified that
there were other occasions when the CCJDC put a no contact order
in place between a juvenile and a juvenile detention officer,
Plaintiff did not explore that testimony. Jordan did not testify,
nor does the record otherwise establish, about the circumstances
under which another no contact order was put in place. 6 (See Jordan
Depo., Pl’s Ex. KK at T39:17-T43:9, Dkt. No. 130-10 at 119-20.)
Plaintiff Scanlon alleges that a few weeks after Jordan
learned from Defendant Surrency that a no contact order was not in
place between himself and Plaintiff, he encouraged Plaintiff to

6

If Plaintiff can point to such evidence in the record, he should
file a motion for reconsideration within 14 days of entry of this
Opinion and the accompanying Order.
14

fight other juveniles while he watched. Yet, this was almost one
year after charges had been brought against Plaintiff and the
record is void of any evidence that the contact between Plaintiff
and Jordan for that time period had raised any concerns. But
Plaintiff must do more than put forward what hindsight has clearly
taught: no doubt, a vigorously enforced no contact order would
seemingly

have

prevented

Plaintiff

Scanlon’s

injuries,

but

Plaintiff must show Defendants Balicki and Surrency were aware of
the risk to Plaintiff’s safety by not having such an order in place
or that the risk was so obvious that they must have known of the
excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety. Plaintiff has not introduced
any evidence that Defendants Balicki and Surrency were aware of
any other incidents when Jordan, or any other JDOs for that matter,
had encouraged juvenile residents to fight each other, nor has
Plaintiff

introduced

evidence

of

JDOs

retaliating

against

juveniles who had assaulted them. 7
Although there is evidence that Jordan was reprimanded for
excessive force against a juvenile resident in 2003, (See 2003
formal reprimand of Wesley Jordan, Ex. U, Dkt. No. 130-8 at 17788), this is insufficient to show an obvious risk that Jordan would
retaliatorily encourage Plaintiff to fight other juveniles almost
a year after the criminal charges were filed. The Supreme Court

7

See supra n. 4.
15

has explained the type of circumstantial evidence, in the context
of a prison official’s alleged failure to place an inmate in
protective custody to protect against assault by another inmate,
that would be sufficient to show the prison official must have
been aware of the risk to the plaintiff’s safety:
if [a] … plaintiff presents evidence showing
that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was
‘longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or
expressly noted by prison officials in the
past,’ and the circumstances suggest that the
defendant-official being sued had been exposed
to information concerning the risk and thus
‘must have known’ about it, then such evidence
could be sufficient to permit a trier of fact
to find that the defendant-official had actual
knowledge of the risk.
Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 747–48 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43. Recently, the Third Circuit held that
a plaintiff made a sufficient showing that detention facility staff
must have known of the risk of sexual assault to an immigration
detainee, although there was no evidence of the staff’s actual
awareness of the risk. E.D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 309 (3d Cir.
2019). In that case, there was evidence that the detention facility
was small; there was frequent interaction between the staff and
detainees

that

permitted

staff

to

observe

the

intimate

interactions between plaintiff and the alleged perpetrator; and
other

inmates

had

complained

of

staff’s

behavior

toward

the

plaintiff. The evidence Plaintiff has adduced falls short of this
standard, there is no evidence of inappropriate conduct between
16

Jordan and Plaintiff Scanlon or between Jordan and any other
juvenile between the date Plaintiff Scanlon was charged with
assaulting Jordan and the March 2012 fighting incidents. Clearly
- it seems worthy of repeating - Jordan’s alleged actions are
reprehensible. Unfortunately, Plaintiff failed to bring timely
claims against him.
For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff Scanlon has
failed to show any evidence that Defendants Balicki and Surrency
were

deliberately

indifferent

to

the

risk

that

Jordan

would

retaliate against Plaintiff for the filing of criminal charges
against him. Thus, Plaintiff has not established a constitutional
violation for failure to protect and the Court need not proceed to
the qualified immunity analysis. See Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at
140 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding plaintiffs failed to establish failure
to

protect

claim

without

evidence

that

directly

showed

the

defendant either knew of the excessive risk to the plaintiffs or
the defendant was aware of such overwhelming evidence of the risk
that defendants had to know of such a risk.)
For

the

sake

of

completeness,

however,

the

Court

notes

Plaintiff has not pointed to a case establishing a constitutional
right to a no contact order in a similar situation as this. Nor
has this Court found precedent “that is sufficiently clear that
every reasonable official would have understood that what he is
doing violates that right" such that "existing precedent must have
17

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate."
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (internal quotations
and citations omitted) (warning courts not to define clearly
established law at a high level of generality).

Therefore, even

if deliberate indifference could be established on this record,
Defendants Balicki and Surrency, in their individual capacities,
would be entitled to qualified immunity.

See Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (holding courts need not first determine
whether there has been a constitutional violation before granting
qualified immunity on the grounds that the relevant facts do not
violate clearly established law).
III. CONCLUSION
On the record before this Court, it cannot be said that
Defendants Balicki and Surrency were deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s safety.

What happened to Plaintiff Scanlon, however,

should never have happened, and should never happen again to
anyone. This case should serve as a valuable lesson going forward
as to the wisdom of enacting a no contact order under similar
circumstances. Unfortunately, the individual allegedly responsible
for Plaintiff Scanlon’s injuries was not sued timely, and that
should never happen again. An appropriate order follows.

Date: September 29, 2020

s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
18