LINDSEY v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Filing 3

OPINION FILED. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 1/31/17. (js)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DANA MARIE LINDSEY,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY,

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06596 (JBS-AMD)
OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Dana Marie Lindsey, Plaintiff Pro Se
194 Madison Ave.
Lumberton, NJ 08048
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Dana Marie Lindsey seeks to bring a civil

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden
County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”). Complaint, Docket Entry
1.
2.

Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

dismiss the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
5.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from CCCF for

allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. As the
CCCF is not a “state actor” within the meaning of § 1983, the
claims against it must be dismissed with prejudice. See, e.g.,
Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–
39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a “person” under
§ 1983).

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6.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the complaint to name

state actors who were personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
7.

Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint must

plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a
constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this
Court’s review under § 1915. Plaintiff alleges she experienced
unconstitutional conditions of confinement in April 2014 and
February 2016. Complaint § III. The fact section of the
complaint states: “had to sleep on floor next to [toilet] with
one sheet and one blanket with people throwing up over my head
who were withdrawing from [heroin]. Cells are so small was
unable to move. Also in February 2016 my medical records were
false they never started me on withdraw protocol.” Id. Plaintiff
also alleges that she complained about her medication and that
she has prescriptions for “Methadone Trazadone, Kolopin and
Celexa.” Id. Even accepting these statements as true for
screening purposes only, there is not enough factual support for
the Court to infer a constitutional violation has occurred.
8.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the dates and length of
the confinement(s), whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, etc.
9.

In addition, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to

allege a claim based on a violation of her right to adequate
medical care, there are not enough facts to support an inference
that Plaintiff’s rights were violated in this regard. In order
to set forth a cognizable claim for a violation of her right to
adequate medical care, an inmate must allege: (1) a serious
medical need; and (2) behavior on the part of prison officials
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that constitutes deliberate indifference to that need. See
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Natale v. Camden
Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). Mere
assertions that Plaintiff was not started on withdrawal protocol
and that she complained about her medication are insufficient to
meet the pleading standard in the absence of additional facts.
If she wishes to pursue this claim, Plaintiff should provide
additional facts supporting both of the requirements in her
amended complaint.
10.

As Plaintiff may be able to amend her complaint to

address the deficiencies noted by the Court,1 the Court shall
grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of
the date of this order.2

1

To the extent the complaint seeks relief for conditions
Plaintiff encountered during her confinement in April 2014,
those claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Claims
brought under § 1983 are governed by New Jersey's two-year
limitations period for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d
181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). “Under federal law, a cause of action
accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the
injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa.
Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). The allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement at CCCF would have
been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of her
detention; therefore, the statute of limitations for some of
Plaintiff's claims expired in April 2016. In the event Plaintiff
elects to file an amended complaint, she should focus on facts
of her February 2016 confinement.
2 The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
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11.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id.
12.

For the reasons stated above, the complaint is

dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The
Court will reopen the matter in the event Plaintiff files an
amended complaint within the time allotted by the Court.
13.

An appropriate order follows.

January 31, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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