JOHNSON v. CAMDEN CORR FACILITY

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 3/7/2017. (rtm, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

RASHON JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06352(JBS-AMD)

CAMDEN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
WARDEN JAMES OWENS,
WARDEN J. TAYLOR, CAMDEN
BOARD OF FREEHOLDERS, CITY
OF CAMDEN, and METRO
POLICE DEPARTMENT,

OPINION

Defendants.
APPEARANCES
Rashon Johnson, Plaintiff Pro Se
706 Berkley Street
Camden, NJ 081041
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Rashon Johnson seeks to bring a civil rights

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden
Correctional Facility (“CCF”), Warden James Owens (“Owens”),
Warden J. Taylor (“Taylor”), Camden Board of Freeholders
(“BOF”), City of Camden (“City”), and Metro Police Department
(“MPD”) for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
2.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any

claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will: (1)

dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to claims made against
CCF; and (2) dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure
to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.

First, the Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice

as to claims made against CCF because it is not a “state actor”
within the meaning of § 1983. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F.
App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an
entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer
v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern
State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989)
(correctional facility is not a “person” under § 1983).
5.

Second, as to claims against the City and BOF,

Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to impose liability on
these defendants. “There is no respondeat superior theory of
municipal liability, so a city may not be held vicariously
liable under § 1983 for the actions of its agents. Rather, a
municipality may be held liable only if its policy or custom is
the ‘moving force’ behind a constitutional violation.” Sanford
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v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 314 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Monell v.
N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). See
also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992)
(“The city is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the
constitutional torts of its agents: It is only liable when it
can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.”).
Plaintiff must plead facts showing that the relevant Camden
County policy-makers are “responsible for either the affirmative
proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a well-settled
custom.” Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990).1
In other words, Plaintiff must set forth facts supporting an
inference that Camden County itself was the “moving force”
behind the alleged constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at
689. As Plaintiff may be able to amend his Complaint to address
the deficiencies noted by the Court, the Court shall grant
Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of the
date of this order.

1

“Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the
action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.
Government custom can be demonstrated by showing that a given
course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or
authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually
to constitute law.” Kirkland v. DiLeo, 581 F. App'x 111, 118 (3d
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original).
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6.

Third, construing the Complaint to assert claims

against Camden County Police (Complaint at 1 (naming “Metro
Police Department” as a defendant)), the Complaint must
similarly be dismissed as to claims made against MPD. “[A] city
police department is a governmental sub-unit that is not
distinct from the municipality of which it is a part.” Jackson
v. City of Erie Police Dep't, 570 F. Appx. 112, 114 n.2 (3d Cir.
2014) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Camden County Police
(i.e., “Metro Police Department”) are not distinct from Camden
County, and the Complaint asserts no facts alleging that Camden
County was the “moving force” behind an alleged constitutional
violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 689. As Plaintiff may be able to
amend his Complaint to address the deficiencies noted by the
Court, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
7.

Fourth, the Complaint must be dismissed as to claims

made against Owens and Taylor because the Complaint does “[not]
allege[] any personal involvement by [the wardens] in any
constitutional violation – a fatal flaw, since ‘liability in a §
1983 suit cannot be predicated solely on the operation of
respondeat superior.’” Baker v. Flagg, 439 F. App’x 82, 84 (3d
Cir. 2011) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207
(3d Cir. 1988)). “[Plaintiff’s] complaint contains no
allegations regarding [the] Warden[s]. ‘Because vicarious
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liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must
plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
official's own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.’ Thus, [plaintiff] failed to state a claim against
[the] Warden.” Bob v. Kuo, 387 F. App’x 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)). As
Plaintiff may be able to amend his Complaint to address the
deficiencies noted by the Court, the Court shall grant Plaintiff
leave to amend the Complaint within 30 days of the date of this
order.
8.

Finally, for the reasons set forth below, the Court

will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to
state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii). The Complaint does
not allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference
that a constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive
this Court’s review under § 1915. Even accepting the statements
in Plaintiff’s Complaint as true for screening purposes only,
there is not enough factual support for the Court to infer a
constitutional violation has occurred.
9.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim2, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to

2

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 165

show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
10.

With respect to alleged facts giving rise to his

claims, Plaintiff states: “[I]t was 4 other inmates besides
myself on the floor.” Complaint § III(C).

1289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000));
Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)).
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11.

Plaintiff alleges that the purported events giving

rise to these claims occurred “on or [a]round 2009, 2010, 2011,
2012, 2013 [and] 2014.” Id. § III(B).
12.

With respect to alleged injuries from these events,

Plaintiff states: “I was injured hitting my head on [the] toilet
seat and the table from sleeping on the floor.” Id. § IV.
13.

With respect to requested relief, Plaintiff seeks “in

the excess of about $2.5 mill[ion].” Id. § V.
14.

These claims must be dismissed because the Complaint

does not set forth enough factual support for the Court to infer
that a constitutional violation has occurred.
15.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
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requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the length of the
confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement, etc.
16.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to

particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by
specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, and
that were excessive in relation to their purposes. To that end,
the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint
within 30 days of the date of this order.3
17.

Plaintiff is further advised that any amended

complaint must plead specific facts regarding the conditions of
confinement. In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint,
Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable

3

The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
8

inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order
to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.4
18.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended

4

To the extent the Complaint seeks relief for conditions
Plaintiff encountered prior to September 28, 2014, those claims
are barred by the statute of limitations. Claims brought under §
1983 are governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period
for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276
(1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2010). “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the
action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d
472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). The allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement would have been immediately apparent
to Plaintiff; therefore, the statute of limitations on some of
Plaintiff’s claims expired two years after release from
incarceration. In the event Plaintiff elects to file an amended
complaint, it should be limited to confinements in which
Plaintiff was released after September 28, 2014.

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complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
19.

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is: (a)

dismissed with prejudice as to the CCF; and (b) dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim. An appropriate
order follows.

March 7, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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