HANNAH v. NO DEFENDANT LISTED

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/1/17. (jbk, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

TAISHA HANNAH,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06764 (JBS-AMD)

v.
CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL,

OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES
Taisha Hannah
Plaintiff Pro Se
1326 Lakeshore Drive, Apt. B
Camden, NJ 08104
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Taisha Hannah seeks to bring a civil rights

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket
Entry 1. Although Plaintiff does not name a defendant in the
caption or in § I(B) of her Complaint, this Court will construe
Plaintiff’s Complaint as asserting claims against Camden County
Jail (“CCJ”), based on Plaintiff’s allegations against “the
county jail” in § II(B) of her Complaint. Furthermore, although
Plaintiff’s Complaint names “Renee Reevey, Breezy Reevey [and]
Gary Connley” as plaintiffs in the caption of her Complaint
(Docket Entry 1, at 1), this Court construes the Complaint as

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asserting claims solely on behalf of Taisha Hannah who is the
only plaintiff-party signatory to the Complaint (Docket Entry 1,
at 5) and who identifies herself in Complaint § I(A) as the sole
plaintiff in this action.
Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints
prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that
is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua
sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the Complaint
with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s Complaint states: “Inside 7 day locked-down

[sic] because I slept on the floor for over 3 weeks. [I]t was
over populated and I kept fighting and getting sent to medical.
There were so many incidents that occur [sic] while I was
incarcerrated [sic] even outta [sic] the 7 day locked-down
[sic]. I was in the county jail for over 2 months because I kept
getting jumped and getting put in medical and I kept getting and
[sic] allergic reaction to the medicine that was giving [sic] me
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inside of the county jail. In the two months I was locked up, I
was rushed to the hospital twice[.] [T]he first time was because
I was jumped and the second time I was jumped again and had a
miscarriage with my daughter so I’ve been trying to sue the jail
and now finally justice is being serve [sic]. Also the sleeping
conditions was [sic] unsanitary and very uncomfortable after I
left the hospital the second time from the miscarriage of my
daughter[.] [T]hey made me sleep right back on the floor and
that’s when I caught and [sic] infection. From there I was in
the medical part of the jail for about three weeks a longer
[sic].” Complaint § III(C). Plaintiff alleges physical injuries
from being “jumped” while incarcerated, allergic reactions to
medication, miscarriage of her daughter, a “bad infection” from
“sleeping on the floor,” and being “extremely sick”; she
contends that she “almost died.” Id. § IV.
With respect to the time of the alleged events giving rise
to her claims, Plaintiff states: “I was in the years between
2007 – 2008 when I was incarcerrated [sic] for these actions.”
Id. § III(B).
Plaintiff seeks $5,000 in damages and maintains that “even
though this lawsuit may not bring my daughter back this would
let me know that justice was served.” Id. § V.

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive sua sponte screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)
for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially
plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster,
764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff claims allegedly unconstitutional conditions of

confinement. Primarily, the Complaint must be dismissed as the
CCJ is not a “state actor” within the meaning of § 1983. See,
e.g., Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537,
538–39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a “person”
under § 1983). See Complaint § II(B) (“I was in the county jail
for over 2 months because I kept getting jumped and getting put
in medical and I kept getting and [sic] allergic reaction to the
medicine that was giving [sic] me inside of the county jail”).
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Accordingly, the claims against CCJ must be dismissed with
prejudice.
Furthermore, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to
dismissal under [§ 1915] should receive leave to amend unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court denies
leave to amend at this time as Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred
by the statute of limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's
two-year limitations period for personal injury.1 See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police,
603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The accrual date of a § 1983
action is determined by federal law, however. Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.,
773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). “Under federal law, a cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez, 773 F.3d
at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted).
With respect to the alleged events giving rise to her
claims, Plaintiff states: “I was in the years between 2007 –

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“Although the running of the statute of limitations is
ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious
from the face of the complaint and no development of the record
is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua
sponte under § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to
state a claim.” Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 111–12
(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
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2008 when I was incarcerrated [sic] for these actions.”
Complaint § III(B). The allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement at CCJ would have been immediately apparent to
Plaintiff at the time of her detention; therefore, the statutes
of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims expired in 2010 at the
latest. As there are no grounds for equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations,2 the Complaint will be dismissed with
prejudice. Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 112 (3d
Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal with prejudice due
to expiration of statute of limitations).
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed

with prejudice for failure to state a claim. An appropriate
order follows.

February 1, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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Equitable tolling “is only appropriate ‘(1) where the defendant
has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's
cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary
way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3)
where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights
mistakenly in the wrong forum.’” Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App’x
162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United
States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).
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