CABRERA v. CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/1/2017. (dmr)(n.m.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

MARISOL CABRERA,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06757(JBS-AMD)

v.
CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL,

OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Marisol Cabrera
Plaintiff Pro Se
266 South 27th Street
Camden, NJ 08105
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Marisol Cabrera seeks to bring a civil rights

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Camden County
Jail (“CCJ”) for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine whether it should be
dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the

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Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s Complaint states in its entirety: “There where

[sic] more than three people in a room.” Complaint § III(C).
Plaintiff contends that the events giving rise to her
allegations occurred “1998-1999, 2000.” Id. § III(B).
Plaintiff does not provide any statement of alleged
injuries (id. § IV) and does not describe her requested relief.
Id. § V.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review
complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), this
Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. This action is subject to sua sponte screening
for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff
is proceeding in forma pauperis.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
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“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from CCJ for allegedly

unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Primarily, the
Complaint must be dismissed as the CCJ is not a “state actor”
within the meaning of § 1983. See, e.g., Grabow v. Southern
State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989)
(correctional facility is not a “person” under § 1983).
Accordingly, the claims against CCJ must be dismissed with
prejudice.
Furthermore, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to
dismissal under [§ 1915] should receive leave to amend unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court denies
leave to amend at this time as Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred
by the statute of limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's
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two-year limitations period for personal injury.1 See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police,
603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The accrual date of a § 1983
action is determined by federal law, however. Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.,
773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014).
“Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the
action is based.” Montanez, 773 F.3d at 480 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Plaintiff contends that the events giving rise
to her allegations occurred “1998-1999, 2000.” Complaint §
III(B). The allegedly unconstitutional conditions Plaintiff’s
confinement at CCJ would have been immediately apparent to her
at the time of detention; therefore, the statutes of limitations
for Plaintiff’s claims expired in 2000 and 2002, respectively.
As there are no grounds for equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations,2 the Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.

1

“Although the running of the statute of limitations is
ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious
from the face of the complaint and no development of the record
is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua
sponte under § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to
state a claim.” Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 111–12
(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
2 Equitable tolling “is only appropriate ‘(1) where the defendant
has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's
cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary
way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3)
where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights
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Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013)
(per curiam) (affirming dismissal with prejudice due to
expiration of statute of limitations).
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed

with prejudice for failure to state a claim. An appropriate
order follows.

February 1, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

mistakenly in the wrong forum.’” Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App’x
162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United
States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).
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