CAMACHO v. CAMDEN COUNTY

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 1/9/2017. (TH, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JUAN A. CAMACHO,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06479(JBS-AMD)
OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Juan A. Camacho, Plaintiff Pro Se
14 Oak Walk
Camden, NJ 08104
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Juan A. Camacho seeks to bring a civil

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Camden
County for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement
in the Camden County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”). Complaint,
Docket Entry 1.
2.

Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is

subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

dismiss the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A]
pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
5.

Plaintiff alleges he experienced unconstitutional

conditions of confinement during his detention at the CCCF in
2015. Complaint § III. He states: “sleeping housing on floor
facilities.” Id. Plaintiff also states that he had a preexisting injury to his knee, for which his healing process was
prolonged, and that he requested but was never given a knee
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brace and that his knee was “w[ith]out protection” for 37 days.
Id. § IV. Even accepting these statements as true for screening
purposes only, there is not enough factual support for the Court
to infer a constitutional violation has occurred.
6.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the dates and length of
the confinement(s), whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, etc.
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7.

In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he

should include specific facts, such as the dates and length of
his confinement, whether he was a pretrial detainee or convicted
prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved in creating
or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement, and any
other relevant facts regarding the conditions of confinement.
8.

There are also not enough facts for the Court to infer

Plaintiff was denied adequate medical care. In order to set
forth a cognizable claim for a violation of his right to
adequate medical care, an inmate must allege: (1) a serious
medical need; and (2) behavior on the part of prison officials
that constitutes deliberate indifference to that need. See
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Natale v. Camden
Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). A mere
assertion that Plaintiff did not receive a knee brace is
insufficient to meet the pleading standard in the absence of
additional facts. If he wishes to pursue this claim, Plaintiff
should provide facts supporting both of the requirements in his
amended complaint.
9.

Moreover, Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to

impose liability on Camden County. “There is no respondeat
superior theory of municipal liability, so a city may not be
held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of its
agents. Rather, a municipality may be held liable only if its
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policy or custom is the ‘moving force’ behind a constitutional
violation.” Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 314 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
691 (1978)). See also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503
U.S. 115, 122 (1992) (“The city is not vicariously liable under
§ 1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only
liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the
wrongdoer.”).
10.

Plaintiff must plead facts showing that the relevant

Camden County policy-makers are “responsible for either the
affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a wellsettled custom.” Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d
Cir. 1990).1 In other words, Plaintiff must set forth facts
supporting an inference that Camden County itself was the
“moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violation.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 689.
11.

As Plaintiff may be able to amend his complaint to

address the deficiencies noted by the Court, the Court shall

1

“Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the
action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.
Government custom can be demonstrated by showing that a given
course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or
authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually
to constitute law.” Kirkland v. DiLeo, 581 F. App'x 111, 118 (3d
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original).
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grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of
the date of this order.
12.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed,2 the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id.
13.

For the reasons stated above, the complaint is

dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The
Court will reopen the matter in the event Plaintiff files an
amended complaint within the time allotted by the Court.
14.

An appropriate order follows.

January 9, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

2

The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
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