BRILEY v. LYNCH et al

Filing 45

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 11/17/2017. (tf, n.m.)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

JAY BONANZA BRILEY,
Petitioner,
v.
MR. ORTIZ, Warden,
FCI Fort Dix,
Respondent.

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Civ. Action No. 16-5571 (RMB)

OPINION

BUMB, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon Petitioner Jay Bonanza
Briley’s (“Briley”) “Urgent Motion Request for Reconsideration of
Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus” (“Mot. for Reconsideration”)
(ECF

No.

34)

and

Briley’s

“Urgent

Motion

Request

to

Amend

Reconsideration of Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus” (“Mot. to
Amend”) (ECF No. 38). Respondent filed a brief in opposition to
Briley’s motion for reconsideration.
I.

(Resp’t Brief, ECF No. 36.)

BACKGROUND
On

September

13,

2016,

Petitioner

Jay

Bonanza

Briley

(“Briley”), incarcerated in FCI Fort Dix, in Fort Dix, New Jersey,
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) Briley contended that Federal Bureau of Prisons

(“BOP”) staff improperly renewed a “Greater Security Management
Variable” (“MGTV”) and later improperly applied a “Public Safety
Factor” (“PSF”) to his security classification, precluding him
from transferring to a minimum-security prison camp.
No. 1, ¶¶14, 16, 19, 25-27.)

(Pet., ECF

Briley sought immediate release to

a residential reentry center (“RRC”), and participation in the
Veteran
Program.

Outreach

Treatment

(Id., ¶33.)

Program

and

the

Veterans

Reentry

He further sought one year early release

based on his RDAP treatment.

(Id., ¶34.)

On April 21, 2017, this Court dismissed Briley’s § 2241
petition, holding Briley’s claims that the Federal Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) staff improperly renewed a MGTV and improperly
applied a PSF to his security classification are not cognizable
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

(Opinion, ECF No. 31 at 12-13, citing

Mundo–Violante, 654 F. App’x 49, 51 (3d Cir. 2016) (“neither BOP
policy nor the Due Process Clause gives a prisoner a liberty
interest in a particular housing location or custody level while
under the jurisdiction of correctional authorities”) (citations
omitted); Briley III, 632 F. App’x at 85 (noting that inmates have
no constitutional right to a particular security classification);
Anguiano-Sanchez v. Zickefoose, No. 12-0477 (RMB), 2013 WL 356012,
at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2013) (same); Ford v. Hughes, No. 11-7029
(RMB), 2012 WL 3228714, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2012) (same)).

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The

Court

unexhausted
release.

also

claims

dismissed

concerning

(Id. at 13, 14.)

without

RRC

prejudice

placement

and

Briley’s

RDAP

early

Briley filed a notice of appeal to the

Third Circuit Court of Appeals on May 5, 2017, and the Third
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court on August 15,
2017.

(ECF Nos. 33, 44).
In the meantime, on May 9, 2017, Briley filed the instant

motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 34), which he sought to amend
on May 30, 2017 (ECF No. 38.)

The Court grants Briley’s motion to

amend his motion for reconsideration (ECF No 38), and the Court
will consider the Administrative Remedy Response dated April 27,
2017,

submitted

by

Briley

after

filing

his

motion

for

reconsideration.
Briley seeks reconsideration based on the Court’s failure to
rule on his request to amend his petition to include a new exhibit,
Docket Entry No. 25.

(ECF No. 34.) Briley asserts this exhibit

was the lynchpin of his petition because it indicates that his
probation officer stated, "the medical evidence suggest with a
sufficient

indicia

impairments

that

of

reliability

manifested

that

subsequent

to

the
the

injuries
arrest

of

and
the

defendant are a direct result of being assaulted by the defendant."
(Id., ¶12.)

Briley claims this is evidence that the probation

officer failed to investigate alleged errors in his presentence
report. (Id., ¶1.)
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Briley

also

submitted

a

May

3,

2017

response

from

his

probation officer, stating she will not amend Briley’s presentence
report without an order from the sentencing judge. (Id., ¶¶ 2122.)

Finally, Briley asserts he has exhausted his administrative

remedies because he received a response from the Central Office on
February 19, 2017.

(Id., ¶25.)

For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies the motion
for reconsideration.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review

In the District of New Jersey, motions for reconsideration
are governed by Local Civil Rule 7.1(i), which provides:
Unless otherwise provided by statute or rule
(such as Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, 52 and 59), a
motion for reconsideration shall be served and
filed within 14 days after the entry of the
order or judgment on the original motion by
the Judge or Magistrate Judge. A brief setting
forth concisely the matter or controlling
decisions which the party believes the Judge
or Magistrate Judge has overlooked shall be
filed with the Notice of Motion.
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to present
newly discovered evidence or to correct manifest errors of law or
fact.

Howard Hess Dental Laboratories Inc. v. Dentsply Intern.,

Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Max's Seafood Café
v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Harsco
Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985)).

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Accordingly, a judgment may be altered or
amended if the party seeking reconsideration
shows at least one of the following grounds:
(1) an intervening change in the controlling
law; (2) the availability of new evidence that
was not available when the court granted the
motion for summary judgment; or (3) the need
to correct a clear error of law or fact or to
prevent manifest injustice.”
Id.
B.

Analysis

“Federal prisoners are ordinarily required to exhaust their
administrative remedies before petitioning for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to § 2241.”

Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons,

98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996); (citing Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682
F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981) (per curiam); United States v.
Gabor, 905 F.2d 76, 78 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1990); Sanchez v. Miller,
792 F.2d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056,
(1987)). Even assuming the newly-submitted Central Office remedy
response shows that Briley exhausted his administrative remedies
concerning his RRC placement and RDAP early release on April 27,
2017, Briley was required to exhaust his administrative remedies
before filing the instant petition on September 13, 2016.

This

Court properly dismissed the unexhausted claims without prejudice
to Briley filing a new petition on these issues after exhausting
his claims, and reconsideration is not warranted.
Furthermore, reconsideration is not warranted based on the
documents filed in Docket Entry 25 or the May 3, 2017 response
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from Briley’s probation officer.

Briley’s claims challenging his

security classification simply are not cognizable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. See Briley v. Att. Gen. U.S., 632 F. App’x 84, 85 (3d Cir.
2016) (dismissing Briley’s security classification claim in prior
habeas petition); Briley, No. 17-2029, 2017 WL 3483166, at *2
(“Briley's instant claims—that the BOP staff improperly renewed a
MGTV and improperly applied a PSF to his security classification—
are not cognizable in a § 2241 petition because he does not
challenge the basic fact or duration of his imprisonment.).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the motion to amend is
granted but the motion for reconsideration is denied.
An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: November 17, 2017
s/Renée Marie Bumb
Renée Marie Bumb
United States District Judge

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