ALPHEAUS v. CAMDEN COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT et al

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 8/22/17. (jbk, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JANNAI ALPHEAUS,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06483(JBS-AMD)

v.
CAMDEN COUNTY POLICE
DEPARTMENT; CAMDEN COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; CAMDEN
COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT;
COUNTY OF CAMDEN; CITY OF
CAMDEN,

OPINION

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
Jannai Alpheaus, Plaintiff Pro Se
2642 Baird Boulevard, Apt. 3
Camden, NJ 08105

SIMANDLE, District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Jannai Alpheaus seeks to bring a civil rights
Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Camden County
Police Department (“CCPD”), Camden County Correctional Facility
(“CCCF”), Camden County Sheriff’s Department, County of Camden
(“County”, City of Camden (“City”). Complaint, Docket Entry 1.1

1

This Court notes that Plaintiff filed a separate complaint
under Docket No. 17-0180. That matter was dismissed on May 31,
2017 under Docket No. 17-cv-0180, Docket Entry 4.

BACKGROUND
The following factual allegations are taken from the
complaint and are accepted for purposes of this screening only.
The Court has made no findings as to the truth of Plaintiff’s
allegations.
Plaintiff alleges he endured unconstitutional conditions of
confinement in CCCF during numerous periods of pretrial
detention: January 15, 2001; June 15, 2010 to July 6, 2010;
February 25 to March 7, 2013; March 31 to April 18, 2013; August
10 to 29, 2013; March 18 to April 8, 2014; and April 22 to June
12, 2014. Inmate Recidivism Sheet, Exhibit to Complaint.
Plaintiff alleges: “I was subjected to several uncivil housing
conditions during each individual stay from 2001 to 2016. I was
placed in a 2 man cell each time with 3-4 inmates, where I was
made to sleep on the floor, at times under tables, bunks, and
near toilets.” Complaint § III(C).
Plaintiff further alleges he was denied water and a
functioning toilet for two weeks in a cell with 3 inmates, and
again was placed in a cell with a non-functioning toilet for 2
weeks. Plaintiff alleges that requests for the non-functioning
toilet were denied by maintenance, correction officers and
sergeants.

2

Plaintiff also alleges that he was held after he was
supposed to be released on both September 6 and September 20,
2016. Id.
Plaintiff further alleges he was provided “substandard
generic, low quality insulin which caused my blood sugar to drop
dramatically.” Id. § IV. For this claim, Plaintiff requests
compensation for “improper medical treatment.” Complaint § V.
Plaintiff also alleges that on June 2, 2015, he sustained
facial injuries after being assaulted by an inmates as several
officers on post “were unattentive [sic] and not available.” Id.
Plaintiff further alleges that on April 5, 2015,
correctional officers at CCCF performed an illegal strip search
on him after he was accused of theft of facial razors. He
specifically alleged that Officer Sergeant John Scott Stinsman
ordered the illegal search. He further alleges that Officer
Rentas made the false allegation after he had collected razors
from his cell which precipitated the search. Plaintiff further
alleges that Officer Riviera and Corderro performed illegal
searches, in which he was “stripped naked.” Id.
Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation between one and five
million dollars. Complaint § V.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review complaints
prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in
3

forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is
frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua
sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will: (1)
dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to claims made against
CCCF; and (2) dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for
failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).2
DISCUSSION
A. Claims Against CCCF: Dismissed With Prejudice
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 19833
for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. In
order to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983, a plaintiff
must show: “(1) a person deprived him of a federal right; and
(2) the person who deprived him of that right acted under color

2

Plaintiff filed another complaint under Docket 17-0180 which
was dismissed for failure to state a claim on May 31, 2017.
Should Plaintiff elect to amend this complaint he is directed to
amend his complaint under this docket number, 16-6483.
3 Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
4

of state or territorial law.” Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47
F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.
635, 640 (1980)).
Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983, “[t]he
term ‘persons’ includes local and state officers acting under
color of state law.” Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99 (3d
Cir. 1996) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)).4 To say
that a person was “acting under color of state law” means that
the defendant in a § 1983 action “exercised power [that the
defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation
omitted). Generally, then, “a public employee acts under color
of state law while acting in his official capacity or while
exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Id.
at 50.
Because the Complaint has not sufficiently alleged that a
“person” deprived Plaintiff of a federal right, the Complaint
does not meet the standards necessary to set forth a prima facie
case under § 1983. In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks monetary

4

“Person” is not strictly limited to individuals who are state
and local government employees, however. For example,
municipalities and other local government units, such as
counties, also are considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983.
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.
5

damages from CCCF for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. The CCCF, however, is not a “person” within the
meaning of § 1983; therefore, the claims against it must be
dismissed with prejudice. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F.
App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v.
Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern
State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989)
(correctional facility is not a “person” under § 1983).
Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to name a
person or persons who were personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
Complaint within 60 days after the date this Opinion and Order
are entered on the docket.5
B. Claims Against County and City: Dismissed Without
Prejudice
As to claims against the County and the City, Plaintiff has
not pled sufficient facts to impose liability on these
defendants. “There is no respondeat superior theory of municipal
liability, so a city may not be held vicariously liable under §
1983 for the actions of its agents. Rather, a municipality may

5

Plaintiff is directed that should he elect to file an amended
complaint it must be filed under this docket number, 16-6483.
6

be held liable only if its policy or custom is the ‘moving
force’ behind a constitutional violation.” Sanford v. Stiles,
456 F.3d 298, 314 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). See also Collins
v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992) (“The city
is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the constitutional
torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly
said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.”).
Plaintiff must plead facts showing that the relevant Camden
County policy-makers are “responsible for either the affirmative
proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a well-settled
custom.” Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990).6
In other words, Plaintiff must set forth facts supporting an
inference that Camden County itself was the “moving force”
behind the alleged constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at
689.

6

“Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the
action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.
Government custom can be demonstrated by showing that a given
course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or
authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually
to constitute law.” Kirkland v. DiLeo, 581 F. App'x 111, 118 (3d
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original).
7

C. Overcrowded Conditions Of Confinement Claim: Dismissed
Without Prejudice
Plaintiff alleges that “during the several times [I was]
incarcerated, I was housed in 2-man cell with 3-4 inmates [and]
made to sleep on floor” (hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff’s
“Overcrowding Claim”). Complaint § III(C).
As detailed below, the Court will dismiss the Overcrowding
Claim without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii). The present Complaint does not allege
sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a
constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this
Court’s review under § 1915.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim7, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

7

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000));
Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)).
8

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
A complaint must plead sufficient facts to support a
reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has
occurred in order to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.
However, with respect to the alleged facts giving rise to
Plaintiff’s claims, the present Complaint states: “While I was
incarcerated in CCCF, I was subjected to several uncivil housing
conditions . . . from 2001 – 2016 . . . I was housed in 2-man
cell with 3-4 inmates, where I was made to sleep on floor.”
Complaint § III(C).
Plaintiff provided a copy of his Inmate Recidivism sheet
which indicates incarcerations of January 15, 2001; June 15,
2010 to July 6, 2010; February 25 to March 7, 2013; March 31 to

9

April 18, 2013; August 10 to 29, 2013; March 18 to April 8,
2014; and April 22 to June 12, 2014. Exhibit to Complaint.
The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff suffered “severe and
chronic neck and back pain due to sleeping on floor of cell
during long periods of incarceration” as a result of these
events. Id. § IV.
Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged prison
overcrowding, any such purported claims must be dismissed
because the Complaint does not set forth sufficient factual
support for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation
of overcrowding has occurred.
The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a
cell with more persons than its intended design does not rise to
the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by itself
did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 F.
App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking does not
constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man, one cell
principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
10

F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Hubbard II”) (noting due process
analysis requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them”) (citing Union Cnty. Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d
984, 992 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 542)). Some
relevant factors are the length of the confinement(s), whether
plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner, any
specific individuals who were involved in creating or failing to
remedy the conditions of confinement, any other relevant facts
regarding the conditions of confinement, etc.
The Complaint also alleges that CCCF Personnel are liable
under the Overcrowding Claim. Complaint § III(C) (“Camden Co.
Correctional Officers, It is common procedure to house 3-4
inmates in a cell, for months at a time”). However, the
Overcrowding Claim must be dismissed without prejudice as to
CCCF Personnel because the Complaint does “[not] allege[] any
personal involvement by [these defendants] in any constitutional
violation – a fatal flaw, since ‘liability in a § 1983 suit
cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat
superior.’” Baker v. Flagg, 439 F. App’x 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2011)
(citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.
1988)). “[Plaintiff’s] complaint contains no allegations
11

regarding [these individual defendants]. ‘Because vicarious
liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must
plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
official's own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.’ Thus, [plaintiff] failed to state a claim against
[the individual defendants].” Bob v. Kuo, 387 F. App’x 134, 136
(3d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676). Given that
the Complaint does not, in the first instance, sufficiently
allege a violation of overcrowding, Plaintiff has not asserted a
colorable constitutional claim to which any CCCF Personnel’s
individual liability could attach. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
Overcrowding Claim against the CCCF Personnel defendants must be
dismissed without prejudice.
Further, Civil rights claims under § 1983 are governed by
New Jersey's limitations period for personal injury and must be
brought within two years of the claim’s accrual. See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police,
603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). “Under federal law, a cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y
Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014).
Most of the incarcerations allege by Plaintiff occurred
more than two years prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s
complaint. The allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
12

confinement at CCCF, namely the overcrowding, would have been
immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of his detention;
therefore, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims
arising from his incarcerations of January 15, 2001; June 15,
2010 to July 6, 2010; February 25 to March 7, 2013; March 31 to
April 18, 2013; August 10 to 29, 2013; March 18 to April 8,
2014; and April 22 to June 12, 2014 expired well before this
complaint was filed in 2016. Plaintiff therefore cannot recover
for these claims.8
Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to
particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by
specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, and
that were excessive in relation to their purposes. To that end,
the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint
within 60 days after the date this Opinion and Order are entered
on the docket.9

8

Although the Court may toll, or extend, the statute of
limitations in the interests of justice, certain circumstances
must be present before it can do so. Tolling is not warranted in
this case because the state has not “actively misled” Plaintiff
as to the existence of his cause of action, there are no
extraordinary circumstances that prevented Plaintiff from filing
his claim, and there is nothing to indicate Plaintiff filed his
claim on time but in the wrong forum. See Omar v. Blackman, 590
F. App’x 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014).
9 The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
13

Plaintiff is further advised that any amended complaint
must plead specific facts regarding the overcrowded conditions
of confinement. In the event Plaintiff files an amended
complaint, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support a
reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has
occurred in order to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is
filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function in
the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the amended
complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
D. Failure To Protect Claim: Dismissed Without Prejudice
Plaintiff alleges that he sustained “facial injuries after
being assaulted by an inmate, unprovoked in June 2, 2015, as
several officers on post, were unattentive [sic] and not

14

available” (hereinafter referred to as “Failure to Protect
Claim”). Complaint § IV.
Given that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant and the Court is
required to construe the Complaint liberally, the Court will
proceed to review the Failure to Protect Claim as against
defendants CCCF, County, City and unnamed correctional officers.
First, as to the County and City, Plaintiff fails to state
a claim pursuant to § 1983.
As explained above, a municipality cannot be held liable in
a § 1983 action on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436
U.S. at 694. Instead, liability may be imposed only where it can
be shown that the municipality had a policy, regulation, custom,
or practice that led to the alleged constitutional violation.
Mulholland v. Gov’t Cnty. of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir.
2013). Plaintiff’s Complaint describes only his personal
experiences, which are insufficient to state a claim against the
County and City. Specifically, Plaintiff fails to allege what
official policy or custom of the County or City caused a
constitutional deprivation. Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty., 757
F.3d 99, 110-11 (3d Cir. 2014) (complaint must plead facts to
support Monell liability), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1398 (2015);
McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009)
(to satisfy pleading standard for a Monell claim, a complaint
“must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly that
15

custom or policy was”). As such, any claims against the County
and City regarding the physical assaults that Plaintiff
supposedly endured will be dismissed without prejudice.
Second, as to CCCF Personnel, Plaintiff has not offered any
of the requisite facts from which this Court could reasonably
infer a constitutional violation.
In order to state a claim for failure to protect (whether
under the Fourteenth Amendment that applies to pre-trial
detainees (such as Plaintiff here) and convicted but-not-yet
sentenced inmates, or the Eighth Amendment that applies to
sentenced prisoners), a plaintiff must plead facts showing that:
“(1) he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial
risk of serious harm, (2) the [defendant] was deliberately
indifferent to that substantial risk to his health and safety,
and (3) the [defendant’s] deliberate indifference caused him
harm.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366-67 (3d Cir. 2012).
“‘Deliberate indifference’ in this context is a subjective
standard: the prison official-defendant must actually have known
or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety.” Id. at
367 (citing Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir.
2001)). “It is not sufficient that the official should have
known of the risk.” Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 367 (citing BeersCapitol, 256 F.3d at 133 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837-38 (1994)).
16

Plaintiff’s has not alleged facts that demonstrate “he was
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm.” Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 367.
Moreover, although Plaintiff alleges that the assault
occurred because un-named correctional officers were
“unattentive” (Complaint § IV), such allegations of negligence
are insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. Burton v.
Kindle, 401 F. App’x 635, 637 (3d Cir. 2010) (“It is well
established that merely negligent misconduct will not give rise
to a claim under § 1983; the defendant must act with a higher
degree of intent”) (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 834 (1998)) (“[L]iability for negligently inflicted
harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional
due process”)). “[N]egligent conduct is never egregious enough
to shock the conscience.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty.
Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 579 (3d Cir. 2004). In
other words, mere negligence or inattention by a corrections
officer in failing to protect a pretrial detainee from violence
at the hands of another inmate is not enough to rise to the
level of a constitutional violation under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Defendants “must actually have been aware of the
existence of the excessive risk; it is not sufficient that
[Defendants] should have been aware.” Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at
133 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38). Plaintiff here has
17

offered no facts whatsoever to even suggest that the unnamed
correctional officers were aware of any risk whatsoever to
Plaintiff’s safety at CCCF (let alone that such risk was
substantial) or that the officers were deliberately indifferent
to such. In short, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted as to CCCF Personnel.
Accordingly, the Failure to Protect Claim will be dismissed
without prejudice, with leave to amend the Complaint, within 60
days after the date this Opinion and Order are entered on the
docket, to meet the pleading deficiencies noted above. If he
wishes to pursue the Failure to Protect Claim, Plaintiff bears
the burden of supplying the facts of the claim, as discussed
above, including: (a) sufficient factual detail for the Court to
infer that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm, that a particular defendant
was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to
Plaintiff’s safety, and such defendant’s deliberate indifference
caused Plaintiff harm; (b) names of the specific party(ies) whom
Plaintiff claims are allegedly liable under the claim; and (c)
the date(s) on which such event(s) occurred. Mala, 704 F.3d at
245; Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004). The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court in this Opinion and the
accompanying Order.
18

E. Condition Of Confinement Claim – Inadequate Medical Care:
Dismissed Without Prejudice
Plaintiff contends that he was “given substandard generic,
low quality insulin which caused my blood sugar to drop
dramatically” (referred to hereinafter as “Medical Care Claim”).
Complaint § III(C), § V.
Given that such allegations are insufficient to plead
unconstitutional conditions of confinement as to the adequacy of
medical care, the Court will dismiss the Medical Care Claim
without prejudice.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies
to pretrial detainees’ claims of inadequate medical care.
Bocchino v. City of Atlantic City, 179 F. Supp.3d 387, 403
(D.N.J. 2016). “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment in this context
incorporates the protections of the Eighth Amendment” (Holder v.
Merline, No. 05-1024, 2005 WL 1522130, at *3 (D.N.J. June 27,
2005) (citing Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042,
1067 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 (1992)), and
most cases have stated that, at a minimum, the Eighth
Amendment’s “deliberate indifference” standard will suffice. In
other words, substantive due process rights are violated only
when the behavior of the government official is so egregious and
outrageous that it “shocks the conscience.” Luzerne, 372 F.3d at
579 (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846-47).

19

Applying this principle in the context of a claim for
violation of the right to adequate medical care, a pretrial
detainee must allege the following two elements to set forth a
cognizable cause of action: (1) a serious medical need; and (2)
behavior on the part of prison officials that constitutes
deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318
F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
To satisfy the first prong of the Estelle inquiry, an
inmate must demonstrate that his medical needs are serious. The
Third Circuit has defined a serious medical need as: (1) “one
that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment”;
(2) “one that is so obvious that a lay person would recognize
the necessity for a doctor's attention”; or (3) one for which
“the denial of treatment would result in the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain” or “a life-long handicap or permanent
loss.” Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). When evaluating
this first element under Estelle, courts consider factors such
as “the severity of the medical problems, the potential for harm
if the medical care is denied or delayed and whether any such
harm actually resulted from the lack of medical attention.”
Maldonado v. Terhune, 28 F. Supp.2d 284, 289 (D.N.J. 1998).

20

The second element of the Estelle test is subjective and
“requires an inmate to show that prison officials acted with
deliberate indifference to his serious medical need.” Holder,
2005 WL 1522130, at *4 (citing Natale, 318 F.3d at 582) (finding
deliberate indifference requires proof that the official knew of
and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety).
Conduct that constitutes negligence does not rise to the level
of deliberate indifference; rather, deliberate indifference is a
“reckless disregard of a known risk of harm.” Holder, 2005 WL
1522130, at *4 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836). “Furthermore, a
prisoner's subjective dissatisfaction with his medical care does
not in itself indicate deliberate indifference.” Holder, 2005 WL
1522130, at *4 (citing Andrews v. Camden Cnty., 95 F. Supp.2d
217, 228 (D.N.J. 2000)). Courts have found deliberate
indifference “in situations where there was ‘objective evidence
that [a] plaintiff had serious need for medical care,’ and
prison officials ignored that evidence[,] Nicini v. Morra, 212
F.3d 798, 815 n. 14 (3d Cir. 2000) [and] in situations where
‘necessary medical treatment is delayed for non-medical
reasons.’ Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834
F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)[,] [cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006
(1988)].” Natale, 318 F.3d at 582.
Here, Plaintiff’s non-specific assertion that “low quality
insulin …caused blood sugar to drop dramatically” (Complaint §
21

III(C)) is insufficient to meet the pleading standard in the
absence of additional facts. Plaintiff offers no facts to
satisfy either of the two prongs required for his Medical Care
Claim: (a) the “serious condition” prong; and (b) the
“deliberate indifference” prong. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106;
Natale, 318 F.3d at 582.
First, the Complaint is silent with respect to facts
relevant to establishing Estelle’s “serious condition” element,
such as, for example: the nature of Plaintiff’s diabetic
condition; the type(s) of medication purportedly administered to
him; the length, frequency and dosage amount of the alleged
insulin administration; and the severity of the reactions, if
any, that he suffered from the claimed overdosing of medication.
(The foregoing examples are merely illustrative but not
exhaustive or exclusive.) In short, Plaintiff has not alleged
that he has ever actually been diagnosed with a particular form
of diabetes, that his purported diabetic condition is so obvious
that a lay person would recognize the necessity for
administering a particular level of medication, or that any
particular defendant’s administration of a certain dosage of
medication resulted in the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain or a permanent loss to Plaintiff. The severity of
Plaintiff’s alleged diabetic condition, the potential for harm
to Plaintiff from such condition if insulin was not administered
22

in a particular dose, and whether any such harm actually
resulted from the alleged insulin overdose are also unclear from
Plaintiff’s allegations. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not
satisfied Estelle’s first element for his Medical Care Claim.
Second, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting
deliberate indifference by any defendant[s] to satisfy Estelle’s
subjective prong. For example, Plaintiff sets forth no
allegations as to whether any defendant[s] deliberately
administered an improperly-elevated dose of insulin without
justification or with the intent to punish Plaintiff. The
Complaint is silent as well with respect to whether Plaintiff
informed any defendant[s] of his need for a certain dosage and
timing of insulin. See, e.g., Mattern v. City of Sea Isle, 131
F. Supp.3d 305, 316 (D.N.J. 2015) (citing Nicini, 212 F.3d at
815 n.14) (“[T]he Third Circuit has found deliberate
indifference in situations where there was ‘objective evidence
that [a] plaintiff had serious need for medical care,’ and
prison officials ignored that evidence”). Furthermore, the
Complaint does not set forth any contentions that are necessary
to describe how individual defendants were personally involved
and deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s purportedly serious
medical needs.
Furthermore, the Court observes that mere disagreement with
the kind of medical care administered does not in itself state a
23

viable claim for relief. Innis v. Wilson, 334 F. App’x 454, 45657 (3d Cir. 2009). See also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235
(3d Cir. 2004) (“mere disagreement as to the proper medical
treatment” is insufficient to state a constitutional violation).
A prisoner is not entitled to the medical treatment of his
choice. See Reed v. Cameron, 380 F. App’x 160, 162 (3d Cir.
2010) (dissatisfaction with prison medical care is insufficient
to show deliberate indifference) (citing Monmouth Cnty., 834
F.2d at 346). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff’s criticism of
medical care received at CCCF arises merely from his
disagreement with that treatment, his Medical Care Claim does
not pass constitutional muster.
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Medical Care
Claim has failed to state a cause of action under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Such claim will be dismissed without prejudice and
with leave to amend the Complaint, within 60 days after the date
this Opinion and Order are entered on the docket, to meet the
pleading deficiencies noted above, if Plaintiff elects to pursue
this claim with respect to deliberate indifference to a serious
diabetic condition. The amended complaint may not adopt or
repeat claims that have been dismissed with prejudice by the
Court in this Opinion and accompanying Order.

24

F. Conditions Of Confinement Claims – Allegations of Illegal
Strip Search
Additionally, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a
Fourth Amendment violation for an improper strip search. Under
the Fourth Amendment, inmates have a limited right of bodily
privacy “subject to reasonable intrusions necessitated by the
prison setting.” Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir.
2016). This right is very narrow, however. Id. at 326.
“The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment . .
. requires a balancing of the need for the particular search
against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.
Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the
manner in which it is conducted, the justification for
initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). A prisoner search policy is
constitutional if it strikes a reasonable balance between the
inmate's privacy and the needs of the institution. Parkell, 833
F.3d at 326 (citing Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of
Cty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1515, 1517 (2012)).
Plaintiff’s cursory allegations that he was subjected to an
illegal strip search after a false allegation that he stole
facial razors, is insufficient to state a claim for relief. In
the absence of further facts regarding the circumstances of the

25

search, the claim cannot proceed at this time. Plaintiff may
amend this claim in an amended complaint, however.
G. Conditions Of Confinement Claims – Jail Conditions:
Dismissed Without Prejudice
Plaintiff complains of being detained in a cell with a
“nonfunctioning toilet for two weeks” (hereinafter referred to
as “Toilet Claim”). Complaint § III(C).
Denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities,” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, which would include basic
sanitary conditions, can be sufficient to state an actionable
constitutional deprivation. However, the non-specific nature of
Plaintiff’s allegations as to his Toilet Claim does not provide
a reasonably sufficient basis for this Court to infer that
sanitary conditions are, in fact, the type of violation from
which his Toilet Claim arises.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R.
Civ. P.”) requires pleadings to contain “a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . .

a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief; and demand for the relief sought . . . .”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(3). While pro se complaints are
construed liberally and are held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers (Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

26

(1972)), pro se litigants nevertheless must still allege facts,
taken as true, to suggest the required elements of the claims
asserted. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35
(3d Cir. 2008); McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113
(1993)(“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in
ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse
mistakes by those who proceed without counsel”).
Here, the Court cannot discern from Plaintiff’s nonspecific reference to “nonfunctioning toilet” (Complaint §
III(C)) the particular cause(s) of action Plaintiff intends to
pursue against any particular person as to this alleged
condition of confinement. For example, the Complaint is silent
regarding: whether the toilet at issue was the unit inside
Plaintiff’s cell at CCCF or was part of the public facility for
the CCCF prison population generally; whether alternate restroom
facilities were made available to Plaintiff to account for the
non-operational unit of which he complains; and the reason for
the non-functioning nature of the toilet referred to in the
Complaint (e.g., plumbing maintenance schedule, plumbing
malfunction, etc.) (see Passmore v. Ianello, 528 F. App’x 144,
149 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[C]ourts will generally not interfere with
prison administrative matters and will afford significant
deference to judgments of prison officials regarding prison
regulation and administration. See, e.g., Jones v. N. Carolina
27

Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977) (‘Because
the realities of running a penal institution are complex and
difficult, we have also recognized the wide-ranging deference to
be accorded the decisions of prison administrators’)”).
Furthermore, construing the Complaint - without deciding –
to suggest that Plaintiff’s Toilet Claim relates in some manner
to sanitary conditions, such toilet condition “[may] no doubt
[have been] unpleasant, [but] it does not pose an obvious health
risk and consequently does not deprive [Plaintiff] the minimal
civilized measures of life’s necessities.” Carson v. Main, No.
14-cv-7454, 2015 WL 18500193, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2015)
(dismissing plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim
where neighboring cells shared plumbing pipes and required
residents to flush their own toilet to dispose of the
neighboring cell’s waste). Accord Junne v. Atlantic City Med.
Ctr., No. 07-5262, 2008 WL 343557, at *10 (D.N.J. Feb. 4, 2008)
(dismissing plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim where
plaintiff alleged that the jail’s lack of a private bathroom and
his “need to use the toilet in the presence of a total stranger
caused substantial embarrassment,” because “plaintiff’s
embarrassment ensuing from having another person in the cell
while plaintiff uses the toilet cannot qualify as a violation of
plaintiff’s constitutional rights”). “There is, of course, a de
minimus level of imposition with which the Constitution is not
28

concerned.” Bell, 441 U.S. 539 n. 21. Plaintiff has failed to
present facts demonstrating that the toilet condition here
passed this threshold. He does not contend that the nonoperational toilet was intended as punishment, or that he
suffered adversely from it. The Complaint has not alleged that
Plaintiff developed physical injuries as a result of the
condition.
Viewing the facts and the totality of the circumstances in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Complaint fails to
set forth sufficient factual matter to show that the Toilet
Claim is facially plausible. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. Since
Plaintiff’s claim asserting “nonfunctioning toilet” (Complaint §
III(C)) does not offer facts that are necessary to show that he
was subjected to a genuine privation for an extended period,
such allegations fail to state a claim and will be dismissed
without prejudice, with leave to amend.
H. Plaintiff’s remaining allegations also are insufficient
to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983.

Blanket statement about not being released is insufficient
to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983.

In regards to

this claim, Plaintiff alleges, “I was also held days after I was
to be released on two occasions, on Sept. 6, 2016 and again on
Sept 20, 2016 with no explanation.” Complaint § III(C).

29

Plaintiff does not offer any additional facts in regards to this
claim to allow this Court to construe a potential violation.
“Imprisonment beyond one’s term constitutes punishment
within the meaning of the eighth amendment.” Sample v. Diecks,
885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1989) citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678, 685, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2570, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978)
(confinement in prison or isolation cell is form of punishment
under eighth amendment); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354
(9th Cir.1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct.
3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986). To establish § 1983 liability in
this context, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a prison
official had knowledge of the prisoner's problem and thus of the
risk that unwarranted punishment was being, or would be,
inflicted; that the official either failed to act or took only
ineffectual action under circumstances indicating that his or
her response to the problem was a product of deliberate
indifference to the prisoner's plight; and must demonstrate a
causal connection between the official's response to the problem
and the infliction of the unjustified detention. Diecks, 885
F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff has not made such showing with his cursory
allegation. Therefore, this claim will be dismissed without
prejudice.

30

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is: (a)
dismissed with prejudice as to defendant CCCF, County and City;
and (b) dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim.
An appropriate order follows.

August 22, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge

31