STOKES v. CAMDEN COUNTY

Filing 3

OPINION FILED. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 3/9/17. (js)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

GREEN STOKES, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06365(JBS-AMD)
OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Green Stokes, Jr., Plaintiff Pro Se
923 White Horse Pike, Apt. C
Haddon Township, NJ 08107
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Green Stokes, Jr. seeks to bring a civil

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Camden
County for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement
in the Camden County Jail. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
2.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim, a complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
5.

Plaintiff alleges that he experienced unconstitutional

conditions of confinement during his detention at the Camden
County Correction Facility in “2013, 2011, a lot more dates. [I]
can’t remember all of them.” Complaint § III(B). He states: “I
was arrested and held in CCCF on different occasion[s][.] [I]
slep[t] on the floor most of the time.” Id. § III(C).
6.

Plaintiff does not identify or otherwise describe any

injury sustained in connection with the alleged events. Id. § IV
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(blank). Plaintiff does not specify or otherwise describe any
requested relief. Id. § V (blank).
7.

Even accepting these statements as true for screening

purposes only, there is not enough factual support for the Court
to infer a constitutional violation has occurred.
8.

Even construing the Complaint to allege

unconstitutional conditions of confinement arising from
purported overcrowding from Plaintiff “sleep[ing] on the floor
most of the time” (Complaint § III(C)), the mere fact that an
individual is lodged temporarily in a cell with more persons
than its intended design does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by itself did not violate
Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 F. App'x 554, 560
(3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking does not constitute
punishment, because there is no ‘one man, one cell principle
lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’”
(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979))). More is
needed to demonstrate that such crowded conditions, for a
pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and thus violates due
process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d
Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis requires courts to
consider whether the totality of the conditions “cause inmates
to endure such genuine privations and hardship over an extended
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period of time, that the adverse conditions become excessive in
relation to the purposes assigned to them.”). Some relevant
factors are the length of confinement, whether a plaintiff was a
pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner, and specific
individuals who were involved in creating or failing to remedy
the conditions of confinement.
9.

In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he

should include specific facts, such as the dates and length of
confinement, whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
and any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement.
10.

Moreover, Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to

impose liability on Camden County. “There is no respondeat
superior theory of municipal liability, so a city may not be
held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of its
agents. Rather, a municipality may be held liable only if its
policy or custom is the ‘moving force’ behind a constitutional
violation.” Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 314 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
691 (1978)). See also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503
U.S. 115, 122 (1992) (“The city is not vicariously liable under
§ 1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only
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liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the
wrongdoer.”).
11.

Plaintiff must plead facts showing that the relevant

Camden County policy-makers are “responsible for either the
affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a wellsettled custom.” Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d
Cir. 1990).1 In other words, Plaintiff must set forth facts
supporting an inference that Camden County itself was the
“moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violation.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 689.
12.

As Plaintiff may be able to amend his Complaint to

address the deficiencies noted by the Court, the Court shall
grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of
the date of this order.
13.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed,2 the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the

1

“Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the
action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.
Government custom can be demonstrated by showing that a given
course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or
authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually
to constitute law.” Kirkland v. DiLeo, 581 F. App'x 111, 118 (3d
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original).
2 The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
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amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted3 must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id.
14.

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is

dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The
Court will reopen the matter in the event Plaintiff files an
amended complaint within the time allotted by the Court.

3

To the extent the Complaint seeks relief for conditions
Plaintiff encountered prior to October 2, 2014, those claims are
barred by the statute of limitations. Claims brought under §
1983 are governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period
for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276
(1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2010). “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the
action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d
472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). The allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement would have been immediately apparent
to Plaintiff; therefore, the statute of limitations on some of
Plaintiff’s claims expired two years after release from
incarceration. In the event Plaintiff elects to file an amended
complaint, it should be limited to confinements from which
Plaintiff was released after October 2, 2014.
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15.

An appropriate order follows.

March 9, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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