GUNN v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 18

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 10/23/2017. (tf, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

EUGENIA ARLENE GUNN,
1:16-cv-05313-NLH
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

APPEARANCES:
LAUREN S. TOVINSKY
JACOBS SCHWABLE & PETRUZELLI PC
10 MELROSE AVENUE
SUITE 340
CHERRY HILL, NJ 08003
On behalf of Plaintiff
ANTONIA MARIA ADAM
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
300 SPRING GARDEN STREET
6TH FLOOR
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19123
On behalf of Defendant
HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Section
205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), regarding Plaintiff’s application for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income
(“Social Security benefits”) under Title II and Title XVI of the
Social Security Act.

42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq.

The issue before

the Court is whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred
in finding that there was “substantial evidence” that Plaintiff
was not disabled at any time since her alleged onset date of
disability, March 4, 2011.

For the reasons stated below, this

Court will affirm that decision.
I.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 18, 2011, Plaintiff, Eugenia Arlene Gunn, who was

thirty-nine years old at the time, applied for benefits alleging
disability since March 4, 2011.

Plaintiff’s impairments include

lumbosacral strain, depression, and anxiety.

Plaintiff

previously worked as a child care provider.
After the state agency denied Plaintiff’s application
twice, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing.
before an ALJ was held on April 16, 2014.

A hearing

After the hearing,

the ALJ ordered a medical consultative examination, which
Plaintiff attended on June 3, 2014.

The ALJ conducted a

supplemental hearing on August 20, 2014, and on August 29, 2014,
the ALJ issued his decision, which determined that Plaintiff was
not disabled.

On April 28, 2016, the Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff’s request for review, rendering the ALJ’s decision the
final decision of the Commissioner.

Plaintiff brings this civil

action for review of the Commissioner’s decision.

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II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Congress provided for judicial
review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny a complainant’s
application for Disability Insurance Benefits.
Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995).

Ventura v.

A reviewing court

must uphold the Commissioner’s factual decisions where they are
supported by “substantial evidence.”

42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),

1383(c)(3); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir.
2001); Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000);
Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992).
Substantial evidence means more than “a mere scintilla.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. V. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

It

means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Id.

The inquiry is not

whether the reviewing court would have made the same
determination, but whether the Commissioner’s conclusion was
reasonable.

See Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir.

1988).
A reviewing court has a duty to review the evidence in its
totality.

See Daring v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir.

3

1984).

“[A] court must ‘take into account whatever in the

record fairly detracts from its weight.’” Schonewolf v.
Callahan, 972 F. Supp. 277, 284 (D.N.J. 1997) (quoting Willbanks
v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th
Cir. 1988) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. V. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 488 (1951)).
The Commissioner “must adequately explain in the record his
reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence.”
Ogden v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp. 273, 278 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (citing
Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1986)).

The Third

Circuit has held that an “ALJ must review all pertinent medical
evidence and explain his conciliations and rejections.”

Burnett

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000).
Similarly, an ALJ must also consider and weigh all of the nonmedical evidence before him.

Id. (citing Van Horn v. Schweiker,

717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 1983)); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d
700, 707 (3d Cir. 1981).
The Third Circuit has held that access to the
Commissioner’s reasoning is indeed essential to a meaningful
court review:
Unless the [Commissioner] has analyzed all
evidence and has sufficiently explained the
weight he has given to obviously probative
exhibits, to say that his decision is
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supported by substantial evidence approaches
an abdication of the court’s duty to
scrutinize the record as a whole to
determine whether the conclusions reached
are rational.

Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978).

Although

an ALJ, as the fact finder, must consider and evaluate the
medical evidence presented, Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 42, “[t]here
is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in its opinion every
tidbit of evidence included in the record,” Hur v. Barnhart, 94
F. App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004).

In terms of judicial review,

a district court is not “empowered to weigh the evidence or
substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder.”
Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182.

However, apart from the substantial

evidence inquiry, a reviewing court is entitled to satisfy
itself that the Commissioner arrived at his decision by
application of the proper legal standards.

Sykes, 228 F.3d at

262; Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir. 1983);
Curtin v. Harris, 508 F. Supp. 791, 793 (D.N.J. 1981).
B.

Standard for Disability Insurance Benefits

The Social Security Act defines “disability” for purposes
of an entitlement to a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits as the inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
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physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.
1382c(a)(3)(A).

See 42 U.S.C. §

Under this definition, a Plaintiff qualifies as

disabled only if his physical or mental impairments are of such
severity that he is not only unable to perform his past relevant
work, but cannot, given his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other type of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a
specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be
hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B)

(emphasis added).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations for
determining disability that require application of a five-step
sequential analysis.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

This five-step

process is summarized as follows:
1.

If the claimant currently is engaged in substantial
gainful employment, he will be found “not disabled.”

2.

If the claimant does not suffer from a “severe
impairment,” he will be found “not disabled.”

3.

If the severe impairment meets or equals a listed
impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1 and has lasted or is expected to last for a
continuous period of at least twelve months, the
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claimant will be found “disabled.”
4.

If the claimant can still perform work he has done in
the past (“past relevant work”) despite the severe
impairment, he will be found “not disabled.”

5.

Finally, the Commissioner will consider the claimant’s
ability to perform work (“residual functional
capacity”), age, education, and past work experience
to determine whether or not he is capable of
performing other work which exists in the national
economy. If he is incapable, he will be found
“disabled.” If he is capable, he will be found “not
disabled.”

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f).

Entitlement to benefits is

therefore dependent upon a finding that the claimant is
incapable of performing work in the national economy.
This five-step process involves a shifting burden of proof.
See Wallace v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 722 F.2d
1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1983).

In the first four steps of the

analysis, the burden is on the claimant to prove every element
of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

See id.

In

the final step, the Commissioner bears the burden of proving
that work is available for the Plaintiff: “Once a claimant has
proved that he is unable to perform his former job, the burden
shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there is some other
kind of substantial gainful employment he is able to perform.”
Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir. 1987); see Olsen v.

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Schweiker, 703 F.2d 751, 753 (3d Cir. 1983).
C.

Analysis

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of
disability.

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s

impairment of lumbosacral strain, depression, and anxiety to be
severe.

At step three the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s

severe impairments or her severe impairments in combination with
her other impairments did not equal the severity of one of the
listed impairments.

For step four, the ALJ determined that

Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) precluded her
from performing her past work as a child care provider, but that
she was capable of the full range of light, unskilled work (step
five).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to
properly evaluate all of Plaintiff’s mental impairments when
determining her RFC, (2) failing to appropriately weigh the
medical evidence, including one of Plaintiff’s treating
physicians, and (3) improperly disregarded the testimony of
Plaintiff’s husband and mother.

In support of her appeal of the

ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not consider
Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder, schizoaffective disorder and

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attention deficit hyperactivity disorder in assessing
Plaintiff’s RFC.

Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s

discussion of the Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”)
scores assigned to Plaintiff by her medical providers. 1
Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ improperly weighed the
medical evidence, and particularly erred by discounting the
opinions of Dr. Sastry, one of Plaintiff’s treating physicians.

1

As discussed below, over the course of treatment, Plaintiff was
assigned GAF scores of 75, 70, and 45. The GAF Scale ranges
from zero to one-hundred. An individual's “GAF rating is within
a particular decile if either the symptom severity or the level
of functioning falls within the range.”:
A GAF of 71-80 is “If symptoms are present, they are
transient and expectable reactions to psychosocial
stressors (e.g., difficulty concentrating after family
argument); no more than slight impairment in social,
occupational or school functioning (e.g., temporarily
failing behind in schoolwork).”
A GAF of 61-70 is “Some mild symptoms (e.g. depressed mood
and mild insomnia) OR some difficulty in social,
occupational, or school functioning (e.g., occasional
truancy, or theft within the household), but generally
functioning pretty well, has some meaningful interpersonal
relationships.”
A GAF of 41-50 is “Serious symptoms (e.g.. suicidal
ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent
shoplifting) OR any serious impairment in social,
occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends,
unable to keep a job).
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed. text rev. 2000) (“DSM–IV–
TR”) p. 34.
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Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider the
testimony of Plaintiff’s husband and mother relating to the
manifestation of Plaintiff’s mental impairments and the affect
her impairments had on her ability to function.

Because all of

Plaintiff’s arguments ultimately culminate into a challenge to
the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff is capable of performing
unskilled work 2 at the light work exertional level 3, the Court
will address Plaintiff’s arguments collectively.
It is important to reiterate the legal standards governing
Plaintiff’s appeal.

First, in making a RFC determination, the

2

Unskilled work “is work which needs little or no judgment to do
simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short period
of time.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568.
3

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 (“Physical exertion requirements. To
determine the physical exertion requirements of work in the
national economy, we classify jobs as sedentary, light, medium,
heavy, and very heavy. These terms have the same meaning as they
have in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, published by the
Department of Labor. In making disability determinations under
this subpart, we use the following definitions: . . . (b) Light
work. Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a
time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to
10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a
job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking
or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with
some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be
considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light
work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these
activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he
or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional
limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to
sit for long periods of time. . . .”).
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ALJ is required to do the following:
In determining whether you are disabled, we consider all
your symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which your
symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the
objective medical evidence and other evidence. By
objective medical evidence, we mean medical signs and
laboratory findings . . . . By other evidence, we mean . .
. statements or reports from you, your treating or
nontreating source, and others about your medical history,
diagnosis, prescribed treatment, daily activities, efforts
to work, and any other evidence showing how your
impairment(s) and any related symptoms affect your ability
to work. . . .
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.

The RFC reflects “what [the claimant] can

still do despite [his or her] limitations,” 20 C.F.R. §
416.945(a), and the controlling regulations are clear that the
RFC finding is a determination expressly reserved to the
Commissioner, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2),
404.1546(c), 416.946(c).
Second, a treating physician’s opinions are entitled to
“great weight,” but an ALJ may reduce his reliance upon a
treating physician’s opinions if it is inconsistent with other
medical evidence, and if he explains his reasoning.

Plummer v.

Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 439 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A]n ALJ is permitted
to accept or reject all or part of any medical source's opinion,
as long as the ALJ supports his assessment with substantial
evidence.”); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)
(“We are also cognizant that when the medical testimony or
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conclusions are conflicting, the ALJ is not only entitled but
required to choose between them. . . . [W]e need from the ALJ
not only an expression of the evidence s/he considered which
supports the result, but also some indication of the evidence
which was rejected.”); Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d
Cir. 1994) (holding that an ALJ “may properly accept some parts
of the medical evidence and reject other parts, but she must
consider all the evidence and give some reason for discounting
the evidence she rejects”).
Third, the issue of whether a claimant is “disabled” is
reserved for the Commissioner, and a physician's opinion thereon
is not entitled to any special significance.

See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(e).
And fourth, the pinnacle legal principal that applies to
the assessment of all of the other standards:

A district court

is not empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its
conclusions for those of the ALJ.

Hartzell v. Astrue, 741

F.Supp.2d 645, 647 (D.N.J. 2010) (citing Williams v. Sullivan,
970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992)).
With these standards in mind, the Court finds that the ALJ
did not err as Plaintiff contends, and finds that the ALJ’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence.

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As a primary

matter, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s assessment of her
physical impairments.

Instead, Plaintiff’s arguments focus on

the ALJ’s consideration of her mental impairments.

In that

analysis, the ALJ detailed Plaintiff’s treatment for her mental
impairments that began on March 3, 2011.

The medial records

show that from March 2011 through October 2011, Plaintiff
complained of anxiety, depression, auditory hallucinations,
irritability, and fatigue, and was diagnosed with bipolar
disorder.

By November 2, 2011, however, the medical records

show that Plaintiff’s treatment and medication regimen had
resulted in what Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Kammiel,
described as a “significant recovery.”

(R. at 58-59.)

Plaintiff’s stable state continued through July 2, 2012,
when an agency consultative physician examined her.

Dr. Coffey

found no evidence of a thought disorder, and noted that she was
compliant with Dr. Kammiel’s prescribed medications.

Dr. Coffey

diagnosed Plaintiff with “rule out attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder and personality disorder, NOS [not
otherwise specified], with borderline features.”

Dr. Coffey

noted that Plaintiff’s condition was considered to be behavioral
and her difficulties were primarily related to her personality
disorder.

(R. at 60.)

Two months later, Dr. McGarry examined

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Plaintiff and found her to be mildly anxious but quite pleasant.
(Id.)
In September 2013, Dr. Kammiel examined Plaintiff and
learned that Plaintiff had reduced her medication dosage by
half.

Under that reduced dosage, Plaintiff reported that she

was more edgy, easily agitated, unable to cope, moody and
overwhelmed.

Dr. Kammiel instructed Plaintiff to return to the

prescribed dosage of her medication which had been
therapeutically effective.

(Id.)

By November 2013, Plaintiff reported to another medical
provider that she was tolerating her medications, her affect and
mood were normal, and her memory was good.

(R. at 60-61.)

Dr.

Kammiel saw Plaintiff again on December 12, 2013, with Dr.
Kammiel observing that Plaintiff appeared clean, alert,
cooperative, mood was good, she had full range of affect, and
she was cooperative with no abnormal psychomotor activity.

Dr.

Kammiel noted that Plaintiff denied paranoia or hallucinations.
Dr. Kammiel determined Plaintiff to be stable and diagnosed
Plaintiff with schizoaffective disorder.

(R. at 61.)

On March 12, 2014, Plaintiff was examined by a different
medical provider, Ms. Hoffman, and reported that she had reduced
her medication by half for the past six months.

14

During that

time, Plaintiff reported symptoms similar to the time before she
was therapeutically medicated by Dr. Kammiel, and also reported
that her marriage was failing.

Ms. Hoffman diagnosed Plaintiff

with bipolar disorder, psychotic disorder, and anxiety disorder.
(Id.)

On March 14, 2014, Plaintiff saw Dr. Sastry, who directed

her to reduce her current medication dosage and begin on another
drug.

(Id.)

After relating Plaintiff’s mental health treatment, the ALJ
noted that while Plaintiff was compliant with the medication
prescribed by Dr. Kammiel, Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder remained
in remission and she did not decompensate.

The ALJ further

noted that Plaintiff’s marital problems and resulting difficulty
with her children she experienced by March 2014 reflected a
situational element to her increased symptomology, which was
compounded by Plaintiff’s lack of compliance with her
medications.

(R. at 64.)

The ALJ therefore determined that

during this period, Plaintiff must be evaluated as an
undertreated patient.

The ALJ further noted that Plaintiff had

not provided treatment records beyond her initial treatment with
Dr. Sastry.

Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that the records

reflected that Plaintiff “responded positively to previous
mental medication treatment regimens in the past with no

15

objective support in the medical record as a whole for a
conclusion that she would not be responsive in the future.”
(Id.)
The ALJ also specifically articulated the weight she
afforded to each medical provider’s opinion.

(R. at 64-67.)

First, the ALJ noted that over the course of treatment,
Plaintiff was assessed GAF scores of 60-75, which was consistent
to the periods when Plaintiff was compliant with her
medications, and assessed a GAF of 45, which was during the time
Plaintiff was not compliant.

The ALJ stated that GAF scores are

a subjective and not objective measure, and the “diagnosis and
assessment of a mental impairment under criteria found in the
DSM-IV are not entitled to great weight in making disability
determinations.”

The ALJ then assigned great weight to the 60-

75 GAF scores and little weight to the 45 GAF score.

(R. at

65.)
Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s rejection of using GAF
scores in making disability determinations, but then goes on to
assign levels of weight to the GAF scores.

The Court does not

find the ALJ’s decision to be in error on this issue.

The ALJ

stated that a particular diagnosis under the DSM-IV, which
considers a GAF score as a part of that diagnosis, is not

16

entitled to great weight – e.g., Plaintiff’s varying diagnoses
of bipolar disorder and schizoaffective disorder, among others. 4
The ALJ did not say that GAF scores by themselves should not be
afforded great weight.

Moreover, the ALJ did not accept or

reject the GAF scores standing alone, but rather found that
assigned GAF scores logically corresponded to Plaintiff’s
compliance with her medications, and that Plaintiff’s condition
during her periods of compliance weighed more heavily on the
ultimate disability determination than Plaintiff’s condition
during non-compliance.
Next, the ALJ determined that the opinions of Dr. Coffey
and Dr. Kammiel were afforded great weight because they
personally examined Plaintiff, Dr. Kammiel was Plaintiff’s
treating physician for several years, and their opinions were
consistent with the record as a whole.

(R. at 65-66.)

The ALJ

then afforded little weight to Dr. Sastry’s opinions, who first

4

This also refutes Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ did not
properly consider Dr. Coffey’s diagnosis “rule out attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder and personality disorder, [not
otherwise specified] NOS, with borderline features.” It is not
the name of a specific diagnosis that is relevant to the
disability determination, but rather how a person’s symptoms
affect a person’s ability to work. In this case, regardless of
whether Plaintiff was diagnosed with bipolar disorder,
schizoaffective disorder, ADHD, or a personality disorder, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s symptoms of her mental
impairments were limiting, but not wholly disabling.
17

saw Plaintiff in March 2014 while she was not in compliance with
Dr. Kammiel’s medication regimen, and opined on May 30, 2014
that Plaintiff was unable to engage in full-time work from May
30, 2014 to May 30, 2016.

(R. at 67.)

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should not have rejected Dr.
Sastry’s opinions in favor of Dr. Kammiel’s and Dr. Coffey’s,
and that the ALJ did not properly explain why he afforded more
weight to the latter two doctors’ opinions.
disagrees.

The Court

The ALJ was permitted to reject the opinions of

Plaintiff’s treating physician, so long as he explained why.

He

did so here, including fully crediting Plaintiff’s prior
treating physician with whom Plaintiff treated for several years
and obtained a “significant recovery.”

Additionally, the ALJ

was permitted to afford varying degrees of weight to the medical
evidence, and the ALJ did not err in this regard because he
explained why he weighted the opinions as he did.
After weighing the medical evidence, the ALJ then
determined that Plaintiff retained the following RFC:
The claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except that she could sit for 5 hours in an 8
hour work day, stand for 5 hours in an 8 hour work day and
sit for 5 hours in an 8 hour work day. She could
frequently reach, handle, finger, and feel. She could
frequently use her bilateral feet to operate foot controls.
She could frequently climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch
18

and crawl.

She is further limited to unskilled work.

(R. at 67.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not explain how Plaintiff
is able to perform light work, or why she can perform work that
is unskilled.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ came to this

conclusion without any discussion of how her various disorders
affect her cognitive and emotional limitations.

Plaintiff

further contends that the ALJ mostly rejected the testimony of
Plaintiff’s mother and husband in making Plaintiff’s RFC
assessment, and did not articulate why.
The Court does not agree that the ALJ’s RFC determination
essentially came out of thin air as argued by Plaintiff.

As

noted above, “light work” only concerns a job’s physical
exertional requirements, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567, and cognitive
and emotional limitations do not come into play with the
physical exertional considerations.

Plaintiff does not

challenge substantively the ALJ’s findings as to Plaintiff’s
physical exertional limitations.
As also noted above, unskilled work “is work which needs
little or no judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on
the job in a short period of time.”

20 C.F.R. § 404.1568.

The

record evidence detailed in the ALJ’s decision does not contain

19

any indication that Plaintiff’s mental impairments imposed a
non-exertional limitation in her ability to perform simple
duties that required little or no judgment.

Indeed, the

evidence shows that she can care for her two children and take
them to activities, shop in stores, prepare some meals, and
perform some household chores.

(R. at 52.)

The ALJ is not

required to perform a function-by-function assessment of
limitations Plaintiff does not have, and Plaintiff fails to
point to any evidence that the ALJ overlooked or discounted
relative to her ability to perform simple tasks.
Finally, the ALJ properly assessed the testimony of
Plaintiff’s mother and husband.

In the ALJ’s decision, he

assigned “some credit” to the opinion of Plaintiff’s husband and
mother (R. at 56-57), which he discussed earlier in the decision
(R. at 52-54).

Even though the ALJ did not restate every detail

related by Plaintiff’s husband and mother, the ALJ was not
required to do so, and he satisfied his burden of showing that
he considered their testimony and articulated the weight he was
affording their testimony.

See Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607,

612 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing SSR 06–03p) (providing that when
evaluating evidence from non-medical sources such as family or
friends, an ALJ should consider such factors as the nature and

20

extent of the relationship, whether the evidence is consistent
with other evidence, and any other factors that tend to support
or refute the evidence, and in doing so the ALJ must make
certain credibility determinations, and a reviewing court defers
to the ALJ’s assessment of credibility).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons expressed above, the ALJ’s determination
that Plaintiff was not totally disabled as of March 4, 2011
because Plaintiff retained the ability to perform unskilled
light work is supported by substantial evidence.

The decision

of the ALJ is affirmed.
An accompanying Order will be issued.

Date: October 23, 2017
At Camden, New Jersey

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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