MCCULLOUGH v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Filing 3

OPINION FILED. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 1/18/17. (js)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MICHAEL J. MCCULLOUGH,
Plaintiff,
v.

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06526 (JBS-AMD)

CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY,

OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Michael J. McCullough, Plaintiff Pro Se
918 E. Clements Bridge Rd., Apt R1
Runnemede, NJ 08078
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Michael J. McCullough seeks to bring a civil

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden
County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”). Complaint, Docket Entry
1.
2.

Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

dismiss the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
5.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from CCCF for

allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. As the
CCCF is not a “state actor” within the meaning of § 1983, the
claims against it must be dismissed with prejudice. See, e.g.,
Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–
39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a “person” under
§ 1983).

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6.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the complaint to name

state actors who were personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
7.

Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint must

plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a
constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this
Court’s review under § 1915. Plaintiff alleges he experienced
unconstitutional conditions of confinement during confinements
from October 19, 2007 to February 26, 2008, January 10, 2009 to
June 8, 2009, August 18, 2010 to November 17, 2010, January 21,
2013 to May 10, 2013, and September 17, 2015 to February 24,
2016. Complaint § III. Plaintiff states: “I slept on floor of
facility for more than 50% of my stays. I have back and hip
problems now, that I have to attend a physician for. I also
retained 7 boils during my stay, when I returned home I still
had 2 I had to go to the hospital for.” Id. Even accepting these
statements as true for screening purposes only, there is not
enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional
violation has occurred.
8.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the dates and length of
the confinement(s), whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, etc.
9.

In addition, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to

allege a claim based on a violation of his right to adequate
medical care, there are not enough facts to support an inference
that Plaintiff’s rights were violated in this regard. In his
complaint, Plaintiff states: “I advised [corrections officers] I
am a diabetic and needed to be on a bunk they told me to ‘fight’
for a bunk spot.” Complaint § III. He further alleges that he
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“had problems with [his] sugars being controlled properly by the
nurses in the facility.” Id. § IV. In order to set forth a
cognizable claim for a violation of his right to adequate
medical care, an inmate must allege: (1) a serious medical need;
and (2) behavior on the part of prison officials that
constitutes deliberate indifference to that need. See Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr.
Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). If he wishes to
pursue this claim, Plaintiff should provide additional facts
supporting both of the requirements in his amended complaint.
10.

As Plaintiff may be able to amend his complaint to

address the deficiencies noted by the Court,1 the Court shall

1

To the extent the complaint seeks relief for conditions
Plaintiff encountered during his confinements from October 19,
2007 to February 26, 2008, January 10, 2009 to June 8, 2009,
August 18, 2010 to November 17, 2010, and January 21, 2013 to
May 10, 2013, those claims are barred by the statute of
limitations. Claims brought under § 1983 are governed by New
Jersey's two-year limitations period for personal injury. See
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State
Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). “Under federal law, a
cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have
known of the injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez v.
Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). The
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement at CCCF
would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of
his detention; therefore, the statute of limitations for some of
Plaintiff's claims expired in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2015,
respectively. In the event Plaintiff elects to file an amended
complaint, he should focus on facts of his September 17, 2015 to
February 24, 2016 confinement.
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grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of
the date of this order.
11.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself.2 Id.
12.

For the reasons stated above, the complaint is

dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The
Court will reopen the matter in the event Plaintiff files an
amended complaint within the time allotted by the Court.
13.

An appropriate order follows.

January 18, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

2

The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
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