BROWN v. CAMDEN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 5/31/2017. (tf, n.m.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
NATHANIEL C. BROWN,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06223 (JBS-AMD)
OPINION
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Nathaniel C. Brown, Plaintiff Pro Se
2011 Ferry Ave, Apt D12
Camden, NJ 08104
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.
Plaintiff Nathaniel C. Brown seeks to bring a civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden
County Department of Corrections (“CCDOC”) for allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket
Entry 1.
2.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review
complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
3.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.
The present Complaint does not allege sufficient facts
to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional
violation has occurred in order to survive this Court’s review
under § 1915. Even accepting the statements in Plaintiff’s
Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there is not
enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional
violation has occurred.
5.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim1, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
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“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000));
Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)).
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factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
6.
With respect to factual allegations giving rise to his
claims, Plaintiff states: “Had to sleep on the floor multiple
time and I have sickle cell anemia I had to go to medical time
after time and being on the cold floor with no pillow half
blankets and when I first got lock up it was 4 people in a cell
I had to sleep next to the t[oilet].” Complaint § III(C).
7.
Plaintiff states this occurred while he was detained
in CCDOC in 2007, 2008, 2010, February 2011, March 28, 2012, and
June 2016. Id. § III(B).
8.
Plaintiff contends that he “received folic acid and
Motrin for pain but due to being on the floor and it being so
cold my pains increased.” Id. § IV.
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9.
With respect to requested relief, Plaintiff seeks
“monetary compensation.” Id. § V.
10.
Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a
civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
prison overcrowding, any such purported claims must be dismissed
because the Complaint does not set forth sufficient factual
support for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation
has occurred.
11.
The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily
in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
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conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the length of the
confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement, etc.
12.
Moreover, to the extent the complaint seeks relief for
conditions Plaintiff encountered during periods of confinement
ending prior to September 30, 2014, those claims are barred by
the statute of limitations and must be dismissed with prejudice,
meaning that Plaintiff cannot recover for those claims because
they have been brought too late.2 Civil rights claims under
§ 1983 are governed by New Jersey's limitations period for
personal injury and must be brought within two years of the
claim’s accrual. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985);
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010).
“Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff
knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is
based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480
(3d Cir. 2014).
2
Plaintiff filed this complaint on September 30, 2016.
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13.
Plaintiff alleges the events giving rise to his claims
occurred in 2007, 2008, 2010, February 2011, March 28, 2012 and
June 2016. Complaint § III. However, all but the incarceration
of June 2016 occurred more than two years prior to the filing of
Plaintiff’s complaint. The allegedly unconstitutional conditions
of confinement at CCDOC, namely the overcrowding, would have
been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of his
detention; therefore, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s
claims arising from his incarcerations from 2007, 2008, 2010,
February 2011, and March 28, 2012 expired well before this
complaint was filed in 2016. Plaintiff therefore cannot recover
for these claims.3
14.
As Plaintiff may be able to amend his complaint to
address the deficiencies noted by the Court, the Court shall
grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of
the date of this order. However, in the event Plaintiff does
elect to file an amended complaint, he should focus only on the
facts of his confinement from June 2016. Because Plaintiff’s
3
Although the Court may toll, or extend, the statute of
limitations in the interests of justice, certain circumstances
must be present before it can do so. Tolling is not warranted in
this case because the state has not “actively misled” Plaintiff
as to the existence of his cause of action, there are no
extraordinary circumstances that prevented Plaintiff from filing
his claim, and there is nothing to indicate Plaintiff filed his
claim on time but in the wrong forum. See Omar v. Blackman, 590
F. App’x 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014).
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earlier claims are barred by the statute of limitations and must
be dismissed with prejudice, Plaintiff may not assert those
claims in an amended complaint.
15.
Additionally, it should be noted the CCDOC is not a
separate legal entity from Camden County and is therefore not
independently subject to suit. See Bermudez v. Essex Cty.
D.O.C., No. 12-6035, 2013 WL 1405263, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 4,
2013) (citing cases). Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to
impose liability on Camden County.
16.
“There is no respondeat superior theory of municipal
liability, so a city may not be held vicariously liable under §
1983 for the actions of its agents. Rather, a municipality may
be held liable only if its policy or custom is the ‘moving
force’ behind a constitutional violation.” Sanford v. Stiles,
456 F.3d 298, 314 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). See also Collins
v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992) (“The city
is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the constitutional
torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly
said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.”).
17.
Plaintiff must plead facts showing that the relevant
Camden County policy-makers are “responsible for either the
affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a wellsettled custom.” Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d
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Cir. 1990).4 In other words, Plaintiff must set forth facts
supporting an inference that Camden County itself was the
“moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violation.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 689.
18.
In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he
should include specific facts, such as the dates and length of
confinement(s), whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
and any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement. Conclusory statements are not enough.
19.
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint
is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
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“Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the
action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.
Government custom can be demonstrated by showing that a given
course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or
authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually
to constitute law.” Kirkland v. DiLeo, 581 F. App'x 111, 118 (3d
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original).
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allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
20.
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The
Court will reopen the matter in the event Plaintiff files an
amended complaint within the time allotted by the Court.
21.
For the reasons stated above, the claims arising from
Plaintiff’s 2007, 2008, 2010, February 2011 and March 28, 2012
confinements are barred by the statute of limitations and
therefore are dismissed with prejudice. The remainder of the
complaint is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. The Court will reopen the matter in the event Plaintiff
files an amended complaint within the time allotted by the
Court.
22.
An appropriate order follows.
May 31, 2017
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
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