BOWEN v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Filing 3

OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 6/29/17. (js)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

RYAN MATTHEW BOWEN,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY,

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06155 (JBS-AMD)
OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Ryan Matthew Bowen, Plaintiff Pro Se
573 Lambs Road
Pitman, NJ 08071
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Ryan Matthew Bowen seeks to bring a civil

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden
County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”). Complaint, Docket
Entry 1.
2.

Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis.
3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

dismiss the complaint with prejudice in part and without
prejudice in part for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
5.

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 19831 for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional

1

Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
2

rights. In order to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) a person deprived him of a federal
right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted
under color of state or territorial law.” Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
6.

Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983,

“[t]he term ‘persons’ includes local and state officers acting
under color of state law.” Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99
(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)).2 To
say that a person was “acting under color of state law” means
that the defendant in a § 1983 action “exercised power [that the
defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation
omitted). Generally, then, “a public employee acts under color
of state law while acting in his official capacity or while

the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2 “Person” is not strictly limited to individuals who are state
and local government employees, however. For example,
municipalities and other local government units, such as
counties, also are considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983.
See Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
690-91 (1978).
3

exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Id.
at 50.
7.

Because Plaintiff has not named a proper “person” as a

defendant alleged to have deprived him of a federal right, the
complaint does not meet the standards necessary to set forth a
prima facie case under § 1983. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages3

3

Plaintiff states as his requested relief, “Because I am filing
as part of a class act I’m asking for what is allotted for each
defendant as per settlement agreement.” Complaint § V. The Court
advises Plaintiff that he is one of thousands of members of a
certified class in the case on this court's docket entitled,
Dittimus-Bey v. Camden County Correctional Facility, Civil No.
05-cv-0063 (JBS), which is a class action case. The class
plaintiffs are all persons confined at the CCCF, as either
pretrial detainees or convicted prisoners, at any time from
January 6, 2005, until the present time. The class of
plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief about
unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the CCCF involving
overcrowding. That class action does not involve money damages
for individuals. A proposed final settlement of that case, which
describes the settlement in detail, was preliminarily approved
on February 22, 2017. At present, various measures already
undertaken in the Second and Third Consent Decrees under court
approval have reduced the jail population to fewer prisoners
than the intended design capacity for the jail. This has greatly
reduced or eliminated triple and quadruple bunking in two-person
cells, as explained in the proposed Sixth and Final Consent
Decree, which would continue those requirements under court
supervision for two more years. According to the Notice to all
class members that was approved in the Dittimus-Bey case on
February 22, 2017, any class member had the opportunity to
object to the proposed settlement by filing an objection in the
Dittimus-Bey case before April 24, 2017. No objections were
filed. Final approval is pending, and if approved, Plaintiff and
other class members will be barred from seeking injunctive or
declaratory relief for the period of time from January 6, 2005,
until the date of final approval, but the settlement does not
bar any individual class member from seeking money damages in an
individual case.
4

from CCCF for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. The CCCF, however, is not a “person” within the
meaning of § 1983; therefore, the claims against it must be
dismissed with prejudice. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F.
App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v.
Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)). Because the claims
against the CCCF must be dismissed with prejudice, the claims
may not proceed and Plaintiff may not name the CCCF as a
defendant.
8.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the complaint to name a

person or persons who were personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
9.

However, to the extent the complaint seeks relief for

conditions Plaintiff encountered during confinements ending
prior to September 30, 2014, those claims are barred by the
statute of limitations and must be dismissed with prejudice,
meaning that Plaintiff cannot recover for those claims because
they have been brought too late.4

4

Plaintiff filed this complaint on September 30, 2016.
5

10.

Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to his

claims occurred “between 2003 – 2016.” Complaint § III. Civil
rights claims under § 1983 are governed by New Jersey's
limitations period for personal injury and must be brought
within two years of the claim’s accrual. See Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d
181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). “Under federal law, a cause of action
accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the
injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa.
Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). The allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement Plaintiff encountered
at CCCF would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the
time of his detention; therefore, the statute of limitations for
some of Plaintiff’s claims may have expired as early as 2005,
well before this complaint was filed in September 2016.
Plaintiff therefore cannot recover for claims arising from
confinements ending prior to September 30, 2014.5

5

Although the Court may toll, or extend, the statute of
limitations in the interests of justice, certain circumstances
must be present before it can do so. Tolling is not warranted in
this case because the state has not “actively misled” Plaintiff
as to the existence of his cause of action, there are no
extraordinary circumstances that prevented Plaintiff from filing
his claim, and there is nothing to indicate Plaintiff filed his
claim on time but in the wrong forum. See Omar v. Blackman, 590
F. App’x 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014).
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11.

If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, he

therefore should focus only on facts that occurred during
confinements ending on or subsequent to September 30, 2014. In
the fact section of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges: “While
incarcerated at CCJ, or Camden County Correctional Facility, I
was made to sleep on the floor as a fifth man in a two man cell.
I woke up to a drug addicts feces all over my legs as a result
of heroin withdrawal. The guards knew enough to joke about the
smell, but not to care enough to let us out.” Complaint § III.
Plaintiff further states: “I was denied a shower, let alone
medical attention for having diahreah [sic] on my legs.” Id.
§ IV. However, Plaintiff does not allege when these events took
place and, given Plaintiff’s broad and vague allegation
regarding when the events giving rise to his claims occurred, it
is unclear from the face of the complaint whether they occurred
outside of the statute of limitations. Construing the complaint
liberally and granting Plaintiff all reasonable inferences,
these claims therefore will be dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff may provide greater factual detail with respect to
these allegations if he elects to file an amended complaint
naming a proper defendant or defendants and if these events

7

occurred within the statute of limitations, i.e., during
confinement(s) that ended on or after September 30, 2014.6
12.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself.7 Id.
13.

For the reasons stated above, the claims arising from

Plaintiff’s confinements ending prior to September 30, 2014, are

6

The Court does not presently address whether the facts alleged
in the complaint are enough to support an inference that a
constitutional violation has occurred. Because Plaintiff has not
named a proper defendant and because some unknown portion of
Plaintiff’s claims appear to be barred by the statute of
limitations, the complaint must be dismissed without prejudice
in any event. It is therefore not necessary for the Court to
make constitutional findings at this time. See Woodall v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 249 (3d Cir. 2005) (declining
to address constitutional issues where it was unnecessary to do
so because disposition of case could be based on other grounds)
(citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347
(1936)).
7 The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
8

barred by the statute of limitations and therefore are dismissed
with prejudice. The remainder of the complaint, insofar as it
seeks relief for conditions Plaintiff encountered during
confinements ending on or subsequent to September 30, 2014, is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The
Court will reopen the matter in the event Plaintiff files an
amended complaint within the time allotted by the Court.
14.

An appropriate order follows.

June 29, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge

9