BROWN v. OWENS

Filing 25

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 3/22/2018. (rtm, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ANTWAN BROWN,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-04497(JBS-AMD)

WARDEN DAVID OWENS,
OPINION
Defendant.

APPEARANCES:
Antwan Brown, Plaintiff Pro Se
#338948C-105635
KB1 4 South Industrial Boulevard
Bridgeton, NJ 08302
Anne E. Walters, Esquire
Assistant County Counsel
Office of Camden County Counsel
520 Market Street, 14th Floor
Camden, NJ 08102-1375
Attorney for Defendant David Owens
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on the unopposed motion
for summary judgment (“the Motion”) of defendant Warden David
Owens (“Defendant” or “Owens”) (ECF No. 23.)1 The Motion is being
considered on the papers pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For
the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment
upon the merits shall be granted.

1

The notation “ECF” as used in this Opinion refers to the
numbered docket entries for this case.
1

BACKGROUND
A.

PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff Antwan Brown (“Plaintiff”) was a pretrial detainee

at the Camden County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) from March
2015 (ECF No. 23-9) through July 2017. (ECF No. 22.) He is
proceeding pro se with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint
(“the Complaint”) regarding the conditions of confinement during
his stay at CCCF. (ECF No. 1.)
On July 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed an Inmate Grievance Form,
claiming as follows: “I’m having serious problems with dealing
with the [CCCF] housing unit overcrowded situation. I do know and
understand this to be a major civil rights violation, and despite
many warnings/complaint[s], the administration here continues to
pack this place in as a matter of practice and policy.” (ECF No.
1

at

8.)

Plaintiff

further

“humbly

request[ed]

that

the

administration here rectif[y] the overcrowding ASAP.” (Id.)
Ten

days

later,

Plaintiff

filed

the

Complaint

against

Defendant and an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP
Application”). (ECF No. 1.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges
“pervasive overcrowding” and “other deleterious conditions” at
CCCF.

(Id.

at

6.)

First,

as

to

the

supposedly

overcrowded

conditions of confinement, Plaintiff contends that he was confined
in “a unit originally constructed to hold 28 inmates [but] due to
severe overcrowding [wa]s housing 40 inmates.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.)

2

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was “forced to live in an
8x10 cell with 2 other inmates [that] was originally designed to
hold 2 people but due to overcrowding a 3rd and sometimes 4th man
sleeps on the floor with nothing more than a mattress next to the
cell[’s] toilet.” (Id. at 6.) Second, as to the “other deleterious
conditions”
inadequate

of

which

‘dayroom

Plaintiff
space’[;]

complains,
(2)

mold

he
and

describes:
insect

“(1)

infested

showers[;] (3) failure to train correction officers and other staff
to deal adequately with the overcrowded and unhealthy conditions
at CCCF[;] [and] (4) triple celling [that] leaves an unconscionably
small amount of unencumbered space within the cells.” (Id.)
Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000 in punitive damages and $1,000 in
compensatory damages “for each day [Plaintiff] was unlawfully
housed in a (3) man as well as a (4) man cell.” (Id. at 7.)
B.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 9, 2016, the Honorable Robert B. Kugler granted

Plaintiff’s IFP Application and directed the Clerk of the Court to
reopen

the

screening

case

and

Plaintiff’s

file

the

Complaint.

Complaint

pursuant

(ECF

No.

to

28

2.)

After

U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, Judge Kugler ordered that Plaintiff’s
Complaint be allowed to proceed in its entirety against Defendant.
(ECF No. 3.) On September 14, 2016, the case was reassigned to the
undersigned and Magistrate Judge Ann Marie Donio for all further
proceedings. (ECF No. 6.)

3

Defendant filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint on April
5, 2017 (ECF Nos. 14 and 15) and an Amended Answer on April 6,
2017. (ECF No. 17.) On May 17, 2017, Magistrate Judge Donio issued
a scheduling order requiring that all pretrial factual discovery
be concluded by August 31, 2017. (ECF No. 20.) Defendant served
Plaintiff

with

his:

(1)

April

12,

2017

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

26

Disclosures (ECF No. 23-5 at 2-4); (2) May 18, 2017 document
requests (ECF Nos. 23-5 at 5; 23-6 at 2-4); and (3) May 18, 2017
interrogatories. (ECF Nos. 23-5 at 5; 23-6 at 5-13.) Plaintiff has
not served Defendant with any discovery responses or disclosures.
(ECF Nos. 23-3 at ¶6; 23-2 at 5.) On August 21, 2017, Defendant
filed the motion for summary judgment now pending before the Court.
(ECF No. 23.) Plaintiff did not file any opposition to the motion,
which remains unopposed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant moves for summary judgment on three grounds: (1)
Plaintiff’s failure to adduce evidence from which a reasonable
fact finder could find unconstitutional conditions of
confinement; (2) the Complaint’s mootness, in light of the Sixth
and Amended Final Consent Decree in the recent class action,
Dittimus-Bey, et al. v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, et al.,
Docket No. 05-cv-0063 (D.N.J.) (“Dittimus-Bey”); and (3)
Defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity. This Court finds
for reasons discussed in Part IV that the mootness doctrine does

4

not apply to Plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief, but that
for reasons discussed in Part V, Defendant is entitled to
summary judgment by virtue of the lack of a genuine dispute of
material fact. In any event, because the Court finds that
summary judgment is proper, there being no proof of a
constitutional violation, the Court need not address the
qualified immunity defense.
WHETHER THE FINAL CONSENT DECREE IN DITTIMUS-BEY RENDERS
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT MOOT
In

addition

to

Defendant’s

meritorious

argument

that

Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence of Fourteenth Amendment
violations from CCCF conditions of confinement (see Section V(B)
of this Opinion below), Defendant also seeks summary judgment on
the ground that the Sixth and Final Amended Consent Decree in
Dittimus-Bey has rendered Plaintiff’s Complaint moot. (ECF No. 232 at 8-9.)
The doctrine of “mootness” derives from the limitation upon
federal judicial power in Article III of the Constitution limiting
jurisdiction

to

actual

cases

and

controversies.

See

Genesis

Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71 (2013). Thus, federal
courts are limited to resolving “the legal rights of litigants in
actual controversies,” Id., quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll.
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia

5

S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)). Thus,
“[a]n action is rendered moot when an intervening circumstance
deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the
lawsuit at any point during the litigation.” MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (citations omitted). The
test for Article III mootness is whether it has become “impossible
for

a

court

to

grant

any

effectual

relief

whatever

to

the

prevailing party.” In re ICL Holding Co., Inc., 802 F.3d 547, 553
(3d Cir. 2015) (citing Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165 (2013)).
Therefore, “[a]s long as the parties have a concrete interest,
however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not
moot.” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016).
It is true that Plaintiff does not contest the Dittimus–Bey
litigation

and

its

effects,

as

characterized

in

Defendant’s

undisputed Statement of Material Facts. For example, Camden County
and CCCF officials agreed to consent decrees in Dittimus–Bey to
take measures to improve the conditions at the CCCF, such as by
retaining

criminal

recommend

solutions

justice
to

planning

the

CCCF’s

firms

to

investigate

overcrowding

and

and

staffing

problems. (ECF No. 23-8 at ¶¶19, 23-25.) Defendant’s undisputed
facts

show

significant,

systemic

improvements

as

to

both

overcrowding and related conditions at CCCF. Plaintiff is not
presently confined at CCCF, and the successful Dittimus–Bey class
action litigation has placed the challenged conditions at CCCF

6

under review, resulting in appreciable changes for those confined
at CCCF. That these facts from Dittimus-Bey are uncontested here
by Plaintiff Brown is merely further demonstration that summary
judgment is appropriate.
The Court is not persuaded, however, that the final consent
decree in Dittimus-Bey moots Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff, a class
member in Dittimus-Bey, is bound by the final judgment in which
class members are deemed to release claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief against Camden County and its officers and
employees. This means that Mr. Brown, like all class members, could
no longer obtain injunctive relief beyond that authorized in the
Consent Decree for jail conditions during the class period. But
that litigation did not involve individual inmates’ or detainees’
claims or class claims for money damages, which must be sought and
proved on an individual claim basis. In other words, the Final
Consent Decree in Dittimus-Bey did not adjudicate or deal with any
individual money damage claims. Indeed, claims for money damages
were not sought in Dittimus-Bey and inmates were free to pursue
individual claims for monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
filing an individual complaint, as Mr. Brown has done. Accordingly,
to the extent that Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for
money damages is mooted by the final Consent Decree in DittimusBey, the mootness argument lacks merit and is denied.

7

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the materials of record

“show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
Where, as in this case, the nonmoving party bears the burden
of persuasion at trial, the moving party may be entitled to summary
judgment by observing that there is an absence of evidence to
support an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); see also Rahman v.
Taylor, 2013 WL 1192352, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2013). Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c) “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S.
at 322. A plaintiff opposing a defendant’s motion for summary
judgment has the burden of coming forward with evidence, not mere
allegations, that would raise a genuine dispute of material fact
and suffice to enable a reasonable jury, giving all favorable
inferences to the plaintiff as the party opposing summary judgment,
to find in plaintiff’s favor at trial. Rule 56(c)(1)(A) further
provides that, to create a genuine issue of material fact, the

8

nonmovant must do so by:
citing to particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits
or
declarations,
stipulations
(including
those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). However, failure to respond to a
motion for summary judgment “is not alone a sufficient basis for
the entry of a summary judgment.” Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin
Island Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990). The
Court still must determine, even for an unopposed summary judgment
motion, whether the motion for summary judgment has been properly
made

and

supported

and

whether

granting

summary

judgment

is

appropriate. Id.
In order to grant Defendant’s unopposed motion for summary
judgment, where, as here, “the moving party does not have the
burden of proof on the relevant issues, . . . the district court
must

determine

that

the

deficiencies

in

opponent’s

evidence

designated in or in connection with the motion entitle the moving
party to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 175. Additionally,
pursuant to Local Civ. R. 56.1(a), Defendant’s statements of
material facts, having not been admitted, denied or addressed by
Plaintiff in any other fashion, are deemed undisputed for the
purposes of this Motion.

9

B.

PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO COME FORWARD WITH ANY EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING HIS CLAIM OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT
As stated above, the evidentiary record in this case consists

of what Defendant attached to the Motion. Plaintiff has provided
the Court only with pleadings that contain a mix of facts and legal
conclusions.

The

Complaint

attaches

no

affidavits

or

certifications; its only exhibit is the Inmate Grievance Form
referenced above. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Plaintiff did not respond to
Defendant’s

discovery

requests,

nor

has

Plaintiff

made

any

discovery demands on Defendant. Mere pleadings such as Plaintiff’s
Complaint are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Rahman,
2013 WL 1192352, at *3. The ample time for completing factual
discovery has expired. (ECF No. 20.)
Defendant asserts in his uncontroverted Statement of Material
Facts that Plaintiff was initially incarcerated in CCCF on March
4, 2015 (ECF No. 23-3 (Statement of Facts) at 2; see also ECF No.
23-2 (Def. Br.) at 9) and was a member of the certified class in
the matter of Dittimus-Bey. (ECF Nos. 23-3 at ¶9; 23-7 at 1-22.)
In Dittimus-Bey, the plaintiffs had alleged several conditions of
“unhealthy, unsafe, and unsanitary environment . . . [a]s a direct
result of severe overcrowding and understaffing” at CCCF. (ECF No.
23-7 (Amended Complaint) at 8; ECF No. 23-2 (Def. Br.) at 6
(“Plaintiffs in Dittimus-Bey alleged that policies and practices
created unconstitutional conditions, which included overcrowded
10

cells [and] inadequate sleeping arrangement[s] . . .”).) As noted
in the Dittimus-Bey Sixth and Amended Final Consent Decree, CCCF’s
population “reached a crisis point in early 2013” (ECF No. 23-8
(Consent Decree) at ¶35), after which the daily population at CCCF
was closely monitored and managed over time to appropriate levels
for resolution of the Dittimus-Bey claims. (Id. at ¶36–37.)
In this case, Defendant does not appear to contest Plaintiff’s
claim that he was housed at CCCF with two or three other men in a
cell designed for only two men total (ECF No. 1 at 6). Thus, the
Court will assume, for purposes of this Motion only, that Plaintiff
was “triple celled” at some point during the period of his March
2015 through July 2017 incarceration. However, as Defendant notes,
the Dittimus-Bey Sixth and Final Amended Consent Decree “indicates
[that]

the

overcrowding

issues

were

being

addressed

during

Plaintiff’s incarceration at the CCCF.” (ECF No. 23-2 (Def. Br.)
at 12.)
Defendant argues that, based on these facts and on Plaintiff’s
failure to provide evidence supporting his contentions, Plaintiff
fails to state a claim or raise a dispute of material fact as to
any Fourteenth Amendment violation. (ECF No. 23-2 (Def. Br.) at 914.) Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has adduced:
no proof of unconstitutional conditions (id. at 10–12); no proof
of injury or damages (id. at 11, 12); no evidence that Defendant
intended to punish Plaintiff or was deliberately indifferent to

11

(or was even aware of risk of serious harm from) the allegedly
constitutional violations (id. at 11, 12-13); and no evidence of
Defendant’s

individual

participation

or

acquiescence

in

the

alleged wrongs (id. at 13-14), as required by Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 535 (1979), Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d
Cir. 2007), and Rode v. Dellaciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988).
Defendant’s factual assertions, which are deemed undisputed,
indicate that entry of summary judgment is appropriate. The mere
fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a cell with more
persons than its intended design does not, on its own, rise to the
level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 348-50 (1981) (holding double-celling by itself did not
violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 F. App’x 554,
560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking does not constitute
punishment, because there is no ‘one man, one cell principle
lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment’”)
(quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 542)). More is needed to demonstrate
that such crowded conditions, for a pretrial detainee, “shock the
conscience,” and thus violate due process rights. See Hubbard v.
Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that due process
analysis requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations and
hardship

over

an

extended

period

of

time,

that

the

adverse

conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned

12

to them”). Here, Plaintiff has adduced no evidence that the
conditions he experienced while “triple celled” (ECF No. 1 at 6)
in a two-man unit were so severe that they “shock the conscience.”
Similarly, being a detainee in a unit housing two or three other
men in a cell designed for only two men total (id.) does not,
standing alone, rise to the level of a due process violation.
Defendant further asserts that, as a result of the DittimusBey class-action litigation addressing overcrowding and conditions
of confinement at CCCF, there has been a “reduction in [CCCF’s]
population and improvement of other conditions in [CCCF].” (ECF
No. 23-2 at 8.) Indeed, as a result of the Dittimus-Bey litigation2,
there has been a significant lessening of the crowding in CCCF and
improvements in other prison conditions. (ECF No. 23-8 (Consent
Decree) at ¶¶36-37.) When the Dittimus-Bey litigation commenced in
2005, CCCF’s average daily population was 1,848 inmates; by May of
2010, the average monthly population reached an all-time low of
1,232 inmates. (ECF No. 23-8 at ¶¶33-34.) Three months prior to
Plaintiff’s release from CCCF in September 2016 (ECF No. 23-2 at
8-9; ECF No. 7), CCCF’s population as of December 9, 2016 was at

2

Order Approving Amended Final Consent Decree, Dittimus-Bey v.
Taylor, No. 05-0063 (D.N.J. June 30, 2017); see also Dittimus-Bey
v. Taylor, 2013 WL 6022128 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2013); Dittimus-Bey v.
Taylor, 244 F.R.D. 284 (2007). The Court does not imply that
Plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief in this case (ECF No. 1 at
6-7) are barred by the class action settlement of Dittimus-Bey,
since that case only involved claims for injunctive relief.

13

1,160 -- in a facility designed for 1,267 persons. (ECF No. 23-8
(Consent Decree) at ¶¶33-34, 36.) While it is conceivable that an
individual

inmate

could

be

subjected

to

unconstitutional

conditions even at a jail that is continuously monitored and
operating within reasonable capacity limits, Plaintiff has not
adduced

any

evidence

that

he

has

actually

suffered

such

deprivation.
These undisputed facts refute any claim that Defendant or
other supervisors at CCCF were “deliberately indifferent” to the
alleged constitutional violations, which is the mental culpability
that must be proven to find liability under § 1983. See Jiminez v.
All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2007)
(describing the “deliberate indifference” standard). There is no
evidence of conduct that would tend to show deliberate indifference
on the part of Defendant. Thus, Defendant is entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s overcrowded conditions of confinement
Fourteenth Amendment claim.
In

addition,

Plaintiff’s

vague

and

cursory

allegations

regarding inadequate “dayroom” space and mold and insect infested
showers (ECF No. 1 at 6) essentially complain “of an inconvenient
and uncomfortable situation”; however, “the Constitution does not
mandate comfortable prisons.” Carson, 488 F. App’x at 560 (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349). Notably, in neither claim does Plaintiff
identify a single “basic human need” which he has been denied.

14

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,
685-88

(1978)).

reasonable

fact

Without
finder

more,
could

the

Court

conclude

cannot

that

say

these

that

a

conditions

deprived Plaintiff of any basic human needs. See Carter v. Owens,
2017 WL 4107204, at *10 (D.N.J. July 21, 2017) (finding that,
without

additional

details

about

the

nature

of

prisoner’s

inadequate “dayroom” space claim, prisoner “has not demonstrated
that denial of access to it was sufficiently serious to deprive
him of the minimal measure of life’s necessities”); Williams v.
Meisel, 2014 WL 4744561, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2014) (finding
that mold in showers did not amount to a constitutional violation
because the mold did not expose inmates to an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to future health). For example, Plaintiff adduces
no evidence that he was sickened by the conditions he describes,
that the crowding led to any assault by another inmate, or that he
was

significantly

Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s

sleep-deprived

Defendant
Fourteenth

is

due

entitled

Amendment

to

to

these

summary

claims

conditions.
judgment

involving

alleged

inadequate “dayroom” space and mold and insect infestation.
C.

WHETHER CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT MUST BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE HE IS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
In addition to the grounds discussed in Sections IV and

V(B) of this Opinion, Defendant also requests that this Court

15

on

grant him summary judgment on the basis that he is entitled to
qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability as long as their conduct “‘does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d
248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010). The qualified immunity test is twopronged: whether the pleadings allege that constitutional
violation occurred, and whether “reasonable officials could
fairly have known that their alleged conduct was illegal.”
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 (2001); Larsen v. Senate of
the Commonwealth of Pa., 154 F.3d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 1998).
Because it is clear that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a
basis for a constitutional violation, there is no need to
address whether a reasonable official would know his conduct was
unlawful, due to no proof of such illegality.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment is granted. An accompanying Order will be
entered.

March 22, 2018
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge

16