SABB v. MS. COHEN
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 10/17/2016. (TH, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
WILLIE SABB,
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Plaintiff,
v.
MS. COHEN, WARDEN, ATLANTIC
COUNTY JAIL AND CLASSIFICATION
OFFICER,
Defendants.
CIV. NO. 16-6290(RMB)
OPINION
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff’s submission
of a civil rights action alleging he is being held in Atlantic County
Jail past his maximum expiration date. (Compl., ECF No. 1). The
complaint is accompanied by a properly completed application to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Plaintiff’s IFP application establishes his financial eligibility
for IFP status, and his application will be granted.
I.
SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) and § 1915A
Plaintiff may not have known when he submitted his Complaint
that even if IFP status is granted, he must pay the filing fee in
installments, and that even if the full filing fee, or any part of
it, has been paid, the Court must dismiss the case if it finds that
the action is: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim
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upon which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against
a
defendant
who
is
immune
from
such
relief.
28
U.S.C.
§§
1915(e)(2)(B), 1915(A). If the Court dismisses the case for any of
these reasons, the Act does not permit the prisoner to get his filing
fee back.
A.
The Complaint
Plaintiff alleges:
The Warden and her classification officer did
not see to it that my time was calculated
correctly and I was released on my max. sentence
date, thereby keeping me in jail past my max.
date.
(Compl., ¶3(B)).
Plaintiff contends that after his jail credits were deducted,
he had only seventeen days left to serve. (Id., ¶4.) Plaintiff said
Defendants told him the credits did not matter. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks
damages, and if he remains in jail after the Complaint is received
by the Court, he seeks release from custody. (Id., ¶5.)
A prisoner cannot bring a § 1983 damages claim and seek release
from confinement in a civil rights action. See Nelson v. Campbell,
541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004)(Ҥ 1983 must yield to the more specific
federal habeas statute, with its attendant procedural and exhaustion
requirements, where an inmate seeks injunctive relief challenging
. . . the duration of his sentence.”) This case will proceed as
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Plaintiff’s § 1983 action for damages. If Plaintiff wishes to file
a petition seeking release from custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
after exhausting his state court remedies, he must file a habeas
petition in a new action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)(“[a]n
application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody . . . shall not be granted unless it appears that . . . the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State.”)
B.
Standard of Review
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.)
“[A] court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint.” Id. A court need not accept legal conclusions as
true. Id. Legal conclusions, together with threadbare recitals of
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the elements of a cause of action, do not suffice to state a claim.
Id. Thus, “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin
by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at
679. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. If
a complaint can be remedied by an amendment, a district court may
not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but must permit the
amendment. Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d
Cir. 2002).
C.
Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
“[A] plaintiff seeking to hold an individual liable under § 1983
must establish that she was deprived of a federal constitutional or
statutory right by a state actor.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646
(3d. Cir. 2009). “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights
and does not provide redress for common law torts—the plaintiff must
allege a violation of a federal right.” Berg v. County of Allegheny,
219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2000)(citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 146 (1979)). A court reviewing a § 1983 claim must “identify
the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been
violated.” Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
841 n. 5 (1998)).
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“[I]mprisonment
beyond
one's
term
constitutes
punishment
within the meaning of the eighth amendment.” Sample v. Diecks, 885
F.2d 1099, 1108 (3d Cir. 1989)(citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,
685 (1978)). Incarceration beyond the term established by the state
is not justified punishment. Id. However, inadvertent mistakes may
occur. Id. at 108. “Such accidents or mistakes are a necessary cost
of any prison system; they therefore are not ‘repugnant to the
conscience of mankind.’” Id. at 108-09 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
323, (1937)).
“[T]here can be no eighth amendment liability in [the context
of confining a prisoner beyond his maximum sentence date] in the
absence of a showing of deliberate indifference on the part of the
defendant
to
whether
the
plaintiff
suffers
an
unjustified
deprivation of his liberty.” Id. at 1100. To state a claim, a
plaintiff must first allege facts indicating:
that a prison official had knowledge of the
prisoner's problem and thus of the risk that
unwarranted punishment was being, or would be,
inflicted. Second, the plaintiff must show that
the official either failed to act or took only
ineffectual
action
under
circumstances
indicating that his or her response to the
problem
was
a
product
of
deliberate
indifference to the prisoner's plight. Finally,
the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal
connection between the official's response to
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the problem and the
unjustified detention.
infliction
of
the
Among
the
circumstances
relevant
to
a
determination of whether the requisite attitude
was present are the scope of the official's
duties and the role he or she has played in the
everyday life of the prison. Obviously, not
every official who is aware of a problem
exhibits indifference by failing to resolve it.
A warden, for example, although he may have
ultimate responsibility for seeing that
prisoners are released when their sentences are
served,
does
not
exhibit
deliberate
indifference by failing to address a sentence
calculation problem brought to his attention
when there are procedures in place calling for
others to pursue the matter. On the other hand,
if a prison official knows that, given his or
her job description or the role he or she has
assumed in the administration of the prison, a
sentence calculation problem will not likely be
resolved unless he or she addresses it or refers
it to others, it is far more likely that the
requisite attitude will be present.
Id.
Here, Plaintiff alleges the warden and classification officer
told him the credits, which he believes entitle him to release from
jail, do not matter. This statement is insufficient to show
deliberate
indifference
because
it
does
not
establish
that
Defendants knew Plaintiff was being held beyond his release date.
For example, if Plaintiff misunderstood how the credits are applied
and how the release date is calculated, it could be that he is
incorrect about his maximum release date and that is why the
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defendants told him the credits do not matter. Plaintiff must allege
additional facts, if warranted, to establish deliberate indifference
by the warden and classification officer.
III. CONCLUSION
The Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice because
Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to establish deliberate
indifference by the defendants. Plaintiff shall have thirty days from
the date of this Order to reopen this case by filing an Amended
Complaint.
Dated: October 17, 2016
s/RENÉE MARIE BUMB__________
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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